IQBAL SINGH NARANG Vs VEERAN NARANG
Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR,SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR
Case number: Crl.A. No.-002225-002225 / 2011
Diary number: 26849 / 2007
Advocates: VIKAS MEHTA Vs
R. C. KAUSHIK
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2225 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP(Crl) No.5625 of 2007)
IQBAL SINGH NARANG & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VS.
VEERAN NARANG … RESPONDENT
O R D E R
ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. On 3rd August, 1998, the Appellant No.1 filed
an Ejectment Application under Section 13 of the
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, for
eviction of the Respondent from the premises in
question.
3. The said Respondent filed Crl. RBT Complaint
No.283/19.8.2003/2.8.2005 against the Appellants
before the Illaqa Magistrate, under Sections 193,
420, 120-B IPC, for allegedly making false
statements in judicial proceedings before the Rent
Controller, Amritsar. The statement of the
Complainant/Respondent was recorded before the
Chief Judicial Magistrate. The Complainant/
Respondent also filed an application under Sections
193/420/425 IPC before the Rent Controller-cum-J.M.
First Class, Amritsar, in Rent Application No.111
of 1998, which had been filed by the Appellant
No.1, in which allegations had been made that the
Appellant No.1 had made false statements therein.
By order dated 14th March, 2005, the Rent Controller
disposed of the application filed by the
2
Complainant/Respondent in the rent proceedings upon
holding that the complaint filed under Sections
193, 420, 425 IPC was yet to be decided and there
was, therefore, no question of initiation of any
action against the Appellant on the basis of the
complaint filed by the Complainant/Respondent.
According to the Appellant, since the Respondent
had not challenged the order of the Rent Controller
on the Application dated 14th March, 2005, the same
had attained finality.
4. Appearing in support of the Appeal, Ms. Indu
Malhotra, learned Senior Advocate, contended that
it was obvious from the number of applications
moved by the Respondent before the Rent Controller
that the same was merely a ploy to delay the
proceedings and cause prejudice to the Appellant
No.1. The facts reveal that the Respondent had
delayed the rent proceedings, which are pending
3
since 1998, by filing vexatious and frivolous
applications.
5. On 20th April, 2006, the Judicial Magistrate,
First Class, Amritsar, after observing that no
offence under Section 420 IPC had been made out
against the accused, issued summons against them to
face trial under Section 193 read with Section 120-
B IPC.
6. Ms. Malhotra submitted that the Appellant Nos.1
and 2 appeared before the Judicial Magistrate,
First Class, Amritsar, and were released on bail
vide order dated 16th May, 2006. Subsequently, the
Appellants filed Crl. Misc. No.32515 of 2006 before
the Punjab & Haryana High Court under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for
quashing of the complaint filed by the Respondent
under Sections 193/120-B IPC pending before the
Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amritsar, as also
4
the Summoning Order dated 24th April, 2006. By its
impugned judgment and order, the High Court
dismissed Crl. Misc. No.32515 of 2006 filed by the
Appellants on the ground that the Rent Controller
is not a Court within the meaning of Section 195(1)
Cr.P.C. and held that a private complaint would be
maintainable in case of false evidence being
adduced or recorded before the Rent Controller.
Ms. Malhotra submitted that the High Court had
failed to consider the fact that the ejectment
proceedings initiated by the Appellant No.1 were
still pending before the Rent Controller and a
similar application had been dismissed on the
ground that the proceedings were still going on and
that the Court had not formed any opinion in the
matter.
7. Having held that the Rent Controller is not a
Court within the meaning of Section 195(1) Cr.P.C.,
the learned Single Judge also held that private
5
complaints would be maintainable in case of
allegations of false evidence before the Rent
Controller. The learned Judge observed that the
concept of the Rent Controller being a Court was
erroneous and hence the decision of the Division
Bench of the High Court in Ram Krishan Vs. Santra
Devi [1986 (1) P&H (DB) PLR 567] was per incuriam.
8. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the
High Court chose not to interfere with the order
passed by the learned Magistrate taking cognizance
of the offence alleged to have been committed by
the Appellants under Section 193/120-B IPC and
dismissed the Misc. Case No.32515-M of 2006 filed
by the Appellants herein.
9. On behalf of the Respondent it was urged that
the order of the learned Single Judge, impugned in
this appeal, was based on a judgment of this Court
and hence it did not suffer from any irregularity
6
or illegality. It was also urged that since the
Rent Controller was not a Court, a complaint under
Section 195 Cr.P.C. in respect of false statements
made before it, would be maintainable at the
instance of a private party, notwithstanding the
bar to filing of such complaint, except on a
complaint in writing of that Court, by such officer
of the Court, as that Court may authorize in
writing in such regard. Learned counsel submitted
that no interference was called for with the order
of the High Court and the appeal was liable to be
dismissed.
10. The question which, therefore, arises for
consideration in this appeal is that even if the
Rent Controller is held not to be a “Court”,
whether any private complaint would be maintainable
in respect of statements alleged to have been
falsely made before it. While disposing of the
Revisional Application filed by the Appellants, the
7
learned Single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High
Court took note of a judgment of the said Court in
Ishwar Chand Gupta Vs. Chander Shekhar & Anr.
[(2001) 1 RCR Criminal 171], in which it had been
held that the Rent Controller was not a Court and
that a complaint would lie under Section 195
Cr.P.C. in respect of statement made before the
Rent Controller at the instance of a private party.
11. The aforesaid question has fallen for
consideration in several cases before this Court
and the consistent view which has been taken is
that the Rent Controller, being a creature of
Statute, has to act within the four corners of the
Statute and could exercise only such powers as had
been vested in him by the Statute.
12. In the decision rendered by this Court in
Prakash H. Jain Vs. Marie Fernandes [(2003) 8 SCC
431], this Court held that the Competent Authority
8
under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, is at
best a statutory authority created for a definite
purpose and to exercise powers in a quasi-judicial
manner, but its powers were strictly circumscribed
by the very statutory provisions which conferred
upon it those powers and the same could be
exercised in the manner provided therefor and
subject to such conditions and limitations
stipulated by the very provisions of law under
which the Competent Authority itself was created.
The aforesaid observations were made by this Court
in the context of the powers conferred on the
Competent Authority appointed under the Maharashtra
Rent Control Act, 1999, which included powers to
condone the delay in the filing of the proceedings.
It is in such circumstances that it was observed
by this Court that the High Court had rejected the
submissions made on behalf of the Appellant therein
that since it had all the trappings of a Court, the
9
Competent Authority was a Court in the eye of law
and consequently possessed inherent powers to
condone the delay. The High Court also rejected the
said prayer upon observing that statutory
authorities have to act within the powers conferred
on them by Statute.
13. The same views were also expressed by this
Court in Om Prakash Vs. Ashwani Kumar Bassi [(2010)
9 SCC 183], wherein it was held that in the absence
of a specific power being vested in the Rent
Controller, it being a creature of statute, it
could only act in terms of the powers vested in it
by the Statute and could not, therefore, entertain
an application under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act for condonation of delay, since the Statute did
not vest him with such power.
14. The aforesaid decisions of this Court establish
that though the Rent Controller discharges quasi-
10
judicial functions, he is not a Court, as
understood in the conventional sense and he cannot,
therefore, make a complaint under Section 340
Cr.P.C. Consequently, as held by the High Court, a
complaint could be made by a private party in the
proceedings.
15. In addition to the above, we also see no reason
to quash the proceedings in which the Appellants
herein had been summoned under Section 193/420/120-
B IPC. The Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The
interim orders passed earlier are vacated.
………………………………………………………J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)
………………………………………………………J. (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR) New Delhi Dated: 30.11.2011
11