REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.16962   OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.25815 of 2013)

INTERNATIONAL ASSET RECONSTRUCTION  COMPANY OF INDIA LTD.       ..........APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF ALDRICH  PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. AND OTHERS ....RESPONDENT(S)

With  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 16963 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.29534 of 2014)

IRIDIUM INDIA TELECOM LTD.   ..........APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

DOHA BANK QSC AND ANOTHER     ......RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

NAVIN SINHA, J.

Leave granted.

2. A common question of  law arising for  consideration in

both appeals is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

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(hereinafter referred to as “the Limitation Act”), can be invoked

to condone the prescribed period of 30 days, under Section

30(1)  of  the  Recovery  of  Debts  and  Bankruptcy  Act,  1993

(hereinafter referred as the “RDB Act”), for preferring an appeal

before the Tribunal, against an order of the Recovery officer.

3. In view of the pure question of law involved, the facts of

the  case  need  not  be  elucidated.   Suffice  to  observe  that

pursuant to a recovery certificate issued by the Tribunal under

Section 19(22)  of  the  RDB Act,  the  Recovery  officer  passed

necessary orders under Section 28 of the Act.  An appeal was

preferred  by  the  aggrieved  against  the  same  before  the

Tribunal, beyond the prescribed period of 30 days.  It was held

that Section 5 of  the Limitation Act not being applicable to

proceedings under Section 30 of the Act, the delay beyond the

prescribed period could not be condoned.  

4. Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned senior counsel on behalf of

the  appellants,  submitted  that  the  RDB  Act  was  not  a

complete  Code  by  itself.   A  mere  expeditious  procedure  for

recovery  was  not  conclusive  to  infer  express  or  implied

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exclusion of the Limitation Act.  In the absence of an express

exclusion of the Limitation Act to Section 30, implied exclusion

cannot be readily inferred, considering the nature of the rights

and  interests  of  the  borrower  involved,  raising  issues  with

regard to fairness of procedure.  By virtue of Section 29(2) of

the Limitation Act, any implied exclusion is ruled out and the

provisions  of  Section  5  of  the  Limitation  Act  will  apply  to

proceedings under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act.  

5. Under Section 22(1) of the RDB Act, the Tribunal was not

bound by the procedures of the Code of Civil Procedure and

was guided by the principles of natural justice, which would

include  the  power  to  condone  delay  beyond  the  prescribed

period of  30  days  under  Section 30(1)  of  the  Act.   Section

19(25) provided for passing of necessary orders to secure the

ends  of  justice,  which  again  would  include  the  power  for

extension of the prescribed period.  The scheme of the RDB

Act  does  not  exclude  application  of  the  Limitation  Act  to

proceedings under it.  Referring to Section 2(b) of the Act and

reading the same in conjunction with Rule 2(c)  of  the Debt

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Recovery  Tribunal  (Procedure)  Rules,  1993,  (hereinafter

referred to as “the Rules”) it was urged that an “application”

filed  under  Section  30(1)  of  the  Act  was  also  amenable  to

condonation under Section 24 of the RDB Act.  Section 20(3)

likewise  provides  for  condoning  delay  beyond  45  days  in

preferring an appeal before the appellate tribunal.

6. Sh.  Arvind  P.  Datar,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the

respondents,  contended  that  the  RDB  Act  was  a  complete

Code by itself with regard to recovery of dues to banks and

financial institutions.  Section 24 of the RDB Act applied only

to  an  application  made  under  Section  19  by  a  bank  or

financial  institution,  to  the  Tribunal  for  recovery  of  a  debt.

Section  20(3)  expressly  applied  to  proceedings  before  the

appellate tribunal only.  The scheme of the Act manifests, that

the Legislature expressly intended to exclude any extension of

the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1), which is

further manifest from the amendment to the same in the year

2000 denuding the deemed status of the Recovery officer as a

Tribunal, for purposes of the provision.

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7. The definition of “application” under Section 2(b) of the

Act  was  confined  to  Section  19  of  the  RDB Act  only.   Its

meaning could not be extended beyond that prescribed under

the Act, by invoking Rule 2(c) which had to be read with Rule

4  providing  the  procedure  for  making  an  application,

inter-alia,   under   Section   30   of   the   RDB Act   in  the

prescribed Form III.

8. Shri Datar with all fairness also invited our attention to a

two-Judge Bench decision dated 01.07.2015 in Civil  Appeal

No.  4926  of  2015,  A.R.  Venugopal  @  R.Venugopal  vs.

Jotheeswaran & ors., holding that the delay in preferring an

appeal under Section 30(1) beyond the prescribed 30 days was

condonable by virtue of Section 20 read with Section 24 of the

RDB Act.

9. We have considered the submissions.  The RDB Act was

enacted  to  facilitate  and  expedite  recovery  of  debts  due  to

banks  and  financial  institutions  by  summary  proceedings

before a statutory Tribunal.  Section 18 bars the jurisdiction of

any  court  or  other  authority  in  such  matters  (except  the

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Supreme Court/High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution).   Section  31  provides  for  transfer  of  pending

cases  from  a  Court  to  the  Tribunal.   The  Act  provides  a

complete procedure for institution of recovery proceedings, the

method of its enforcement including the right to appeal.  The

RDB Act is undoubtedly a special law and a complete code by

itself with regard to expeditious recovery of dues to banks and

financial institutions.

10. The fact that the Tribunal may be vested with some of the

powers as a Civil  Court  under the Code of  Civil  Procedure,

regarding summoning and enforcing attendance of witnesses,

discovery and production of the documents, receiving evidence

on  affidavits,  issuing  commission  for  the  examination  of

witnesses or documents, reviewing its decisions etc. does not

vest in it the status of a Court.  Section 22(1), in fact, provides

that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedures under

the C.P.C., and can regulate its own procedures in accordance

with natural justice.  

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11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that the appeal

or application, with the exception of Order XXI, CPC may be

admitted after the prescribed period, if the applicant satisfies

the court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the

application within time.   The pre-requisite,  therefore,  is  the

pendency  of  a  proceeding  before  a  court.   The  proceedings

under the Act being before a statutory Tribunal, it cannot be

placed at par with proceedings before a court.  The Tribunal

shall  therefore  have  no  powers  to  condone  delay,  unless

expressly conferred by the Statute creating it.  In Sakuru vs.

Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590, it was observed that:

“3…that the provisions of  the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in ‘courts’ and not  to  appeals  or  applications  before  bodies other  than  courts  such  as  quasi-judicial Tribunals  or  executive  authorities, notwithstanding  the  fact  the  such  bodies  or authorities  may  be  vested  with  certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes  of  Civil  or  Criminal  Procedure.  The Collector  before  whom  the  appeal  was preferred  by  the  appellant  herein  under Section 90 of  the Act not  being a court,  the Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability to the proceedings before him.  But even in such a  situation  the  relevant  special  statute  may contain an express provision conferring on the

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appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power  to  extend  the  prescribed  period  of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings.   Hence it  becomes necessary to examine  whether  the  Act  contains  any  such provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of  the  delay  in  the  filing  of  the appeal…”

12. An “application” is defined under Section 2(b) of the RDB

Act  as  one  made  under  Section  19  of  the  Act.   The  latter

provision  in  Chapter  IV,  deals  with  institution  of  original

recovery proceedings before a Tribunal.  An appeal lies against

the  order  of  the  Tribunal  under  Section  20,  before  the

Appellate Tribunal within 45 days, which may be condoned for

sufficient cause under the proviso to Section 20(3) of the Act.

The Tribunal issues a recovery certificate under Section 19(22)

to the Recovery officer who then proceeds under Chapter V for

recovery of the certificate amount in the manner prescribed.  A

person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery officer can prefer

an appeal before the Tribunal under Rule 4, by an application

in the prescribed Form III.  Rule 2(c) defines an “application”

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to include a memo of appeal under Section 30(1).  The appeal

is  to  be  preferred  before  the  Tribunal,  as  distinct  from the

appellate tribunal, within 30 days.  Section 24 of the RDB Act,

therefore,  manifestly  makes the  provisions of  the  Limitation

Act  applicable  only  to  such  an  original  “application”  made

under  Section  19  only.   The  definition  of  an  “application”

under Rule 2(c) cannot be extended to read it in conjunction

with  Section 2(b)  of  the  Act  extending  the  meaning  thereof

beyond what the Act provides for and then make Section 24 of

the RDB Act applicable to an appeal under Section 30(1) of the

Act.  Any such interpretation shall be completely contrary to

the legislative intent, extending the Rules beyond what the Act

provides  for  and limits.   Had the  intention been otherwise,

nothing  prevented  the  Legislature  from  providing  so

specifically.  

13. A  comparative  study  of  Section  30,  pre  and  post

amendment in the year 2000, reveals that the deemed status

of  proceedings  before  the  Recovery  officer,  as  a  Tribunal,

stands  denuded.   Had  the  proceedings  before  the  Recovery

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officer  deemed  to  be  before  a  Tribunal,  entirely  different

considerations may have arisen.

Old Section 30 before 2000 amendment

Old Section 30 before 2000 amendment

“S.  30  Orders  of  Recovery Officer to be deemed as orders of Tribunal— Notwithstanding  anything

contained  in  Section  29,  an

order  made  by  the  Recovery

Officer in exercise of his powers

under  Sections  25  to  28  (both

inclusive),  shall  be  deemed  to

have been made by the Tribunal

and  an  appeal  against  such

orders shall lie to the Appellate

Tribunal.”

“S.  30.   Appeal  against  the order of Recovery Officer. (1)  Notwithstanding  anything

contained  in  Section  29,  any

person aggrieved by an order of

the Recovery Officer made under

this Act may, within thirty days

from the date on which a copy of

the order is issued to him, prefer

an appeal to the Tribunal.

(2)   On  receipt  of  an  appeal

under  sub-section  (1),  the

Tribunal  may,  after  giving  an

opportunity  to  the  appellant  to

be heard, and after making such

enquiry as it deems fit, confirm,

modify  or  set  aside  the  order

made by the Recovery Officer in

exercise  of  his  powers  under

Sections  25  to  28  (both

inclusive).”

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14. The RDB Act is a special law.  The proceedings are before

a  statutory  Tribunal.   The  scheme  of  the  Act  manifestly

provides that the Legislature has provided for application of

the Limitation Act to original proceedings before the Tribunal

under  Section  19  only.   The  appellate  tribunal  has  been

conferred the power to condone delay beyond 45 days under

Section 20(3) of the Act.  The proceedings before the Recovery

officer are not before a Tribunal.  Section 24 is limited in its

application  to  proceedings  before  the  Tribunal  originating

under Section 19 only.   The exclusion of any provision for

extension  of  time  by  the  Tribunal  in  preferring  an  appeal

under  Section  30  of  the  Act  makes  it  manifest  that  the

legislative intent for exclusion was express.   The application of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act by resort to Section 29(2) of the

Limitation Act, 1963 therefore does not arise.  The prescribed

period  of  30  days  under  Section  30(1)  of  the  RDB Act  for

preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery officer

therefore cannot be condoned by application of Section 5 of

the Limitation Act.  

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15. Insofar  as  A.R.  Venugopal  @ R.Venugopal  (supra)  is

concerned,  all  that  would  be  required  to  be  noticed  and

observed is that the entire statutory scheme did not fall  for

consideration of the court in that case.   

16. The appeals lack merit and are dismissed.   

………………………………….J.  (Ranjan Gogoi)  

……….………………………..J.   (Abhay Manohar Sapre)  

……….………………………..J.    (Navin Sinha)  

New Delhi, October 24, 2017

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