HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA
Bench: A.K. SIKRI,ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN
Case number: C.A. No.-004003-004003 / 2007
Diary number: 8586 / 2007
Advocates: MANIK KARANJAWALA Vs
V. N. RAGHUPATHY
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4003 OF 2007
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. …APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF KARNATAKA …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
R.F.Nariman, J.
1. The appellant is a public limited company having a tea
manufacturing unit at Dharwad and various other units which
also manufacture tea. The tea manufactured by the appellant is
of three types, namely, packet tea, tea in tea bags, and quick
brewing black tea. It is claimed that the Dharwad Unit, as
opposed to the other units manufacturing tea, is a new unit and
is, therefore, exempt altogether from payment of entry tax on
packing material of tea under a notification dated 31.3.1993
issued under Section 11A of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of
Goods Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the “Karnataka
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Entry Tax Act”). Insofar as the other units are concerned, it is
the case of the appellant they are covered by Explanation II to
a Notification dated 23.9.1998 issued under Section 3 of the
said Act, and “packing material” being covered by the said
Explanation would entitle them to pay entry tax at the rate of
1% and not 2%. In these appeals, we are concerned with three
assessment years 1994-1995, 1995-1996 and 1996-1997.
2. The question that arises for decision in this appeal is
whether “packing materials” which enter the local area for
consumption therein, that is for packing tea that is
manufactured by the appellant, can be said to be raw material,
components, or inputs used in the manufacture of tea. In order
to answer this question, it is necessary to first set out the
relevant provisions of the Karnataka Entry Tax Act. They are as
follows:
“2. Definitions.- (A) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(4a) goods means all kinds of moveable property (other than newspapers, actionable claims, stocks and shares and securities) and includes livestock;
(7) “Schedule” means a schedule appended to this Act;
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(8) “tax” means tax leviable under this Act;
(8a) ‘Value of the goods’ shall mean the purchase value of such goods that is to say, the purchase price at which a dealer has purchased the goods inclusive of charges borne by him as cost of transportation, packing, forwarding and handling charges, commission, insurance, taxes, duties and the like, or if such goods have not been purchased by him, the prevailing market price of such goods in the local area.
(B) Words and expressions used in this Act, but not defined, shall have the meaning assigned to them in the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 25 of 1957.)
3. Levy of tax.- (1) There shall be levied and collected a tax on entry of any goods specified in the FIRST SCHEDULE into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein, at such rates not exceeding five percent of the value of the goods as may be specified retrospectively or prospectively by the State Government by notification and different dates and different rates may be specified in respect of different goods or different classes of goods or different local areas.
11A. Power of State Government to exempt or reduce tax.-
(1) The State Government may, if in its opinion it is necessary in public interest so to do, by notification and subject to such restrictions and conditions and for such period as may be specified in the notification, exempt or reduce either prospectively or retrospectively the tax payable under this Act,-
(i) by any specified class of persons or class of dealers or in respect of any goods or class of goods; or
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(ii) on entry of all or any goods or class of goods into any specified local area.
(2) The State Government may, by notification cancel or vary any notification issued under sub-section (1).
(3) Where any restriction or condition specified under sub-section (1) is contravened or is not observed by a dealer or a declaration furnished under the said sub-section is found to be wrong, then such dealer shall be liable to pay by way of penalty an amount equal to twice the difference between the tax payable at the rates specified by or under the Act and the tax paid at the rates specified under the notification on the value of such goods in respect of which such contravention or non-observance has taken place or a wrong declaration is furnished:
Provided that before taking action under the sub-section the dealer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
FIRST SCHEDULE
(See Section 3 (1))
66. Packing materials namely :-
(i) fibre board cases, paper boxes, folding cartons, paper bags, carrier bags and card board boxes, corrugated board boxes and the like.
(ii) tin plate containers (cans, tins and boxes) tin sheets, aluminium foil, aluminium tubes, collapsible tubes, aluminium or steel drums, barrels and crates and the like ;
(iii) plastic, poly-vinyl chloride and polyethylene films bottles, pots, jars, boxes, crates, cans, carboys, drums, bags and cushion materials and the like ;
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(iv) wooden boxes, crates, casks and containers and the like;
(v) gunny bags, bardan (including batars), hessian cloth, and the like ;
(vi) glass bottles, jars and carboys and the like ;
(vii) laminated pacing materials such as bitumanised paper and hessian based paper and the like;
80. Raw materials component parts and inputs which are used in the manufacture of an intermediate or finished product.”
3. Under Section 11A of the Act, a Notification dated
31.3.1993, exempting raw materials, component parts, and
inputs entering a local area for use in the manufacture of an
intermediate or finished product, was promulgated. It reads as
under:
“Entry tax on raw materials, etc. for use in manufacture of goods by new industrial units – Exemption (Karnataka)
Notification III No.FD.11.CET 93 dated the 31st March,1993
[Public in Karnataka Gazette, Extraordinary No. 201, Part 4-C(ii) dated 31st March, 1993]
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 11-A of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979 the Government of Karnataka being of the opinion that it is necessary in the public interest so to do,
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hereby exempts with effect from the first day of April, 1993 the tax payable under the said act, on the entry of raw materials, component parts and inputs and machinery and its parts into a local area for use in the manufacture of an intermediate or finished product by the new industrial units mentioned in column (2) of the Table below located in the zones specified in column (3) and for the period mentioned in Column (4) thereof.
TABLE
Sl.No. Type of Industry Location of Industry Period of exemption 1 2 3 4
1. Tiny/Small/medium and large scale industrial units
Situated in Zone-III specified in annexure-I to Government Order No. CI/138 SPC/90, dated 27.9.1990
4 years from the date of commencement of commercial production or 4 years from the date of commencement of this notification whichever is later.
2. Tiny/small/medium and large scale industrial units
Situated in Zone-IV specified in annexure I to Government Order No. CI/138/SPC/90, dated 27.9.1990
5 years from the date of commencement of commercial production or 5 years from the date of commencement of this notification whichever is later.
3. Tiny/small scale/ Medium and large scale industrial units in the thrust sector as defined in annexure-II to G.O. No. CI.138/SPC/90, dated 27.9.1990
Situated in Zone-III specified in annexure I to Government Order No. CI/138/SPC/90, dated 27.9.1990
5 years from the date of commencement of commercial production
OR 5 years from the date of commencement of this notification whichever is later.
4. Tiny/small scale/ Medium and large scale industrial units in the thrust sector as defined in Annexure II to G.O. No. CI.138/SPC/90, dated 27.9.1990
Situated in Zone-IV specified in annexure-I to Government Order No. CI/138/SPC/90, dated 27.9.1990
6 years from the date of commencement of commercial production,
OR 6 years from the date of commencement of this notification whichever is later.
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_____________________________________________________________________________________
Explanation – (1) For the purpose of this notification “a new industrial unit” shall have the same meaning assigned to it in Notification No. FD 239 CSL 90(1) dated 19th June, 1991, issued under Section 8-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957.
(2) The provisions of the notification shall not apply to a unit to which the provisions of Notification No. FD 239 CSL 90(1) dated 19th June, 1991 issued under Section 8-A of the Karnataka Salex Tax Act, 1957 shall not apply.
(3) The procedure specified in Notification No. FD 239 CSL 90(1), dated 19th June, 1991 issued under Section 8-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 for claiming exemption under that notification shall mutates mutandis apply to a industrial unit claiming exemption under this notification.”
4. By a notification dated 31.3.1994, various goods which
entered a local area were charged at different rates of entry tax.
This notification was struck down by the High Court as violating
Article 301 of the Constitution, and hence, the State
Government came out with notification dated 23.9.1998 to cure
the defects pointed out by the High Court, and was for the
period dated 1.4.1994 to 6.1.1998. The aforesaid notification
reads as follows:
“SI No.104
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No. FD 112 CET 98, Bangalore, dated 23rd September, 1998
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979 (Karnataka Act 27 of 1979), the Government of Karnataka, hereby specify that with effect from the First day of April, 1994 and upto 6 th day of January, 1998, tax shall be levied and collected under the said Act on the entry of goods specified in column (2) of the table below into a local area from any place outside the State of consumption or use therein, at the rates specified in the corresponding entries in column ; (3), thereof:-
TABLE
Sl. No. Commodity Rate of tax
1 2 3
3. Packing material namely:
(i) Fibre board cases, paper boxes, Folding 2%
cartons, paper bags, carrier bags and
card board boxes, corrugated board boxes
and the like;
(ii) Tin plate containers (cans, tins and 2%
boxes), tin sheets, aluminium foil,
aluminium tubes, collapsible tubes,
aluminium or steel drums, barrels and crates
and the like:
(iii) Plastic, polyvinyl chloride and polyethylene 2%
firms, bottles, pots, jars, boxes, crates, cans,
carboys, drums, bags and cushion materials
and the like;
(iv) Wooden boxes, crates, casks and containers 2%
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and the like;
(v) Gunny bags, bardan (including batars) hessian 2%
cloth and the like;
(vi) Glass bottles, jars and carboys and the like; 2%
(vii) Laminated packing materials, such as bluminised 2%
paper and hessian-based paper and the like;
4. Raw materials, component parts and inputs 1%
are used in the manufacture of an intermediate
of finished product.
Explanation I – The words “raw materials, component parts and any other inputs” do not include exempted goods which are specified in the Schedule, horticultural produce, cereals, pulses, oil seeds including copra and cotton seeds, timber or wood of any species, newsprint, silk cocoons, raw, thrown or twisted silk, tobacco (whether raw or cured) and blended yarn, man-made filament yarn, man-made fibre yarn, man-made fibre, woolen yarn and woolen blended yarn, washed cotton seed oil, non-refined edible oil, rice bran and oil cake and such other goods as may be notified by the State Government from time to time.
Explanation II – If any of the goods liable to tax under this Act are brought into a local area for use or consumption as raw materials, component parts and inputs in the manufacture of an intermediate or finished product, the tax payable on such goods shall be at the rate of one percent.”
5. All the authorities under the Entry Tax Act i.e. the
Assessing Authority, the First Appellate Authority and the
Karnataka Appellate Tribunal have held that packing material
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cannot be regarded as raw material, component parts or inputs
used in the manufacture of finished goods and, therefore, in the
context of the Entry Tax Act read with Schedule I, such packing
material is neither exempt nor chargeable at the rate of 1% on a
true construction of the aforesaid notifications of 1993 and
1998. The High Court in turn has dismissed the revision
petitions filed under the statute by the assessee following their
own judgment in Nestle India Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, a
Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court dated
22.3.2006. This is how the appellants have come before us in
the present civil appeals.
6. Shri Arvind Datar and Shri Kavin Gulati, learned senior
advocates, strenuously argued before us that the judgment in
the Nestle case, which was followed in the instant case, was
incorrect inasmuch as according to them “packing material” is
clearly an “input”, if not a component part of manufactured tea,
and would, therefore, qualify for exemption and/or lesser rate of
tax as the case may be. They also argued that Explanation II
to the Notification of 23.9.1998 made the position clear that
even though packing material may be covered under item 3 of
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the said Notification, yet, as it is an input in the manufacture of
the finished product tea, it would be covered by Explanation II,
and therefore would be taxable at the rate of 1% and not 2%.
They further argued that words and expressions that are not
defined under the Entry Tax Act but which are defined in the
Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 would have to be borrowed for
the purpose of the Entry Tax Act. In this regard, in particular,
they relied upon Section 5A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, and
in particular Explanation I to the aforesaid Section which
defined “industrial inputs” as meaning either a “component part”
or “raw material” or “packing materials”, and argued that
packing material has been recognized as an input under the
Karnataka Sales Tax Act, and should be so recognized under
the Entry Tax Act read with the two notifications aforesaid.
They also cited a large number of judgments of this Court and
of the High Court to buttress their submission that packing
material would certainly come within the expression “input” and
would therefore be covered by the aforesaid two notifications.
Shri Kavin Gulati also specifically pointed out the Tea
Marketing Control Order, 2003 made under Section 30 of the
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Tea Act, 1953 in which, “manufacturer” has been defined as a
person who also produces value added products commercially
known as tea, that is packet tea, tea box, etc., and therefore
went on to argue that it is obvious that packing material used to
market tea would necessarily be included.
7. Shri Patil, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of
the State of Karnataka, countered these submissions, and
stated that the High Court was absolutely correct in interpreting
the Entry Tax Act and the two notifications in the manner that it
did in Nestle case. He argued that the context of the Entry Tax
Act is most important and that decisions relatable to the Central
Excise Act and to Sales Tax statutes would not therefore apply.
His primary argument was that Schedule I of the Entry Tax Act
itself made a clear distinction between packing materials, on
the one hand, and raw materials, component parts and inputs,
on the other, the Schedule making it clear that they were
distinct and separate goods. He further adverted to the
definition of the expression “goods” contained in the Entry Tax
Act and argued that unlike in the Central Excise Act and in
Sales Tax statutes, goods need not be marketable, the
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definition confining goods to “movable property” without more.
He also argued that adverting to Section 5A of the Karnataka
Sales Tax Act would be of no help in the facts of the present
case inasmuch as we are not concerned with “industrial inputs”
but inputs as understood by the Entry Tax Act read with
Schedule I. According to him all the judgments cited by the
appellants were distinguishable in that none of them pertain to
any entry tax statute but were all under the Central Excise Act
or Sales Tax statutes.
8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it is
important to go back to a few fundamentals. As has been
explained in Escorts Limited v. CCE, (2015) 9 SCC 109, the
definition of “manufacture” in the Central Excise Act is
dependent upon the definition of “goods” defined by the
Constitution in Article 366(12). This Court has therefore held:-
“It is clear on a reading of this Entry that a duty of excise is only leviable on “goods” manufactured or produced in India. “Goods” has been defined under Article 366(12) as follows:
“366.Definitions.—In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say—
***
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(12) ‘goods’ includes all materials, commodities and articles;”
Each of these three expressions has been defined in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as follows:
“Materials”.—the matter of which a thing is or may be made; the constituent parts of something.
“Commodities”.—a thing of use or value; a thing that is an object of trade; a thing one deals in or makes use of.
“Articles”.—a particular item of business.
Although the definition of “goods” is an inclusive one, it is clear that materials, commodities and articles spoken of in the definition take colour from one another. In order to be “goods” it is clear that they should be known to the market as materials, commodities and articles that are capable of being sold.
In the basic judgment which has been referred to in every excise case for conceptual clarity, namely, Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. [(1977) 1 ELT 199 : AIR 1963 SC 791 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 586] , this Court held that for excise duty to be chargeable under the constitutional entry read with Section 3 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, two prerequisites are necessary. First, there must be “manufacture” which is understood to mean the bringing into existence of a new substance. And secondly, the word “goods” necessarily means that such manufacture must bring into existence a new substance known to the market as such which brings in the concept of marketability in addition to manufacture. …” [paras 8-11]
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9. However, on a perusal of the definition of “goods” in
Section 2(A)(4a) of the Entry Tax Act, the said definition is an
exhaustive one including all kinds of movable property and
livestock. It is obvious from a reading of this definition that
marketability does not appear to be a sine qua non for
something to qualify as “goods” under the Entry Tax Act, unlike
the Central Excise Act, and this basic fact will have to be kept in
view while dealing with some of the judgments that have been
cited before us. This is for the reason that anything that is
tangible, without more, and enters a local area for consumption,
sale or use therein is taxable, the taxable event being ‘entry’
and not ‘manufacture’ of goods, which, as has been noticed
hereinabove, brings in the concept of marketability in the
context of a duty of excise, which is absent in the context of
entry tax. We might also add that Section 2(A)(8a) wherein the
“value of the goods” is defined, also makes a distinction
between “goods” as such, and “packing material”, making it
clear that charges borne by a dealer as cost of packing would
have to be included in the “value of goods”. In the context of
the Entry Tax Act, the difference between ‘goods’ used in the
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manufacture of goods and “packing material” is also brought
out by Schedule I. Packing materials are separately defined in
Entry 66. On the other hand, raw materials, component parts
and inputs, which are used in the manufacture of an
intermediate or finished product, are separately and distinctively
given in Entry 80 thereof. The context of the Entry Tax Act
therefore is clear. When raw materials, component parts and
inputs are spoken of, obviously they refer to materials,
components and things which go into the finished product,
namely, tea in the present case, and cannot be extended to
cover packing materials of the said tea which is separately
provided for by the aforesaid Entry 66.
10. The notification dated 23.9.1998 issued under Section 3
uses identical language as that contained in Entries 66 and 80
of Schedule I to the Entry Tax Act. Equally, notification dated
31.3.1993 is an exemption notification issued under Section
11A which also uses the identical language of Entry 80 of
Schedule I. This being the case, it is clear that neither
notification can be read to include “packing material” as “raw
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materials, component parts or inputs used in the manufacture”
of tea.
11. This brings us to an argument made by learned counsel
for the appellants on the correct construction of Explanation II
to the notification dated 23.9.1998.
12. What has first to be seen is that packing material, and raw
materials, component parts and inputs are separately provided
for under the Schedule to the Act. The same is also true of the
aforesaid Notification. Packing material is contained in Entry 3
of the table whereas raw materials, component parts and inputs
are contained in Entry 4. The rate at which they are taxed is
also different – packing materials at 2%, whereas raw materials,
components parts and inputs are taxed at 1%. This being so,
the reason for inclusion of Explanation II appears to be that
goods which are liable to tax, being finished goods in
themselves, may yet be brought into a local area for use or
consumption as raw material, component parts and inputs in
the manufacture of an intermediate or finished product. It is
only such goods that are liable to be taxed at the rate of 1%. It
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is difficult to accept the argument on behalf of the appellants
that Explanation II makes it clear that though packing materials
may be liable to tax at 2%, yet if they fall in Explanation II, they
would be liable to tax at the rate of 1%. This would fly in the
face of the scheme of Schedule I of the statute which, as has
been held earlier, makes it clear that in no case can packing
materials be said to be raw materials, component parts or
inputs used in the manufacture of finished goods. For this
reason alone we find it difficult to construe the notification dated
23.9.1998 in the manner suggested by the appellants.
13. Even otherwise, there is no such Explanation II contained
in the exemption notification dated 31.3.1993. This being the
case, if we were to accept the case of the appellants, they
would be liable to tax at the rate of 1% under the 1998
notification but would not be exempt under the 1993
notification, thus rendering the same packing material liable to
tax at the rate of 2% in the case of the Dharwad unit and 1% in
the case of all other units. This would lead to an anomalous
situation which can best be avoided by not accepting the
argument on behalf of the appellants.
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14. Equally, the argument based on Section 5A of the
Karnataka Sales Tax Act is fallacious in that it is only for the
purpose of “industrial inputs” that packing materials are
included, and forms a separate scheme of taxation under the
Sales Tax statute. We cannot accede to the argument that de
hors the context of the Entry Tax Act, we should accept that
industrial inputs include packing materials and that therefore, by
parity of reasoning, “inputs” under the Entry Tax Act should also
include packing material. This argument has therefore correctly
been turned down by the High Court of Karnataka in the Nestle
case.
15. We have now to deal with the judgments cited on behalf
of the appellants. In Government of Andhra Pradesh v.
Guntur Tobaccos Ltd., [15 STC 240], this Court had to decide
as to whether the use of packing material should be regarded
as execution of a works contract and not as a sale. This Court
held on the facts in that case that packing material was part of
the process of re-drying tobacco as it was necessary to pack it
in a waterproof material to protect it from heat and humidity, so
as to store tobacco for a sufficiently long period to avoid
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fermentation, and to make the tobacco mature for use in
cigarettes, cigars, etc. The context of the judgment is entirely
different from the facts contained in the present case and would
thus have no relevance. Learned counsel for the appellants
tried to draw succour from this judgment stating that the idea of
packing tea is also to keep out moisture. While that may be so,
that single fact cannot lead to a conclusion that would drive a
coach and four through the scheme of the Entry Tax Act.
16. Brooke Bond Lipton India Ltd. v. State of Karnataka,
109 STC 265, was cited next. This is a High Court judgment
under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, in which it was stated that
packaging led to value addition for the purpose of excise and
sales tax, and that it was a possible view that packaged
blended tea produced in the industrial unit of the appellant is a
manufactured product in which packing materials are inputs.
This was in the context of exemption notifications under the
Sales Tax Act. As can be seen from paragraph 26 of the
aforesaid judgment, the questions involved in that case were
entirely different. Also, the test of what is “manufacture” was
borrowed from the Central Excise Act as can be seen from
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paragraph 48 of the judgment. The High Court points to a new
dimension to the word “manufacture” in the context of excise
which would therefore include within it packing material as well
in order that the goods be made marketable. This, as we have
seen above, cannot be done in the context of the Entry Tax Act.
17. In Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. (TELCO) v.
State of Bihar, (1994) 6 SCC 479, this Court had to deal with a
notification issued by the State of Bihar in the context of sales
tax. The expression “raw material” and “input” was used in the
notification. This Court held, following J.K. Cotton Spinning &
Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. S.T.O., (1965) 1 SCR 900, that the
expression “in the manufacture of goods” would normally
encompass the entire process carried on by the dealer of
converting raw materials into finished products. The precise
question before this Court was whether products finished in
themselves, such as tyres, tubes, batteries, etc., when
purchased by the appellant for use in the manufacture of
vehicles, could be said to be inputs. This Court held that as a
vehicle cannot be operative without tyres, tubes, and batteries,
obviously they were inputs in the sense of the dictionary
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meaning of what is “put in”. Both the fact situation and the ratio
of this judgment are far removed from the facts in the present
case inasmuch as it is nobody’s case that without the packing
material manufactured tea cannot be said to exist as a finished
product, it being “moveable property” and therefore “goods”
under the Karnataka Entry Tax Act. This judgment is also
therefore of no avail to the appellant.
18. M/s. Star Paper Mills Ltd. v. CCE, Meerut, (1989) 4
SCC 724, is an excise case in which an exemption Notification
exempted goods used as component parts in manufacture of
any goods on which excise duty was leviable. This judgment
defines the word “component” to mean a constituent part. In
this context, it was held that paper core is a component part of
paper delivered to the customer in rolls, but not in sheets as it
was not necessary for manufacture of paper sheets. This case
would have no application to the facts of the present case. It is
obvious that packing material used to pack a product complete
in itself, cannot possibly be included in the word “component”
as it is not a constituent part of manufactured tea.
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19. Three other judgments under the Central Excise Act were
cited. The first of them, CCE v. M/s. Eastend Paper
Industries Ltd., (1989) 4 SCC 244, was concerned with the
marketability aspect of central excise which, as has been held
by us above, would not apply in the context of the Entry Tax Act.
In that judgment, paper wrapping was held to be essential to
make the concerned goods marketable. The second of these
judgments CCE v. Ballarpur Industries Limited, (1989) 4 SCC
566, again concerned a completely different fact situation. The
question in that case was whether an admitted input, Sodium
Sulphate, in the manufacture of paper, would not be construed
to be a raw material only by reason that in the course of
chemical reactions Sodium Sulphate is consumed and burnt up.
This Court held that consumption and burning up would make
no difference, as an ‘input’ need not always manifest itself in the
final product. And in H.M.M. Ltd. V. CCE, (1994) 6 SCC 594, it
was held that a screw cap on a bottle containing Horlicks was a
component part of Horlicks, it being an essential ingredient to
complete the process of manufacture to make Horlicks
marketable. This judgment again will not apply for the same
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reason indicated above, namely, that marketability is not
relevant for the purpose of the Entry Tax Act.
20. M/s. J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v.
Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur, (1965) 1 SCR 900, is a judgment in
which Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act was pressed into
aid on behalf of the appellant. In this case, the question was
whether drawing materials, photographic materials etc. could be
comprehended within the expression “in the manufacture of
goods for sale” within the meaning of section 8(3)(b) of the
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. In order to determine whether
such materials would qualify as such, this Court held that where
any particular process is so integrally connected with the
ultimate production of goods that, but for that process,
manufacture or process of goods would be commercially
inexpedient, goods required in that process would fall within the
expression “in the manufacture of goods”. What has been said
about the excise cases squarely applies here. The expression
used in Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act is not “in the
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manufacture of goods”, but “in the manufacture of goods for
sale”, bringing in the element of marketability.
21. It only remains to deal with the argument made on behalf
of the appellant based on the Tea Marketing Control Order.
Needless to add, a manufacturer for the purpose of the said
Order is specifically a person who produces value added
products commercially known as tea. The context of the said
definition is for the purpose of registering manufacturers or
producers and buyers of tea, having relevance therefore to the
sale aspect of tea. As has already been held by us, the context
of entry tax being different, we are afraid this argument also
does not avail the appellant.
22. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was
correct in following its own earlier Division Bench judgment in
the Nestle case. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
..............................J. (A.K. SIKRI)
..............................J.
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(R.F. NARIMAN) New Delhi; September 2, 2016
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