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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 129 OF 2013

Inspector of Police and another        … Appellant (s)   

Versus

Battenapatla Venkata Ratnam and another    ... Respondent (s)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 124 OF 2013

WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 125 OF 2013

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 126 OF 2013

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 127 OF 2013

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 128 OF 2013

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 130 OF 2013

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 131 OF 2013

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 132 OF 2013

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REPORTABLE

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J U D G M E N T  

KURIAN, J.:

1. Whether  sanction  under  Section  197  of  The  Code  of  

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’) is  

required to initiate criminal proceedings in respect of offences  

under  Sections  420,  468,  477A,  120B  read  with  109  of  the  

Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’),  

is the question arising for consideration in these cases.  

2. The District  Registrar,  Vijayawada lodged a complaint  

with the Inspector of Police, CBCID Vijayawada on 07.07.1999.  

The  main  allegation  against  the  respondents  was  that  while  

they were working as Sub-Registrars in various offices in the  

State of  Andhra Pradesh,  they conspired with stamp vendors  

and document writers and other staff to gain monetary benefit  

and  resorted  to  manipulation  of  registers  and  got  the  

registration of the documents with old value of the properties,  

resulting  in  wrongful  gain  to  themselves  and  loss  to  the  

Government,  and  thereby  cheated  the  public  and  the  

Government.  

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3. On the basis of the complaint,  F.I.R.  No. 35/1999 was  

registered  by  the  appellant,  and  after  investigation,  report  

under  Section  173(2)  CrPC  against  41  persons  including  the  

respondents  herein,  was  submitted  before  the  III  Additional  

Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Vijayawada.  The  respondents  

raised the objection that there was no sanction under Section  

197 CrPC and hence the proceedings could not be initiated.  

4. Learned  Magistrate  on  03.07.2007  passed  an  order  

holding that:  

“Whether the sanction is required under Section  197 Cr.PC. or not to be considered during the  trial and it is the burden on the complainant to  prove  that  the  accused  acted  beyond  in  discharge of their official duties and there is no  nexus  between  the  acts  committed  and  their  official duties and at this stage the question that  the accused acted within their duties cannot be  decided.”

5. Aggrieved,  respondents  moved  the  High  Court  under  

Section 482 CrPC leading to the impugned order whereby the  

criminal  proceedings  were  quashed  on  the  sole  ground  that  

there was no sanction under Section 197 CrPC, and hence the  

appeals.

6. Heard  Mr.  Guntur  Prabhakar,  Ms.  Prerna  Singh  and  

Mr.  D.  Mahesh  Babu,  learned  Counsel  appearing  for  the  

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appellants  and  Shri  K.  Maruthi  Rao,  Mr.  K.  Subba  Rao,  Mr.  

Aniruddha  P.  Mayee,  Mr.  V.  Sridhar  Reddy  and  Mr.  V.  N.  

Raghupathy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents.  

7. No doubt, while the respondents indulged in the alleged  

criminal  conduct,  they  had been working  as  public  servants.  

The question is not whether they were in service or on duty or  

not but whether the alleged offences have been committed by  

them “while acting or purporting to act in  discharge of  their  

official  duty”.  That  question  is  no  more  res  integra.  In  

Shambhoo Nath Misra v.  State of  U.P.  and others1,  at  

paragraph-5, this Court held that:  

“5. The  question  is  when  the  public  servant  is  alleged  to  have  committed  the  offence  of  fabrication  of  record  or  misappropriation of public fund etc. can he be  said  to  have acted in  discharge of  his  official  duties.  It  is  not  the official  duty of  the public  servant  to  fabricate  the  false  records  and  misappropriate  the  public  funds  etc.  in  furtherance of or in the discharge of his official  duties. The official capacity only enables him to  fabricate  the  record  or  misappropriate  the  public  fund  etc.  It  does  not  mean  that  it  is  integrally  connected or  inseparably  interlinked  with the crime committed in the course of the  same  transaction,  as  was  believed  by  the  learned Judge.  Under these circumstances,  we  are of the opinion that the view expressed by  the High Court as well as by the trial court on  

1 (1997) 5 SCC 326

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the  question  of  sanction  is  clearly  illegal  and  cannot be sustained.”

8. In  Parkash  Singh  Badal v.  State  of  Punjab  and  

others2, at paragraph-20, this Court held that:  

“20. The principle of immunity protects all acts  which the public servant has to perform in the  exercise  of  the  functions  of  the  Government.  The  purpose  for  which  they  are  performed  protects  these acts  from criminal  prosecution.  However,  there  is  an  exception.  Where  a  criminal  act  is  performed under  the  colour  of  authority but which in reality is for the public   servant’s  own  pleasure  or  benefit  then  such  acts shall not be protected under the doctrine of  State immunity.”

and thereafter, at paragraph-38, it was further held that:

“38. The  question  relating  to  the  need  of  sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not  necessarily  to  be  considered  as  soon  as  the  complaint  is  lodged  and  on  the  allegations  contained  therein.  This  question  may arise  at  any  stage  of  the  proceeding.  The  question  whether sanction is necessary or not may have  to be determined from stage to stage.”

9.  In a recent decision in  Rajib Ranjan and others v.  

R.  Vijaykumar3,  at  paragraph-18,  this  Court  has  taken  the  

view that  … “even  while  discharging  his  official  duties,  if  a   

public servant enters into a criminal conspiracy or indulges in   

2 (2007) 1 SCC 1 3 (2015) 1 SCC 513

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criminal misconduct, such misdemeanour on his part is not to   

be  treated  as  an  act  in  discharge  of  his  official  duties  and,   

therefore,  provisions  of  Section  197 of  the  Code  will  not  be   

attracted”.

10. Public  servants have,  in  fact,  been treated as special  

category  under  Section  197  CrPC,  to  protect  them  from  

malicious  or  vexatious  prosecution.  Such  protection  from  

harassment  is  given  in  public  interest;  the  same  cannot  be  

treated as shield to protect corrupt officials. In  Subramanian  

Swamy v. Manmohan Singh and another4, at paragraph-74,  

it has been held that the provisions dealing with Section 197  

CrPC must be construed in such a manner as to advance the  

cause of honesty, justice and good governance. To quote:

 “74. …  Public  servants  are  treated  as  a  

special  class  of  persons  enjoying  the  said  protection so that they can perform their duties  without fear and favour and without threats of  malicious  prosecution.  However,  the  said  protection against malicious prosecution which  was extended in public interest cannot become  a  shield  to  protect  corrupt  officials.  These  provisions  being  exceptions  to  the  equality  provision  of  Article  14  are  analogous  to  the  provisions  of  protective  discrimination  and  these  protections  must  be  construed  very  narrowly.  These procedural  provisions  relating  to sanction must be construed in such a manner  as to advance the causes of honesty and justice  

4 (2012) 3 SCC 64

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and good governance as opposed to escalation  of corruption.”

11. The  alleged  indulgence  of  the  officers  in  cheating,  

fabrication of records or misappropriation cannot be said to be  

in discharge of their official  duty. Their official  duty is not to  

fabricate  records  or  permit  evasion  of  payment  of  duty  and  

cause  loss  to  the  Revenue.  Unfortunately,  the  High  Court  

missed  these  crucial  aspects.  The  learned  Magistrate  has  

correctly taken the view that if at all the said view of sanction is  

to be considered, it could be done at the stage of trial only.  

12. Resultantly, the impugned orders are set aside. Appeals  

are  allowed.  The  criminal  proceedings  initiated  being  of  the  

year 1999, we direct the trial court to dispose of the cases as  

expeditiously as possible at any date on or before 31.12.2015.

                                                      ………..………………………..J.                        (KURIAN JOSEPH)

                                                  ……..……………..……………J.        (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

New Delhi; April 13, 2015.  

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