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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 463 of 2006  

HET RAM BENIWAL & ORS.

.... Appellant(s) Versus

RAGHUVEER SINGH & ORS.

….Respondent(s) With  

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 464 of 2006  

BHURAMAL SWAMI

.... Appellant(s) Versus

RAGHUVEER SINGH & ORS.

….Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

The  Appellants  were  found  guilty  of  committing

contempt by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan

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at  Jodhpur.   Simple imprisonment  of  two months and

fine of Rs. 2,000/- each was imposed.  Aggrieved by the

said judgment, the Appellants have filed these Criminal

Appeals.  

2.  The Appellants along with Sheopat Singh belong to

the  Marxist  Communist  Party.   Sheopat  Singh  died

during the pendency of these proceedings.  It is relevant

to mention that Appellants Nos. 2 and 3 are advocates. A

prominent trade union activist of Sri Ganganagar District

Shri Darshan Koda was murdered on 18.12.2000.  Some

of  the  accused  were  granted  anticipatory  bail  in

February,  2001 by the High Court of  Rajasthan.   The

Appellants  addressed  a  huge  gathering  of  their  party

workers in front of the Collectorate at Sri Ganganagar on

23.02.2001.  While  addressing  the  gathering,  the

Appellants  made  scandalous  statements  against  the

High  Court  which  were  published  in  Lok  Sammat

newspaper  on 24.02.2001.    The offending  statements

made by the Appellants (from the translated version) are

summarized as under:   

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Appellant No. 1 - “Ex MLA Het Ram Beniwal said that,

there are two types of justice in the courts.  A thief of

Rs.100/- cannot get bail, if the lathi and gandasi is hit

then the courts ask for the statements of the witnesses

and diary,  but  Miglani  and Gurdayal  Singh committed

the murder, even then anticipatory bail had been taken

on the application without diary.” Appellant No. 2 - “Navrang Chaudhary, Advocate, District

President,  CITU  said  that  the  general  public  has  lost

confidence in the law and justice.” Appellant No. 3 - “MCP Leader Bhuramal Swami naming

the judge of the High Court said in attacking way that all

around  there  is  rule  of  rich  people  whether  it  is

bureaucracy or judiciary.” Appellant  No.  4  -  “Sarpanch  Hardeep  Singh  told  that

there was influence of money behind the anticipatory bail

of the accused.”       The  Advocate  General  gave  his  consent  to  Respondent

No.1  for  initiation  of  contempt  proceedings  on

16.01.2002.  Thereafter,  Respondent  No.1  filed  a

Contempt Petition in the High Court.   It was stated by

Respondent No. 1 in the contempt petition that baseless

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allegations  of  bias  and  corruption  were  made  by  the

Appellants against the judiciary.   He also alleged that

the Appellants were guilty of  a systematic campaign to

destroy the public confidence in the judiciary.   

3. The Appellants filed a common counter denying the

allegations made against them. The appointment of the

Special  Public  Prosecutor in the case of  the murder of

Shri  Darshan Koda was in dispute and the Appellants

contended  that  they  were  agitating  for  appointment  of

another competent lawyer as Special Public Prosecutor.

They  accused  Respondent  No.1  of  initiating  contempt

proceedings only to harass and victimize them as they

were  agitating  for  a  change  of  the  Special  Public

Prosecutor.   They  denied  making  any  defamatory

statements against the judiciary.    A compact disc (CD)

was  produced  on  15.07.2003  which  was  a  video

recording of a press conference held on 15.05.2002 at Sri

Ganganagar by the third Appellant and Sheopat Singh.

The  said  press  conference  was  also  telecast  on  ETV

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(Rajasthan).  The High Court viewed the CD after taking

consent  from  both  sides  in  the  presence  of  the  third

Appellant and Sheopat Singh.  The High Court directed a

transcript  of  the  video to  be  prepared and be  kept  on

record.  

4. The  High  Court  framed  three  questions  for

consideration which are as follows:

i. “Whether  statement  published  in  “Lok

Sammat”  dtd.  24.2.2001  published  from Sri

Ganganagar amounts to criminal contempt?

ii. Whether  editor’s  liability  for  whatever  is published in the newspaper is absolute or he

is  not  liable  for  faithful  reproduction  of  the

statement  made  by  somebody  else  in  the

news reporting?

iii. Whether it is proved beyond reasonable doubt on  the  basis  of  material  on  record  that

respondents  No.2  to  6  did  make  the

statements attributed to them respectively so

as to hold them liable for contempt?”    

5. In  view  of  the  disparaging  remarks  made  by  the

Appellants  against  the  judges  of  the  Rajasthan  High

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Court, the High Court held that the statement published

in  Lok  Sammat  on  24.02.2001  amounts  to  criminal

contempt.  The scathing remarks made by the Appellants

have a tendency of creating a doubt in the minds of the

public about the impartiality, integrity and fairness of the

High Court  in  administering justice.   According  to  the

High Court, the scurrilous attack made by the Appellants

against the judiciary lowers the authority of the Court.  

6. In view of the unconditional apology tendered at the

earliest point of time by Respondent No. 1, the Editor of

Lok  Sammat,  the  High  Court  discharged  the  notices

against  him in  the  contempt  petition.  The  High  Court

answered the third point against the Appellants and held

them guilty of contempt as the case was proved against

them beyond reasonable doubt.  The entire evidence on

record  was  scrutinized  carefully  by  the  High  Court  to

reach this conclusion.  The press conference held by the

third  Appellant  was  highlighted  by  the  High  Court  to

conclude that the highly objectionable statements were,

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in fact, made by the Appellants on 23.02.2001.  As the

Appellants denied having made any statements against

the judiciary in their reply to the contempt petition, the

journalists  demanded  an  explanation.   The  third

Appellant  stated that  they  stood  by  what  was said  on

23.02.2001.  The High Court held the Appellants guilty of

committing  criminal  contempt  and  sentenced  them  to

simple  imprisonment  of  two  months  and  fine  of  Rs.

2000/- each.  

7. We have heard Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate for

the  Appellants.  As  Respondent  No.  1  who  was  the

petitioner  in  the  contempt  petition  was  unrepresented,

we requested Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Advocate to assist the

Court to which she readily agreed.   Apart from making

oral submissions Ms. Bhati also gave a written note.  Mr.

Bhushan  submitted  that  statements  attributed  to  the

Appellants only represent fair criticism which would not

amount to contempt.  According to him, the Appellants

were in an agitated mood due to the murder of  one of

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their  leaders and the mishandling of  the criminal  case

connected to that murder.   Criticism of class bias and

improper administration of justice cannot be considered

to be contempt.  He referred to a statement attributed to

the fourth Appellant who alleged influence of money in

the  grant  of  anticipatory  bail  to  the  accused  and

explained  that  statement  as  having  been  made  in  a

different context altogether.  He stated that the influence

of money was against the authorities and police force and

not attributed to the judiciary.  He also stated that the

statement made by the third Appellant who named the

judge  who  granted  anticipatory  bail  and  accused  the

judiciary  of  being  partial  to  rich  people  does  not

tantamount to contempt.  Strong reliance was placed on

Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. R. K. Jain,

reported  in  (2010)  8  SCC  281 by   Mr.  Bhushan  to

contend that the Courts should not be sensitive to fair

criticism.  He also stated that the power of punishing for

contempt has to be exercised sparingly.   

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8. Ms.  Aishwarya Bhati,  the  learned Amicus Curiae,

submitted that the judgment of the High Court does not

warrant any interference as the entire evidence was dealt

with in detail.  She submitted that all the relevant factors

were taken into account by the High Court including the

statements  made  by  the  Appellants  which  ex  facie

demonstrated contempt,  the  stand of  the  editor  of  the

newspaper  that  they  have  scrupulously  and  correctly

reported the statements in the newspaper and non denial

of  the Appellants addressing the public meeting at  the

Collectorate of Sri Ganganagar.  She also submitted that

the High Court took note of the press conference of the

third Appellant  and Sheopat Singh on 15.05.2002 and

the affidavits of  5 journalists and one deed writer who

were witness to the meeting on 23.02.2001.  She placed

reliance  on  a  judgment  of  this  Court  reported  in  Bal

Kishan  Giri  v.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh,  reported  in

(2014)  7  SCC  280 to  contend  that  vituperative

comments undermining  the  judiciary  would amount  to

contempt.   She also relied upon Vijay Kumar Singh v.

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Union  of  India,  reported  in  (2014)  16  SCC  460 to

contend that the apology was made only for the purpose

of avoiding punishment and was not bona fide.  To avoid

prolixity, we are not referring to other judgments cited by

the learned Amicus Curiae.  She referred to the affidavits

filed by the Appellants in this Court apologizing for the

statements  and  even  they  do  not  demonstrate  any

genuine contrition.   She submitted that an apology by

the  contemnors  should  be  tendered  at  the  earliest

opportunity and it should be unconditional.  

9. Section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

(hereinafter  referred  to  as ‘the  Act’)  defines  criminal

contempt as follows:   

“2. Definitions.  In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,  (c)  “criminal  contempt”  means  the  publication

(whether  by  words,  spoken  or  written,  or  by

signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise)

of  any  matter  or  the  doing  of  any  other  act

whatsoever which –

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(i) scandalises  or  tends  to  scandalise,  or

lowers or tends to lower the authority of,

any court; or  (ii) prejudices,  or  interferes  or  tends  to

interfere  with,  the  due  course  of  any

judicial proceeding; or  (iii) interferes  or  tends  to  interfere  with,  or

obstructs  or  tends  to  obstruct,  the

administration  of  justice  in  any  other

manner;”       10. Section 5 of the Act is as under:

   “5.Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt.   

“A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court  for  publishing any fair  comment  on

the  merits  of  any  case  which  has  been

heard and finally decided.”  

11. Section 12 of the Act is as under:

“12. Punishment for contempt of court (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this

Act  or  in any other law,  a contempt of  court

may be punished with simple imprisonment for

a  term  which  may  extend  to  six  months,  or

with fine which may extend to two thousand

rupees, or with both.  

Provided  that  the  accused  may  be

discharged  or  the  punishment  awarded  may

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be  remitted  on  apology  being  made  to  the

satisfaction of the court.  

Explanation.-An  apology  shall  not  be

rejected  merely  on  the  ground  that  it  is

qualified or conditional if the accused makes it

bona fide.  

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in

any law for the time being in force,  no court

shall  impose  a  sentence  in  excess  of  that

specified  in  sub-section  (1)  for  any  contempt

either  in  respect  of  itself  or  of  a  court

subordinate to it.  

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in

this section, where a person is found guilty of a

civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a

fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a

sentence  of  imprisonment  is  necessary  shall,

instead  of  sentencing  him  to  simple

imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a

civil  prison for  such period not  exceeding six

months as it may think fit.

(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt

of court in respect of any undertaking given to

a court is a company, every person who, at the

time  the  contempt  was  committed,  was  in

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charge  of,  and  was  responsible  to,  the

company for the conduct of the business of the

company,  as  well  as  the  company,  shall  be

deemed to be guilty of  the contempt and the

punishment may be enforced, with the leave of

the  court,  by  the  detention  in  civil  prison  of

each such person:

Provided  that  nothing  contained  in  this

sub-section shall render any such person liable

to  such  punishment  if  he  proves  that  the

contempt  was  committed  without  his

knowledge  or  that  he  exercised  all  due

diligence to prevent its commission.

(5)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in

sub-section  (4),  where  the  contempt  of  court

referred  to  therein  has  been committed  by a

company and  it  is  proved  that  the  contempt

has  been  committed  with  the  consent  or

connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect

on the part of, any director, manager, secretary

or other officer of the company, such director,

manager,  secretary or other officer  shall  also

be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the

punishment may be enforced with the leave of

the  court,  by  the  detention  in  civil  prison  of

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such  director,  manager,  secretary  or  other

officer.

Explanation.-For  the  purpose  of

sub-sections (4) and (5),-

(a)"  company” means anybody corporate and

includes  a  firm  or  other  association  of

individuals ; and  

(b)  "director",  in  relation  to  a  firm,  means  a

partner in the firm.

12. We are, in the present case, concerned with Section

2(c)(i) of the Act which deals with scandalizing or lowering

the authority of the Court.  It has been held by this Court

that judges need not be protected and that they can take

care of  themselves.   It  is  the right  and interest  of  the

public in the due administration of justice that have to be

protected.  See Asharam  M.  Jain  v.  A.  T.  Gupta,

reported in (1983)  4 SCC 125  .  Vilification of  judges

would  lead  to  the  destruction  of  the  system  of

administration of justice.  The statements made by the

Appellants  are  not  only  derogatory  but  also  have  the

propensity to lower the authority of the Court.  Accusing

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judges  of  corruption  results  in  denigration  of  the

institution which has an effect of lowering the confidence

of the public in the system of administration of justice.  A

perusal of the allegations made by the Appellants cannot

be termed as fair criticism on the merits of the case.  The

Appellants indulged in an assault on the integrity of the

judges  of  the  High  Court  by  making  baseless  and

unsubstantiated  allegations.   They  are  not  entitled  to

seek shelter under Section 5 of the Act.  

13. The  oft-quoted  passage  from  Ambard  v.

Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, [1936] A.C.

322 is that “[j]ustice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be

allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though

outspoken comments of ordinary men.”  The Privy Council

in  the  same  judgment  held  as  follows: “The  path  of

criticism is a public way: the wrong headed are permitted

to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain

from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the

administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a

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right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to

impair  the  administration  of  justice,  they  are  immune.”

[Emphasis ours]

In  Indirect  Tax  Practitioners  Association  v.  R.  K.  Jain

(supra) this Court held in paragraph 23 as follows:

“Ordinarily, the Court would not use the power

to punish for contempt for curbing the right of

freedom  of  speech  and  expression,  which  is

guaranteed  under  Article  19  (1)  (a)  of  the

Constitution.  Only when the criticism of judicial

institution transgresses all limits of decency and

fairness  or  there  is  total  lack  of  objectivity  or

there  is  deliberate  attempt  to  denigrate  the

institution then the court would use this power.”

     14.  Every citizen has a fundamental right to speech,

guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

Contempt  of  Court  is  one  of  the  restrictions  on  such

right. We are conscious that the power under the Act has

to be exercised sparingly and not in a routine manner. If

there is  a calculated effort  to undermine the judiciary,

the Courts will exercise their jurisdiction to punish the

offender  for  committing  contempt.  We  approve  the

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findings recorded by the High Court that the Appellants

have  transgressed  all  decency  by  making  serious

allegations of corruption and bias against the High Court.

The caustic comments made by the Appellants cannot, by

any stretch of imagination,  be termed as fair  criticism.

The  statements  made  by  the  Appellants,  accusing  the

judiciary of corruption lower the authority of the Court.

The Explanation to  sub-Section 12 (1) of the Act provides

that  an  apology  should  not  be  rejected  merely  on  the

ground that it is qualified or tendered at a belated stage,

if the accused makes it bona fide.  The stand taken by the

Appellants in the contempt petition and the affidavit filed

in this Court  does not  inspire any confidence that  the

apology is made bona fide.  After a detailed consideration

of the submissions made by both sides and the evidence

on record, we are in agreement with the judgment of the

High Court that the Appellants are guilty of committing

contempt of Court.  After considering the peculiar facts

and circumstances of the case including the fact that the

contemptuous statements were made in 2001, we modify

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the sentence to only payment of fine of Rs. 2,000/- each.

The Appeal is dismissed with the said modification.

15. Criminal Appeal No. 464 of 2006, which concerns

the same facts as reported in another newspaper, stands

disposed of in terms of Criminal Appeal No.463 of 2006.

16. We  record  our  appreciation  for  the  assistance

rendered by Ms. Aishwarya Bhati,  Advocate  as Amicus

Curiae.       

.…............................J.                  [ANIL R. DAVE]

               ................................J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

New Delhi, October 21, 2016

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