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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.   4166      OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12644 of 2009)

Guru Granth Saheb Sthan Meerghat Vanaras         ……  Appellant

   Vs.

Ved Prakash & Ors.        ……Respondents

JUDGMENT

R.M. LODHA, J.  

Leave granted.

2. The short question for consideration in this appeal by special  

leave is whether  High Court was justified in staying the proceedings in civil  

suit till the decision in criminal case.

3. It is not necessary to narrate the facts in detail. Suffice it to  

say  that  the  appellant  filed  an  FIR  (P.S.  Case  No.  8  of  2003)  at  

Dharampura Police Station against respondent nos. 1 to 4 for commission  

of the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 120B, IPC alleging that  

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they had executed a false, forged and fabricated will on 02.07.1997 in the  

name of late Devkinandan Sahay  with the intention to grab his property. It  

was further alleged that based on the fabricated will, these respondents  

had  obtained  a  mutation  order  dated  24.11.1999  from  the  Tehsildar,  

Ajaygarh. On completion of investigation in the above F.I.R., the  challan  

has been filed against  the above respondents  and trial  against  them is  

going on in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ajaygarh, Panna  

(M.P.).

4. On  09.02.2004,  the  appellant  brought  legal  action  in  

representative capacity  against the respondents nos. 1 to 4 by way of a  

civil suit in the Court of District Judge, Panna (M.P.) praying for a decree  

for declaration of title, perpetual  injunction and possession in respect of  

disputed lands and for annulling the sale deed dated 14.08.2003 and the  

mutation order dated 24.11.1999.   In the suit, reference of will forged by  

the  respondent  nos.  1  to  4  has  been  made.  The  said  suit  has  been  

transferred to the Court of Additional District Judge, Panna and bears  Civil  

Suit No. 10A of 2006. The respondent nos. 1 to 4, who are defendants in  

the suit, have  filed their written statement on 19.06.2006. The trial court  

has  framed  issues  on  the  basis  of  the  pleadings  of  the  parties  on  

21.09.2007.  On  21.04.2008,  the  defendants  (respondent  nos.  1  to  4  

herein) filed an application under Section 10 read with Section 151, CPC  

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for staying the proceedings in the civil suit during the pendency of above-

referred criminal case.  

5. The  Additional  District  Judge,  Panna,  by  his  order  dated  

21.04.2008 dismissed the application  for staying the proceedings in the  

suit.  

6. The respondent nos. 1 to 4 herein  challenged the order of the  

Additional District Judge in the High Court in a writ petition under Article  

227  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  The  Division  Bench  of  the  Madhya  

Pradesh  High Court by the impugned order has set aside the order  of the  

Additional   District  Judge  and,  as  noted  above,  has   stayed  the  

proceedings in Civil  Suit till  the decision of criminal case. It is from this  

order that the present civil appeal,  by special leave,  has arisen.

7. We have heard Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior counsel for  

the appellant, and Mr. K.G. Bhagat, learned counsel for respondent nos. 1  

to 4.  

8. A Constitution Bench of this Court in  M.S. Sheriff & Anr.    v.  

State  of  Madras  &  Ors.1 has  considered  the  question  of  simultaneous  

prosecution of the criminal proceedings with the civil suit. In paragraphs  

14,15 and 16  (Pg. 399) of the Report, this Court  stated as follows:

“14.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   It  was  said  that  the  simultaneous  prosecution of these matters will embarrass the accused.  

1  AIR 1954 SC 397

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. . . . but we can see that the simultaneous prosecution of  the present criminal proceedings out of which  this appeal

arises and the civil suits will embarrass the accused. We  have therefore to determine which should be stayed. 15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings  we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be  given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in  the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast  rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the  possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal  Courts  is  a  relevant  consideration.  The  law  envisages  such  an  eventuality  when  it  expressly  refrains  from  making the decision of one Court binding on the other, or  even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such  as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration  here is the likelihood of embarrassment. 16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil  suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a  criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned  has forgotten  all  about  the  crime.  The  public  interests  demand that  criminal  justice should be swift  and sure;  that the guilty should be punished while the events are  still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should  be  absolved  as  early  as  is  consistent  with  a  fair  and  impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to  let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.  This,  however,  is  not  a  hard  and  fast  rule.  Special  considerations  obtaining  in  any  particular  case  might  make some other course more expedient and just.  For  example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding  may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it  in  order  to  give  precedence  to  a  prosecution  ordered  under S. 476. But in this case we are of the view that the  civil  suits should be stayed till  the criminal proceedings  have finished.”   

9.  The ratio of the decision in M.S. Sheriff1 is that no hard and  

fast rule can be laid down as to which of the proceedings – civil or criminal  

– must be stayed. It was held that possibility of conflicting decisions in the  

civil and criminal courts cannot be considered as a relevant consideration  

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for  stay  of  the  proceedings  as  law  envisaged  such  an  eventuality.  

Embarrassment was considered to be a relevant aspect and having regard  

to certain factors, this Court found expedient in  M.S. Sheriff1  to stay the  

civil proceedings. The Court made it very clear that this, however, was not  

hard and fast rule; special considerations obtaining in any particular case  

might make some other course more expedient  and just.   M.S. Sheriff1   

does  not  lay  down an  invariable  rule  that  simultaneous  prosecution  of  

criminal  proceedings  and  civil  suit  will  embarrass  the  accused  or  that  

invariably the proceedings in the civil suit should be stayed until disposal of  

criminal case.

10. In  M/s.  Karam  Chand  Ganga  Prasad  and  Another  etc. v.  

Union  of  India  and  Others2,  this  Court  in  paragraph  4  of  the  Report  

(Pg. 695) made the following general observations,  “it is a well established  

principle of  law that the decisions of the civil  courts are binding on the  

criminal courts. The converse is not true.”  This statement has been held to  

be  confined  to  the  facts  of  that  case  in  a  later  decision  in  K.G.  

Premshanker v. Inspector of Police and Another3, to which we shall refer to  

a little later.

11. In  V.M.  Shah  v.  State  of  Maharashtra  and  Another4,  while  

dealing with the question whether the conviction under Section 630 of the  

2  1970 (3) SCC 694 3  (2002) 8 SCC 87 4  (1995) 5 SCC 767

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Companies Act was sustainable, this Court, while noticing the decision in  

M.S. Sheriff1  in para 11 (pg. 770) of the Report, held as under:

“11.  As seen  that  the  civil  court  after  full-dressed  trial  recorded the finding that the appellant had not come into  possession through the Company but had independent  tenancy rights from the principal landlord and, therefore,  the decree for eviction was negatived. Until that finding is  duly considered by the appellate court after weighing the  evidence  afresh  and  if  it  so  warranted  reversed,  the  findings bind the parties. The findings, recorded by the  criminal court, stand superseded by the findings recorded  by the civil court. Thereby, the findings of the civil court  get  precedence over  the  findings recorded by  the  trial  court,  in  particular,  in  summary  trial  for  offences  like  Section 630. The mere pendency of the appeal does not  have the effect of suspending the operation of the decree  of the trial court and neither the finding of the civil court  gets nor the decree becomes inoperative.”

 12. The statement of law in  V.M. Shah4,  as quoted above, has  

been expressly held to be not a good law in K.G. Premshanker3 .  

13. In State of Rajasthan v. Kalyan Sundaram Cement Industries   

Ltd. and Others5, this Court made the following statement in paragraph 3  

(pgs. 87-88):

“3. It is settled law that pendency of the criminal matters  would  not  be  an  impediment  to  proceed  with  the  civil  suits.  The  criminal  court  would  deal  with  the  offence  punishable under the Act. On the other hand, the courts  rarely  stay  the  criminal  cases  and  only  when  the  compelling  circumstances  require  the  exercise  of  their  power. We have never come across stay of any civil suits  by the courts so far. The High Court of Rajasthan is only  an  exception  to  pass  such  orders.  The  High  Court  proceeded on a wrong premise that the accused would  be expected to disclose their defence in the criminal case  by asking them to proceed with the trial of the suit. It is  not a correct principle of law. Even otherwise, it no longer  

5  (1996) 3 SCC 87

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subsists, since many of them have filed their defences in  the  civil  suit.  On  principle  of  law,  we  hold  that  the  approach adopted by the High Court is not correct. But  since the defence has already been filed nothing survives  in this matter.”

14. We may now refer  to a three-Judge Bench decision of  this  

Court  in  K.G.  Premshanker3.  The  three-Judge  Bench  took  into  

consideration Sections 40, 41, 42 and 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872  and  

also the decision of this Court in M.S. Sheriff1  and observed in paragraph  

32 of the Report that the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in  

M.S. Sheriff case1 would be binding wherein it has been specifically held  

that  no  hard  and  fast  rule  can  be  laid  down  and  that  possibility  of  

conflicting  decision  in  civil  and  criminal  courts  is  not  a  relevant  

consideration.  

15. Section  40  of  the  Evidence  Act  makes  it  plain   that  the  

existence  of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any  

Courts from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact  

when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such  

suit, or to hold such trial.  

16. Section 41 provides  for relevancy  of judgments passed in the  

exercise of probate, matrimonial admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction by the  

Competent Court. It  reads as follows :

“S. 41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc.,  jurisdiction.—A  final  judgment,  order  or  decree  of  a  competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial  

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admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or  takes  away  from  any  person  any  legal  character,  or  which  declares  any  person  to  be  entitled  to  any  such  character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as  against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant  when the existence of any such legal character, or the  title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant. Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof—

that any legal character, which it confers accrued  at the time when such judgment, order or decree came  into operation;

that any legal character, to which it declares any  such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the  time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to  have accrued to that person;

that any legal character which it takes away from  any such  person ceased at  the  time from which  such  judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or  should cease;

and that anything to which it declares any person  to be so entitled was the property of that person at the  time from which such judgment, order or decree declares  that it had been or should be his property.”

17. Section  42  deals  with  relevancy  and  effect  of  judgments,  

orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in Section 41. It reads as  

under:

“S.42.   Relevancy  and  effect  of  judgments,  orders  or  decrees,  other  than  those  mentioned  in  section  41.— Judgments,  orders  or  decrees  other  than   those  mentioned  in  section  41,  are  relevant  if  they  relate  to  matters  of  a  public  nature  relevant  to  the  enquiry;  but  such  judgments,  orders  or  decrees  are  not  conclusive  proof of that which they state.”

18. Section  43  provides  that  the  judgments,  orders  or  decrees  

other than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant unless  

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the existence of such judgment,  order or decree is a fact in issue or is  

relevant under some other provisions of the Evidence Act.  

19. In  K.G.  Premshanker3, the  effect  of  the  above  provisions  

(Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act) has been broadly noted thus:  if the  

criminal case and civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of  

the civil court would be relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43  

are  satisfied  but  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  same  would  be  conclusive  

except  as provided in  Section 41.  Section 41 provides which judgment  

would  be  conclusive  proof  of  what  is  stated  therein.  Moreover,  the  

judgment, order or decree passed in previous civil proceedings, if relevant,  

as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence  

Act then in each case the Court has to decide to what extent it is binding or  

conclusive with regard to the matters decided therein. In each and every  

case  the  first  question  which  would  require  consideration  is,  whether  

judgment,  order  or  decree  is  relevant;  if  relevant,  its  effect.  This  would  

depend upon the facts of each case.

20 In  light  of  the  above  legal  position,  it  may  be  immediately  

observed  that  the  High  Court  was  not  at  all  justified  in  staying  the  

proceedings  in  the  civil  suit  till  the  decision  of  criminal  case.  Firstly,  

because even if there is possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and  

criminal  courts,  such  an  eventuality  cannot  be  taken  as  a  relevant  

consideration.  Secondly,  in  the  facts  of  the  present  case  there  is  no  

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likelihood of any embarrassment to the defendants (respondent nos. 1 to 4  

herein) as they had already filed the written statement in the civil suit and  

based on the pleadings of the parties the issues have been framed. In this  

view of the matter,  the outcome and/or findings that may be  arrived at by  

the civil court will not at all prejudice the defence(s) of the respondent nos.  

1 to 4 in the criminal proceedings.

21. For  the  above  reasons,  appeal  is  allowed.  The  impugned  

order  dated  24.11.2008  passed  by  the  Division  Bench  of  the  Madhya  

Pradesh High Court is set aside. The proceedings in the civil suit shall now  

proceed further in accordance with law. The parties shall bear their own  

costs.    

 ……………………….J. (R.M. Lodha)

   ..…..………………...J.                (Sharad Arvind Bobde)

NEW DELHI MAY 1, 2013.

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