REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.16962   OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.25815 of 2013)

INTERNATIONAL ASSET RECONSTRUCTION  COMPANY OF INDIA LTD.       ..........APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF ALDRICH  PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. AND OTHERS ....RESPONDENT(S)

With  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 16963 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.29534 of 2014)

IRIDIUM INDIA TELECOM LTD.   ..........APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

DOHA BANK QSC AND ANOTHER      ......RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

NAVIN SINHA, J.

Leave granted.

2. A common question of law arising  for  consideration  in

both appeals is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

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(hereinafter referred to as “the Limitation Act”), can be invoked

to condone the prescribed period of 30 days, under Section

30(1) of the  Recovery of  Debts and  Bankruptcy  Act, 1993

(hereinafter referred as the “RDB Act”), for preferring an appeal

before the Tribunal, against an order of the Recovery officer.

3. In view of the pure question of law involved, the facts of

the case need not be elucidated.   Suffice to observe that

pursuant to a recovery certificate issued by the Tribunal under

Section 19(22)  of the  RDB Act, the  Recovery  officer  passed

necessary orders under Section 28 of the Act.  An appeal was

preferred by the aggrieved against the same before the

Tribunal, beyond the prescribed period of 30 days.  It was held

that Section 5 of the Limitation Act not being applicable to

proceedings under Section 30 of the Act, the delay beyond the

prescribed period could not be condoned.  

4. Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned senior counsel on behalf of

the appellants, submitted that the RDB Act was not a

complete  Code by itself.  A  mere  expeditious  procedure for

recovery was not conclusive to infer express or implied

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exclusion of the Limitation Act.  In the absence of an express

exclusion of the Limitation Act to Section 30, implied exclusion

cannot be readily inferred, considering the nature of the rights

and interests of the borrower involved, raising issues  with

regard to fairness of procedure.   By virtue of Section 29(2) of

the Limitation Act, any implied exclusion is ruled out and the

provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation  Act  will apply to

proceedings under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act.  

5. Under Section 22(1) of the RDB Act, the Tribunal was not

bound by the procedures of the Code of Civil Procedure and

was guided by the principles of natural justice, which would

include the  power to condone  delay  beyond the  prescribed

period of  30  days  under  Section 30(1)  of the  Act.  Section

19(25) provided for passing of necessary orders to secure the

ends of justice, which again would include the power for

extension of the prescribed period.   The scheme of the RDB

Act does not exclude application of the Limitation Act to

proceedings under it.  Referring to Section 2(b) of the Act and

reading the same in conjunction with Rule 2(c)  of the Debt

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Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993, (hereinafter

referred to as “the Rules”) it was urged that an “application”

filed  under  Section  30(1) of the  Act  was  also amenable to

condonation under Section 24 of the RDB Act.   Section 20(3)

likewise provides for condoning delay beyond 45 days in

preferring an appeal before the appellate tribunal.

6. Sh. Arvind P. Datar, learned senior counsel for the

respondents, contended that the  RDB  Act  was a complete

Code by itself with regard to recovery of dues to banks and

financial institutions.  Section 24 of the RDB Act applied only

to an application made under Section 19 by a bank or

financial institution, to the  Tribunal for recovery  of  a  debt.

Section 20(3) expressly applied to proceedings before the

appellate tribunal only.  The scheme of the Act manifests, that

the Legislature expressly intended to exclude any extension of

the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1), which is

further manifest from the amendment to the same in the year

2000 denuding the deemed status of the Recovery officer as a

Tribunal, for purposes of the provision.

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7. The definition of “application” under Section 2(b) of the

Act  was confined to  Section  19 of the  RDB  Act only.   Its

meaning could not be extended beyond that prescribed under

the Act, by invoking Rule 2(c) which had to be read with Rule

4 providing  the  procedure  for  making an application, inter­

alia,  under  Section  30  of  the  RDB Act  in the prescribed

Form III.

8. Shri Datar with all fairness also invited our attention to a

two­Judge Bench decision dated 01.07.2015  in Civil  Appeal

No. 4926 of 2015,  A.R. Venugopal @ R.Venugopal vs.

Jotheeswaran & ors., holding that the delay in preferring an

appeal under Section 30(1) beyond the prescribed 30 days was

condonable by virtue of Section 20 read with Section 24 of the

RDB Act.

9. We have considered the submissions.  The RDB Act was

enacted to facilitate and expedite recovery of debts due to

banks and financial institutions by summary proceedings

before a statutory Tribunal.  Section 18 bars the jurisdiction of

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any court or other authority in such  matters (except the

Supreme Court/High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution).   Section  31 provides for transfer of pending

cases from a Court to the Tribunal.   The Act provides a

complete procedure for institution of recovery proceedings, the

method of its enforcement including the right to appeal.   The

RDB Act is undoubtedly a special law and a complete code by

itself with regard to expeditious recovery of dues to banks and

financial institutions.

10. The fact that the Tribunal may be vested with some of the

powers as a Civil  Court under the Code of  Civil  Procedure,

regarding summoning and enforcing attendance of witnesses,

discovery and production of the documents, receiving evidence

on affidavits, issuing commission for the examination of

witnesses or documents, reviewing its decisions etc. does not

vest in it the status of a Court.  Section 22(1), in fact, provides

that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedures under

the C.P.C., and can regulate its own procedures in accordance

with natural justice.  

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11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that the appeal

or application, with the exception of Order XXI, CPC may be

admitted after the prescribed period, if the applicant satisfies

the court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the

application within  time.  The pre­requisite, therefore, is the

pendency  of  a  proceeding  before  a  court.  The  proceedings

under the Act being before a statutory Tribunal, it cannot be

placed at par with proceedings before a court.   The Tribunal

shall therefore have no powers to condone delay, unless

expressly conferred by the Statute creating it.  In Sakuru vs.

Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590, it was observed that:

“3…that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in ‘courts’ and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than courts such as quasi­judicial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact the such  bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant herein under Section 90 of the Act  not  being a court, the Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability to the proceedings before him.  But even in such a situation the relevant special statute  may

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contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings.  Hence  it  becomes necessary to examine  whether the  Act contains  any  such provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the  delay in the filing  of the appeal…”

12. An “application” is defined under Section 2(b) of the RDB

Act  as  one  made  under  Section  19  of the  Act.  The latter

provision in Chapter IV, deals with institution of original

recovery proceedings before a Tribunal.  An appeal lies against

the order of the Tribunal under Section 20, before the

Appellate Tribunal within 45 days, which may be condoned for

sufficient cause under the proviso to Section 20(3) of the Act.

The Tribunal issues a recovery certificate under Section 19(22)

to the Recovery officer who then proceeds under Chapter V for

recovery of the certificate amount in the manner prescribed.  A

person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery officer can prefer

an appeal before the Tribunal under Rule 4, by an application

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in the prescribed Form III.   Rule 2(c) defines an “application”

to include a memo of appeal under Section 30(1).  The appeal

is to  be  preferred before the  Tribunal,  as  distinct from  the

appellate tribunal, within 30 days.  Section 24 of the RDB Act,

therefore,  manifestly  makes  the provisions of the Limitation

Act applicable only to such an original “application”  made

under Section 19 only.   The definition of an “application”

under Rule 2(c) cannot be extended to read it in conjunction

with  Section 2(b) of the  Act extending the  meaning thereof

beyond what the Act provides for and then make Section 24 of

the RDB Act applicable to an appeal under Section 30(1) of the

Act.   Any such interpretation shall be completely contrary to

the legislative intent, extending the Rules beyond what the Act

provides for  and  limits.  Had  the intention been otherwise,

nothing prevented the Legislature from providing so

specifically.  

13. A comparative study of Section 30, pre and post

amendment in the year 2000, reveals that the deemed status

of proceedings before the Recovery officer, as a Tribunal,

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stands  denuded.  Had  the  proceedings  before the  Recovery

officer deemed to be before a Tribunal, entirely different

considerations may have arisen.

Old Section 30 before 2000 amendment

Section 30 Post 2000 amendment

“S. 30 Orders of Recovery Officer to be deemed as orders of Tribunal— Notwithstanding anything

contained in Section 29, an

order made by the Recovery

Officer in exercise of his powers

under  Sections  25 to 28 (both

inclusive), shall be deemed to

have been made by the Tribunal

and an appeal against such

orders shall lie to the Appellate

Tribunal.”

“S. 30.   Appeal against the order of Recovery Officer. (1) Notwithstanding anything

contained in Section 29, any

person aggrieved by an order of

the Recovery Officer made under

this Act may, within thirty days

from the date on which a copy of

the order is issued to him, prefer

an appeal to the Tribunal.

(2)   On receipt of an appeal

under sub­section (1), the

Tribunal may, after giving an

opportunity to the appellant to

be heard, and after making such

enquiry as it deems fit, confirm,

modify or set aside the order

made by the Recovery Officer in

exercise of his powers under

Sections 25 to 28 (both

inclusive).”

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14. The RDB Act is a special law.  The proceedings are before

a statutory Tribunal.   The scheme of the Act manifestly

provides that the Legislature has provided for application of

the Limitation Act to original proceedings before the Tribunal

under Section 19 only.   The appellate tribunal has been

conferred the power to condone delay beyond 45 days under

Section 20(3) of the Act.  The proceedings before the Recovery

officer are not before a Tribunal.   Section 24 is limited in its

application to proceedings before the Tribunal originating

under Section 19 only.   The exclusion of any provision for

extension of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal

under Section 30 of the Act makes it manifest that the

legislative intent for exclusion was express.   The application of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act by resort to Section 29(2) of the

Limitation Act, 1963 therefore does not arise.  The prescribed

period of 30  days  under  Section  30(1) of the  RDB Act for

preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery officer

therefore cannot be condoned by application of Section 5 of

the Limitation Act.  

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15. Insofar  as  A.R.  Venugopal  @ R.Venugopal (supra)  is

concerned, all that would be required to be noticed and

observed is that the entire statutory scheme did not  fall  for

consideration of the court in that case.   

16. The appeals lack merit and are dismissed.   

………………………………….J.  (Ranjan Gogoi)  

……….………………………..J.   (Abhay Manohar Sapre)  

……….………………………..J.    (Navin Sinha)  

New Delhi, October 24, 2017

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