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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL Nos.1668-1670    OF 2014   [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 5340-5342/2007]

J.J. IRANI & ANR.                                           …. APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF JHARKHAND                   …. RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

S. A. BOBDE, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. In this  batch of  appeals,  the appellants  have challenged  

the  Judgment  and  Order  of  the  High  Court  of  Jharkhand  at  

Ranchi  dated  15th June,  2007  allowing  the  three  Criminal  

Revision  Nos.  212  –  214  of  1990  filed  by  the  State,  and  

reversing  the  Order  dated  29.06.1990  of  the  Chief  Judicial  

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Magistrate, Jamshedpur and further directing the Chief Judicial  

Magistrate,  Jamshedpur  to  proceed  against  the  appellants  in  

accordance with law. Since they arise out of the same incident  

they have been taken up together for disposal.

3. The only question that arises in these appeals is whether  

the  complaint  made  by  the  Inspector  of  Factories  that  the  

appellants have allegedly committed offences was made within  

three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the  

offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector, as required by  

Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as  

‘the Act’).  At the relevant time the appellant No. 1 - Dr. J.J. Irani  

was “Occupier”  and the appellant No. 2 -   Mr.  P.N. Roy was  

“Manager” of the factory within the meaning of the Act.

4. On  3rd March,  1989,  the  Tata  Iron  and   

Steel Company Limited (TISCO) celebrated the 150th birthday of  

Mr. J.N. Tata, as Foundation Day.  They constructed temporary  

Pandals  at  the  main  gate  of  the  Factory  premises.   All  of  a  

sudden a fire broke out and two of the Pandals, where guests  

were seated, were badly gutted.  There was panic due to the  

fire.   As a result 18 to 20 persons died on the spot and a larger  

number were admitted with burn injuries at the Tata Hospital,  

some of whom later succumbed to their injuries.  The injured  

and the dead were mainly employees of TISCO, its officers and  

their family members.

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5. As required by Section 88(1)1 of the Act read with Rule 96  

of the Bihar Factories Rules, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the  

Rules’) formal notice of intimation of the accident was given to  

the Inspector of Factories.  In pursuance of the Notice on 5 th and  

6th March,  1989,  the  Chief  Inspector  of  Factories  of  the  then  

State  of  Bihar  and  the  Deputy  Chief  Inspector  of  Factories,  

Jamshedpur,  conducted  a  preliminary  investigation.   These  

Officers  submitted  a  Report  to  the  Commissioner  of  Labour,  

Patna  on  08.03.1989.   Before  submitting  the  Report  a  

preliminary inquiry was conducted, photographs of the Pandals  

and other affected areas were taken, Pandals were measured,  

and distances between Pandals and Roads were also measured.  

A list of those dead and injured was prepared and the cause of  

the  accident  was gone into  and ascertained.   Apparently,  the  

cause was a high powered cracker fired on the occasion, which  

fell on roof of one of the Pandals made of combustible material,  

and started the blaze. The officers also determined the factors  

that prevented the stopping of the fire, such as the narrowness  

of the pathways and the distance of the fire hydrants from the  

place  of  occurrence  and  the  seating  arrangement  because  of  

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 Section 88 requires the authority, who receives the Notice,  to make an inquiry into the occurrence within one month of the receipt of the  Notice.  

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which it was not possible for the guests to escape from the site.  

The  Chief  Inspector  of  Factories,  who  signed  the  preliminary  

report,  recommended  to  the  State  Government  that  a  

Committee  be  constituted  under  Section  90  of  the  Act  for  

conducting  a  detailed  investigation  into  the  cause  of  the  

accident.   The preliminary report  records  that  the Committee  

should  be  constituted  by  the  State  Government  under  the  

Chairmanship of the Chief Inspector of Factories in which other  

Members  shall  be  (1)  Dy.  Chief  Inspector  of  Factories,  

Jamshedpur  as  Co-ordinator;  (2)  Dy.  Chief  Inspector  of  

Factories,  Ranchi  as  Member;  (3)  Dy.  Chief  Inspector  of  

Factories,  Patna  as  Member;  and  (4)  Chief  Security  and  Fire  

Extinguisher Officer, Barauni Oil Refinery, Begusarai as Member.

6.  It is of significance that the Factory Inspector, Jamshedpur  

Circle,  who  filed  the  complaint  was  part  of  the  team  that  

conducted this preliminary detailed investigation (vide para 9 of  

the letter dated 08.03.1989).

7. In  pursuance  of  the  recommendation  of  the  Preliminary  

Report,  the  State  Government  constituted  a  three  Member  

Committee under Section 90 of the Act consisting of (i) Chief  

Inspector of Factories, Bihar (Ranchi) as Chairman; (ii) Dy. Chief  

Inspector of Factories (Jamshedpur) as Member; and (iii) Chief  

Safety and Fire Officer (Begusarai) as Member.  The Government  

further directed the Committee to submit its report within two  

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months of its constitution.  Instead of submitting the report in  

two months, the Committee concluded its inquiry by 03.09.1989.  

Two of its Members signed the Report on 26.09.1989.  The third  

Member signed on 16.03.1990.  The Report is said to have been  

handed over to the Inspector of Factories on 23.04.1990.

8. On 07.05.1990, three criminal complaints were filed under  

different  provisions  of  the  Act  by  the  Inspector  of  Factories,  

Jamshedpur Circle – I, Jamshedpur, which are as under:

“(i)  Complaint  No.  224  of  1990 –  (along  with  detailed  statement  in  support  of  the  petition  of  complaint)  alleging  contravention  of  provisions  of  Section 6(1)(aa) of the Factories Act read with Rule 8  of the Bihar Factories Rules, 1950, for not submitting  the plans of Pandals and structures (6 in number)  constructed  inside  the  premises  of  TISCO  for  the  150th Birthday  celebrations  of  J.N.  Tata  (near  the  main gate  around the statue of  J.N.  Tata and not  getting the same approved by the Chief Inspector of  Factories).

(ii)  Complaint  No.  225  of  1990 (along  with  detailed  statement  in  support  of  petition  of  complaint) for violating the provisions of Section 38  of the Factories Act, 1948, read with Rule 62 of the  Bihar Factories Rules, 1950 by not taking precautions  in case of fire as envisaged under Section 38 of the  Factories Act, 1948 read with Rules 62 of the Bihar  Factories Rules, 1950 such as safe means of escape  in  the  event  of  fire  for  all  persons,  and  by  not  providing  necessary  equipment  and  facilities  for  extinguishing fire; and

(iii)  Complaint  No.  226  of  1990 (along  with  detailed  statement  in  support  of  petition  of  complaint)  for  violating  the  provisions  of  Section  41B(4) of the Factories (Amendment) Act, 1987 by  not  drawing  up  with  the  approval  of  the  Chief  

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Inspector  of  Factories,  Bihar,  an  “on-sight”  Emergency Plan and Disaster Control for the Pandals  and structures (6 in number) constructed inside the  factory  (TISCO),  near  its  main  gate  around  the  statue  of  its  founder  Shri  Jamshedji  Tata  for  celebrating his 150th Birthday, and constructing such  pandals  and  structures  of  highly  combustible  material – an actual fire hazard.”

9. The dispute in these appeals centers around the question  

whether the filing of complaint on 07.05.1990 was within three  

months  of  the  date  on  which  the  alleged  commission  of  the  

offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector (vide Section  

106 of the Act).   

10. There  is  no  dispute  about  the  meaning  of  the  term  

“commission of the offence” or “knowledge,” hence the question  

is  essentially:  when  did  the  Inspector  come  to  know  of  the  

commission of the offences?  Section 106 of the Act reads as  

follows:

“Section  106:  Limitation  of  prosecution:  No  Court  shall  take  cognizance  of  any  offence  punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is  made within three months of the date on which the  alleged  commission  of  the  offence  came  to  the  knowledge of an Inspector:  

Provided  that  where  the  offence  consists  of  disobeying  a  written  order  made  by  an  Inspector,  complaint thereof may be made within six months of  the date on which the offence is alleged to have been  committed.  

[Explanation: - For the purpose of this section -

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(a) in the case of a continuing offence, the period of  limitation shall be computed with reference to every  point of time during which the offence continues;  

(b)  where  for  the  performance of  any  act  time is  granted or extended on an application made by the  occupier  or  manager  of  a  factory,  the  period  of  limitation shall be computed from the date on which  the time so granted or extended expired.]”  

11. The  Respondent  –  State  claims  that  the  Inspector  of  

Factories,  who  filed  the  complaints,  came  to  know  of  the  

commission of the offences on 23.04.1990, when the Report of  

the Committee,  constituted under  Section 90 of  the Act,  was  

received by him.  According to the appellants, who are accused,  

by virtue of the Occupier and Manager of the Factory within the  

premises of which the accident occurred, the complaint is clearly  

barred by the limitation of three months provided by Section 106  

of the Act because the Inspector of Factories had knowledge of  

the commission of the offence as early as 05.03.1989 when he  

conducted  the  preliminary  investigation  into  the  accident  

between 5th and 6th March, 1989 along with the Chief Inspector  

of Factories and Dy. Chief Inspector of Factories, Jamshedpur.  In  

any  case,  he  had  been  directed  to  carry  out  an  intensive  

investigation,  and  having  been  inducted  into  the  Committee  

under Section 90 of the Act on 8.3.1989, he knew of the alleged  

commission  of  the  offence  much  earlier.   According  to  the  

Respondent  –  State  the  copy  of  the  inquiry  report  and  the  

Government’s  letter  were  handed over  to  the complainant  on  

23.04.1990 by the Chief Inspector of Factories under cover of  

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letter  dated  21.04.1990,  and  therefore  23.04.1990  must  be  

taken as the date on which the complainant came to know about  

the commission of the offence alleged against the Occupier and  

Manager  of  the Factory.   It  was  argued also  before  the  High  

Court that he was directed by the letter of the Government to  

file a complaint for that prosecution and accordingly he filed the  

complaint  on  7.5.1990.   According  to  the  respondent,  the  

complaint  has  been  filed  well  within  three  months  from  

23.4.1990 on 7.5.1990.

12. The  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  who  heard  the  complaint  

found that the Factory Inspector – Complainant, had knowledge  

of the occurrence at least on 5.3.1989 when a detailed inquiry  

was conducted by the Chief Inspector of Factories.  The Chief  

Judicial Magistrate, therefore, dismissed the complaint as being  

barred  by  limitation  holding  that  the  offence  was  not  a  

continuing  offence  and  that  the  limitation  be  reckoned  from  

5.3.1989 – i.e. the date of knowledge.

13. The  High  Court  accepted  that  the  starting  point  for  

limitation  was  the  date  of  knowledge  of  the  commission  of  

offence but took the view that in the present case the date of  

accident and the date of knowledge of the commission of the  

offence are different.  The High Court relied on the decision of  

this Court in  P.D. Jambekar v.  State of Gujarat,  (1973) 3  

SCC 524, in which this Court observed as follows:

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“As Section 106 makes the date of knowledge of the  commission of the offence the starting point of the  period of limitation, we find it  difficult  to read the  section  so  as  to  make  the  date  on  which  the  Inspector  would  or  ought  to  have  acquired  knowledge of the commission of the offence had he  been  diligent,  the  starting  point  of  limitation,  especially  where,  as  here  the  statute  does  not  provide for an inquiry into the accident much less the  period with which the inquiry has to be made. It is  only in the jurisprudence of Humpty Dumpty that we  can equate the “date on which the alleged offence  came to  the  knowledge  of  an  Inspector”  with  the  date  on  which  the  alleged  offence  ought  to  have  come to his knowledge. We think that the High Court  was right in its conclusion (para 8).”

14. The High Court took the view that it cannot be said that  

the complainant came to know of the commission of the offence  

in the preliminary inquiry conducted on 5.3.1989 by the Chief  

Inspector  of  Factories  in  his  presence  by  distinguishing  the  

difference between “knowledge of an accident” and “knowledge  

of commission of the offence.”  The High Court observed that the  

complainant  could  have  known  of  the  breach  only  when  the  

cause of accident, which was inquired into, was reported by the  

Chief Inspector of Factories in his report, which was received by  

the complainant on 23.04.1990; and it was only from the inquiry  

report that it could be gathered that the accident of fire took  

place because of breach of provisions of law.

15. We have  heard  the  matter  and  considered  the  issue  at  

length and we find ourselves unable to uphold the reasoning of  

the High Court.  Jambekar’s case (supra) is of no assistance  

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in deciding the present case.  In that case this Court accepted  

that from a reading of the report of the incident it was difficult  

for  anyone  to  come to  the  conclusion  that  an  offence  under  

Section  21(1)(iv)(c)  has  been  committed.   The  Inspector’s  

statement that the report did not convey to him any knowledge  

that  the  offence was committed was accepted  and this  Court  

concluded that the Inspector did not acquire the knowledge of  

the ‘commission of  the offence’  when he received the report.  

The case before us is entirely different.  Here the Inspector was  

himself  part  of  the  team,  which  conducted  the  preliminary  

inquiry between 5th and 6th March, 1989.  As observed earlier,  

the inquiry is a detailed investigation going into all aspects of the  

occurrence.  In these circumstances it is not possible to hold that  

the Inspector of Factories, who undertook a detailed inquiry into  

the  accident  along  with  the  Chief  Inspector  of  Factories,  

remained  ignorant  that  the  offences  in  question  have  been  

allegedly  committed.   It  is  proper  to  assume that  an  officer,  

conducting an investigation, comes to know what has happened,  

that being the only purpose of the investigation.   

16. We find that it has not been disputed at any stage that the  

complainant was not associated with and did not participate in  

the preliminary investigation from 5th to 6th March 1989 along  

with the Chief Inspector of Factories. This is obvious from the  

letter/report of preliminary investigation dated 08.03.1989. The  

Inspector must be taken as having acquired knowledge of the  

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alleged commission of  the offence soon before or at  least  on  

08.03.1989,  when the  report  of  preliminary  investigation  was  

sent to the Commissioner of Labour, Bihar.  In fact, a perusal of  

allegations of the offence against the appellants, makes it clear  

that an inquiry or investigation at the site of the accident was  

not necessary in order to gain knowledge of the alleged breach.  

For  instance,  the  failure  to  submit  “Plans  of  Pandals  and  

Structures” as required under Section 6(1)(aa) of the Act read  

with Rule 8 of the Bihar Factory Rules, 1950; not drawing up an  

“on-sight” Emergency Plan and Disaster Control for the Pandals  

and Structures as required under Section 41B(4) of the Factories  

(Amendment) Act, 1987 are alleged breaches, which could have  

been ascertained even from the office record of the Inspector.  

The  third  breach  is  not  taking  precautions  in  case  of  fire  as  

envisaged under Section 38 of the Factories Act, 1948 read with  

Rule 62 of the Bihar Factories  Rules, 1950 or providing a safe  

means  of  escape  in  the  event  of  fire  for  all  persons,  and  

providing  necessary  equipment  and  facilities  for  extinguishing  

fire, can be easily and must have been ascertained at the first  

inspection of the site. We are clearly of the view that it was not  

necessary for the Inspector to have waited to receive the report  

on 23.04.1990 from the Government under cover of the letter  

dated   21.04.1990  directing  him  to  file  a  complaint  for  the  

prosecution of the appellants.  We thus agree with the view of  

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the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur and disagree  

with the view of the High Court.

17. Mr. Tapesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the  

State/respondent pointed out that whilst these Criminal Revision  

Petitions against the judgments of the Chief Judicial Magistrate in  

the three criminal cases were pending in the High Court, Writ  

Petition  232  of  1991  was  filed  under  Article  32  of  the  

Constitution  of  India  against  State  of  Bihar,  TISCO  and  its  

directors  and  officers  to  which  the  Inspector  of  Factories,  

Jamshedpur was also a party.   This Writ Petition was filed by  

victims on behalf of themselves and all other persons affected by  

the fire.  A prayer was made in the Writ of Mandamus ordering  

prosecution of Directors and Officers of TISCO for negligence in  

organizing  of  the  function.  A  prayer  for  appropriate  

compensation  was  also  made  in  the  said  Writ  Petition.   By  

Preliminary Order dated 15.12.1993, this Court after laying down  

certain principles of compensation directed that the retired Chief  

Justice Mr. Chandrachud should determine the compensation.  It  

was then directed as follows:

“Pending further orders, the following criminal cases  shall be stayed:

“1. G.R. Case No. : 365-A/89 pending in the Court of  Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jamshedpur.

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2. Crl. Rev. Nos. 212, 213 and 214 of 1991 pending before  Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court.”

18.    Chief  Justice  Chandrachud  (Retd.)  eventually  assessed  the  

compensation  in  November,  2000 for  an  aggregate sum of  Rs.5.47  

crores.  Finally, this Court disposed of the Writ Petition on 16.8.2001  

[reported  as  (2001)  8  SCC  197]  after  observing  that  Criminal  

Revision  Petitions  had  been  stayed  by  its  earlier  Order  dated  

15.12.1993.  This Court then enhanced the aggregated compensation  

amount by adding a certain amount on compassionate grounds.  The  

Writ Petition was accordingly disposed of.

19. It  was  argued  by  Mr.  Tapesh  Kumar  Singh  that  the  above  

sequence of events meant that the Criminal Revisions before the High  

Court  remained  stayed  notwithstanding  the  disposal  of  the  Writ  

Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, and therefore, it could not  

have  proceeded  to  decide  the  matter.   We  fail  to  understand  this  

submission  coming from the State.   In  the  first  place,  there  is  no  

warrant  for  assuming,  unless  specifically  directed  or  necessarily  

intended, that an interim order such as the Stay of proceedings before  

a lower forum continues even if the proceedings in the higher forum is  

disposed of.  This Court has made observations to that effect in  Prem  

Chandra  Agarwal  and  Another v.  Uttar  Pradesh  Financial  

Corporation and Others, (2009) 11 SCC 479. In any case, in this  

case the parties understood that the true position was that the Stay  

had ceased to operate and argued the matter on that understanding  

before the High Court.  What is more surprising is that this contention  

comes from the State, which has succeeded before the High Court.  

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Accordingly, we see no reason whatsoever to consider this submission  

any further.  We are informed that in pursuance of the Order of this  

Court in Lata Wadhwa and Others v.  State of Bihar and Others,  

(2001) 8 SCC 197  the TISCO has deposited an amount of Rs. 6.95  

crores  in  the  Registry  of  the  Supreme  Court.   Shri  F.S.  Nariman,  

learned senior counsel,  appearing for the appellants has very fairly  

submitted  that  the  appellants  and  TISCO  have  no  grievance  

whatsoever  in  making  any  payment  to  the  victims  by  way  of  

compensation since the accident was a terrible tragedy.  Shri Nariman  

submitted that the TISCO has not treated any litigation in this matter  

as an adversarial litigation.   

20. In the result, appeals are allowed.  The Judgment and Order of  

the High Court dated 15.6.2007 is set aside and Criminal complaints  

are dismissed.

...........................................………………..J.                                [ SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA ]

…..................................………………………J.                          [ S.A. BOBDE ]

   New Delhi, August 8, 2014

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