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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.  4127  OF 2013  (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 30 of 2012)

  Hari Dass Sharma                                        … Appellant

Versus Vikas Sood & Ors.                                     … Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No. 4128  OF 2013  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.776 of 2012)

  Hari Dass Sharma                                        … Appellant

Versus Kesri Devi & Ors.                                      … Respondents

AND

CIVIL APPEAL No.  4129  OF 2013  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.888 of 2012)

  Hari Dass Sharma                                        … Appellant

Versus

Shiv Prashad                                     … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.

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Leave granted.   

2. These are appeals against the common order dated  

02.09.2011 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Civil  

Revision Nos.179, 180 and 181 of 2008.

3. The facts very briefly are that the appellant let out  

shops in premises No.5 Cart Road, Shimla (for short  

“the  building”)  to  the  respondents.   The  appellant  

filed applications under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban  

Rent Control Act,  1987 (for  short “the Act”)  before  

the  Rent  Controller,  Shimla,  for  eviction  of  the  

respondents from the building on grounds  inter alia  

that he bona fide required the building for purposes  

of  addition  and  alteration  of  the  building  or  

rebuilding.  The respondents filed their replies before  

the  Rent  Controller  denying  that  the  appellant  

required the building for additions and alterations or  

rebuilding.  The Rent Controller framed an issue as to  

whether the building was required bona fide by the  

appellant  for  rebuilding  or  reconstruction.   The  

appellant  examined  an  official  of  the  Municipal  

Corporation, Shimla, in support of his case that a plan  

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for  rebuilding/  reconstruction  had  been  sanctioned  

and also a Civil Engineer in support of his case that  

the building was in dilapidated condition and required  

to  be  reconstructed.   The  Rent  Controller  after  

considering the oral  and documentary evidence on  

record  held  that  though  the  sanction  plan  of  the  

building  was  not  a  requirement  of  the  Act,  it  is  a  

circumstance  to  establish  the  bonafide  of  the  

appellant  to  seek  eviction  for  the  purpose  of  

rebuilding or  reconstruction and also  held  that  the  

building  was  old  and  the  appellant  was  in  the  

occupation  of  second  floor  of  the  building  and  for  

rebuilding or reconstruction, the respondents have to  

vacate  the  building  and  accordingly  allowed  the  

applications  of  the  appellant  for  eviction  of  the  

respondents from the building.  The respondents filed  

appeals  before  the  Appellate  Authority,  Shimla  

against  the  order  of  eviction  but  the  Appellate  

Authority dismissed the appeals.  

4. The respondents then filed the Civil Revisions before  

the High Court and by the impugned common order  

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maintained the orders of eviction but relying on the  

decision of this Court in  Harrington House School v.  

S.M. Ispahani & Anr. [(2002) 5 SCC 229] directed that  

only on the valid revised/renewed building plan being  

sanctioned by the competent authority, the order of  

eviction shall  be available for execution.  The High  

Court further directed in the impugned order that the  

valid  revised/renewed  sanctioned  or  approved  

building plan shall be produced before the executing  

court  whereupon the  executing  court  shall  allow a  

reasonable  time  to  the  tenants  for  vacating  the  

property  and  delivering  possession  to  the  landlord  

and till  then  the  tenant  shall  remain  liable  to  pay  

charges for  use and occupation of the premises at  

the  rate  at  which  they  were  being  paid  earlier.  

Aggrieved, the appellant has filed these appeals.

5. Mr. Nidesh Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the  

appellant,  submitted  that  Section  14(4)  of  the  Act  

provides  that  if  the  Controller  is  satisfied  that  the  

claim of the landlord is bonafide, he shall make an  

order  directing  the  tenant  to  put  the  landlord  in  

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possession of the building on such date as may be  

specified by the Controller and the proviso to Section  

14(4) of the Act says that the Controller may give the  

tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in  

possession of the building and may extend such time  

not exceeding three months in the aggregate.   He  

submitted that Section 14(4) of the Act thus makes it  

clear that the order of eviction once passed by the  

Controller  will  have  to  be  executed  and  that  the  

direction  of  the  High  Court  in  the  impugned order  

that  the  order  of  eviction  will  not  be  executed till  

such  time  as  the  building  plan  is  sanctioned  for  

rebuilding or reconstruction of the tenanted building  

is contrary to the bare provision in Section 14(4) of  

the  Act.   He  submitted  that  in  Harrington  House  

School v.  S.M. Ispahani & Anr. (supra), on which the  

High Court has relied on in the impugned judgment,  

this Court decided the dispute between the landlord  

and  the  tenant  under  the  provisions  of  the  Tamil  

Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)  Act,  1960  

and it had not considered the effect of the proviso to  

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Section 14(4) of the Act whereunder the Controller  

had  the  power  to  grant  in  the  aggregate  three  

months time to put the landlord in possession of the  

tenanted  premises.   He  cited  the  decision  of  this  

Court  in  Shri  Balaganesan  Metals  v.  M.N.   

Shanmugham  Chetty  &  Ors.  [1987)  2  SCC  707],  

wherein this Court, while considering the proviso to  

Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease  

and Rent Control) Act, 1960, similar to the proviso to  

Section  14(4)  of  the  Act,  held  that  the  proviso  

empowers the Controller to grant adequate time to  

the  tenant  upto  a  maximum  of  three  months  to  

vacate  the  building  and  secure  accommodation  

elsewhere.   He  also  relied  on  the  decision  of  this  

Court in J. Jermons v. Aliammal & Ors. [(1999) 7 SCC  

382] in which it has been similarly held that a tenant  

is entitled under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu  

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)  Act, 1960 to be  

granted reasonable time for putting the landlord in  

possession of the building, which may be extended  

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from time to time upto the maximum period of three  

months.   

6. In reply, Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel appearing  

for the respondents, submitted that the provisions of  

the Tamil  Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)  

Act, 1960 as well as the provisions of the H.P. Urban  

Rent Control Act, 1987 (“the Act”) are analogous and,  

therefore,  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Harrington  

House  School v.  S.M.  Ispahani  &  Anr. (supra)  will  

apply to a case arising under the Act and the High  

Court  rightly  relied  on  the  decision  in  Harrington  

House School v. S.M. Ispahani & Anr. (supra) in which  

this Court directed that the order of eviction will not  

be  executed  until  the  plan  for  the  building  was  

sanctioned.  He further submitted that in any case  

under  the  proviso  to  Section  14(4)  of  the  Act  the  

Controller  has  power  to  give  to  the  tenant  a  

‘reasonable  time’  for  putting  the  landlord  in  

possession of the building and it is only on expiry of  

such reasonable time that the Controller may extend  

the time not exceeding three months in any case.  He  

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submitted that the power of the Controller to grant  

reasonable time to the tenant for putting the landlord  

in  possession  of  the  building  is  different  from the  

power  of  the  Controller  to  extend  such  time  not  

exceeding  three  months.   He  submitted  that  the  

expression  ‘reasonable  time’  to  be  given  to  the  

tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the  

building will depend upon the facts of each case and  

in the facts of the present case, the High Court has  

granted time upto the time of sanction of the plan for  

rebuilding or reconstruction of the building.  In this  

context,  he submitted that  the sanctioned plan for  

reconstruction of the building has lapsed and as the  

building regulations for areas within the city limits of  

Shimla  have  undergone  drastic  changes,  it  is  not  

permissible  for  the  appellant  to  reconstruct  the  

building as per the sanction originally granted.  He  

submitted that in  Jagat Pal Dhawan v. Kahan Singh  

(dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. [(2003) 1 SCC 191] this Court,  

while  interpreting  clause  (c)  of  sub-section  (3)  of  

Section  14  of  the  Act,  has  observed  that  while  

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adjudicating an eviction petition on the ground that  

the building is bona fide required by the landlord for  

reconstruction, the Court may look into the condition  

of  building,  availability  of  necessary  funds  and  

whether building plans have been sanctioned by the  

local authority in order to assess the bona fide of the  

landlord,  even  if  the  Act  does  not  require  these  

aspects  to  be  considered.   He  submitted  that,  

therefore, unless the appellant produces the revised  

sanctioned plan before the executing court, the order  

of eviction cannot be executed as rightly directed by  

the High Court and this is not a case for interference  

with the impugned order of the High Court.  He finally  

submitted that by the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent  

Control  (Amendment)  Act,  2009  (for  short  ‘the  

Amendment  Act,  2009’)  a  new  proviso  has  been  

added in clause (c) of Section 14(3) stating that the  

tenant evicted under clause (c)  of Section 14(3) of  

the Act shall have the right to re-enter on new terms  

of  tenancy,  on  the  basis  of  mutual  agreement  

between the landlord and the tenant, to the premises  

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in  the  rebuilt  building  equivalent  in  area  to  the  

original  premises for  which he was a  tenant.    He  

submitted that since the eviction orders passed by  

the Controller in this case are under Section 14(3)(c)  

of the Act, the respondents are entitled to re-entry as  

per  this  proviso  inserted  by  the  Amendment  Act,  

2009.

7. Before  considering  the  submissions  of  the  learned  

counsel for the parties, we may have a look at clause  

(c) of sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of Section  

14 of the Act.  These provisions, as they stood before  

the  Amendment  Act,  2009,  when  the  Controller  

passed  the  orders  of  eviction,  are  extracted  

hereinbelow:  

“14. Eviction of tenants –  (1) ……………… (2) ……………… (3) A landlord may apply to the Controller  for  an order  directing the tenant to put  the landlord in possession:  

(a) ………………. (b) ………………. (c)  in  the  case  of  any  building  or  rented land, if he requires it to carry  

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out  any  building  work  at  the  instance of the Government or local  authority or any Improvement Trust  under  some  improvement  or  development  scheme  or  if  it  has  become  unsafe  or  unfit  for  human  habitation  or  is  required  bona  fide  by him for carrying out repairs which  cannot  be  carried  out  without  the  building  or  rented  land  being  vacated  or  that  the  building  or  rented land is required bona fide by  him for the purpose of building or re- building  or  making  thereto  any  substantial  additions  or  alterations  and that such building or re-building  or  addition  or  alteration  cannot  be  carried  out  without  the  building  or  rented land being vacated.

(4)  The Controller shall, if he is satisfied  that the claim of the landlord is bona fide,  make an order directing the tenant to put  the landlord in possession of the building  or rented land on such date as may be  specified  by  the  Controller  and  if  the  Controller  is  not  so  satisfied  he  shall  make an order rejecting the application:  

Provided  that  the  Controller  may  give  the  tenant  a  reasonable  time  for  putting the landlord in possession of the  building or rented land and may extend  such time not exceeding three months in  the aggregate.”

8. A reading of clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section  

14 of the Act would show that a landlord may apply to the  

Controller  for  an  order  directing  the  tenant  to  put  the  

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landlord  in  possession  in  case  of  any  building  if  it  is  

required bona fide by him for the purpose of building or  

rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or  

alterations and that such building or rebuilding or addition  

or  alteration cannot be carried out  without the building  

being vacated.  In Jagat Pal Dhawan v. Kahan Singh (dead)   

by L.Rs.  &  Ors.  (supra),  this  Court  had the occasion  to  

consider the provisions of Section 14(3)(c) of the Act and  

R.C. Lahoti J. writing the judgment for the Court held that  

Section 14(3)(c) does not require that the building plans  

should have been duly sanctioned by the local authorities  

as a condition precedent to the entitlement of the landlord  

for eviction of the tenant.  To quote from the judgment of  

this Court in  Jagat Pal Dhawan v. Kahan Singh (dead) by   

L.Rs. & Ors. (supra):  

“The  provision  also  does  not  lay  down  that the availability of requisite funds and  availability  of  building  plans  duly  sanctioned by the local authority must be  proved by the landlord as an ingredient of  the provision or as a condition precedent  to  his  entitlement  to  eviction  of  the  tenant.   However  still,  suffice  it  to  observe,  depending  on  the  facts  and  circumstances of a given case, the court  may  look  into  such  facts  as  relevant,  

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though  not  specifically  mentioned  as  ingredient of the ground for eviction, for  the purpose of determining the bona fides  of  the  landlord.   If  a  building,  as  proposed, cannot be constructed or if the  landlord  does  not  have  means  for  carrying  out  the  construction  or  reconstruction obviously his requirement  would remain a mere wish and would not  be bona fide.”

It will be clear from the aforesaid passage that this Court  

has held that availability of building plans duly sanctioned  

by  the  local  authorities  is  not  an  ingredient  of  Section  

14(3)(c) of the Act and, therefore, could not be a condition  

precedent to the entitlement of the landlord for eviction of  

the tenant, but depending on the facts and circumstances  

of each case, the Court may look into the availability of  

building plans duly sanctioned by the local authorities for  

the purpose of determining the bonafides of the landlord.  

9. In  the present case,  the Controller  has held in  the  

orders  of  eviction  that  the  appellant  had  admittedly  

obtained sanction from the Municipal Corporation, Shimla  

and  that  the  building  was  an  old  one  and  that  the  

appellant was occupying the second floor of the building  

and that rebuilding or reconstruction cannot be carried out  

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without  the building being vacated by the respondents.  

The  Controller  has  accordingly  arrived  at  a  satisfaction  

that the appellant bonafide requires the building for the  

purpose  of  building  or  rebuilding  and  has  accordingly  

issued the direction in terms of sub-section (4) read with  

clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act to the  

respondents  to  put  the  appellant  in  possession  of  the  

building.  This order of the Controller was challenged by  

the respondents in appeal but the Appellate Authority has  

dismissed the appeal.   Thereafter,  the respondents filed  

the Civil Revisions before the High Court challenging the  

orders of the Controller and the orders of the Appellate  

Authority,  and  the  High  Court  has  in  the  impugned  

common  order  maintained  the  orders  passed  by  the  

Controller  and  the  Appellate  Authority  subject  to  the  

modifications mentioned in para 27 of its order.  Para 27  

of  the  impugned  order  of  the  High  Court  is  quoted  

hereinbelow:  

“Accordingly, in view of the observations  and discussions made hereinabove, there  is no merit in the petition and the same is  dismissed.   However,  in  the  interest  of  justice, in view of the judgment rendered  

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by  their  Lordships  of  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  in  Harrington  House  School v. S.M. Ispahani & Another (2002)  5 SCC 229, though the orders passed by  both the authorities are upheld/sustained,  however,  it  is  directed that  only on the  valid  revised/  renewed  building  plan  being  sanctioned  by  the  competent  authority,  the order  of  eviction shall  be  available  for  execution.   The  valid  revised/ renewed sanctioned or approved  building  plan  shall  be  produced  before  the  executing  court  whereupon  the  executing court shall  allow a reasonable  time  to  the  tenants  for  vacating  the  property and delivering possession to the  landlord.  Till then the tenant shall remain  liable  to  pay  charges  for  use  and  occupation of the premises at the same  rate at which they are being paid earlier.  Subject to these modifications, the orders  passed by both the authorities below are  maintained.  No costs.”  

10. We  also  find  that  the  respondents  challenged  the  

impugned order  of  the High Court  separately in  Special  

Leave Petition (Civil)  Nos. 14028 and 2971 of 2012, but  

this  Court  dismissed  the  Special  Leave  Petitions  of  the  

respondents.   The  result  is  that  the  findings  of  the  

Controller  regarding  the  claim  of  the  appellants  for  

eviction  of  the  respondents  on  the  ground  that  the  

appellant bonafide requires the building for rebuilding or  

reconstruction as affirmed by the appellate authority and  

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the High Court have become final could not be reopened  

on any ground whatsoever  and the respondents cannot  

now  contend  that  the  appellant  cannot  any  longer  

construct or reconstruct the building on account of drastic  

changes in the building regulations within the city limits of  

Shimla.   

11. In fact, the only question that we have to decide in  

this  appeal  filed  by  the  appellant  is  whether  the  High  

Court  could  have  directed  that  only  on  the  valid  

revised/renewed building  plant  being  sanctioned  by  the  

competent  authority,  the  order  of  eviction  shall  be  

available for execution.  The High Court has relied on the  

decision of this Court in  Harrington House School v.  S.M.  

Ispahani & Anr. (supra) and we find in that case that the  

landlords were builders by profession and they needed the  

suit premises for the immediate purpose of demolition so  

as  to  construct  a  multi-storey complex and the tenants  

were running a school in the tenanted building in which  

about 200 students were studying and 15 members of the  

teaching staff  and 8 members of the non-teaching staff  

were employed and the school was catering to the needs  

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of children of non-resident Indians.  This Court found that  

although  the  plans  of  the  proposed  construction  were  

ready and had been tendered in evidence, the plans had  

not been submitted to the local  authorities for  approval  

and on these facts, R.C. Lahoti, J, writing the judgment for  

the Court, while refusing to interfere with the judgment of  

the High Court and affirming the eviction order passed by  

the Controller, directed that the landlords shall submit the  

plans of reconstruction for approval of the local authorities  

and  only  on  the  plans  being  sanctioned  by  the  local  

authorities,  a  decree  for  eviction  shall  be  available  for  

execution  and  further  that  such  sanctioned  plan  or  

approved  building  plan  shall  be  produced  before  the  

executing court whereupon the executing court shall allow  

a reasonable time to the tenant for vacating the property  

and delivering the possession to the landlord and till then  

the tenants shall remain liable to pay charges for use and  

occupation of the said premises at the same rate at which  

they are being paid.   In the present case, on the other  

hand,  as  we  have  noted,  the  Rent  Controller  while  

determining the bonafides  of  the  appellant-landlord has  

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recorded  the  finding  that  the  landlord  had  admittedly  

obtained  the  sanction  from  the  Municipal  Corporation,  

Shimla, and has accordingly passed the order of eviction  

and this order of eviction has not been disturbed either by  

the  Appellate  Authority  or  by  the  High  Court  as  the  

Revision Authority.   In our considered opinion,  once the  

High Court maintained the order of eviction passed by the  

Controller under Section 14(4) of the Act, the tenants were  

obliged to give vacant possession of the building to the  

landlord and could only ask for reasonable time to deliver  

vacant  possession  of  the  building  to  the  landlord  and  

hence the direction of the High Court that  the order of  

eviction could only be executed on the revised plan of the  

building  being  approved  was  clearly  contrary  to  the  

provisions  of  Section  14(4)  of  the  Act  and  the  proviso  

thereto.  

12.  We  accordingly  allow  the  appeals,  set  aside  the  

directions  in  Para  27 of  the impugned judgment  of  the  

High Court, but grant time to the respondents to vacate  

the building within three months from today.  We make it  

clear that it will be open for the respondents to apply for  

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re-entry into the building in accordance with the proviso to  

clause (c) of Section 14(3) of the Act introduced by the  

Amendment  Act,  2009.   Considering,  however,  the  

peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases, there shall  

be no order as to costs.   

.……………………….J.                                                            (A. K. Patnaik)

………………………..J.                                                            (Gyan Sudha Misra) New Delhi, April 29, 2013.    

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