GURMEET PAL SINGH Vs STATE OF PUNJAB
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J. CHELAMESWAR, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J. CHELAMESWAR
Case number: C.A. No.-004853-004853 / 2018
Diary number: 31820 / 2013
Advocates: UPASANA NATH Vs
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4853 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP(C) No.33680/2013]
GURMEET PAL SINGH ….APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. ….RESPONDENTS
WITH
Civil Appeal No._4856 of 2018 [Arising out of SLP(C) No.3826/2014]
Civil Appeal No.4857 of 2018 [Arising out of SLP(C) No.8431/2014]
Civil Appeal No.4858 of 2018 [Arising out of SLP(C) No.31833/2014]
Civil Appeal No.4854 of 2018 [Arising out of SLP(C) No.36660/2013]
Civil Appeal No.4855 of 2018 [Arising out of SLP(C) No.2997/2014]
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309
of the Constitution of India, the Punjab Superior Judicial Service
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Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Rules’) were notified
on 31.08.2007 duly published in the Gazette of 03.09.2007 for
regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of the persons
appointed to the Punjab Superior Judicial Service. The method of
appointment as per Rule 7 of the said Rules was both from amongst the
members of the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch), as well as
direct appointment from amongst the eligible advocates on the basis of
written test and viva-voce conducted by the High Court. Sub-clause
(c) of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 dealt with the latter direct appointment for
which 25 per cent of the posts were reserved. The appeals in question
relate to the process of the direct recruitment under these Rules at the
first instance, carried out in pursuance of the advertisement issued on
02.02.2008.
2. In terms of the aforesaid advertisement, applications were
invited for selection of twenty one (21) candidates, with a further
breakup of ten (10) from General category, six (6) from Scheduled
Caste (‘SC’) category, two (2) from Backward Class category, one (1)
from Ex-Serviceman (General) category, one (1) from B.C. (Ex-
Serviceman) category and one (1) from Physically Challenged
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category of Locomotor or Orthopedic Disability, under Rule 7(3)(c) of
the said Rules. It may be noted that the advertisement also stated that
‘the number of posts will be subject to variation.’ Note 4 to the
advertisement qua the Physically Challenged category also stated that
“if no candidate is found suitable or medically fit under this category,
the post shall be reverted to the General category candidate.”
3. The appellants before this Court are all candidates, who
appeared for the examination. It may be noted that none had assailed
the advertisement on any account prior to the declaration of the result.
On declaration of the result of the written examination, viva-voce was
held and there was variation in the merit position of the candidates in
the combined marks as compared with just the written examination.
The appellants all belong to the General category and their merit
position was beyond the ten (10) candidates whose recruitment was
envisaged under the advertisement. It may be noted that one of the SC
candidates obtained marks to merit consideration without the benefit of
reservation and consequently nine (9) of the General category
candidates were recruited against the ten (10) posts.
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4. There were five developments, which need to be taken note of,
in view of the pleas advanced on behalf of the appellants. The first
was the elevation of Justice Sabina as a Judge of the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana on 12.03.2008, and, thus, the submission of the
appellants is that one more seat for General category became available
post issuance of the advertisement and since the number of posts were
subject to variation, this vacancy should be made available to the
General category. The second is arising from a defect in the
advertisement inasmuch as no reservation for ex-serviceman was
envisaged, as Rule 3 of the Punjab Recruitment of Ex-Servicemen
Rules, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Ex-Servicemen Rules’)
exempted the applicability of these Rules to the Punjab Vidhan Sabha
Secretariat Service and the Punjab Superior Judicial Service. The High
Court also took cognizance of this fact and, thus, the reservation being
not in accordance with law, resolved appropriately in a meeting of the
Judges held on 25.07.2008. The meeting noted that the vacancy, which
was advertised as Ex-Serviceman (General) category should also go to
the General category. Thus, a second seat as per the appellants became
available for the General category. The third is the absorption of two
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Presiding Officers of Fast Track courts against which vacancies for
direct recruitment purportedly under Rule 7(2) of the said Rules even
though the present recruitment exercise was under Rule 7(3) of the said
Rules. Fourthly, no candidate was available in the physically
challenged category, but instead of carrying it to the General category
as per Note 4 of the advertisement, the vacancy was carried forward.
Finally, the advertisement was issued on the basis of a total cadre
strength of 107 posts, while actually the total cadre strength on the date
of advertisement was 111, i.e., there were four more posts, which could
have been filled in and the General category would have got two more
seats and two more candidates could have been absorbed in the
General category.
5. The endeavor of the appellants by filing writ petitions before the
Punjab and Haryana High Court, however, was not successful and in
terms of the common judgment dated 19.08.2013 all the writ petitions
were dismissed. In the course of the last decade since the recruitment
process took place in the year 2008, similar recruitment of advocates
was carried out five times through different notifications. Three of the
candidates before this Court took their chances in different
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examinations. The details of these are disclosed as per Annexure A to
the additional affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.2/the High
Court, which is reproduced hereinunder:
Sr. No .
Candidate’s Name
Father/Husband’s Name
Notification dated 2.2.2008
Rank as per Merit List
Notification dated 21.10.2009
Notification dated 8.4.2011
Notification dated 2.1.2012
Notification dated 29.4.2013
Notification dated 23.3.2015
1. Gurmeet Pal Singh
Santokh Singh Appeared in the Exam
11 - Appeared in the Exam
Appeared in the Exam
Appeared in the Exam
-
2. Kadambini Mukand Lal Arora
Appeared in the Exam
13 - Appeared in the Exam
Appeared in the Exam
Appeared in the Exam
Appeared in the Exam
3. Anuradha Bhavnesh Shukla Appeared in the Exam
12 - - - - -
4. Preeti Bhargav
Narinder Bharbav
Appeared in the Exam
15 - - - - -
5. Parmod Kumar
Satyapal Sharma Appeared in the Exam
16 - Appeared in the Exam
- Appeared in the Exam
-
6. The appellants, however, contend that if they have been
wrongfully excluded, whether they appeared in a subsequent
examination or not, or whether they were successful or not in the
subsequent examination, would not be material. It is also the case of
the appellants that though a decade has passed since the examination
was held, the delays in the adjudication process should not deprive
them of being appointed even if there have been subsequent
recruitments, and if that aspect weighs with the Court, the relief can be
suitably modified qua the issue of seniority.
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A. Effect of elevation of a Judge from the category of direct advocate recruits to the High Court:
7. The elevation of Justice Sabina on 12.03.2008 is a matter of fact.
It is not also in dispute that the advertisement was issued prior to such
elevation on 02.02.2008 and the advertisement noted the possibility of
the number of posts being subject to variation. However, in our view,
this would not mandate the inclusion of a post which fell vacant
subsequently, nor can there be even otherwise a compulsion on the
High Court to necessarily expand the scope of the number of persons
to be recruited. In fact, the persons, who may have become eligible
post the advertisement would suffer a prejudice were subsequent
vacant posts to be included against an earlier advertisement. The plea
based on the vacancy of this seat is, thus, completely devoid of merit.
B. The provision wrongfully made in the advertisement reserving two seats for Ex-Servicemen:
8. The advertisement dated 02.02.2008 did make a provision for
two seats for Ex-Servicemen – one in General category and one from
Backward Class category. However, such a reservation had no force of
law in view of Rule 3 of the Ex-Servicemen Rules, carving out an
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exception in respect of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat Service
and the Punjab Superior Judicial Service. The High Court having
noticed this fact, abandoned the process of recruitment for this
category in terms of the minutes of meeting dated 25.07.2008. It did
initially resolve that the vacancy advertised for Ex-Servicemen
(General) would also go to the General category but ultimately that is
not what was done. The said seat was, however, made available for
absorption of the Judges from the Fast Track court. In fact, there were
two Judges recruited from the Fast Track court – one against this post
and the other against the vacancy, which arose on account of the
elevation of Justice Sabina through a different exercise, which will be
discussed later on.
C. The recruitment of two Judges from Fast Track Courts:
9. The Fast Track courts owe their origin to the allocation of funds
under the 11th Finance Commission to deal with long pending cases,
particularly Sessions cases. A time bound utilization within a period of
five years was envisaged and, thus, various State Governments were
required to take necessary steps to establish such courts. We may
notice here that obviously the regular cadre strength of Judges has been
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awfully inadequate to meet the pendency and inflow of cases, one
methodology could be to increase the cadre strength itself. There have
been periodic reviews for this purpose in the last few years. However,
not having done that at the relevant stage, a short cut method was
envisaged to, at least, temporarily create the Fast Track courts for
certain category of cases. However, since the fund from the Central
Government ceased after five years, the question arose as to what was
to happen to these Fast Track courts especially keeping in mind that a
number of the presiding officers had been appointed directly from the
Bar. The challenge laid to the constitutionality of this scheme for Fast
Track courts was repelled in Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India &
Ors.1. In para 10 of the judgment, directions were issued to deal with
the initial teething problems of the Scheme. Direction No.4, after the
earlier directions recorded that preference will be given to appointment
on ad hoc promotions, followed by retired Judges, stipulated as under:
“4. The third preference shall be given to members of the Bar for direct appointment in these Courts. They should be preferably in the age group of 35-45 years, so that they could aspire to continue against the regular posts if the Fast Track Courts cease to function. The question of their continuance in service shall be reviewed periodically by the High Court based on their
1(2002) 5 SCC 1
9
performance. They may be absorbed in regular vacancies, if subsequent recruitment takes place and their performance in the Fast Track Courts is found satisfactory. For the initial selection, the High Court shall adopt such methods of selection as are normally followed for selection of members of the Bar as direct recruits to the Superior/Higher Judicial Services.”
10. The stand of the High Court is that it is in furtherance of the
aforesaid judgment that a provision was made for absorption of the
Judges appointed to the Fast Track court on a permanent basis.
11. The appointment was made vide order dated 20.06.2008 and two
such Judges in the Fast Track court against the two vacancies, i.e., one
of Ex-Servicemen (General) category and the second which occurred
on elevation of Justice Sabina from the subordinate judiciary to the
High Court. Such selection was preceded by a Selection Committee
constituted by the High Court in order to assess the suitability for
absorption of the Judges. The Judges were marked on a benchmark of
100 marks, out of which 50 marks were from written test, 25 marks for
viva-voce and 25 marks for performance as a Judge of the Fast Track
court. These two obtained the highest marks qua the vacancies for
Punjab as recorded in the minutes of the meeting dated 18.03.2008.
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12. The aforesaid shows that a completely different process was
followed for absorption of the Judges from the Fast Track court. The
moot point, however, remains whether one of the vacancies in the
advertisement, which arose ought to have been utilized for absorption
of these Fast Track court Judges, which, in turn, affected the senior-
most, i.e., Gurmeet Pal Singh. In a way, Gurmeet Pal Singh suffered
the consequences both of a more meritorious candidate from the SC
category being found eligible, because of which he went one slot
down. But then it is a well-established legal position that members
belonging to the reserved category, who get selected in open
competition on the basis of their merit have a right to be included in
the General/Unreserved category and are not to be included in the
quota reserved for the SC category (Samta Andolan Samiti v. Union
of India2).
13. Insofar as the adjustment against the seat which was made
available on account of the wrongful reservation for Ex-Servicemen,
we cannot lose sight of the fact that the said Mr. Gurmeet Pal Singh
made an endeavour by taking three successive subsequent exams held
2(2014) 14 SCC 745 – para 16
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on 08.04.2011, 02.01.2012 and 29.04.2013, but was unsuccessful
(chart reproduced above). Not only that, there has been a passage of a
decade since the initial recruitment and though the appellants cannot be
blamed for judicial delays, it is really not possible to put the clock back
for all the aforesaid reasons.
14. We are, thus, not inclined on this aspect to interfere with the
recruitment process.
D. Non-availability of candidate with disability:
15. The plea based on an inherent right in view of the wording of the
advertisement qua the seat meant for person with disability when no
candidate is available is intrinsically flawed. The provisions of the
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights
and Full Participation) Act, 1995, are towards the social objective of
accommodating people with physical disability. We find nothing
wrong in carrying forward the vacancy for the future.
E. The larger recruitment was possible since the cadre strength was more:
16. The undisputed fact is that the advertisement was issued on the
basis of a cadre strength of 107. Twenty-seven (27) posts would arise
12
in the category in question and six (6) were already occupied and, thus,
the advertisement was issued for twenty-one (21) posts. The
advertisement was not challenged by any of the appellants. It is a well
settled principle of law that when a candidate appears in an
examination without objection and is subsequently found to be not
successful a challenge to the process is precluded. In a recent
judgment in Ashok Kumar & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Ors.3, this
principle has been re-emphasised by referring to the earlier judgments
on this point starting from Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala
Shukla4. Thus, undoubtedly the appellants not having challenged the
advertisement at the relevant point of time, cannot be permitted to
contend that having not made the mark in the cut off for the select list,
something must be done to somehow accommodate them. The plea of
the existence of a larger number of posts is in this direction. No doubt
every endeavor should be made to fill up the existing vacancies and
prospective vacancies keeping in mind the judgment in Malik Mazhar
Sultan & Anr. v. U.P. Public Service Commission & Ors.5. However,
there cannot be a blanket proposition that the advertisement is
3(2017) 4 SCC 357 4(2002) 6 SCC 127 5(2008) 17 SCC 703
13
defective merely because every vacancy which existed or which is
contemplated is not taken into account. Certainly, a subsequent
vacancy arising from an elevation can hardly be treated as in
contemplation.
17. We agree with the contention advanced by learned counsel
appearing for the High Court, more so when merely because the name
of a candidate finds a place in the select merit list does not given an
indefeasible right to appointment as well and it is always open to not
even fill up a vacancy. (Kulwinder Pal Singh & Anr. v. State of
Punjab & Ors.6).
18. It is also the plea of learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.2 that the cadre consisted of only 107 posts. This is stated to be
quite apparent from the gradation and distribution list of officers of
The Judicial Department, Punjab corrected up to 01.01.2008. The
strength, including permanent and temporary has been mentioned as
109. However, at serial No.6, under the temporary post are two
temporary posts of Additional District & Sessions Judges sanctioned
by the Punjab Government letter dated 27.01.2004 for setting up of
6(2016) 6 SCC 532
14
special courts at Patiala and Jalandhar. These courts were actually not
set up till much later. It was also contended that even if the cadre
strength was 109, then the particular category would be entitled to
27.25 (25% of 109 = 27.25) posts, with this six (6) posts filled up.
Therefore, once again, one would come to 21 posts. The cadre strength
of 111 relied upon by the appellants is available from the Gradation
and Distribution List of Officers of the Judicial Department, Punjab
corrected up to 31.01.2010, i.e., which was subsequent to the
advertisement and the recruitment process. Thus, the appellants cannot
get any relief even on this ground.
Conclusion:
19. We have dealt with the pleas advanced before us on behalf of the
appellants. We have, of course, perused the impugned order. We may
note that the line of attack before the High Court appeared majorly to
be on different pleas, though it cannot be said that the issues raised
before us have been raised for the first time. The focus was, however,
elsewhere. We have, thus, dealt with the pleas, which have been
advanced before us.
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20. We are, thus, unable to grant any relief to the appellants in the
present case.
21. We may, however, note in the end that one of the appellants,
Ms. Kadambini, Advocate, argued the appeal in person and, without
taking anything away from the endeavour of the other learned senior
counsel, did a commendable job. However, that cannot be a ground to
accommodate the said appellant.
22. The appeals are accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear
their own costs.
..….….…………………….J. [J. Chelameswar]
...……………………………J. [Sanjay Kishan Kaul]
New Delhi; May 15, 2018.
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