REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1635   of 2011 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 7787 of 2010)

Inderjit Singh Grewal        …Appellant

        Versus

State of Punjab & Anr.                 …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. Leave granted.  

2. The instant appeal reveals a very sorry state of affair where the  

wife files a criminal complaint before the competent court to initiate  

criminal  proceedings  against  her  husband  alleging  that  they  had  

obtained decree of divorce by playing fraud upon the court without  

realising  that  in  such  a  fact-situation  she  herself  would  be  an  

accomplice in the crime and equally responsible for the offence. More

so, the appeal raises a substantial question of law as to whether the  

judgment and decree of a competent Civil Court can be declared null  

and void in collateral proceedings, that too, criminal proceedings.  

3. This criminal appeal arises from the judgment and final order  

dated  9.8.2010  in  Criminal  Misc.  No.  M-29339  of  2009  (O&M)  

passed by the High Court  of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh,  by  

which  the  High  Court  has  dismissed  the  application  filed  by  the  

appellant  under  Section  482 of  Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  

(hereinafter  called  as  `Cr.P.C.’)  for  quashing  the  complaint  No.  

87/02/09 dated 12.6.2009 filed by  respondent no. 2 under Section 12  

of  the  Protection  of  Women  from  Domestic  Violence  Act,  2005  

(hereinafter called the `Act 2005’).

4. Facts and circumstances giving rise to present case are as under:

A. That  the  appellant  and  respondent  no.  2  got  married  on  

23.9.1998 at Jalandhar as per Sikh rites and from the said wedlock a  

son, namely, Gurarjit Singh was born on 5.10.1999.  The parties to the  

marriage could not pull on well together because of temperamental  

differences and decided to get divorce and, therefore, filed HMA Case  

No.  168  of  19.9.2007  before  the  District  Judge,  Ludhiana  under  

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Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the `Act  

1955’)  for  dissolution  of  marriage  by  mutual  consent.   In  the  said  

case, statements of appellant and respondent no. 2 were recorded on  

19.9.2007 and proceedings were adjourned for a period of more than  

six months to enable them  to ponder over the issue.   

B. The parties  again appeared before the court  on 20.3.2008 on  

second motion and their statements  were recorded and both of them  

affirmed  that  it  was  not  possible  for  them  to  live  together  and,  

therefore,  the  learned  District  Judge,  Ludhiana  vide  judgment  and  

order  dated 20.3.2008 allowed the said petition and dissolved their  

marriage.   

C.   Respondent no. 2 filed a complaint before Senior Superintendent  

of  Police,  Ludhiana  against  the  appellant  on  4.5.2009  under  the  

provisions of the Act 2005 alleging that the decree of divorce obtained  

by them was a sham transaction.  Even after getting divorce, both of  

them had been living together as husband and wife.  She was forced to  

leave the matrimonial home. Thus, she prayed for justice.  The said  

complaint  was sent to SP, City-I,  Ludhiana for conducting inquiry.  

The said SP, City-I conducted the full-fledged inquiry and submitted  

the report on 4.5.2009  to the effect that the parties had been living  

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separately after divorce and,  no case was made out against the present  

appellant. However, he suggested  to seek legal opinion  in the matter.  

D. Accordingly, legal opinion dated 2.6.2009 was sought, wherein  

it  was  opined  that  the  parties  had  obtained  the  divorce  decree  by  

mutual consent and the allegations made by  respondent no. 2 against  

the appellant  were false and baseless  and the purpose of  filing the  

complaint was only to harass the appellant.  

E.   Respondent no. 2 subsequently filed a complaint under the Act  

2005 on 12.6.2009.  The learned Magistrate issued the summons to  

the  appellant  on  the  same  date.   The  Magistrate  vide  order  dated  

3.10.2009 summoned the minor child for counseling. The appellant,  

being aggrieved of the order of Ld. Magistrate dated 12.6.2009, filed  

application dated 13.10.2009 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing  

the complaint dated 12.6.2009.

F. In  the  meanwhile,  respondent  no.  2  filed  Civil  Suit  on  

17.7.2009 in  the  court  of  Civil  Judge (Senior  Division),  Ludhiana,  

seeking declaration that the judgment and decree dated 20.3.2008, i.e.  

decree of divorce, was null and void as it had been obtained by fraud.  

The said suit is still pending.  

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G.      Respondent no. 2 also filed application dated 17.12.2009 under  

Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 for grant of custody and guardianship  

of  the  minor  child  Gurarjit  Singh  and  the  same  is  pending  for  

consideration  before  the  Additional  Civil  Judge  (Senior  Division),  

Ludhiana.   

H.     Respondent  no.  2  on  11.2.2010  also  lodged  an  FIR  under  

Sections 406,  498-A, 376,  120-B of   the  Indian Penal  Code,  1860  

(hereinafter  called `IPC’)  against  the  appellant  and his  mother  and  

sister.  

I.     The  High  Court  vide  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  

9.8.2010 dismissed the application filed by the appellant.   

Hence, this appeal.  

5. Shri  Ranjit  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellant  has  submitted  that  the  High  Court  erred  in  rejecting  the  

application of the appellant under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as none of the  

reliefs  claimed by the respondent  no.2 could be entertained by the  

criminal court while dealing with the complaint; the complaint itself is  

time barred,  thus,  the Magistrate  Court  could not  take  cognizance  

thereof. The complaint has been filed because of malice in order to  

extract money from the appellant. More so, the plea of fraud alleged  

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by the respondent no.2 in the complaint for obtaining the decree of  

divorce  before  the  Civil  Court  as  per  her  own  version,  succinctly  

reveals that she herself had been a party to this fraud. The High Court  

failed to appreciate as to what extent her version could be accepted as  

she  herself  being  the  accomplice  in  the  said  offence  of  fraud  

committed upon the court.  Even if the allegations made therein are  

true, she is equally liable for punishment under Section 107 IPC. More  

so, the reliefs claimed by the respondent no. 2 in the civil suit  for  

declaring  the decree of divorce as  null and void and in another suit  

for getting the custody of the child referred to hereinabove,  would  

meet her requirements.  Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.  

6. On the contrary, Shri Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing  

for  the  respondent  no.2  has  vehemently  opposed  the  appeal  

contending that decree of divorce is a nullity as it has been obtained  

by fraud. The relationship of husband and wife between the appellant  

and respondent no.2 still subsists and thus, complaint is maintainable.  

The  court  has  to  take  the  complaint  on  its  face  value  and  the  

allegations made in the complaint require adjudication on facts. The  

issue of limitation etc. can be examined by the Magistrate Court itself.  

The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.  

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7. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

8. Before we proceed to determine the case on merit, it is desirable  

to highlight the admitted facts of the case:  

I. Appellant  and respondent  no.2 are   highly  qualified persons.  

Both of them are employed and economically independent.  Appellant  

is  an  Assistant  Professor  and  respondent  no.  2  is  a  Lecturer.  The  

appellant is Ph.D and respondent no.2 has registered herself for Ph.D.  

They are competent to understand the complications of law and other  

facts prevailing in the case.  

II. Both of them got married in year 1998 and had been blessed  

with a son in year 1999. There was no complaint by respondent no.2  

against  the  appellant  of  any  cruelty,  demand of  dowry  etc.  before  

getting the decree of divorce dated 20.3.2008 by mutual consent.

III. The decree of divorce has been obtained under Section 13-B of  

the Act 1955. Respondent no.2 was examined by the court  on first  

motion on 19.9.2007 wherein she stated,  inter-alia, as under:

“We are living separately from each other since   23.9.2005. Now there is no chance of our living   together as husband and wife.”

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IV. Respondent  no.2  was  examined  in  the  second  motion  by  the  

learned District Judge, Ludhiana on 20.3.2008, wherein she stated as  

under:

“My  statement  was  recorded  on  19.9.2007  alongwith  the  statement  of  my  husband  Inderjit   Singh Grewal.  Six months time was given to us to   ponder over the matter but we could not reconcile.   One  child  was  born  from  our  wedlock  namely   Gurarjit  Singh  Grewal  whose  custody  has  been  handed over by me to my husband Inderjit Singh  Grewal and he shall look after the welfare of the  said  child.  We  have  settled  all  our  disputes   regarding  dowry  articles  and  past  and  future   permanent alimony. Now there is nothing left out   against each other. A draft of Rs.3,00,000/- ….has  been received by me towards permanent alimony  and maintenance and in lieu of dowry articles left   by  me  in  the  matrimonial  home.  We  are  living  separately since 23.9.2005. After that there is no  co-habitation between us. There is no scope of our   living together as husband and wife. I will remain  bound by the terms and conditions as enshrined in   the  petition.    I  have left  with  no claim against   petitioner No.1. Our marriage may be dissolved by  passing a decree of divorce by mutual consent.”

V. The  learned  District  Judge,  Ludhiana  granted  the  decree  of  

divorce dated 20.3.2008 observing as under:  

“They  have  settled  all  their  disputes  regarding   dowry articles, past and future alimony….They are  living  separately  from  each  other  since   23.9.2005…The petitioners have not been able to  reconcile….The  petitioners  have  settled  all  their   disputes regarding dowry, stridhan and past and  

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future  permanent  alimony….The  custody  of  the  son of  the  petitioners  is  handed over  to  Inderjit   Singh Grewal by Amandeep Kaur. The petition is   allowed. The marriage between the petitioners is   henceforth declared dissolved….”  

VI. The complaint dated 4.5.2009 filed by respondent no. 2 before  

the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana was investigated by the  

Superintendent of Police, City-I, Ludhiana.  He recorded statements of  

several neighbours and maid servant working in appellant’s house and  

submitted the report to the effect that as the husband and wife could not  

live together, they obtained the decree of divorce by mutual consent.  

However, the complainant Amandeep Kaur had alleged that she was  

induced by her husband to get divorce for settling in the United States  

and it was his intention   to kick her out from the house.  However, the  

husband stated that she had been paid Rs.3,00,000/- in the court by  

draft and Rs.27,00,000/- in cash for which the husband Inderjit Singh  

Grewal had entered into an agreement to sell  his ancestral  property.  

The complainant had not been living with the appellant after the decree  

of divorce and they were not having physical relationship with each  

other.  It was further suggested in the report that legal opinion may also  

be taken.  

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VII. Legal  opinion dated 2.6.2009  had been to the effect  that  the  

parties had taken divorce by mutual consent due to their differences.  

The allegation to the extent that they had been living together even  

after  divorce were false and baseless and had been labelled only to  

harass the appellant.  

9. The instant  case is  required to  be considered in  the aforesaid  

factual backdrop.  

 So far as the complaint dated 12.6.2009 is concerned, there had  

been  allegation  of  mis-behaviour  against  the  appellant  during  the  

period of year 2005. Respondent no. 2 alleged that during that period  

she had not been treated well by the appellant, thus, she had to take  

shelter  in the house of her parents;  all  her  belongings including the  

dowry articles were kept by the appellant and his parents.   She has  

further given details how both of them have obtained decree of divorce  

by  mutual  consent  as  they  wanted  to  settle  in  United  States  and  

therefore, they had decided to get divorce on paper so that the appellant  

may  go  to  U.S.A.  and  get  American  citizenship  by  negotiating  a  

marriage of convenience with some U.S. citizen and divorce her and  

again re-marry the complainant.   She further alleged that  even after  

decree of divorce she had been living with the appellant till 7.2.2009  

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and continued co-habitation with him. They had visited several places  

together during this period. The child had been forcibly snatched from  

her by the appellant. Therefore, she was entitled to the custody of the  

minor child along with other reliefs.  

 10. The  question  does  arise  as  to  whether  reliefs  sought  in  the  

complaint can be granted by the criminal court so long as the judgment  

and decree  of  the  Civil  Court  dated 20.3.2008 subsists.  Respondent  

no.2  has prayed as under:  

“It is therefore prayed that the respondent no.1 be   directed  to  hand  over  the  custody  of  the  minor  child Gurarjit  Singh Grewal forthwith. It  is also   prayed that the respondent no.1 be directed to pay   to her a sum of Rs.15,000/- per month  by way of   rent   of  the  premises  to  be  hired  by  her  at   Ludhiana for her residence.  It is also prayed that   all the respondents be directed to restore to her all   the dowry articles as detailed in Annexure A to C   or in the alternative they be directed to pay to her   a sum of Rs.22,95,000/- as the price of the dowry  articles. Affidavit attached.”

Thus, the reliefs sought have been threefolds:  

(a)  Custody  of  the  minor  son;  (b)  right  of  residence;  and  (c)  

restoration of dowry articles.  

11. It   is   a   settled legal  proposition that  where  a  person gets    

an  order/office  by  making  misrepresentation  or  playing  fraud  

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upon the competent  authority, such order cannot be sustained in the  

eyes of the law as fraud unravels everything.  “Equity is always known  

to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to  

evade law”.  It is a trite that “Fraud and justice never dwell together”  

(fraus  et  jus  nunquam  cohabitant).   Fraud  is  an  act  of  deliberate  

deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not  

due. Fraud and deception are synonymous. “Fraud is an anathema to all  

equitable  principles  and  any  affair  tainted  with  fraud  cannot  be  

perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine”. An  

act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. (Vide: Meghmala &  

Ors. v. G. Narasimha Reddy & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 383)

12. However, the question does arise as to whether  it is permissible  

for a party to treat the judgment and order as null and void without  

getting it set aside from the competent court.    

The issue is no more  res integra and stands settled by a  

catena of decisions of this Court. For setting aside such an order, even  

if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. (Vide:  State  

of  Kerala  v.  M.K.  Kunhikannan  Nambiar  Manjeri  Manikoth,  

Naduvil  (dead)  &  Ors., AIR  1996  SC  906; and  Tayabbhai  M.  

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Bagasarwalla  & Anr.  v.  Hind Rubber Industries  Pvt.  Ltd.,  AIR  

1997 SC 1240).

13. In  Sultan Sadik v. Sanjay Raj Subba & Ors., AIR 2004 SC  

1377, this Court held that there cannot be any doubt that even if an  

order  is  void  or  voidable,  the  same requires  to  be  set  aside  by  the  

competent court.   

14. In M. Meenakshi & Ors. v. Metadin Agarwal (dead) by Lrs. &  

Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 470, this Court considered the issue at length and  

observed that if the party feels that the order passed by the court or a  

statutory authority is non-est/void, he  should question the validity of  

the said order before the appropriate forum resorting to the appropriate  

proceedings. The Court observed as under:–

“It is well settled principle of law that even a void   order is required to be set aside by a competent   Court of law, inasmuch as an order may be void in  respect of one person but may be valid in respect   of another. A void order is necessarily not non-est.   An  order  cannot  be  declared  to  be  void  in   collateral proceedings and that too in the absence  of the authorities who were the authors thereof.”   (Emphasis added)

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Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Sneh Gupta v.  

Devi Sarup & Ors., (2009) 6 SCC 194.  

From the above, it is evident that even if a decree is void  

ab initio,  declaration to that effect has to be obtained by the person  

aggrieved   from  the  competent  court.  More  so,  such  a  declaration  

cannot be obtained in collateral proceedings.   

15. Respondent no.2 herself had been a party to the fraud committed  

by the appellant upon the civil court for getting the decree of divorce as  

alleged by her in the impugned complaint.  Thus,  according to her own  

admission she herself is an abettor to the crime.   

         A person alleging his own infamy cannot be heard at any forum  

as explained by the legal maxim “allegans suam turpetudinem non est   

audiendus”. No one should have an advantage from his own wrong  

(commondum  ex  injuria  sua  memo habere  debet).  No action  arises  

from an immoral cause (ex turpi cause non oritur action).   Damage  

suffered by consent is not a cause of action (volenti non fit injuria). The  

statements/allegations  made  by  the  respondent  no.2  patently  and  

latently  involve  her  in  the  alleged  fraud committed  upon the  court.  

Thus, she made herself  disentitled for any equitable relief.  

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16. The offence of abetment is complete when the alleged abettor  

has  instigated  another  or  engaged with  another  in  a conspiracy  to  

commit offence. (Vide: Faguna Kanta Nath v. The State of Assam,  

AIR 1959 SC 673;  and Jamuna Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1967 SC  

553).   If  more  than  one  person  combining  both  in  intent  and  act,  

commit an offence jointly, each is guilty, as if he has done the whole  

act alone.  Offence has been defined under Section 40 IPC and Section  

43  IPC defines illegality.  Making false statement on oath before the  

court  is  an  offence  under  Section  191  IPC  and  punishable  under  

Section 193 IPC.

17. While  granting  the  decree  of  divorce,  the  statement  of  

respondent no.2 had been recorded in the first as well as in the second  

motion as mentioned hereinabove. Period of more than 6 months was  

given  to  her  to  think  over  the  issue.  However,  she  made  a  similar  

statement in the second motion as well.  

18. As per the statutory requirement, the purpose of second motion  

after a period of six months is that parties may make further efforts for  

reconciliation in order to save their marriage.  There is also obligation  

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on the part of the court under Section 23(2) of the Act 1955 to make  

every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties.   

           In Jagraj Singh v. Birpal Kaur, AIR 2007 SC 2083, this Court  

held that conjugal rights are not merely creature of statute but inherent  

in the very institution of marriage.  Hence, the approach of a court of  

law  in  matrimonial  matters  should  be  “much  more  constructive,  

affirmative  and  productive  rather  than  abstract,  theoretical  or  

doctrinaire”.  The court should not give up the effort of reconciliation  

merely on the ground that there is no chance for reconciliation or one  

party or the other says that there is no possibility of living together.  

Therefore, it is merely a misgiving that the courts are not concerned  

and obligated to save the sanctity of the institution of marriage.

19. In Smt. Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, AIR 1992 SC 1304, this  

Court held that mere filing the petition for divorce by mutual consent  

does  not  authorise  the  court  to  make  a  decree  for  divorce.  The  

interregnum waiting period from 6 to 18 months is obviously intended  

to give time and opportunity  to the parties to reflect on their move and  

seek advice from relations and friends.  In this transitional period one  

of the parties may have a second thought and change the mind not to  

proceed with the petition.  The court must be satisfied about the bona  

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fides and the consent of  the parties for the reason that  court  gets  

jurisdiction to make a decree for divorce only on mutual consent at the  

time of enquiry.  The consent must continue to decree nisi and must be  

valid subsisting consent when the case is heard. Thus, withdrawal of  

consent can be unilateral prior to second motion.  The Court further  

observed:  

“The 'living separately' for a period of one year   should be immediately preceding the presentation  of  the petition.  It  is  necessary that  immediately   preceding the presentation of petition, the parties   must have been living separately. The expression  'living  separately',  connotes  to  our  mind  not   living like husband and wife. It has no reference   to the place of living. The parties may live under  the same roof by force of circumstances, and yet   they may not be living as husband and wife. The.   parties may be living in different houses and yet   they could live as husband and wife. What seems  to be necesssary  is  that  they have no desire  to  perform marital obligations and with that mental   attitude  they  have  been  living  separately  for  a   period  of  one  year  immediately  preceding  the  presentation  of  the  petition.  The  second  requirement that they 'have not been able to live   together' seems to indicate the concept of broken   down marriage and it  would not be possible to  reconcile  themselves.  The  third  requirement  is   that they have mutually agreed that the marriage  should be dissolved.”                 (Emphasis added)

20. For grant of divorce in such a case, the Court has to be satisfied  

about  the  existence  of  mutual  consent  between the parties  on  some  

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tangible materials  which demonstrably disclose such consent.  (Vide:  

Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, AIR 2011 SC 1637).  

21. Respondent no.2, who did not change her stand in the second  

motion and obtained a sham decree of divorce as alleged by her  asked  

the criminal court to sit in appeal against the judgment and decree of  

the  competent  Civil  Court.   The  complaint  was  filed  before  the  

Magistrate, Jalandhar  while the decree of divorce had been granted by  

the  District  Judge,  Ludhiana  i.e.  of  another  district.  Therefore,  it  is  

beyond  our  imagination  as  under  what  circumstances  a  subordinate  

criminal court  can sit in appeal  against the judgment and order of the  

superior Civil Court, having a different territorial jurisdiction.  

22. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the submission made  

on behalf of respondent no.2 that the judgment and decree of a Civil  

Court granting divorce is null and void and they continued to be the  

husband and wife, cannot be taken note of at this stage unless the suit  

filed by  the respondent no.2 to declare the said judgment and decree  

dated  20.3.2008   is  decided  in  her  favour.   In  view  thereof,  the  

evidence adduced by her particularly the record of the telephone calls,  

photographs attending a wedding together and her signatures in school  

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diary of the child cannot be taken into consideration so long as the  

judgment  and  decree  of  the  Civil  Court  subsists.   On  the  similar  

footing,  the contention advanced by her counsel that even after the  

decree of divorce, they continued to live together as husband and wife  

and therefore the complaint under  the Act 2005 is maintainable, is not  

worth acceptance at this stage.

     23. In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469, this  

Court considered the expression “domestic relationship” under Section  

2(f)  of the Act 2005 placing reliance on  earlier judgment in Savitaben  

Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat & Ors.,  (2005) 3 SCC 636  

and  held  that  relationship  “in  the  nature  of  marriage”  is  akin  to  a  

common law marriage. However,  the couple must hold themselves out  

to society as being akin to spouses in addition to fulfilling all other  

requisite conditions for a valid marriage.

The said judgments are distinguishable on facts as those  

cases relate to live-in relationship without marriage. In the instant case,  

the parties got married and the decree of Civil Court for divorce still  

subsists.  More so, a suit to declare the said judgment and decree as a  

nullity is still pending consideration before the competent court.   

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24. Submissions  made  by  Shri  Ranjit  Kumar  on  the  issue  of  

limitation, in view of the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C., that the  

complaint could be filed only within a period of one year from the date  

of the incident seem to be preponderous in view of the provisions of  

Sections  28 and 32 of  the  Act  2005 read  with  Rule  15(6)  of   The  

Protection  of  Women  from  Domestic  Violence  Rules,  2006  which  

make the provisions of Cr.P.C. applicable and stand fortified by the  

judgments  of  this  court  in   Japani  Sahoo  v.  Chandra  Sekhar  

Mohanty, AIR  2007  SC  2762;  and   Noida  Entrepreneurs  

Association v. Noida & Ors., (2011) 6 SCC 508.  

    25. In  view  of  the  above,  we  are  of  the  considered  opinion  that  

permitting the Magistrate to proceed further with the complaint under  

the provisions of the Act 2005 is not compatible and in consonance  

with the decree of divorce which still  subsists and thus, the process  

amounts  to  abuse  of  the  process  of  the  court.   Undoubtedly,  for  

quashing a complaint, the court has to take its contents on its face value  

and in case the same discloses an offence, the court generally does not  

interfere with the same.  However, in the backdrop of the factual matrix  

of this case, permitting the court to proceed with the complaint would  

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be travesty of justice. Thus, interest of justice warrants quashing of the  

same.  

26.    The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and  

order dated 9.8.2010 is hereby set aside. Petition filed by the appellant  

under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  is  allowed.   Complaint  No.  87/02/09  

pending before the Magistrate, Jalandhar and all orders passed therein  

are quashed.  

Before parting with the case,  we clarify that respondent  

no.2 shall  be entitled to continue with her other cases and the court  

concerned  may  proceed  in  accordance  with  law  without  being  

influenced by the  observations  made herein.   The said  observations  

have  been  made  only  to  decide  the  application  under  Section  482  

Cr.P.C. filed by the appellant.        

            ………………………………….J.     (P. SATHASIVAM)

  …………………………………..J.    (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi August 23,   2011

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