16 January 2012
Supreme Court
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J.SAMUEL Vs GATTU MHESH .

Bench: P. SATHASIVAM,J. CHELAMESWAR
Case number: C.A. No.-000561-000561 / 2012
Diary number: 8422 / 2011
Advocates: A. SUBBA RAO Vs PRABHA SWAMI


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REPORTABLE        

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.    561          OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8985 of 2011

J. Samuel and Others                  .... Appellant (s)

Versus

Gattu Mahesh and Others                         .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order  

dated  08.02.2011  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Andhra  

Pradesh at Hyderabad in Civil  Revision Petition No. 5162 of  

2010 whereby the High Court  while  setting aside  the  order  

dated 20.10.2010 passed by the II Additional District Judge,  

Karimnagar at Jagtial, allowed the revision petition filed by the  

respondents herein.   

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3)    Brief Facts:

a) The  Diocese  at  Karimnagar  was  incorporated  on  

12.03.1978  from  its  parent  Diocese  of  Dornakal.   On  

22.08.1985,  the  Retired  Diocesan  Treasurer  and  Property  

Secretary,  Karimnagar,  issued a publication in the paper to  

auction the land bearing Survey No. 43, admeasuring Ac. 3.31  

gts. situated at Mission Compound, Dharmapuri Road, Jagtial  

and  the  last  date  to  receive  the  tenders  was  fixed  as  

05.09.1985.  On 13.09.1985, the sealed tenders were opened  

and  Gattu  Mahesh-Respondent  No.  1  herein  and  Kotha  

Mohan-Respondent No. 2 herein, Managing Partners in M/s  

Jagath  Swapna  &  Co.  put  tenders  for  an  amount  of  

Rs.  24,55,569/-  along  with  a  DD  for  an  amount  of  

Rs.2,45,556/-  which  is  10%  of  the  EMD.   They  being  the  

highest bidders, their tenders were accepted.

b) The  contract  for  sale  of  property  was  entered  into  

between the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein with Karimnagar  

Diocese on 27.09.1985.  It was mentioned in the contract that  

Karimnagar  Diocese  agreed to  receive  Rs.  2,50,000/-  on or  

before  08.11.1985  because  the  land  under  sale  was  under  

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dispute  and  the  balance  amount  was  to  the  paid  by  the  

respondents herein only after getting final dropping of the land  

acquisition proposal by the Municipality, Jagtial and sanction  

of  layout  by  the  Municipality,  Jagtial.   On  03.04.2003,  

Respondent  Nos.  1  and  2  herein  issued  a  legal  notice  to  

Karimnagar  Diocese  informing  that  the  land  acquisition  

proceedings were dropped on 05.05.1986 and the sanction of  

layout  by  the  Municipality,  Jagtial  was  completed  on  

28.12.1989 and to execute and register the sale deed in their  

favour as per the agreement dated 27.09.1985.          

c) In  the  absence of  adequate  response  from Karimnagar  

Diocese, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed O.S. No. 9 of 2004 in  

the Court of II Additional District Judge, Karimnagar at Jagtial  

for  specific  performance  of  the  contract  of  sale  and  for  

perpetual  injunction.    During  the  pendency  of  the  suit,  

Karimnagar Diocese filed written statement pointing out the  

inherent defects, namely, absence of mandatory requirements  

of Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act and Form 47, Appendix  

‘A’  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908.   On  24.09.2010,  

respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein filed I.A. No. 1078 of 2010 in  

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O.S.  No.  9  of  2004  under  Order  VI,  Rule  17  of  the  Code  

seeking  amendment  of  the  plaint  to  incorporate  specific  

pleading  in  compliance  of  the  above  section  of  the  Specific  

Relief  Act  and the  Code  on the  ground that  the  same was  

missed  due  to  typographical  error.   On  04.10.2010,  

Karimnagar  Diocese  filed  counter  affidavit  resisting  the  

application.

d) By  order  dated  20.10.2010,  the  II  Additional  District  

Judge dismissed the application for amendment filed by the  

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein.  Aggrieved by the order, the  

Respondents herein approached the High Court by filing Civil  

Revision Petition being No. 5162 of 2010.  The High Court, by  

impugned  order  dated  08.02.2011,  allowed  the  amendment  

sought for by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein.   

e) Aggrieved  by  the  said  decision,  the  respondents  have  

preferred this appeal  by way of special  leave petition before  

this Court.

4) Heard  Mr.  A.  Subba  Rao,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellants  and  Mr.  K.  Swami,  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondents.   

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5) The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether  

the High Court is right in allowing the application filed under  

Order VI Rule 17 CPC for amendment of the plaint which was  

filed  after  conclusion  of  trial  and  reserving  the  matter  for  

orders.

6) Based on the agreement dated 27.07.1985 which relates  

to sale of 3 acres and 31 gunthas of land in Survey No. 43  

situate in Mission Compound, Dharmapuri Road at Jagtial for  

a consideration of Rs.24,55,569/-, the respondents/plaintiffs  

filed the  said suit  for  specific  performance.   Since  we have  

already mentioned factual details, there is no need to refer the  

same excepting the details relating to the petition filed under  

Order  VI  Rule  17.   After  filing  written  statement  by  the  

contesting  defendants,  the  trial  of  the  suit  commenced and  

admittedly both parties adduced the evidence on their behalf  

and arguments on behalf  of  both the sides were heard and  

completed on 22.09.2010.  On that day, the Court reserved  

the  matter  for  orders.   Meanwhile,  on  24.09.2010,  the  

respondents herein filed a petition praying for amendment of  

the plaint.  In support of the said application, plaintiff  No.2  

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has filed an affidavit stating that in para 11of the plaint he has  

stated  about  the  legal  notice  issued  on  03.04.2003  to  

defendant Nos. 1 to 7 for specific performance of agreement of  

sale dated 27.09.1985 and there was no reply for it.  In para 3  

of the affidavit, the deponent has stated that by type mistake,  

the  following  sentences  have  missed.   After  para  11 of  the  

plaint, the following para 12 may be added.  “We are and has  

been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the  

agreement of sale dated 27.09.1985 on our part of which the  

defendants have, had noticed.  I am ready with the balance  

amount as per agreement of sale dated 27.09.1985.  I submit  

the para nos. 12-18 of the plaint may be changed as 13 to 19.”  

The only reason given by the plaintiffs praying for amendment  

and  inclusion  of  the  above  averment  in  the  plaint  is  “type  

mistake”.  It is also stated that it happened in spite of their  

due diligence.   

7) The above claim was resisted by the appellants herein by  

filing  detailed  counter  affidavit.   Apart  from  disputing  the  

merits of the claim of the plaintiffs, with regard to the petition  

under  Order  VI  Rule  17  they  specifically  stated  that  after  

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passing  several  stages  in  the  protracted  trial,  the  final  

arguments  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  suit  were  heard  on  

20.09.2010.   The  defendants  have  also  filed  their  written  

arguments  on  22.09.2010  wherein  the  inherent  defect  of  

plaintiff i.e. absence of averments of mandatory requirements  

of Section 16(c) Explanation (ii)  and Form 47 Appendix A of  

CPC was pointed out.  Even after this, further argument was  

made  by  both  the  parties  and  the  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  

informed the court that no further time is required and the  

matter may be posted for judgment.  In view of the same, the  

learned  trial  Judge  posted  the  matter  to  04.10.2010  for  

judgment.  Only at this juncture i.e. on 24.09.2010, plaintiffs  

came  up  with  the  present  petition  seeking  amendment  to  

incorporate specific pleading in compliance with Section 16 (c)  

of the Specific Relief Act and Form 47 of Appendix A CPC on  

the ground that the same was missed due to “type mistake” in  

spite  of  due  diligence.   Though  the  said  claim  was  not  

acceptable  by  the  trial  Court,  the  High  Court  allowed  the  

plaintiff to amend the plaint as prayed for.   

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8) Before considering the acceptability or otherwise of the  

reasoning of the High Court, it is useful to refer Order VI Rule  

17 CPC.   

“17.  Amendment  of  pleadings.- The  Court  may  at  any  stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend  his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be  just,  and all  such amendments shall  be made as may be  necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions  in controversy between the parties.

Provided that no application for amendment shall be  allowed  after  the  trial  has  commenced,  unless  the  Court  comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the  party  could  not  have  raised  the  matter  before  the  commencement of trial.”

The said provision was omitted by the Civil  Procedure Code  

(Amendment)  Act,  1999.  Section 16 of the Amendment Act  

reads as under:

“16.  Amendment of Order 6 – In the First Schedule, in Order  6,--

*** (iii) Rules 17 and 18 shall be omitted.”

After stiff resistance by the litigants and the members of the  

bar, again Order VI Rule 17 was re-introduced with proviso  

appended therein.  As per the said proviso, no application for  

amendment shall  be allowed after the trial has commenced.  

However, there is an exception to the said rule, i.e., if the court  

comes to  the  conclusion  that  in  spite  of  due  diligence,  the  

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party  could  not  have  raised  the  matter  before  the  

commencement of the trial, such application for amendment  

may be allowed.

9) Before  proceeding  further,  it  is  also  useful  to  refer  

Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act which reads as under:

“16.  Personal  bars  to  relief.- Specific  performance  of  a  contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person-

(a) xxx  

(b) xxx

(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has  always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms  of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than  terms  the  performance  of  which  has  been  prevented  or  waived by the defendant.

Explanation.- For the purposes of clause (c),-

(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not  essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant  or to deposit in Court any money except when so directed by  the Court;

(ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and  willingness  to  perform,  the  contract  according  to  its  true  construction.”   

It is clear that in a suit for specific performance of a contract,  

unless there is a specific averment that he has performed or  

has always been ready and willing to  perform the  essential  

terms  of  the  contract,  the  suit  filed  by  him is  liable  to  be  

dismissed.  In other words, in the absence of the above said  

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claim that he is always ready and willing to perform his part of  

the  contract,  the  decree  for  specific  performance  cannot  be  

granted by the Court.  

10) In  this  legal  background,  we  have  to  once  again  

recapitulate the factual details.  In the case on hand, Suit O.S.  

No.  9  of  2004  after  prolonged  trial  came  to  an  end  in  

September,  2010.   The  application  for  amendment  under  

Order VI Rule 17 CPC was filed on 24.09.2010 that is after the  

arguments were concluded on 22.09.2010 and the matter was  

posted  for  judgment  on  04.10.2010.   We  have  already  

mentioned  that  Section  16(c)  of  the  Specific  Relief  Act  

contemplates that specific averments have to be made in the  

plaint that he has performed and has always been willing to  

perform  the  essential  terms  of  the  Act  which  have  to  be  

performed by him.  This is an essential ingredient of Section  

16(c) and the form prescribes for the due performance.  The  

proviso inserted in Rule 17 clearly states that no amendment  

shall be allowed after the trial has commenced except when  

the  court  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  in  spite  of  due  

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diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the  

commencement of the trial.   

11) As  stated  earlier,  in  the  present  case,  the  amendment  

application  itself  was  filed  only  on  24.09.2010  after  the  

arguments  were  completed  and  the  matter  was  posted  for  

judgment on 04.10.2010.  On proper interpretation of proviso  

to Rule 17 of Order VI, the party has to satisfy the Court that  

he could not have discovered that ground which was pleaded  

by amendment, in spite of due diligence.  No doubt, Rule 17  

confers  power  on the  court  to  amend the  pleadings  at  any  

stage  of  the  proceedings.   However,  proviso  restricts  that  

power  once  the  trial  has  commenced.   Unless  the  Court  

satisfies  that  there  is  a  reasonable  cause  for  allowing  the  

amendment normally the court has to reject such request.  An  

argument  was  advanced  that  since  in  the  legal  notice  sent  

before  filing of  the suit,  there is  reference to readiness and  

willingness and the plaintiff has also led in evidence, nothing  

precluded  the  court  from  entertaining  the  said  application  

with which we are unable to accept in the light of Section 16(c)  

of the Specific Relief Act as well as proviso to Order VI Rule 17.  

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The  only  reason  stated  so  in  the  form  of  an  affidavit  is  

omission by “type mistake”.  Admittedly, it is not an omission  

to mention a word or an arithmetical number.  The omission is  

with reference to specific plea which is mandated in terms of  

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.   

12) The primary aim of  the court is to try the case on its  

merits and ensure that the rule of justice prevails. For this the  

need is for the true facts of the case to be placed before the  

court  so  that  the  court  has  access  to  all  the  relevant  

information in coming to its decision. Therefore, at times it is  

required to permit parties to amend their plaints. The Court’s  

discretion  to  grant  permission  for  a  party  to  amend  his  

pleading lies on two conditions,  firstly, no injustice must be  

done to the other side and secondly, the amendment must be  

necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in  

controversy  between  the  parties.    However  to  balance  the  

interests of the parties in pursuit of doing justice, the proviso  

has been added which clearly states that:  no application  for  

amendment  shall  be  allowed  after  the  trial  has  commenced,  

unless the court comes to  the  conclusion that  in spite  of  due  

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diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the   

commencement of trial.  

13) Due diligence is the idea that reasonable investigation is  

necessary  before  certain  kinds  of  relief  are  requested.  Duly  

diligent efforts are a requirement for a party seeking to use the  

adjudicatory  mechanism  to  attain  an  anticipated  relief.  An  

advocate representing someone must engage in due diligence  

to  determine  that  the  representations  made  are  factually  

accurate and sufficient. The term ‘Due diligence’ is specifically  

used  in  the  Code  so  as  to  provide  a  test  for  determining  

whether to exercise the discretion in situations of requested  

amendment after the commencement of trial.

14) A party requesting a relief  stemming out  of  a  claim is  

required to exercise due diligence and is a requirement which  

cannot be dispensed with. The term "due diligence" determines  

the scope of  a  party's  constructive  knowledge,  claim and is  

very critical to the outcome of the suit.

15) In the given facts, there is a clear lack of ‘due diligence’  

and the mistake committed certainly does not come within the  

preview of a typographical error. The term typographical error  

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is  defined as a  mistake made in the printed/typed material  

during  a  printing/typing  process.  The  term  includes  errors  

due to mechanical failure or slips of the hand or finger, but  

usually  excludes  errors  of  ignorance.  Therefore  the  act  of  

neglecting to perform an action which one has an obligation to  

do cannot be called as a typographical error. As a consequence  

the plea of typographical error cannot be entertained in this  

regard since the situation is of lack of due diligence wherein  

such amendment is impliedly barred under the Code.

16) The claim of typographical error/mistake is baseless and  

cannot be accepted.  In fact, had the person who prepared the  

plaint, signed and verified the plaint showed some attention,  

this  omission  could  have  been  noticed  and  rectified  there  

itself.  In such circumstances, it cannot be construed that due  

diligence  was  adhered  to  and  in  any  event,  omission  of  

mandatory requirement running into 3 to 4 sentences cannot  

be a typographical error as claimed by the plaintiffs.  All these  

aspects  have  been rightly  considered and concluded  by  the  

trial  court  and  the  High  Court  has  committed  an  error  in  

accepting the explanation that it was a typographical error to  

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mention and it was an accidental slip.  Though the counsel for  

the appellants have cited many decisions, on perusal, we are  

of the view that some of those cases have been decided prior to  

the  insertion  of  Order  VI  Rule  17  with  proviso  or  on  the  

peculiar facts of that case.  This Court in various decisions  

upheld the power that in deserving cases, the Court can allow  

delayed  amendment  by  compensating  the  other  side  by  

awarding costs.  The entire object of the amendment to Order  

VI Rule 17 as introduced in 2002 is to stall filing of application  

for amending a pleading subsequent to the commencement of  

trial, to avoid surprises      and that the parties had sufficient  

knowledge of other’s case.  It also helps checking the delays in  

filing  the  applications.  [vide  Aniglase  Yohannan vs.  

Ramlatha and Others, (2005) 7 SCC 534, Ajendraprasadji  

N. Pandey and Another vs. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N.  

and  Others,  Chander  Kanta  Bansal vs.  Rajinder  Singh  

Anand,  (2008)  5  SCC  117,  Rajkumar  Guraward  (dead)  

through  LRS. vs.  S.K.Sarwagi  and  Company  Private  

Limited  and Another,  (2008)  14  SCC 364,  Vidyabai  and  

Others vs.  Padmalatha and Another,  (2009)  2  SCC 409,  

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Man Kaur (dead) By LRS vs.  Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010)  

10 SCC 512.        

17) In  the  light  of  the  above  discussion,  we  are  in  entire  

agreement with the conclusion arrived by the Trial Court and  

unable to accept the reasoning of the High Court.  Accordingly,  

the order dated 08.02.2011 passed in Civil  Revision Petition  

No. 5162 is set aside.   

18) The civil appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

         

...…………….…………………………J.            (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

 .…....…………………………………J.    (J. CHELAMESWAR)  

NEW DELHI; JANUARY 16,  2012.  

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