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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

Civil Appeal  No(s).1332 of 2008  

GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS.                  Appellant(s)  

                               VERSUS  

NARAYANAGOWDA (DEAD)BY LRS. & ORS.           Respondent(s)  

J U D G M E N T  

K.M. JOSEPH, J.  

1.  This appeal filed by special leave is directed  

against the judgment dated 28.11.2005 passed by the High  

Court of Karnataka in Regular Second Appeal Nos. 870/1996  

and 871/1996.  The High Court, by its impugned judgment,  

dismissed the appeals and affirmed the judgment of the  

First Appellate Court which had reversed the decree passed  

by the Trial Court.  The Trial Court decreed the suits  

[O.S. No. 68/1985 and 21/1986 (O.S. No. 393/75)] filed by  

the appellants.    

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2.  The case of the appellants is as follows:-  

 One Ramanna was the owner of the properties which are  

scheduled to the plaint.  He passed away in 1907.  He was  

married to Jankamma (first wife) who predeceased  him.   

The second wife Seethamma passed away in the year 1938.   

Through his first wife  (Jankamma), he had a daughter  

named Venkamma.  Venkamma passed away in 1910.   

Venkamma, in turn, had a daughter named Jankamma.   The  

appellants before us claimed right to the properties by  

virtue of sale deeds executed by Jankamma in the year 1955.     

 After the sale executed by Jankamma, the father of  

the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff claimed that  

they were in possession of the suit properties.  The  

respondents filed the suits (bearing O.S. Nos. 211 and 213  

of 1955) for declaration of their title and injunction.   

The said suit was decreed by the Trial Court.  The High  

Court in second appeal set aside the decree of the lower  

court and confirmed the sale of Jankamma in favour of the  

first plaintiff’s father and the second plaintiff and held  

that title to the properties could not be decided.  It is

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their case that since Venkamma survived Ramanna, Jankamma  

became a full owner of the properties and through her under  

the sale deed, the plaintiffs claimed absolute ownership,  

and sued for declaration of title, recovery of possession  

and mesne profits.   

3.  The respondents, on the other hand, denied the  

allegations that Ramanna had a daughter by name Venkamma  

and Venkamma had a daughter by name Jankamma.  The  

ownership by Jankamma was denied.  Seethamma had sold the  

properties to her brother - Srinivasa Rao.    

It is the further case of the respondents  

(defendants) that they purchased property from Srinivasa  

Rao under registered sale deed dated 13.09.1954 and they  

are in possession since then.  They also claimed adverse  

possession. They have been found to be in possession right  

upto the High Court in the earlier proceedings.   

4.  The Trial Court decreed the suit and found inter  

alia that Venkamma was the daughter of Ramanna and  

Venkamma had two daughters by name Patamma and Jankamma.   

Patamma died and Jankamma alone survived.  The Trial  

Court further proceeded to enquire whether Jankamma had

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acquired any right in the properties of her grandfather  

which was alienated to the plaintiffs.  The Court  

referred to the following findings of the High Court in  

the earlier litigation commenced by the respondents:  

“17. Now, whether Seethamma independently got  

any right to acquire the suit property from her  

husband is a matter to be looked into.  

Further, this aspect has also been considered by  

the Hon’ble High Court in S.A. No. 801/60 at  

page-16.  It is observed in the said judgment:-  

“Now it should be point out that although there is  

no dispute that Ramanna left behind him his wife  

Seethamma, who died in the year 1938, there was a  

serious controversy in this litigation in regard  

to the question whether Ramanna had a daughter  

Jankamma.  A question which was even more serious  

than that was whether Venkamma was alive when  

Ramanna died in the year 1907 or there about.  This  

question assumes great importance in the context  

of the finding recorded by the courts below, that  

Seethamma under the provisions of Mysore Hindu Law  

Women’s Right to property Act became an absolute  

owner of the properties of her husband.  It is  

clear from Sec. 10(2)(g) of the Act that she could  

become absolute owner of these properties, only if  

Ramanna when he died did not left behind his a  

daughter or daughter’s son.  If Venkamma was the  

daughter of Ramanna and she was alive when Ramanna  

died, then it becomes clear that Sec. 10(2)(g) of  

the Act is no application and Seethamma had only  

a widow’s estate and the properties could not  

become her Sreedhana properties.  It was for this  

purpose to demonstrate that they did not that way  

become Sreedhana properties of Seethamma that  

defendants contended that Ramanna left behind him  

his daughter Venkamma and that Venkamma had a child  

Jankamma, who could convey to the contesting  

defendants the properties purchased by them.  

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Both the courts have found that Venkamma was the  

daughter of Ramanna and that finding being a  

finding on the question of fact has remained  

undisturbed.  They have further found that  

defendant No.8 is Jankamma, daughter of Venkamma  

and that finding is equally unassailable for the  

same reason.  

18. While answering issue Nos. 1 and 2, not only  

I have come to the conclusion that Venkamma  

survived her further and she was the daughter of  

Ramanna and she had a daughter by name Jankamma but  

earlier proceedings between the same parties have  

also established this fact beyond any shadow of  

doubt.  When Venkamma survived her father, who  

died in the year 1907, then Seethamma, the 2nd wife  

of late Ramanna enquiring the properties of her  

husband could not have been there at all.  Because  

as it is already stated above under Section  

10(2)(g) of Hindu Law Women’s Right to Properties  

Act she could not become an absolute owner of the  

properties of her husband, Ramanna.  Because  

Ramanna had left behind his daughter Venkamma.   

The said Venkamma died in the year 1910.  Leaving  

behind her daughter by name Jankamma.  So under  

Section 10(2)(g) of the said Act, Seethamma had  

only a widow’s estate but the properties of her  

husband could not form her Sreedhana properties so  

in that way any alienations made by her in favour  

of her brother Srinivasa Rao were all illegal.”  

5.  When Venkamma survived her father then Seethamma  

(the second wife of Ramanna) could not acquire properties  

of her husband.   Reference was made to Section 10(2)(g)  

of the Hindu Law Women’s Right to Properties Act (for short  

‘the State Act’).  On finding that Ramanna had left behind  

her daughter - Venkamma who died in the year 1910,  

therefore under Section 10(2)(g) of the Act, the widow

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Seethamma had only widow’s estate which could not form her  

Stridhan properties and therefore any alienation made by  

her in favour of her brother - Srinivasa Rao was illegal.   

Seethamma was found to have no vested interest in the  

properties of her husband except having widow’s estate.   

Seethamma herself had not acquired any saleable interest  

in the properties of her husband - Ramanna.  It was  

observed that in the earlier second appeal that the sale  

by Srinivas Rao in favour of the respondents could not be  

sustained and accordingly the sale had been set aside only  

confirming the decree for permanent injunction against  

the appellants.  The sale of the properties by Jankamma  

was upheld in the earlier proceedings.  On this basis, the  

sale of properties by Seethamma in favour of her brother  

was found to be illegal entitling the plaintiffs to be  

declared as owner.    

6.  The contention of the respondents was that they  

were in possession and there were also entries in the  

revenue record to that effect.  It was found that the  

entries in the revenue record would not advance the case  

of the respondents.

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The Trial Court proceeded to consider the question  

whether the possession of the defendants could be found  

to be adverse and the Court came to the conclusion that  

the defendants had miserably failed to establish adverse  

possession.  The contention based on limitation was  

accordingly rejected.  Accordingly, on these findings,  

the suit came to be decreed declaring the appellants as  

owners of the scheduled properties and entitled to recover  

possession of the suit properties and also mesne profits  

from the respondents.  

7.  In the first appeal, the Appellate Court inter  

alia found that the respondents were in possession and if  

the properties were not recovered within 12 years, then  

the right to recovery is extinguished as per the decision  

in [AIR 1972 Mysore 22].    

Though the High Court in the earlier round of  

litigation observed that the question relating to whether  

Venkamma survived Ramanna or predeceased him has to be  

decided, the appellants should have approached the Court  

immediately but they had approached the Court with the  

delay of beyond 12 years and that too without giving any  

proper explanation for the delay.

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It was found that the right of the appellants for  

recovery of possession on the foot of their acquisition  

of title by sale from Jankamma on 16.04.1955 accrued on  

16.04.1955.  The judgment of the High Court in the earlier  

second appeal delivered on 16.09.1963 did not give rise  

to any cause of action.  Accordingly, the appeals were  

allowed and the suits were dismissed.  

Proceedings in the High Court  

8.  The High Court framed the following substantial  

questions of law in R.S.A. No. 870/96 and R.S.A. No.  

871/96:  

R.S.A. No. 870/96  

i) Whether the finding of the first appellate Court that  

the suit is barred by time is without considering the  

provisions of Section 65 of the Limitation Act of 1963?  

ii) Whether the finding that the respondents have  

perfected their title by adverse possession is justified  

when they have contended that they are the owners of the  

property by virtue of a registered sale deed?  

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R.S.A. No. 871/96  

i) Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in  

holding that the suit was barred by limitation?  

ii) Whether the lower appellant court was justified in  

holding that the respondents acquired title by adverse  

possession?  

9.  The High Court came to the following findings  

after referring to the relationship of the parties.  It  

was found inter alia that during the life time of Jankamma  

although the properties were sold by Seethamma in favour  

of his brother Srinivasa Rao but she had not challenged  

the same, so possession of the properties by the  

defendants by virtue of sale deed in favour of Srinivasa  

Rao and by Srinivasa Rao in favour of the respondents  

remained unchallenged and that would be the starting point  

of limitation.  

10.  The transferees from Jankamma namely the  

appellants moved the Court only in 1975, 1985 and 1986.   

As per Madras School of Mitakshara Law in a catena of  

decisions, it is held that at a place other than Bombay  

State the right of survivorship necessarily is in favour

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of the widow than the daughter and the grand-daughter. So  

the alienation made by Seethamma in favour of Srinivas Rao  

and by Srinivas Rao to the respondents could not be said  

to be invalid.  

11.  Thereafter, the Court referred to the ‘the State  

Act’ and observed that even under Section 4 as per Section  

4(1)(ii) of the State Act, the widow stands in preference  

to the daughters i.e. the right of widow (Seethamma) is  

preferable to the right of daughter and  Jankamma’s  

position comes only afterwards.  Jankamma - the grand  

daughter is in category (ix) of the aforesaid provision.  

12.  Such being the position of law, the sale made by  

Jankamma, grand-daughter of Ramanna, in favour of the  

appellants, if any, is non est, more so, as noted, since  

Jankamma had not challenged the earlier sale made by  

Seethamma in favour of Srinivas Rao.  Seethamma although  

had a limited interest, the alienation had not been  

challenged by the reversioners of Ramanna for 50 years.   

The right of Seethamma stood unchallenged and the  

alienation made also remained unchallenged.

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As regards the point relating to limitation, it was  

found that first of all Jankamma had to challenge the   

alienation by Seethamma, which was of the year 1913.  No  

special privilege was given in excluding limitation  

created by the Limitation Act by the observation of the  

High Court in the earlier second appeals (801/1960 and  

819/1960).  Since the right of Seethamma had not been  

challenged by Jankamma, the suits are necessarily barred  

by time.  

Thereafter, regarding the adverse possession, this  

is what the Court held:  

“As to the point of adverse possession is  

concerned, it is made clear by the lower appellate  

court that even after order of declaration has been  

negatived by this Court in the second appeals  

801/60 and 819/60, the suits are belatedly filed  

by the plaintiffs in the year 1985 and 86  

respectively and as such Sreenivas Rao and  

thereafter, the defendants have acquired right and  

title to the suit properties by adverse  

possession.  It is needless to say that when  

necessarily these defendants have set up their  

right not only for possession, but also by virtue  

of the sale deed, that finding would not be  

appropriate.”  

13.  We have heard learned counsel for the parties.   

Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to  

Section 4 of the State Act and then he further sought

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support from Section 10 of the Act.  Section 10 (2) (g)  

of the Act reads as follows:-  

“10. (2) Stridhana includes:-  

(g) property taken by inheritance by a female  

from another female and property taken by  

inheritance by a female from her husband or son,  

or from a male relative connected by blood except  

when there is a daughter or daughter’s son of the  

propositus alive at the time the property is so  

inherited.”  

14.  The appellant’s contention is that the High Court  

has committed a clear error in taking the view that  

Seethamma - the widow would get an absolute right.  It is  

his contention that as per the definition of Stridhan  

which undoubtedly is her absolute right, there is an  

exception carved out in Section 10(2)(g) of the Act.  In  

so far as the properties in question were properties  

inherited by Seethamma on the death of her husband -  

Ramanna and at that time the daughter Venkamma was very  

much alive,  therefore,  Seethamma would not get an  

absolute right.  In this case, the daughter of Ramanna  

(Venkamma) died only in 1910 which was after the death of  

Ramanna – 1907. When succession to the estate of Ramanna  

in 1907 opened, then Seethamma his widow would inherit the  

property where the right is only limited to the estate of

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a widow.  On her death, the property would revert back to  

the reversioners of her late husband - Ramanna.  

15.  It is his complaint that the High Court has  

overlooked this vital aspect by not referring to Section  

10 of the Act and confining its focus on Section 4 of the  

State Act.  Under Section 4 of the State Act, the widow  

has priority over daughter and granddaughter.  

When it was pointed out to the learned counsel for  

the appellant that since Ramanna died in 1907 and the State  

Act was not in existence as the Act was passed in 1933,  

learned counsel for the appellant took up another  

contention.  He contended that under the Mitakshara law  

which was applicable, the widow was entitled only to a  

limited estate.  He would contend that the position even  

prior to the passing of the State Act was that the widow  

did not get absolute estate.  

16.  Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents  

would contend that Seethamma had transferred the property  

in the year 1913.  Seethamma died in 1938.  If that is so,  

the suit should have been filed if at all within a period  

of 12 years from the date on which the alleged right in

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the reversioners came to be vested namely upon the death  

of Seethamma in the year 1938.  The period of 12 years  

would run out in 1950.  The appellants - plaintiffs  

purchased the property in the year 1955 from Jankamma -  

grand daughter of Ramanna.  Even then the suit was filed  

by them only after more than 20 years.  It is further  

contended by learned counsel for the respondent that under  

Mitakshara law applicable in the region in question, the  

grand daughter was not a heir.  Only the daughter of a male  

upon his death intestate could inherit the property.   

Therefore, even the limited right attributed to the widow  

Seethamma would by default become an absolute right.  

Findings in the earlier Second Appeal  

17.  The findings in the earlier Second Appeals which   

emanated from the suits filed by the respondents are as  

follows:  The High Court did not interfere with a finding  

that the sale deeds executed by Seethamma in favour of  

Srinivas Rao were genuine.  Equally, the High Court  

affirmed the finding that the respondents in this appeal  

were in possession of the properties purchased by them.   

Jankamma was found to be the grand-daughter of Ramanna.   

Further, the Court proceeded to pose the question whether

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Venkamma was a daughter of Ramanna and whether she was  

alive when Ramanna died having regard to Section 10(2)(g)  

of the State Act.  It was noticed that both the Courts  

below had found that Venkamma was the daughter of Ramanna  

and Jankamma was the daughter of Venkamma.  It was,  

however, observed that there were no pleadings as to  

whether Venkamma survived or predeceased Ramanna.  

18.  The Court was of the view that the first issue  

in all the cases was whether Seethamma became absolute  

owner of the properties of her husband and it was equally  

true that the processes by which she could become such  

owner would be by her being alive and there being no  

surviving child of Ramanna when he died. It was found  

that the parties did not have the opportunity to produce  

all evidences in this regard and an investigation was  

required.  The finding that Seethamma became absolute  

owner of Ramanna’s properties was set aside.  The Court,  

however, proceeded to find that the fact that the  

aforesaid finding was set aside did not mean that the Court  

held that Seethamma had not become the absolute owner.  No  

opinion was expressed as it was dependent upon the

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question whether Venkamma was alive when Ramanna died and  

materials in this regard were insufficient.  

19.  On this basis, the decree declaring the  

respondents to be the owners of the property was set aside.   

The decree restraining the appellants from disturbing the  

respondents’ possession was also affirmed.  It may be  

seen from the judgment of the High Court in the earlier  

round of litigation that the respondents were found to be  

in possession.  The question relating to title was  

essentially not decided as is clear from what was found  

by the High Court.  The Court left it open to be decided  

on the basis that Seethamma would become absolute owner  

if Venkamma - the daughter of Ramanna had not survived  

Ramanna.  

20.  Now we shall proceed to render our findings.  

Position of a Hindu Widow prior to Hindu Succession Act  

and the State Act   

There is no dispute that the parties are governed by  

the Madras School of Hindu Law.  Thereunder, every female  

who succeeded as a heir whether to a male or a female, took  

a limited estate in the property inherited by her.  As

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regards widow’s estate, this statement is found in Mulla  

Hindu Law, 23rd Edition.  

“176. Widow’s estate – A widow or other limited  

heirs is not a tenant for life, but is owner of the  

property inherited by her, subject to certain  

restrictions on alienation and subject to its  

devolving upon the next heir of the last full owner  

upon her death.  The whole estate is for the time  

vested in her, and she represents it completely.   

As stated in a Privy Council case, her right is of  

the nature of a right of property; her position is  

that of owner; her powers in that character are,  

however limited; but so long as she is alive no one  

has any vested interest in the succession.”    

In Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey & Ors. [AIR 1962 SC 83],  

this Court proceeded to hold that it could not be an  

inflexible proposition of law that whenever there is a  

usufructory mortgage, the widow could not sell the  

property on the ground that it would deprive the  

reversioners of the right to redeem it.  This is what the  

Court held:  

“……...Such a proposition could be supported only  

if the widow is in the position of a trustee,  

holding the estate for the benefit of the  

reversioners, with a duty cast on her to preserve  

the properties and pass them on intact to them.   

That, however, is not the law.  When a widow  

succeeds as heir to her husband, the ownership in  

the properties both legal and beneficial vests in  

her.  She fully represents the estate, the  

interest of the reversioners therein being only  

spec successiones.  The widow is entitled to the  

full beneficial enjoyment of the estate and is not

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accountable to any one.  It is true that she cannot  

alienate the properties unless it be for necessity  

or for benefit to the estate, but this restriction  

on her powers is not one imposed for the benefit  

of reversioners but is an incident of the estate  

as known to Hindu law.  It is for this reason that  

it has been held that when Crown takes the property  

by escheat it takes it free from any alienation  

made by the widow of the last male holder which is  

not valid under the Hindu law vide : Collector of  

Masulipatam v. Cavaly Venkata 8 Moo Ind App  

529(PC).  Where, however, there is necessity for  

a transfer, the restriction imposed by Hindu law  

on her power to alienate ceases to operate, and the  

widow as owner has got the fullest discretion to  

decide what form the alienation should assume.   

Her powers in this regard are, as held in a series  

of decisions beginning with Hunooman Persaud v.  

Mussamat Babooee Mundraj Koonweree, 6 Moo Ind App  

393 (PC) those of the manager of an infant’s estate  

or the manager of joint Hindu family.”   

(Emphasis Supplied)  

21.  In Gogula Gurumurthy & Ors. v. Kurimeti Ayyappa  

(1975) 4 SCC 458, this Court reiterated the position of  

a Hindu widow and of greater relevance to us held no one  

has any vested interest in succession as long as the widow  

is alive.  

“A hindu widow is entitled to the full beneficial  

enjoyment of the estate.  So long as she is not  

guilty of wilful waste, she is answerable to no  

one.  Her estate is not a life-estate, because in  

certain circumstances she can give an absolute and  

complete title.  Nor is it in any sense an estate  

held in trust for reversioners.  Within the limits  

imposed upon her, the female holder has the most  

absolute power of enjoyment and is accountable to  

no one.  She fully represents the estate, and so  

long as she is alive, no one has any vested  

interests in the succession.  It cannot be

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predicted who would be the nearest reversioner at  

the time of her death.  It is, therefore,  

impossible for a reversioner to contend that for  

any loss which the estate might have sustained due  

to the negligence on the part of the widow he should  

be compensated from out of the widow’s separate  

properties.  He is entitled to get only the  

property left on the date of the death of the widow.   

The widow could have, during her lifetime, for  

necessity, including her maintenance alienated  

the whole estate.”  

(Emphasis Supplied)  

The impact of the State Act of 1933  

The State Act that is the Mysore Act of 1933 (as it was  

when it was passed) came into force on first day of January,  

1934.  

Section 2 reads as follows: -  

“2. (1) This Act applies to persons who but for the  passing of this Act, would have been subject to the law  

of Mitakshara in respect of the provisions herein  

enacted.  

(2) Save as aforesaid, nothing herein contained shall  

be deemed to affect any rules or incidents of the Hindu  

Law which are not inconsistent with the provisions of  

this Act.”  

Thus, the rules or incidents of Hindu law to the extent  

they were not inconsistent with the Act was to continue to  

operate. Section (4) of the Act provided as follows:-  

“4(1) The succession to a Hindu male dying intestate  

shall, in the first place, vest in the members of the  

family of the propositus mentioned below, and in the  

following order:-  

   (ii) the widow;  

(iii) daughters;  

(ix) daughters’ daughters;  

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As far as Section 10 is concerned, the relevant portion reads  

as follows: -  

“10(1) “Stridhana” means property of every description  

belonging to a Hindu female, other than property in  

which she has, by law or under the terms of an  

instrument, only a limited estate.   

10(2) Stridhana includes:-  

(g) property taken by inheritance by a female from  

another female and property taken by inheritance by a  

female from her husband or son, or from a male relative  

connected by blood except when there is a daughter or  

daughter’s son of the propositus alive at the time the  

property is so inherited.”   

It is necessary to notice Section 11 also. Section 11  

reads as follows:-  

“11.(1) A female owning stridhana property shall have  

over it absolute and unrestricted powers both of  

enjoyment and of disposition inter vivos and by will,  

subject only to the general law relating to  

guardianship during minority.  

(2) Except when acting as the lawful guardian of his  

wife, a husband shall have no right to or interest in  

any portion of his wife’s stridhana during her life nor  

shall he be entitled to control the exercise of any of  

her powers in relation thereto.”  

Thus, the female owning stridhana property was conferred  

absolute powers to dispose of the same as also in the matter  

of enjoyment. The disposal could be by will or transfer inter  

vivos. The only limitation was the law relating to  

guardianship would continue to operate during minority.  

Reverting back to Section 10 (2) (g), the property inherited  

by a woman inter alia from her husband was brought under the

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definition of stridhana. This was a clear expansion of a  

widow’s rights by conferring upon a widow absolute right over  

property inherited from her husband being a radical departure  

from the widow’s estate under Hindu Law which was a limited  

estate and under which there was no such absolute right of  

disposal. There was however a catch and it was this. If the  

husband was survived by the widow and a daughter or a daughter  

son, then the widow’s estate as understood in Hindu Law was  

to continue undisturbed. If a daughter or grandson as  

mentioned did not survive the husband, the widow would get  

the absolute right notwithstanding Section 10(1) defining  

stridhana as meaning property of any description belonging  

to a Hindu female other than which she has by law ‘only a  

limited estate’. Thus though under Section 4, the widow would  

inherit in preference to the daughter and daughters’ daughter  

the nature of the right is as contained in Section 10 and  

Section 11, the effect of which we have called out.  

22.  The next thing which we must ascertain is who are  

the reversioners.  The reversioners are the heirs of the last  

full owner, who would be entitled to succeed to the estate  

of such owner on the death of a widow or other limited heir,

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if they be then living (as per para 175 of the Mulla on Hindu  

Law).  

The nature of the interest of reversioners is also  

discussed under the same para, which is as follows:  

(2) Interest of reversioners – The interest of  

a reversioner is an interest expectant on the death  

of a limited heir and is not a vested interest.  It  

is a spes successionis or a mere chance of  

succession within the meaning of Section 6,  

Transfer of Property Act, 1882.  It cannot,  

therefore, be sold, mortgaged or assigned, nor can  

it be relinquished. A transfer of a spes  

successionis is a nullity, and it has no effect in  

law.  

23.  Under the Hindu Law, a widow took a limited estate.  

She was not a trustee for the reversioners. She was owner of  

the properties. But she could alienate the property only for  

necessity or benefit of the estate. By the State Act, the  

widow’s estate became stridhana, which by virtue of Section  

11 conferred upon her absolute right to dispose the property  

either by way of inter vivos transfer or will. The State Act  

came into force on 01.01.1934.  When the succession opened  

on Ramanna dying in 1907, he was survived by both his widow  

Seethama and also his daughter Venkamma. Therefore, it is  

quite clear that Seethama would not get an absolute right  

under Section 11 of the State Act. When succession opened in

23  

this case to the estate of Ramanna, in fact, the State Act  

was not in force at that time.  The estate which was inherited  

by Seethama was that of a widow. Therefore, be it from stand  

point of Hindu Law as applicable prior to the State Act or  

the provisions of the State Act, Seethama did not acquire  

absolute rights. As such, the right which she had, was the  

right of the Hindu widow under Hindu Law.   

Further, as long as Seethamma - widow of Ramanna was  

alive, no reversioners had any vested interest.  The  

daughter of Ramanna (Venkamma) through his first wife passed  

away in the year 1910.  At that time, Seethamma the widow of  

Ramanna was alive.  Therefore, she (Venkamma) would not get  

any right in the property.  Seethamma died only in the year  

1938.  When Seethamma died in 1938, no doubt Jankamma was  

alive.  It is here that we must consider the argument of  

learned counsel for the respondents that the daughter of a  

daughter was not recognized as a heir.  When succession  

opened upon the death of the widow, in this case, namely  

Seethamma in the year 1938, if Jankamma could be treated as  

the reversioner being grand daughter of the last full owner,  

then the property would vest in Jankamma.

24  

24.  There would be two obstacles for the appellants:-  

firstly, it would have to be held that Jankamma being the  

grand daughter of Ramanna was a reversioner upon the death  

of Seethamma, the widow of Ramanna.  Secondly, even assuming  

for a moment that Jankamma was the reversioner whether it was  

incumbent upon her to institute proceedings for recovery of  

possession within 12 years of death of Seethamma.  

25.  Taking up the second question, we notice the  

following commentary of Mulla on Hindu Law:  

“207. Reversioner’s suit for possession and  

limitation._ A suit by reversioners, entitled to  

succeed to the estate on the death of a widow or  

other limited heir, for possession of immovable  

property from an alienee from her must be brought  

within 12 years from her death (the Indian  

Limitation Act, 1908, Schedule I, Article 141),  

and of movable property, within six years from that  

date.  

Now see Articles 65, 109 and 113 of the new  

Limitation Act, 1963.  

The reversioner may sue for possession without  

suing to have alienation set aside.  The reason is  

that he is entitled to treat the unauthorized  

alienation as a nullity without the intervention  

of any court.  

26.  Learned counsel for the respondents has placed  

considerable reliance on the judgment of this Court in  

Kalipada Chakraborti & Anr. v. Palani Bala Devi & Ors. [AIR  

1953 SC 125].  Therein, this Court dealt with transfer of

25  

Shebeiti right by Hindu Widow and the suit by reversioners  

challenging the same.  This Court held as follows:  

“But all doubts on this point were set at rest  

by the decision of the Privy Council itself in  

Faggo v. Utsava [(1929) 56 I.A. 267] and the law  

can now be taken to be perfectly well settled that  

except where a decree has been obtained fairly and  

properly and without fraud and collusion against  

the Hindu female heir in respect to a property held  

by her as a limited owner, the cause of action for  

a suit to be instituted by a reversioner to recover  

such property either against an alienee from the  

female heir or a trespasser who held adversely to  

her accrues only on the death of the female heir.   

This principle, which has been recognized in the  

law of limitation in this country eversince 1871  

seems to us to be quite in accordance with the  

acknowledged principles of Hindu law.  The right  

of reversionary heirs is in the nature of spes  

successionis, and as the reversioners do not trace  

their title through or from the widow, it would be  

manifestly unjust if they are to lose their rights  

simply because the widow has suffered the property  

to be destroyed by the adverse possession of a  

stranger.  The contention raised by Mr. Ghose as  

regards the general principle to be applied in such  

cases cannot, therefore, be regarded as sound.  

Ordinarily, there are two limitations upon a  

widow’s estate.  In the first place, her rights of  

alienation are restricted and the in the second  

place, after her death the property goes not to her  

heirs but to the heirs of the last male owner.”  

This view has been followed in the judgment reported in AIR  

1969 SC 204. The law of limitation relevant at that point of  

time was the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. It is crucial to  

notice Articles 140 and 141:-

26  

Description of Suit Period of  

Limitation  

Time from which period  

begins to run  

140. By a remainderman, a  

reversioner (other than a  

landlord) or a devisee,  

for possession of  

immovable property.   

Twelve years When his estate falls  

into possession.  

141. Like suit by a Hindu  

or Muhammadan entitled to  

the possession of  

immovable property on the  

death of a Hindu or  

Muhammadan female.  

Twelve years When the female dies.  

It is this statutory framework which formed the basis of the  

law laid down by this Court which we have noticed.  

It is next relevant to notice Section 28 of the Act:-  

“28. Extinguishment of right to property. - At the  

determination of the period hereby limited to any  

person for instituting a suit for possession of  

any property, his right to such property shall be  

extinguished.”  

In other words, while it was open to the reversioners to  

ignore an alienation made by a Hindu widow and the period of  

limitation would not start to run upon a transfer effected  

by the Hindu widow, undoubtedly, the period of limitation for  

filing a suit for recovery of possession would commence upon  

the death of the widow.   

27.  The property was alienated by Seethamma, the widow  

of Ramanna in favour of her brother Srinivas Rao in the year

27  

1913. Undoubtedly, it was open to the reversioner to proceed  

on the basis that such alienation does not bind her.   

28.  Thereafter, in 1938, Seethamma passed away. Even  

proceeding on the basis that Jankamma, the grand-daughter of  

Ramanna was a reversioner, her estate in expectancy became  

vested in her, upon the death of the Ramanna’s widow,  

Seethamma in 1938. While it is true that it was open to the  

reversioner to ignore the sale deed executed by the widow,  

as not binding on her, as far as suit for recovery of  

possession, the law clearly provided for a period of 12 years  

and the period of limitation started with the death of the  

limited owner, namely, the widow in 1938. The time started  

ticking with the passing away of the widow in 1938. The period  

of limitation being 12 years, it ran out in 1950. With the  

running out of the period of limitation prescribed under the  

Limitation Act, 1908 (by Articles 140 and 141), the very right  

of the alleged reversioner Jankamma also came to an end. Thus,  

when she executed the sale in the year 1955 in favour of the  

appellants, she could not have conveyed any right. That apart,  

even for a moment, proceeding on the basis that period of  

limitation would start from 12 years from 1955 when the sale  

deed was executed in favour of the appellants by Jankamma even

28  

that period ran out in 1967. Admittedly, the suits were filed  

several years even after 1967. Section 31 of the Limitation  

Act, 1963 reads as follows:-  

“31 Provisions as to barred or pending suits, etc:-  

Nothing in this Act shall,—  

(a) enable any suit, appeal or application to be  

instituted, preferred or made, for which the period of  

limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act,  

1908 (9 of 1908), expired before the commencement of  

this Act; or  

(b) affect any suit, appeal or application instituted,  

preferred or made before, and pending at, such  

commencement.”  

Quite clearly much before the Limitation Act, 1963 came into  

force, the period of limitation for instituting the suits had  

expired. This is apart from the effect of not filing such a  

suit on the very right itself.  

29.  In such circumstances, we see no reason to interfere  

with the judgment of the High Court. The appeals will stand  

dismissed with no order as to costs.     

…....................J.  [ASHOK BHUSHAN]  

 …....................J.  

[K.M. JOSEPH]  NEW DELHI;  APRIL 03, 2019.