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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1675 OF 2004

GOVINDA BALA PATIL (D) BY LRS.      APPELLANTS  

VERSUS

GANPATI RAMCHANDRA NAIKWADE (D) BY LRS. RESPONDENTS  

JUDGMENT  

CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J.

This appeal arises out of a proceeding under  

Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural  

Lands Act, 1948.  One Govinda Bala Patil, since  

deceased,  the  predecessor-in-interest  of  the  

appellants,  hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  

landlord”, owned land being R.S. No. 51 admeasuring  

35  gunthas  at  Village  Pandewadi  within  Taluka  

Radhanagari  in  the  District  of  Kolhapur.   A  

proceeding under Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy  

and  Agricultural  Lands  Act,  1948,  hereinafter  

referred to as “the Act”, was initiated by one Rama

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Dattu  Naikwade,  predecessor-in-interest  of  the  

respondents, for determination of price of the land  

on  the  plea  that  he  shall  be  deemed  to  have  

purchased  the  land.   The  Additional  Tahsildar  &  

ALT, Radhanagari, at the first instance, held that  

the land in question was leased out for growing  

sugarcane and, accordingly, dropped the proceeding.  

However, in appeal, the said order was set aside  

and the matter ultimately remitted back to him to  

hold fresh inquiry.   Accordingly,  the Additional  

Tahsildar held fresh inquiry and again by its order  

dated 10th of December, 1981 reiterated its earlier  

finding and held that the land was leased out for  

growing sugarcane and the proceeding was dropped.  

The  tenant thereafter  preferred  appeal  which  was  

heard  by  the  Sub-Divisional  Officer,  Shahuwadi  

Division, Kolhapur who allowed the appeal and set  

aside the order of the Additional Tahsildar on its  

finding that the landlord has failed to prove the  

specific purpose of the lease.  The landlord then  

preferred revision before the Maharashtra Revenue  

Tribunal, Kolhapur, hereinafter referred to as “the  

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Tribunal”, which set aside the order of the Sub-

Divisional  Officer  and  restored  that  of  the  

Additional Tahsildar.  While doing so, the Tribunal  

held as follows:

“In  the  instant  case  as  I  have  stated  earlier  there  is  sufficient  evidence  on  record  to  show  on  the  basis  of  entries  in  the  “E”  Patrak  that  suit  land  was  continuously  growing sugarcane crop from the year  1946 and this particular fact is also  corroborated  to  some  extent  by  two  independent witnesses examined by the  applicant-landlords.  So in this case  it cannot be said that no agreement of  lease  was  established  between  the  parties  and in as much as  sugarcane  crop was grown in the suit land since  the  year  1946, there  are reasons to  believe that the main purpose of lease  was for growing sugarcane crop.”

The tenant assailed the aforesaid order before  

the High Court in a writ petition.  The High Court  

by the impugned order set aside the order of the  

Tribunal  and  held  that  the  Tribunal  erred  in  

setting  aside  the  finding  of  the  Sub-Divisional  

Officer that the land in question was not leased  

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out for sugarcane cultivation.  The High Court, in  

this connection, has observed as follows:

“12. While toppling the judgment and  order  passed  by  the  Sub-Divisional  Officer, Shahuwadi, the learned Member  of M.R.T. has dislodged the findings  of  facts  recorded  by  the  said  authority.  After  examining  the  judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  S.D.O. Shahuwadi, this Court comes to  the  conclusion  that  the  findings  recorded by the S.D.O. Shahuwadi were  consistent  with  the  evidence  on  record.  The  approach  adopted  by  him  was  correct,  proper  and  legal.  When  that  was  so,  it  was  beyond  the  jurisdiction of the learned Member of  M.R.T. to dislodge it in the revision.  The findings of facts consistent with  evidence and law cannot be dislodged  by revisional authority.”

The High Court has further held that Section  

43A of the Act will not govern the field as the  

lease in question was not given to more than one  

person.   At  this  juncture,  we  consider  it  

appropriate to reproduce the reasoning of the High  

Court in this regard:

“11. Section 43A of the Bombay Tenancy  Act  was  exempting  certain  categories  of the cultivation of the land and the  persons  cultivating  it  for  growing  sugarcane,  for  making  improvement  in  

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the financial and social status of the  peasants  using  the  land  for  growing  sugarcane,  fruits  or  flowers  or  for  the breeding of livestock. The words  which  are used in sub-clause  (b) of  Section  43A(1)  clearly  provide  that  such  exemption  was  available  to  the  leases of land granted by "any bodies"  or  "persons"  other  than  those  mentioned  in  clause  (a)  for  cultivation  of  sugarcane  or  the  growing  of  fruits  or  flowers  or  for  breeding of livestock. The words used  in  sub-clause  (b)  "any  bodies"  or  "persons" cannot be made applicable to  a single person. Such an attempt would  be throttling the spirit of enacting  Section  43A  of  the  Bombay  Tenancy  Act…………..”

We have heard Dr. Rajeev B. Masodkar, learned  

counsel for the appellants whereas respondents are  

represented by Mr. Kailash Pandey, Advocate.

Dr.   Masodkar  contends  that  the  finding  

recorded by the Tribunal that the lease was for  

cultivation of sugarcane has been set aside by the  

High  Court  without  assigning  any  reason  and  it  

merely stated “that the finding recorded by the SDO  

Shahuwadi  is  consistent  with  the  evidence  on  

record”  and  “the  approach  adopted  by  him  was  

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correct,  proper  and  legal”  and  in  such  

circumstances “it was beyond the jurisdiction” of  

the Tribunal “to dislodge it in the revision”.  He  

points  out  that  the  Sub-Divisional  Officer  had  

jumped to a finding without assigning any reason  

and hence it was open for the Tribunal to upset the  

same  and  record  its  own  finding.   Mr.  Pandey,  

however,  submits  that  the  Tribunal,  which  is  a  

court of revision, cannot act as a court of appeal  

and, hence, the High Court was right in setting  

aside its finding.   

We have considered the rival submission and we  

find substance in the submission of Dr. Masodkar.  

True  it  is  that  the  revisional  court  ordinarily  

does not reappraise the evidence but in case it is  

found that the finding recorded by the appellate  

authority  is  perverse,  nothing  prevents  it  from  

upsetting the finding of the appellate authority.  

If  the  appellate  authority  records  a  finding  

without consideration of the relevant material or  

on  consideration  of  irrelevant  material  or  the  

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finding  arrived  at  is  such  that  no  person  duly  

instructed in law can reach at that finding, such  

finding in law is called perverse and in such a  

contingency,  in  our  opinion,  it  is  within  the  

jurisdiction of the revisional court to set aside  

the said finding.  

Bearing in mind the principles aforesaid, when  

we consider the facts of the present case we are of  

the opinion that the finding recorded by the Sub-

Divisional Officer is patently perverse.  The Sub-

Divisional Officer has referred to the statement of  

the landlord and his witnesses that the land was  

leased out for growing sugarcane but rejected the  

evidence on the ground that the “landlord and his  

witnesses have not been able to prove the purpose  

of lease beyond  reasonable  doubt” and ultimately  

held that “the landlord has failed to prove the  

specific purpose of the lease.”  While doing so,  

the  Sub-Divisional  Officer,  in  our  opinion,  has  

lost sight of the basic principle that the nature  

of the proceeding is decided on the preponderance  

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of probability and the principle of proof beyond  

reasonable doubt does not apply in such proceeding.  

Further,  the  Sub-Divisional  Officer,  without  

assigning any reason, has rejected the evidence of  

the landlord and his witnesses and  jumped to a  

conclusion without reference to the evidence.  We  

have quoted the observations of the Tribunal which  

has recorded the finding that it was leased out for  

the purpose of growing sugarcane.  The Tribunal has  

referred to the evidence of the landlord and his  

witnesses and further to the record of rights and  

from that it has come to the aforesaid conclusion.  

In the face of what we have observed above, the  

Tribunal was well within its right in setting aside  

the  finding  of  the  Sub-Divisional  Officer  and  

holding  that  the  land  was  leased  out  for  the  

purpose of growing sugarcane.  That being so, we  

are of the opinion that the High Court erred in  

setting  aside  the  finding  of  the  Tribunal.  

Accordingly,  we  restore  the  finding  of  the  

Additional Tahsildar as  affirmed  by the Tribunal  

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and  hold  that  the  land  was  leased  out  for  

cultivation of sugarcane.

Dr. Masodkar, then submits that the High Court  

committed a grave error in coming to the conclusion  

that Section 43A of the Act would not govern the  

field and cannot be made applicable to a single  

person.  He submits that in law, the plural covers  

the singular also.  Mr. Pandey, however, submits  

that the High Court is right in holding that in  

view of the use of the expression “any bodies or  

persons” in sub clause (b) of Section 43A(1) of the  

Act, the same cannot be made applicable to a single  

person. He points out that in the present case, it  

is an admitted position that the land in question  

was given on lease to a single person.  In order to  

appreciate  the  rival  submissions,  we  deem  it  

expedient  to  reproduce  Section  43A(1)(b)  of  

the Act:

“43A.Some  of  the  provisions  not  to  apply  to  leases  of  land  obtained  by  industrial or commercial undertakings,  

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certain co-operative societies or for  cultivation of sugarcane or fruits or  flowers

(1) The provision of sections 4B, 8,  9, 9A, 9B, 9C, 10, 10A, 14, 16, 17A,  17B,  18,  27,  31  to  31D  (both  inclusive),  32  to  32R  (both  inclusive), 33A,  33B,  33C, 43,  63,  63A, 64 and 65, shall not apply to-

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b)  leases  of  land  granted  to  any  bodies  or  persons  other  than  those  mentioned  in  clause  (a)  for  the  cultivation  of  sugarcane  or  the  growing  of  fruits  or  flowers  or  for  the breeding of livestock;

(c) xxx xxx xxx”

Section 43A excludes the application of various  

provisions of the Act including 33C in respect of  

“leases” granted to “any bodies or persons” inter  

alia for the purpose of cultivation of sugarcane.  

However,  in  view  of  the  plural  expression  “any  

bodies”  or “persons”, the High Court has come to  

the conclusion that it shall cover only those cases  

in  which  lease  has  been  given  to  more  than  one  

person and not singular person.  It seems that the  

attention of the Court was not drawn to Section 13  

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of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 which inter  

alia  provides  that  words  in  the  singular  shall  

include the plural and vice versa.  Section 13 of  

the aforesaid Act reads as follows:

“Section 13 - Gender and number.

In  all  Bombay  Acts or  Maharashtra  Acts,  unless  there  is  anything  repugnant in the subject or context, -

(a) words importing the masculine  gender shall be taken to include  females; and

(b)  words  in  the  singular  shall  include  the  plural,  and  vice  versa.”

It  is  relevant  here  to  state  that  the  High  

Court has not come to the conclusion that there is  

anything repugnant in the subject or context so as  

to come to the conclusion that the plural will not  

include the singular.  We have examined the use of  

the plural word “persons” from that angle and we do  

not find that there is anything repugnant in the  

subject or context so that it may not be read as  

singular.  It is worth mentioning here that sub-

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section (b) of Section 43A(1) of the Act has also  

used  the  plural  expression  “leases”  and  if  we  

accept  the  reasoning  of  the  High  Court,  the  

aforesaid  provision  shall  cover  only  such  cases  

where there is more than one lease.  This, in our  

opinion, will defeat the very purpose of the Act.   

Thus, the impugned judgment of the High Court  

is vulnerable on both the counts and, hence, cannot  

be sustained.

In the result, the appeal is allowed, impugned  

judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of  

the  Tribunal  is  restored.   In  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the case, there shall be no order  

as to costs.    

………………………………………………………………J   (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)

………..……….………………………………..J                  (V.GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI, JULY 29, 2013.  

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