REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 2056-2059  OF 2011 (@ SLP(Crl.) Nos. 844-847 of 2008)

H.G. RANGANGOUD               … APPELLANT

VERSUS

M/S.STATE TRADING CORPORATION  OF INDIA LIMITED & ORS.      …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T  

CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.  

1. Petitioner, aggrieved by the order passed by  

the  Division  Bench  of  the  Karnataka  High  Court  

initiating proceeding for contempt in exercise of  

its  suo  motu power,  has  preferred  these  special  

leave petitions.

2. Leave granted.

3. Bereft of unnecessary details the facts giving  

rise to the present appeals are that the appellant  

applied on 16th of April, 2003 for grant of mining  

lease for iron ore over an area of 350 acres in  

Yeshawanthnagar  Range  of  the  Kumarswamy  Reserve  

Forest Area within Sandur Taluk in Bellary District  

of the State of Karnataka.  The State Government  

processed  the  request  and  in  exercise  of  powers  

under  Section  5  (1)  of  the  Mines  and  Minerals  

(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter  

referred to as ‘the Act’) by its letter dated 9th of  

February,  2004  recommended  to  the  Central  

Government for grant of mining lease in favour of  

the  appellant  to  the  extent  of  16.8  hectares.  

However  before  any  decision  could  be  taken,  the  

Central Government issued notification dated 27th of  

June, 2005 in exercise of the power under Section  

17 A (1A) of the Act and reserved iron ore deposits  

in the area in question for exploitation by State  

Trading  Corporation  of  India  Limited,  a  public  

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sector  undertaking.   In  view  of  the  aforesaid  

reservation  the  Central  Government  returned  the  

proposal of the State Government to grant mining  

lease to the appellant by its letter dated 21st of  

July,  2005.  Aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  

notification appellant preferred WP No. 19339 of  

2005 (H.G. Rangangoud v. Minister of Coal & Mines,  

represented  by  the  Secretary  &  Ors.)  before  the  

Karnataka  High  Court,  inter  alia  praying  for  

quashing the notification reserving the iron ore  

deposits in favour of the State Trading Corporation  

of India Limited.  The writ petition filed by the  

appellant  was  heard  along  with  another  writ  

petition  filed  by  Salgaocar  Mining  Industries  

Private Limited and the learned Single Judge by its  

judgment  and  order  dated  14th of  August,  2007  

quashed  the  aforesaid  notification  dated  27th of  

June,  2005.   Armed  with  the  order  of  the  High  

Court,  appellant  represented  to  the  State  

Government to consider his application for grant of  

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mining  lease  by  its  representation  dated  18th of  

September, 2007.  After one day of filing of the  

representation i.e. on 20th of September, 2007 the  

State Trading Corporation, aggrieved by the order  

of the learned Single Judge preferred appeal before  

the  High  Court.   Said  appeal  was  posted  for  

consideration  on  3rd of  October,  2007  and  the  

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  taking  into  

consideration  the  ‘enormity’  of  the  case  and  

finding that all the parties have been served and  

represented, directed for its final disposal on 11th  

of October, 2007.  However, no interim order was  

passed.   As  directed,  the  matter  was  heard  and  

reserved for judgment but before the judgment could  

be pronounced the State Trading Corporation, the  

appellant  before  the  High  Court,  brought  to  its  

notice that “when the matter was in the hearing  

process,  Government  of  Karnataka  has  sent  a  

communication  to  the  Union  of  India  for  mining  

lease  in  favour  of  the  writ  petitioners”.   The  

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Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court,  when  informed  

about  the  aforesaid  fact  “called  upon  the  

Government  Advocate  to  explain  this  situation”.  

The explanation was furnished in which it was inter  

alia stated that “as there was no interim order  

granted in the writ appeal and keeping in view the  

fact that if the mining area is not sanctioned to  

the writ petitioners the existing mining operation  

would be forced to close down and keeping in view  

the jeopardy to the workmen, such recommendation  

has been made.”  The explanation put forth by the  

State Government did not find favour with the High  

Court  and  on  its  prima  facie  finding  that  the  

aforesaid conduct “amounts to interference with the  

due course of judicial process” initiated suo motu  

criminal contempt proceedings against the appellant  

herein and K. Jayachandra, Under Secretary to the  

Government  of  Karnataka,  Commerce  and  Industries  

Department.  While doing so the High Court observed  

as follows:

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“……..On going through the affidavit as  well as the records, prima facie it  appears to us that there is a clear  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  writ  petitioner Mr. H.G. Rangangoud and the  concerned official to take such action  when the grant of lease/licence itself  was seized and was under consideration  by  this  Court  thereby  cause  on  the  merit or decision of this court.”

4. Mr.  P.  Vishwanatha  Shetty,  Senior  Advocate  

appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that  

the appellant had filed the representation in the  

light of the order of the learned Single Judge even  

before the appeal was filed against the judgment of  

the learned Single Judge and hence it cannot be  

said that the appellant in any way interfered with  

the due course of judicial process.  Accordingly he  

submits that the order initiating the proceeding  

for  criminal  contempt  deserves  to  be  set  aside.  

Ms. Anitha Shenoy appears on behalf of the State of  

Karnataka and submits that the act of filing the  

representation  by  the  appellant  and  the  

recommendation made by the Under Secretary in no  

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way  interferes  with  the  due  course  of  judicial  

process and in such a state of affairs she is not  

in  a  position  to  defend  the  order  of  the  

High Court.  At the same breath she reminds us that  

contempt  is  a  matter  between  the  court  and  the  

contemnor and this Court may take the view which it  

considers just and proper.  

5. We have given our most anxious consideration to  

the submissions advanced and at the outset we may  

observe that this Court seldom interferes with an  

order  initiating  a  contempt  proceeding  and  

ordinarily  relegates  the  person  charged  with  

contempt  to  file  a  show  cause  before  the  court  

which had initiated the proceeding.  But this is  

not an absolute rule and in the facts of a given  

case when this Court comes to the conclusion that  

the allegation made, even when not denied do not  

constitute  contempt,  interferes  with  the  order  

initiating  contempt  proceeding  so  as  to  avoid  

unnecessary harassment to the person served with  

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contempt  notice.   We  proceed  to  consider  the  

present  appeal  bearing  in  mind  the  aforesaid  

principle.

6. It  is  relevant  here  to  state  that  the  

proceeding has been initiated against the appellant  

for criminal contempt on the ground that the act  

done by the appellant amounts to interference with  

the due course of judicial process.  The expression  

“criminal contempt” has been defined under Section  

2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in  

the present case we are concerned with Section 2  

(c) (ii), the same reads as follows:

“2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the  context otherwise requires, -  

   xxx    xxx xxx

(c) “criminal  contempt”  means  the  publication (whether by words, spoken  or written, or by signs, or by visible  representation,  or  otherwise)  of  any  matter or the doing of any other act  whatsoever which –  

xxx    xxx xxx

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(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to  interfere with, the due course of any  judicial proceeding; or

xxx    xxx xxx.”

From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision  

it  is  evident  that  an  act  which  prejudices  or  

interferes  or  tends  to  interfere  with  the  due  

course  of  judicial  proceeding  comes  within  the  

mischief of criminal contempt.  The power to punish  

for contempt is inherent in Courts of record and  

described as a necessary incident to every court of  

justice.   The  power  is  inalienable  attribute  of  

court and inheres in every Court of record.  This  

power though inherent to the High Court is given a  

constitutional  status  by  Article  215  of  the  

Constitution.  It is to secure public respect and  

confidence in the judicial process.  Rule of law is  

the  basic  rule  of  governance  of  any  civilized  

democratic polity.  It is only through the courts  

that  rule  of  law  unfolds  its  contours  and  

establishes  its  concept.   For  the  judiciary  to  

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carry out its obligations effectively and true to  

the spirit with which it is sacredly entrusted the  

task,  constitutional  courts  have  been  given  the  

power  to  punish  for  contempt,  but  greater  the  

power; higher the responsibility.  

7. In the present case, even before filing of the  

appeal the appellant has brought to the notice of  

the  State  Government  the  order  passed  by  the  

learned Single Judge and sought its implementation.  

In the representation he had not voiced and could  

not have voiced any opinion on the appeal as the  

same was not filed till then.  The Under Secretary  

while making recommendation also did not voice any  

opinion on the pending appeal.  It has to be borne  

in mind that any attempt to influence the outcome  

of the matter pending before the court to prejudice  

the parties therein may prejudice or interfere with  

the due course of any judicial proceeding but in  

our opinion, mere filing of the representation and  

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making recommendation thereon in no way prejudices  

or interferes or tends to interfere with the due  

course of any judicial proceeding.  In our opinion,  

it is criminal contempt to voice opinion on a case  

pending in court as that would seem to influence  

the  outcome  of  the  matter  and  to  prejudice  the  

parties  therein.  However,  we  hasten  to  add  that  

fair  reporting  of  court  proceedings  and  fair  

comments  on  the  legal  issues  do  not  amount  to  

contempt.  The order of the learned Single Judge  

was not stayed.  Further, mere filing of the appeal  

would not operate as a stay of order appealed from.

8.  When tested on the aforesaid anvil we are of  

the  opinion  that  the  act  alleged  in  no  way  

prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with  

the due course of any judicial proceeding.  From  

the conspectus of the discussion aforesaid we have  

no doubt in our mind that the proceeding initiated  

against the appellant as also the Under Secretary  

to  the  Government  of  Karnataka,  Commerce  and  

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Industries Department is not just and appropriate  

and an abuse of the process of the court.  This  

being so, we are duty bound to interfere at this  

stage itself.

9. True  it  is  that  Under  Secretary  to  the  

Government  of  Karnataka,  Commerce  and  Industries  

Department against whom the contempt proceeding has  

been initiated by the impugned order, not chosen to  

file any petition before this Court but in view of  

what has been observed above we are of the opinion  

that it shall be too technical to deny him the  

relief by this Court, which has jurisdiction for  

doing  complete  justice  in  any  cause  or  matter  

pending before it.  Therefore, he shall also be  

entitled  to  the  same  relief  as  that  of  the  

appellant.  

 10. Accordingly,  these  appeals  are  allowed,  the  

impugned judgment and order is set aside.

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    …..………….………………………………….J.                   (H.L. DATTU)

                          ..…. ………..……………………………….J.

                         (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)

NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 11, 2011.  

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