NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 1462 OF 2019

(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 14820 of 2017)

Hori Lal ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.        ….Respondent(s)

              J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment

and order dated 09.03.2017 of the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No.44731 of

2016 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court

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dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant

herein.  

3. A few relevant facts need mention to appreciate

the short controversy involved in this appeal.

4. The appellant herein was the writ petitioner

whereas the respondents herein were the respondents

in the writ petition filed before the High Court out of

which this appeal arises.

5. In exercise of the powers conferred under

Section 4  (1)  of the  Land Acquisition Act,  1894  (for

short called “the Act 1894”), the State of UP

(respondent No.1 herein) issued a notification on

30.10.2002 (Annexure P­1) for acquisition of lands as

detailed in the schedule to the notification.  

6. The acquisition was for the public purpose,

namely, construction of Varanasi Bye­Pass (Ring Road)

in District Varanasi. The State, however, invoked the

urgency clause under Section 17 and, therefore,

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dispensed with the inquiry as provided in Section 5­A

of the Act, 1894. This was followed by a declaration

made under Section 6 on 29.11.2003. The appellant's

land was acquired in these acquisition proceedings.

7.  "The Act, 1894" was repealed on 01.01.2014 and

was replaced by another Act called “the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition

Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013” (for short

called “the Act, 2013”). The Act 2013 came into force

on 01.01.2014.

8. The Land Acquisition Officer, however, passed an

award  on  30.06.2016 (Annexure  P­4), i.e., after the

repeal of the Act, 1894 in relation to the

aforementioned lands by determining the

compensation payable to the landowner (appellant

herein) accordingly.

9. The appellant (writ petitioner) thereupon felt

aggrieved by the entire acquisition proceedings

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including passing of the award dated 30.06.2016 and

filed the  writ petition in the Allahabad  High  Court

challenging therein the validity and legality of the

notification issued under Section 4 of  the Act,  1894

dated 30.10.2002 as also the award dated 30.06.2016.

10. The main challenge of the appellant to the

acquisition proceedings was that the entire acquisition

proceedings initiated by the respondent­State on the

strength  of  notification issued  on  30.10.2002  under

Section  4 of the  Act, 1894  which eventually led to

passing of the award on 30.06.2016, stood lapsed

consequent upon the repeal of the Act, 1894.  

11. It is  pertinent to mention here  that  during the

hearing before the High Court, the writ petitioner

(appellant herein) expressly gave up his challenge to

the acquisition proceedings and confined his challenge

only to the manner in which the determination of  the

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compensation was done by the Land Acquisition

Officer and, in consequence, to its quantum.

12. The State, in the counter affidavit filed before the

High Court,   placed reliance on the order of the

Central Government issued under Section 113 of the

Act, 2013 and contended that the compensation

payable to the appellant would be determined on the

basis of market value as it was prevalent on

01.01.2014. .

13. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the

writ petition. The High Court held that in view of the

stand taken by the State in this case, that the

compensation payable to the appellant would be

determined on the basis of market value of the land in

question as it  was prevalent on 01.01.2014, nothing

survives for deciding any question. The appellant was,

however, granted liberty to claim reference to the

competent authority for determination of the

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compensation under the Act, 2013 in accordance with

law.  

14. It is against this order of the High Court, the writ

petitioner has felt  aggrieved and filed this appeal by

way of special leave in this Court.

15. The short question, which arises for

consideration in this appeal, is whether the High Court

was justified in dismissing the appellant's writ petition

and, if so, whether the reasoning of the High Court is

legal, just and proper.

16. Heard Mr. Pallav Sisodia, learned senior counsel

for the appellant and Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned

Solicitor General for the respondents.

17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no

merit in this appeal.

18. As mentioned above, the High Court held that in

the light of the stand taken by the State contending in

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their counter that the appropriate date for determining

the market value of the appellant's acquired land

would be the date, which is declared by the Central

Government, i.e., “01.01.2014” and, therefore, the

State  would  determine the  compensation payable to

the  appellant accordingly.   This  order is  not  under

challenge in these proceedings.

19. Indeed, once the State took a defense in this case

that the compensation in the case of the  appellant

would be determined keeping in view 01.01.2014 to be

the date as the basis, the appellant should feel

satisfied with this stand. The apparent reason is that

though the acquisition was made under the old Act in

2002 yet the appellant was held entitled to get

compensation under the New Act, 2013 by taking

01.01.2014 as the base date for determination of the

compensation.

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20. We, therefore, find no good ground to accept the

submission of the learned  counsel for the  appellant

when he contended that the date for determining the

compensation should be the date on which the Land

Acquisition Officer passed the award. This argument

does not have any basis and is, therefore, not

acceptable for the simple reason that such date is not

provided either in the  old  Act,  1894  or in the  Act,

2013.  

21. Indeed, how the compensation is required to be

determined and with reference to what date, is

provided under the Act and admittedly the date

suggested by the learned counsel is not the date

prescribed either in the old Act or the new Act. This

submission has, therefore, no merit and deserves to be

rejected. It is accordingly rejected.

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22. We, therefore, find no good ground to take a

different view than what was taken by the High Court

in the impugned order.  

23. As mentioned above, since the challenge to the

acquisition proceedings was expressly given up by the

appellant (writ petitioner) in the High Court, the High

Court rightly  did  not  decide this question.  We  also

need not examine this question in the present appeal.  

24. However, before parting, we consider it apposite

to mention that the appellant would be entitled to get

the compensation re­determined by the competent

authority in accordance with the procedure prescribed

under the Act, 2013 as per the liberty granted by the

High Court in the impugned order.

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25. The appeal thus fails and is accordingly

dismissed.  

………...................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]   

                                                                    ....……..................................J.

       [R. SUBHASH REDDY] New Delhi; February 05, 2019.

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