30 July 2019
Supreme Court
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HUCHANAGOUDA Vs THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND LAND ACQUSITION OFFICER

Bench: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. BOPANNA
Judgment by: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI
Case number: C.A. No.-005976-005976 / 2019
Diary number: 27982 / 2017
Advocates: SUPREETA SHARANAGOUDA Vs


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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL  No(s). 5976  OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(C) No(s).18232 OF 2019

@ SLP(C) DIARY NO.27982 OF 2017)

HUCHANAGOUDA                                       Appellant(s)

                               VERSUS

THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND  LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER & ANR.   Respondent(s)

WITH  CIVIL APPEAL  No(s).5977 OF 2019

(Arising out of SLP(C) No(s).18233 OF 2019 @ SLP(C) Diary No(s). 27981/2017)  

J U D G M E N T BANUMATHI, J:

(1) Leave granted.  

(2) The  Government  notified  the  lands  in-question  for

acquisition  for  the  purpose  of  rehabilitating  the  Veerapur

villagers on account of implementation of Hirehalla project on

16.10.2003.   The  Land  Acquisition  Officer  passed  the  award

dated 08.03.2006 fixing the value of the land at the rate of

Rs.24,500/-  per  acre.   In  reference,  the  Court  raised  the

market value to Rs.1,26,500/- per acre.  In appeal, the High

Court has taken into account the market value determined in

respect  of  acquisition  under  another  Notification  dated

24.11.1994, pointing out that the present notification is dated

16.10.2003 and there being a gap of about eight years and ten

months and twenty two days from the earlier Notification dated

24.11.1994, the High court granted 5% escalation for the gap of

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about nine years between 24.11.1994 and 16.10.2003 and arrived

at the market value of Rs.1,55,133/- which is rounded off to

Rs.1,56,000/- per acre.  Being aggrieved, the claimants have

preferred these appeals seeking further enhancement.

(3) We  have  heard  Mr.  Sharanagouda  Patil,  learned  counsel

appearing for the appellants and Mr. Navin R. Nath, learned

counsel  appearing  for  respondent  No.2  and  also  perused  the

impugned judgment and the materials on record.

(4) Mr.  Navin  R.  Nath,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the

respondent, has submitted that SLP(C)No.22784 of 2016 arising

out of the same project had been filed by another land owner.

The said special leave petition was mainly dismissed by this

Court vide Order dated 10.01.2018 mainly on the ground of delay

in filing the special leave petition.

(5) Mr. Sharanagouda Patil, learned counsel appearing for the

appellants-claimants, has placed reliance on the judgment of

this  Court  in  Imrat  Lal  and  Others v.  Land  Acquisition

Collector and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 133, and has submitted that

in case of land acquisition matters there is necessity to take

the judicial notice of the fact that in India villagers are by

and large poor and therefore the delay in filing the special

leave petition cannot be the reason to deny the just and fair

compensation to the claimants.  It was submitted that the Court

should adopt liberal approach where there is a delay in filing

the special leave petition.  This Court in para ‘11’ of Imrat

Lal (Supra) has held as under:

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“11. We can take judicial notice of the fact that villagers in our country are by and large illiterate  and  are  not  conversant  with  the intricacies of law. They are usually guided by their co-villagers, who are familiar with the proceedings in the Courts or the advocates with whom they get in touch for redressal of their grievance. Affidavits filed in support of the applications  for  condonation  of  delay  are usually drafted by the advocates on the basis of half baked information made available by the affected persons. Therefore, in the acquisition matters  involving  claim  for  award  of  just compensation, the Court should adopt a liberal approach and either grant time to the party to file better affidavit to explain delay or suo motu  take  cognizance  of  the  fact  that  large number of other similarly situated persons who were  affected  by  the  determination  of compensation by the Land Acquisition Officer or the Reference Court have been granted relief.”

(6) We further take note that this Court in the case of Dhiraj

Singh  (Dead)  Thr.  Lrs.  And  Others v.  State  of  Haryana  and

Others, (2014) 14 SCC 127, has considered the issue relating to

condonation of delay in land acquisition matters and the manner

in which the equities are to be balanced.  It is held therein

as hereunder:

“15. Equities  can  be  balanced  by  denying  the appellants’ interest for the period for which they did  not  approach  the  Court.   The  substantive rights of the appellants should not be allowed to be  defeated  on  technical  grounds  by  taking hypertechnical  view  of  self-imposed  limitations. In  the  matter  of  compensation  for  land acquisition, we are of the view that approach of the court has to be pragmatic and not pedantic.

16. The  principles  regarding  condonation  of delay  particularly  in  land  acquisition  matters, have been enunciated in Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, wherein it is sated in para 3 as under:

“3. The legislature has conferred the power  to  condone  delay  by  enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963

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in  order  to  enable  the  courts  to  do substantial  justice  to  parties  by disposing of matters on ‘merits’.  The expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by  the  legislature  is  adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice – that being the life-purpoe for the existence of the institution of courts.  It is common  knowledge  that  this  Court  has been  making  a  justifiably  liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court.  But the message does not appear to  have  percolated  down  to  all  the other  courts  in  the  hierarchy.   And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that:

(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

(2) Refusing to condone delay can result  in  a  meritorious  matter  being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated.  As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would  be  decided  on  merits  after hearing the parties.

(3) ‘Every  day’s  delay  must  be explained’  does  not  mean  that  a pedantic approach should be made.  Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay?  The doctrine must be applied in a  rational  common  sense  pragmatic manner.

(4) When  substantial  justice  and technical  considerations  are  pitted against  each  other,  cause  of substantial  justice  deserved  to  be preferred  for  the  other  side  cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

(5) There  is  no  presumption  that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides.  A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay.  In fact he runs a serious risk.

(6) It  must  be  grasped  that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on

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technical  grounds  but  because  it  is capable  of  removing  injustice  and  is expected to do so.”

Further, even if the consideration is made on merits after

condoning the delay, the determination of the market value will

in  all  event  relate  back  to  the  date  of  preliminary

notification  and  as  such  there  is  no  prejudice  to  the

acquisition authority nor added advantage to the land loser.

The aspect relating to interest can be taken care by denying it

to the land loser for the period of delay.

(7) Following the above judgment and for the further reasons

assigned above, in our view the delay of 2154 days in filing

and 252 days in refiling S.L.P.(C) Diary No.27982 of 2017 as

also the delay of 2109 days in filing and 250 days in refiling

S.L.P.(C)Diary No.27981 of 2017 cannot be a reason to deny the

consideration of the matter on merits regarding the claim of

the appellant for just and fair compensation.

(8) The High Court has granted 5% escalation for the gap of

about  nine  years  between  24.11.1994  and  16.10.2003.

Admittedly, the acquisition of the land was for rehabilitating

the  Veerapur  villagers  on  account  of  implementation  of

Hirehalla  Project.   Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the

appellants has submitted that though the acquired land on the

date of acquisition was agricultural land the very fact that it

is acquired for rehabilitation which is non-agricultural use,

the same has the potential for development for being converted

into  building  sites  and  had  the  potential  of  being  put  to

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better use.  Reliance was placed by learned counsel for the

appellants on the judgment of this Court in  General Manager,

Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai

Patel and Another, (2008) 14 SCC 745.  Pointing out that there

should be significant increases in the market value of the land

in para ‘14’ of Rameshbhai (supra) it was held by this Court

which reads as under :   

“14.  On  the  other  extreme,  in  remote  rural areas  where  there  was  no  chance  of  any development and hardly any buyers, the prices stagnated  for  years  or  rose  marginally  at  a nominal rate of 1% or 2% per annum. There is thus a significant difference in increases in market value of lands in urban/semi-urban areas and increases in market value of lands in the rural  areas.  Therefore  if  the  increase  in market value in urban/semi-urban areas is about 10%  to  15%  per  annum,  the  corresponding increases in rural areas would at best be only around half of it, that is about 5% to 7.5% per annum. This rule of thumb refers to the general trend in the nineties, to be adopted in the absence of clear and specific evidence relating to increase in prices. Where there are special reasons for applying a higher rate of increase, or any specific evidence relating to the actual increase  in  prices,  then  the  increase  to  be applied would depend upon the same.”

(9) In the present case, though the land is stated to be an

agricultural  land  in  Veerapur  Village,  considering  the

potentiality of the land for development, the escalation is

granted at the rate of 10% with cumulative effect as under :

“1994 -    Rs.1,00,000/- 1995 -     Rs.1,10,000/- 1996 -     Rs.1,21,000/- 1997 -     Rs.1,33,100/- 1998 -     Rs.1,46,410/- 1999 -     Rs.1,61,051/- 2000 -     Rs.1,77,156/- 2001 -     Rs.1,94,872/- 2002 -     Rs.2,14,359/-

2003 -     Rs.2,35,795/-”

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(10) Awarding  10%  increase,  the  appellants-claimants  are

entitled  to  Rs.2,35,795/-  per  acre.   Accordingly,  the

compensation awarded to the appellants-claimants is enhanced to

Rs.2,35,795/- per acre.  Needless to point out that for the

period of delay in filing and in refiling the special leave

petitions the appellants-claimants shall not be entitled to any

interest on the enhanced compensation and statutory amount.

(11) The impugned judgment(s) of the High Court is modified to

the extent indicated above and the appeals are partly allowed.

There shall be no order as to costs.

..........................J.                 (R. BANUMATHI)

..........................J.         (A.S. BOPANNA)

NEW DELHI, JULY  30, 2019.