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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL NOS.       6989-6990   OF 2013   (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.17704-17705 of 2012)

GM, Sri Siddeshwara Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr. … Appellants

   Versus

Sri Ikbal & Ors.      … Respondents

WITH

CIVIL  APPEAL NOS.       6991-6992        OF 2013   (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.12106-12107 of 2012)

JUDGMENT

R.M. LODHA, J.  

Leave granted.

2. The question to which we have to turn in these appeals, by  

special leave, centres around Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement)  

Rules, 2002 (for short, “2002 Rules”).  

3.  The facts are these: on 08.02.1996, the  respondent no.1,  

Ikbal  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “borrower”),  took  a  housing  loan  of  

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Rs. 5,00,000/- from Sri Siddeshwara Co-operative Bank Ltd. (for short, “the  

Bank”).  He  mortgaged  his  immovable  property  being  RS  No.872,  Plot  

No.29, Mahalbagayat situate at Bijapur. The borrower committed default in  

repayment of the said housing loan. Despite several reminders when the  

borrower failed to make payment of the loan amount, the Bank issued a  

notice  on  16.02.2005  calling  upon  him  to  repay  the  outstanding  loan  

amount of Rs.10,43,000/- with interest and costs failing which it was stated  

in the notice that the mortgaged property will be sold according to law.

4. The borrower failed to make payment of the outstanding loan  

amount  as  demanded  in  the  notice  dated  16.02.2005.  The  Bank  then  

issued  a  notice  to  him  on  30.06.2005  under  Section  13(2)  of  the  

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of  

Security Interest  Act, 2002 (for short,  “SARFAESI  Act”).   In that notice  

borrower was informed that if he failed to discharge the outstanding dues  

within 60 days, the Bank may exercise action under Section 13(4) of the  

SARFAESI Act and the mortgaged property shall be sold.

5. On 09.12.2005, the Bank got the mortgaged property valued  

which was fixed at Rs.9,00,000/-.

6. On 18.12.2005, the Bank published the auction notice in the  

local newspapers. The conditions of the public notice were also mentioned  

in the auction notice.

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7. Bashir Ahmed (appellant in two appeals and respondent no.3  

in the appeals of the Bank), who we shall refer to hereafter as “auction  

purchaser”  made  the  payment  of  Rs.90,000/-  towards  earnest  money  

deposit  on  18.12.2005  itself.   The  public  auction  was  conducted  on  

11.01.2006.  The auction purchaser gave the bid of  Rs.8,50,000/-  which  

was accepted being the highest bid. The auction purchaser made payment  

of Rs.1,45,000/- towards  25% of the sale consideration. However, he did  

not make the payment of remaining 75% within 15 days of the confirmation  

of sale in his favour.  He made the payment towards balance sale price in  

installments  on  various  dates  and  the  final  payment  was  made  on  

13.11.2006.  On 16.11.2006, the Bank issued the sale certificate in favour  

of the auction purchaser.  

8. The  proceeds  from the  sale  of  the  mortgaged  property  fell  

short  of  the  total  outstanding  amount  against  the  borrower.  As  on  

09.02.2007, Rs.2,27,000/- remained outstanding against him.  The Bank  

moved the Joint  Registrar  of  Co-operative Societies for  recovery of  the  

outstanding amount.   In  those proceedings,  on 26.02.2007 an  ex parte  

award for a sum of Rs.2,37,038/- including the interest and miscellaneous  

expenses was passed against the borrower.

9. The Bank levied execution of the ex parte award somewhere  

in 2011.    It  was then that  the borrower  challenged the sale certificate  

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issued in favour of the auction purchaser and the notice dated 09.02.2007  

in  two writ  petitions  before  the Karnataka  High Court,  Circuit  Bench at  

Gulbarga.

10. The Single Judge of that Court, after hearing the parties, by  

his order of 12.12.2011 quashed the sale certificate issued in favour of the  

auction purchaser and the demand notice dated 09.02.2007. In that order  

the Bank was granted liberty to conduct fresh sale in accordance with the  

law. The Single Judge made certain observations against the authorised  

officer and directed the Additional Registrar of the High Court to send a  

copy of the order to the Superintendent of Lokayukta Police at Bijapur for  

further action in accordance with law.

11. The Bank as well  as the  auction  purchaser  challenged the  

order of the Single Judge in intra-court appeals but without any success.  

12. Both Single  Judge as well  as the Division  Bench held  that  

mandatory  requirements  of  Rule  9  were  not  followed  and,  therefore,  

despite the remedy of appeal to the borrower provided under Section 17 of  

the SARFAESI Act, a case was made out for interference.   

13. We have heard Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for the Bank  

(appellants  in  the  appeals  arising  from  SLP(C)  No.17704-17705/2012),  

Mr.  Raja  Venkatappa  Naik,  learned counsel   for  the auction  purchaser  

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(appellants  in  the  appeals  arising  from SLP(C)  Nos.12106-12107/2012)  

and Mr. Rajesh Mahale, learned counsel for the borrower.

14. SARFAESI  Act  lays  down  the  detailed  and  comprehensive  

procedure  for  enforcement  of  security  interest  created  in  favour  of  a  

secured creditor without intervention of the court or tribunal. Section 13(2)  

requires the secured creditor to issue notice to the borrower in writing to  

discharge his liabilities within 60 days from the date of the notice. Such  

notice must indicate that if the borrower fails to discharge his liabilities, the  

secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise its rights in terms of Section  

13(4).

15. There is no dispute that a notice in terms of Section 13(2) was  

given  by  the  Bank  to  the  borrower  on  30.06.2005.  That  the  Bank  

proceeded for the enforcement of security interest  in one of the modes  

provided under Section 13(4) is also not in dispute. The borrower in the  

writ  petitions filed before the Karnataka High Court set up the plea that  

there was non-compliance of  Rule 9 and that had rendered the sale in  

favour  of  the  auction  purchaser  bad in  law.  The Single  Judge and the  

Division  Bench were  convinced  by  the  borrower’s  contention.   We are  

required to see the correctness of that view.

16. 2002 Rules have been framed by the Central Government in  

exercise of the powers conferred on it by sub-section (1) and clause (b) of  

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sub-section (2) of Section 38 read with sub-sections (4), (10) and (12) of  

Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act.  

17. Rule 9∗  provides for the detailed procedure with regard to sale  

of immovable property including issuance of sale certificate and delivery of  

possession.   Sub-rule  (1)  of  Rule  9  states  that  no  sale  of  immovable  * 9. Time of sale, Issue of sale certificate and delivery of possession, etc.-

(1) No sale of immovable property under these rules shall take place before the expiry of  thirty days from the date on which the public notice of sale is published in newspapers as   referred to in the proviso to sub-rule (6) or notice of sale has been served to the borrower.  

(2) The sale shall be confirmed in favour of the purchaser who has offered the highest  sale price in his bid or tender  or quotation or offer to the authorised officer and shall be   subject to confirmation by the secured creditor:  

Provided that no sale under this rule shall be confirmed, if the amount offered by sale  price is less than the reserve price, specified under sub-rule (5) of rule 9:  

Provided  further  that  if  the  authorised  officer  fails  to  obtain  a  price  higher  than  the  reserve price, he may, with the consent of the borrower and the secured creditor effect the  sale at such price.  

(3) On every sale of immovable property, the purchaser shall immediately pay a deposit  of twenty five per cent of the amount of the sale price, to the authorised officer conducting  the sale and in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be sold again.  

(4) The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the  authorised officer on or before the fifteenth day of confirmation of sale of the immovable  property or such extended period as may be agreed upon in writing between the parties.  

(5) In default of payment within the period mentioned in sub-rule (4), the deposit shall be  forfeited and the property shall be resold and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claim  to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may be subsequently sold.  

(6) On confirmation of sale by the secured creditor and if the terms of payment have been  complied with, the authorised officer exercising the power of sale shall issue a certificate  of  sale  of  the  immovable  property  in  favour  of  the  purchaser  in  the  Form  given  in  Appendix V to these rules.  

(7) Where the immovable property sold is subject to any encumbrances, the authorised  officer may, if he thinks fit, allow the purchaser to deposit with him the money required to  discharge the encumbrances and any interest  due thereon together with such additional  amount  that  may be sufficient  to  meet  the contingencies  or  further  cost,  expenses  and  interest as may be determined by him:

Provided that if after meeting the cost of removing encumbrances and contingencies there  is any surplus available out of the money deposited by the purchaser such surplus shall be  paid to the purchaser within fifteen days from the date of finalisation of the sale.

(8) On such deposit of money for discharge of the encumbrances, the authorised officer  shall issue or cause the purchaser to issue notices to the persons interested in or entitled to  the money deposited with him and take steps to make the payment accordingly.  

(9)  The  authorised  officer  shall  deliver  the  property  to  the  purchaser  free  from  encumbrances known to the secured creditor on deposit of money as specified in sub-rule  (7) above.  

(10)  The  certificate  of  sale  issued  under  sub-rule  (6)  shall  specifically  mention  that  whether  the  purchaser  has  purchased  the  immovable  secured  asset  free  from  any  encumbrances known to the secured creditor or not.

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property shall  take place before the expiry of 30 days from the date on  

which the public notice of sale is published in newspapers as referred to in  

the  proviso  to  sub-rule  (6)  or  notice  of  sale  has  been  served  to  the  

borrower. Sub-rule (2) provides that sale shall be confirmed in favour of the  

purchaser who has offered the highest sale price in his bid. This is subject  

to confirmation by the secured creditor.  There is a proviso appended to  

sub-rule (2) which provides that no sale under this rule shall be confirmed  

if the amount offered by sale price is less than the reserve price but this is  

relaxable in view of the second proviso appended to sub-rule (2). Sub-rule  

(3)  lays down that  on every sale of  immovable property,  the purchaser  

shall immediately make the deposit of 25% of the amount of the sale price.  

In default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be sold again. Sub-

rule (4) provides that the balance amount of purchase price payable shall  

be paid by the purchaser on or before the fifteenth day of confirmation of  

sale of the immovable property or such extended period as may be agreed  

upon in writing between the parties.  Sub-rule (5) makes a provision that if  

the balance amount of purchase price is not paid as required under sub-

rule (4), then the deposit shall be forfeited and the property shall be resold  

and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claim to the property or to any  

part of the sum for which it may be subsequently sold.  According to sub-

rule (6),  on confirmation of sale by the secured creditor and if the terms of  

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payment have been complied with,  the authorised officer exercising power  

of sale shall issue a certificate of sale of the immoveable property in favour  

of the purchaser in the form given in Appendix V to the 2002 Rules.  

18. A reading of sub-rule (1) of Rule 9 makes it manifest that the  

provision  is  mandatory.  The plain  language of  Rule  9(1)  suggests  this.  

Similarly, Rule 9(3) which provides that the purchaser shall pay a deposit  

of 25% of the amount of the sale price on the sale of immovable property  

also indicates that the said provision is mandatory in nature. As regards  

balance  amount  of  purchase  price,  sub-rule  (4)  provides  that  the  said  

amount shall be paid by the purchaser on or before the fifteenth day of  

confirmation of  sale of  immovable property  or  such extended period as  

may be agreed upon in writing between the parties.  The period of fifteen  

days in Rule 9(4) is not that sacrosanct and it is extendable if there is a  

written agreement between the parties for such extension.  What is the  

meaning of the expression ‘written agreement between the parties’ in Rule  

9(4)?  2002 Rules do not prescribe any particular form for such agreement  

except  that  it  must  be  in  writing.  The  use  of  term  ‘written  agreement’  

means a mutual understanding or an arrangement about relative rights and  

duties  by  the  parties.   For  the  purposes  of  Rule  9(4),  the  expression  

“written agreement” means nothing more than a manifestation of mutual  

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assent in writing.   The word ‘parties’ for the purposes of Rule 9(4) we think  

must mean the secured creditor, borrower and auction purchaser.  

19. On  behalf  of  the  borrower,  the  following  non-compliances  

were  brought  forth:  (i)  the  auction  notice  of  sale  was  published  on  

18.12.2005  under  Rule  9(1).  The  public  auction  should  have  been  

conducted not before 30 days therefrom, i.e., it must have been conducted  

on or after 17.01.2006 but the public auction in fact  was conducted on  

11.01.2006; (ii) 25% of the sale price from the auction purchaser should  

have been collected on the day of confirmation of sale in his favour, i.e., on  

11.01.2006 but instead Rs. 90,000/-  were adjusted which he deposited as  

earnest  money deposit   and a sum of Rs.1,45,000/-  was only received  

which could not have been done,  and  (iii) on or before expiry of fifteenth  

day from the confirmation of sale, the auction purchaser did not pay the  

balance amount and having not done that in terms of Rule 9(5) the deposit  

made by the auction purchaser should have been forfeited and property  

resold.

20. In response to the above allegations,  the Bank relied upon  

the letter dated 13.11.2006 written by the borrower to the Bank giving his  

express consent that the  auction made in favour of the auction purchaser  

may be accepted and sale-certificate be issued to him.

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21. The letter dated 13.11.2006 sent by the borrower to the Bank  

reads as follows:

“General Manager, Shri. Shiddheshwar Co-op. Bank, Bijapur.

Sub.  : Issue of sale certificate of auctioned my house property.

I, Iqbal Balasab Mallad humbly submits in writing as under;  On my request the mortgaged property to my housing loan account  no.194, is sold on 11.01.2006, in public auction for Rs.8,50,000/- to  my known person, Sri. Basheer Ahmed Gulam Hussain Inamdar,  as  he was the  highest  bidder.  But,  Sri.  B.G.  Inamdar  could  not  repay the loan within one month. Today the said person is making  the payment of entire balance amount of Rs.2 Lakhs and I request  you to issue him the sale certificate as I have consented.

I  request  to appropriate the sale amount  of  Rs.8,50,000/-  to my  loan account.

Thanking you, Yours faithfully,

Sd/- Dated : 13.11.2006    (I.B. Mallad)

Signature of G.M. And Seal of the Bank.

Sd/- General Manager Shri. Shiddheshwar Co-op. Bank Ltd., Bijapur”

22. Two things clearly emerge from the above letter. First, at the  

time of auction sale on 11.01.2006 the borrower was present. He did not  

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object to the auction being held before expiry of 30 days from the date on  

which the public  notice of  sale was published.  He also agreed that  bid  

given by the auction purchaser for Rs.8,50,000/- which was highest bid be  

accepted  as the auction  purchaser  happened to  be  his  known person.  

Second,  and equally important,  the borrower expressly  gave consent  in  

writing  that  the  balance  sale  price  may  be  accepted  from  the  auction  

purchaser now and sale certificate be issued to him. The above letter sent  

by the borrower to the Bank has been accepted by the Bank.   Thus, there  

is a written agreement between the borrower and the Bank for extension of  

time up to 13.11.2006.  The auction purchaser made the payment of the  

balance  purchase  price  forthwith  on  that  day,  i.e.,  13.11.2006.  This  

indicates that he was impliedly a party to the written agreement between  

the Bank and the borrower. In the circumstances, there is no reason why  

the condition in Rule 9(4) viz. “such extended period as may be agreed  

upon  in  writing  between  the  parties”  be  not  treated  as  substantially  

satisfied. The learned Single Judge was clearly in error in holding that the  

letter  dated  13.11.2006 written by the  borrower  to the Bank cannot  be  

construed as written agreement falling under Rule 9(4).  

23.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Rule  9(1)  is  mandatory  but  this  

provision is definitely for the benefit of the borrower.  Similarly, Rule 9(3)  

and Rule 9(4) are for the benefit of the secured creditor (or in any case for  

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the benefit  of  the borrower).   It  is  settled position in law that  even if  a  

provision is mandatory, it can always be waived by a party (or parties) for  

whose benefit such provision has been made. The provision in Rule 9(1)  

being for the benefit of the borrower and the provisions contained in Rule  

9(3) and Rule 9(4) being for the benefit of the secured creditor (or for that  

matter  for  the  benefit  of  the  borrower),  the  secured  creditor  and  the  

borrower can lawfully waive their right.  These provisions neither expressly  

nor contextually indicate otherwise. Obviously, the question whether there  

is waiver or not depends on facts of each case and no hard and fast rule  

can be laid down in this regard.  

24. The letter dated 13.11.2006 sent by the borrower to the Bank  

leaves no manner of doubt  that the borrower had waived his right under  

Rule 9(1) or for that matter  under Rule 9(3) and  Rule 9(4) as well.

25. It is true that before the High Court the borrower disowned the  

letter dated 13.11.2006 and a plea was set up by him that on one signed  

blank  paper  the  above  document  has  been  prepared  but  neither  the  

learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench accepted the said version of  

the borrower.  Rather they proceeded on the basis that the letter dated  

13.11.2006  was  written  by  the  borrower  to  the  Bank.  There  is  no  

justification for us not to accept the letter dated 13.11.2006 as true and  

genuine.  

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26. In  view  of  what  we  have  discussed  above,  learned  Single  

Judge was not justified in quashing the sale certificate dated 16.11.2006  

issued in favour of the auction purchaser and the notice dated 09.02.2007.  

The Division Bench also committed an error in upholding the erroneous  

order of the learned Single Judge.

27. There is one more aspect in the matter which has troubled us.  

Against the action of the Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act,  

the  borrower  had  a  remedy  of  appeal  to  the  Debts  Recovery  Tribunal  

(DRT) under  Section 17.  The remedy provided under  Section 17 is  an  

efficacious remedy.  The borrower did not avail of that remedy and further  

remedies from that order and instead directly approached the High Court in  

extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.  

28. The  learned  Single  Judge  brushed  aside  the  argument  of  

alternative remedy by holding as follows :

“16.  As regards alternate remedy submitted by the learned counsel  for respondents II to IV, in the decision cited supra, the Supreme  Court has held that the rule of exhaustion of alternate remedy is a  rule of discretion and not a rule of compulsion. The court has to  assign  reasons  for  entertaining  writ  petition  without  exhausting  alternate remedy. The petitioner has been victimized by fraudulent  acts of respondents III and IV. The III respondent had misused his  official position and petitioner has been deprived of his property in  the manner not known to law. There is violation of Article 21 of the  Constitution  of  India.  The  petitioner  has  been  deprived  of  his  shelter. The right to livelihood is an integral facet of the right to life  under Article 21 of the Constitution, (Narendra Kumar Vs. State of  Haryana), (1994) 4 SCC 460. Therefore, the submission of learned  counsel for respondents II to IV that petitioner should have availed  alternate remedy cannot be accepted.”

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29. The learned Division Bench in this regard observed thus :

“14.   Though the petitioner could agitate these matters in an appeal  filed  under  Section  17  of  the  Act,  it  is  settled  law  that  when  a  Constitutional right of an individual is affected by statutory authorities  by  trampling  upon  the  mandatory  requirements  of  law,  this  court  cannot be a silent spectator. It becomes not only a right, but the duty  of  this  court  to  interfere  and  strike  at  these  illegal  activities  and  uphold the Constitutional right of a citizen of this country. Therefore,   the learned Single Judge rightly interfered with these illegal acts of  statutory authorities in its jurisdiction under Article 226 and it cannot  be found fault with.”   

30. In  Satyawati  Tondon1,  the  Court  was  concerned  with  an  

argument of alternative remedy provided under Section 17 of SARFAESI  

Act. Dealing with this argument,  the Court  had observed that where an  

effective remedy was available to the aggrieved person, the High Court  

must insist that before availing the remedy under Article 226 the alternative  

remedies  available  to  him under  the relevant  statute  are exhausted.  In  

paragraphs 43,44 and 45 (pg. no. 123) of the Report, the Court stated as  

follows :

“43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that  the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article  226 of the Constitution if  an effective remedy is available to the  aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in  matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public  money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our  view,  while  dealing  with  the  petitions  involving  challenge  to  the  action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc.  the High Court  must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and  State  Legislatures  for  recovery  of  such  dues  are  a  code  unto  themselves  inasmuch  as  they  not  only  contain  comprehensive  procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of  

1  United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Others; (2010) 8 SCC 110

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quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved  person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that  before  availing  remedy  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution,  a  person  must  exhaust  the  remedies  available  under  the  relevant  statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the  powers  conferred  upon the  High  Court  under  Article  226 of  the  Constitution  to  issue  to  any  person  or  authority,  including  in  appropriate  cases,  any  Government,  directions,  orders  or  writs  including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the  rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide  and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at  the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed  restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to  keep  in  view  while  exercising  power  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a  rule of  discretion and not  one of compulsion, but  it  is  difficult  to  fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition  filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order  ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail  effective alternative  remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular  legislation  contains  a  detailed  mechanism  for  redressal  of  his  grievance.”

31. No  doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the  

exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article  226 but by now it is well  

settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the  

High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226.  On  

misplaced considerations,  statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be  

circumvented.      

32. If the facts of the present case are seen, it is apparent that the  

borrower  had been chronic  defaulter  in  repayment  of  the loan amount.  

Before issuance of notice under Section 13(2) on 30.06.2005 a demand  

notice was given by the Bank to the borrower on 16.02.2005 calling upon  

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him to pay the outstanding loan amount but he did not comply with that  

notice. Thereafter, 13(2) notice was given to him on 30.06.2005 but he did  

not bother to pay the outstanding dues.  The secured interest which was  

immovable property was put up for auction more than six months after the  

notice  under  Section  13(2)  was given to  him by  the  Bank  but  still  the  

outstanding payment was not made. The auction was held on 11.01.2006  

in  his  presence  and  he  did  not  raise  any  objection  about  time  of  the  

auction.  When the auction purchaser did not make the balance amount in  

time  and  took  about  11  months  in  paying  the  balance  amount,  the  

borrower gave his written consent to the Bank that balance purchase price  

may be accepted from the auction purchaser and sale certificate may  be  

issued to him. Moreover, the writ petition was filed by the borrower more  

than four years after the issuance of sale certificate. The above facts are  

eloquent and indicate that the observations made by the Single Judge that  

borrower was victimized and a fraud was practiced upon, have no basis.  

The finding  by the Single Judge  that the sale of secured interest  had  

been in violation of borrower’s right to livelihood and the observation of the  

Division Bench that non-compliance of Rule 9 has violated, the borrower’s  

right to property  are misconceived. In our view, there was no justification  

whatsoever for the learned Single Judge to allow the borrower to by-pass  

the efficacious remedy provided to him under Section 17 and invoke the  

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extraordinary jurisdiction in his favour when he had disentitled himself for  

such  relief  by  his  conduct.   The  Single  Judge  was  clearly  in  error  in  

invoking  his  extraordinary  jurisdiction  under  Article  226  in  light  of  the  

peculiar facts indicated above. The Division Bench also erred in affirming  

the erroneous order of the Single Judge.

33. Before we close, one more fact may be noted.  The auction-

purchaser over and above the sale price of Rs.8,50,000/-, has discharged  

the  entire  liability  of  the  borrower  towards  the  bank  by  making  further  

payment of more than Rs.2,37,000/-.

34. We  are,  thus,  satisfied  that  impugned  orders  cannot  

be sustained.  Appeals are, accordingly, allowed. The impugned orders are  

set aside. The writ petitions filed by the borrower before the High Court are  

dismissed with no order as to costs.   

…..………………………….J. (R.M. Lodha)

…..………………………….J. (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad)

New Delhi, August 22, 2013.

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