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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAIL LEAVE PETITION(C) No……….of 2012 (CC No. 11497 of 2012)

Girimallappa                                      …Petitioner  

Versus The Special Land Acquisition                       …Respondents Officer M & MIP & Anr.  

O R D E R  

1. Delay condoned.  

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition are that:

A.  A huge area of land was notified under Section 4(1) of the  

Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  (hereinafter  called  the  `Act’)  on  

30.5.1984  including  the  petitioner’s  land  measuring  11  Acres  32  

Guntas at Gobbur (K) Village in District Gulbarga for the purpose of  

construction of a tank.   The possession of the said land has been  

taken  by  the  respondent  authorities  on  23.6.1985.   The  Land  

Acquisition Collector made an Award under Section 11 of the Act  

fixing the market value of the land at the rate of Rs. 3800/- per Acre.

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B. One LAC Case No. 500 of 1993 filed by another person was  

decided  by  the  Reference  Court  under  Section  18  of  the  Act  on  

28.9.1994.  While placing reliance on the same, the petitioner filed  

application  under Section 28-A of the Act.  The said application was  

allowed  fixing  the  market  value  of  the  dry  land  at  the  rate  of  

Rs.10000/- per Acre.  Petitioner preferred a further reference against  

that order claiming Rs.45000/- per Acre for dry land and Rs.75000/-  

per Acre for irrigated lands.  The said reference was decided vide  

order dated 27.9.2003 assessing the market value at the rate of Rs.  

15000/- per Acre for  dry land and Rs.21500/- per Acre for irrigated  

land.   

C. Aggrieved  from  the  said  reference  award,  petitioner  

preferred LAC Appeal  No.  64 of  2008 before  the District  Judge,  

Gulbarga,  seeking  enhancement  of  compensation  assessing  the  

market value of the land at the rate of Rs.24000/- per Acre which  

stood allowed vide judgment and decree dated 27.10.2009.   

D. Petitioner  filed  MSA  No.  510  of  2010  against  the  said  

judgment and decree dated 27.10.2009 before High Court which has  

been  dismissed  by  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  

12.9.2011.  

Hence, this petition.

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3. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,  

vehemently submitted that courts cannot defeat the claim based on  

substantial justice on mere technicalities.  Learned counsel  would  

submit that when technicalities are pitted against substantial justice,  

the latter must prevail;  in case petitioner was entitled for a higher  

compensation,  awarding  a  lesser  amount  of  compensation,  

tantamounts to expropriation of the property in violation of mandate  

of Article 300-A of the Constitution of  India.  Petitioner has been  

deprived the higher compensation as he could not afford to pay the  

court fees though he was entitled for higher compensation  claimed  

by him.   

4. Record of the case reveals that petitioner’s land measuring  

11 Acres 32 Guntas had been acquired though there is nothing on  

record to show as to whether petitioner had some more land. But the  

area of land acquired makes it  clear that petitioner was a man of  

means.  We fail to understand, in case,  he did not file a reference  

under  Section  18  of  the  Act,  under  what  circumstances  his  

application under Section 28-A of the Act could be entertained.  

5. This Court in State of Orissa & Ors. v. Chitrasen Bhoi, JT  

2009 (13) SC 388, considered this aspect and held :

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“The scope of  provisions of  Section 28-A of  the   Act was considered by this Court in Mewa Ram v.   State of Haryana AIR 1987 SC 45, and the Court   placed emphasis particularly on para 2 (ix) of the   object  and reasons  of  the Amendment  Act,  1987   which  provided  for  a  special  provision  for   inarticulate  and  poor  people  to  apply  for  re- determination of the compensation amount on the   basis  of  the  court  award  in  a  land  acquisition   reference  filed  by  comparatively  affluent  land   owner. The Court observed as under:

  Section 28-A in terms does not apply to   the case of the petitioners..... They do not   belong to that class of society for whose   benefit  the  provision  is  intended  and   meant, i.e. inarticulate and poor people   who  by  reason  of  their  poverty  and   ignorance have failed to take advantage   of the right of reference to the civil court   under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition   Act, 1894.                   

   This Court approved and reiterated the law laid   down in Mewa Ram (Supra) in  Scheduled Caste   Cooperative Land Owning Society Ltd. Bhatinda   v.  Union of India & Ors, AIR 1991 SC 730. In   Babua Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1995)  2 SCC 689, this  Court  again reiterated the law  laid  down  in  Mewa Ram (Supra)  observing  as   under:-                 

Legislature made a discriminatory policy   between the poor and inarticulate as one   class of persons to whom the benefit of   Section  28-A  was  to  be  extended  and   comparatively  affluent  who  had  taken   advantage of the reference under Section   18 and the latter as a class to which the   

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benefit of Section 28-A was not extended.   Otherwise,  the  phraseology  of  the   language  of  the  non-obstante  clause   would have been differently worded..... It   is  true  that  the legislature  intended  to   relieve  hardship  to  the  poor,  indigent   and inarticulate interested persons who   generally  failed  to  avail  the  reference   under Section 18 which is  an existing   bar and to remedy it, Section 28-A was  enacted giving a right and remedy for re-   determination......The legislature appears   to have presumed that the same state of   affairs  continue  to  subsist  among  the   poor  and inarticulate  persons  and they   generally  fail  to  avail  the  right  under   sub-section  (1)  of  Section  18  due  to   poverty  or  ignorance  or  avoidance  of   expropriation.              

      Thus, it is apparent that the legislature has   carved out an exception in the form of Section 28- A  and  made  a  special provision  to  grant  some  relief  to  a  particular  class  of  society,  namely   poor, illiterate, ignorant and inarticulate people.   It is made only for “little Indians”.   (Emphasis  added)

6. Petitioner cannot claim, by any means to fall under the said  

category of “little Indians”.  However, as the said order has not been  

challenged  by  the  respondent(s),  we  cannot  examine  the  issue  

further, even if the order is totally unwarranted.  

7. Petitioner’s  claim  in  the  first  appeal  before  the  learned  

District Judge had been only to the tune of Rs.24000/- per Acre.  The  

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prayer  before  the  learned District  Judge  in  LAC No.  64  of  2008  

reads as under:  

“ Hence, it is prayed that the Hon’ble Court may  kindly be pleased to set aside the order passed by  the court below in LAC No. 193/01 and enhance it  to Rs.24,000/- per Acre with all statutory benefits  and excluding the interest for the delayed period in  the interest of justice for which the appellants shall  ever pray.”  

8. It may be pertinent to mention here that while hearing the  

appeal, the learned District Judge at Gulbarga condoned the delay of  

1717 days in filing the appeal.   

9.    In the appeal before the High Court, no specific amount was  

demanded by the petitioner. The prayer made before the High Court  

reads as under:  

“Therefore,  it  is  most  humbly  prayed  that  the  Hon’ble Court may be pleased to allow this appeal  and  modify  the  judgment  and  Award  dated  27.10.2009 passed in L.A.C. Appeal No. 64/2008  by the learned III Addl. District Judge at Gulbarga,  modifying  the  judgment  and  award  dated  27.9.2003 passed in LAC No. 193/2001 by the Prl.  Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.)  Gulbarga and pass any other  appropriate orders, in the interest of justice.”

10. Thus, it is apparent that no specific demand was raised by  

the petitioner before the High Court. The Memo of Appeal reveals  

that Rs.25/- was paid as the court fees.  The High Court dealt with  

the  issue  elaborately  taking  note  of  earlier  proceedings/orders  

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including  the  order  passed  under  Section  28-A  of  the  Act,  and  

condonation  of  delay  of  1717  days  by  the  first  appellate  court.  

Finally the High Court held that the claim itself was restricted to Rs.  

24000/- per Acre.  There was no justification to interfere as the claim  

of the petitioner stood fully satisfied by the order passed in the first  

appeal.   

11. This special leave petition is filed with a delay of 154 days,  

with  an  explanation  that  petitioner  suffered from the ailment  and  

could not approach the court within limitation.  

12. The question does arise as to whether such a vague prayer  

can be entertained by the court. The memo of appeal before the High  

Court does not even reveal as to what was his demand.  Reliance is  

being placed on the judgment of this Court in Chandrashekhar &  

Ors.  v.  Addl.  Special  Land Acquisition Officer,  AIR 2009 SC  

3012,  wherein  after  considering  the  earlier  judgments,  this  Court  

held  that  court  should  not  be  too  technical  in  awarding  the  

compensation  in  case  there  is  a  shortfall  of  court  fees.  The  said  

judgment is not an authority on the proposition advanced before us  

in  this  petition  that  court  is  bound  to  enhance  the  amount  of  

compensation  though  no  specific  amount  is  demanded  by  the  

petitioner.  

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13. It was not a case where an order could be challenged on the  

ground that  the  same is  a  nullity  for  want  of  competence  of  the  

issuing authority and proper pleadings including appropriate grounds  

challenging the same have been taken, but no prayer has been made  

for quashing the said order. In such an eventuality the order can be  

examined only after  considering the statutory provisions  involved  

therein.   The court  may reach a conclusion that  the order suffers  

from  lack  of  jurisdiction.  (See:  Godrej  Sara  Lee  Limited  v.  

Assistant Commissioner (AA) & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 338).  

14. In case, the petitioner was serious about the matter, he could  

have amended the Memo of Appeal and that application could have  

been considered sympathetically by the High Court as held by this  

Court in Harcharan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 43.  

15.    The facts mentioned in this petition depict entirely different  

picture  and  it  gives  an  impression  as  if  the  High  Court  had  not  

enhanced the compensation though demanded by the petitioner for  

want of payment of court fees which he could not afford to pay due  

to paucity of funds.  

16. The case relied upon by Ms. Kiran Suri is the case where the  

prayer was  for  a  particular  enhancement  and it  was further  made  

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clear that the applicants therein could not afford to pay the court fees  

for financial constraints.  In the instant case, the first appeal filed by  

the petitioner was barred by 1717 days and the delay was condoned.  

This petition is also barred by 154 days. Petitioner for the reasons  

best  known  to  him  did  not  make  the  demand  for  a  specific  

enhancement.  Mere making a reference in the Memo of Appeal that  

the High Court had awarded a higher amount in respect of a land  

covered by the same Notification under Section 4 of the Act, is not  

enough.   The claimant  has  to  satisfy  the  court  that  his  land was  

similar in quality and had same geographical location or was situated  

in close vicinity of the land covered by the exemplar relied upon by  

him.  In the instant case, no such attempt has ever been made by the  

petitioner.  Thus, it is not that a meritorious case has been thrown out  

and the cause of justice stood defeated.  

More so, the exemplar cited first time before the High Court  

in Second Appeal has not been referred to in the First Appeal. In  

absence thereof, it is beyond imagination as how findings recorded  

by the first Appellate Court could be termed as perverse and be a  

subject matter of appeal.  

17. Justice  is  an  illusion  as  the  meaning  and  definition  of  

‘justice’ varies from person to person and party to party. Party feels  

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having  got  justice  only  and  only  if  it  succeeds  before  the  court,  

though it may not have a justifiable claim.  

Justice  is  the  virtue,  by  which  the  Society/Court/Tribunal  

gives to a man what is his due, opposed to injury or wrong.  Justice  

is an act of rendering what is right and equitable towards one who  

has suffered a wrong. Therefore, while tempering the justice with  

mercy, the Court has to be very conscious that it has to do justice in  

exact conformity to some obligatory law for the reason that human  

actions are found to be just or unjust as they are in conformity with  

or  in  opposition  to  the  law.  (Vide:  Delhi  Administration  v.  

Gurudeep Singh Uban, AIR 2000 SC 3737).

18. Thus, in view of the above, we do not see any justification to  

accept the submission on behalf of the petitioner that the High Court  

preferred technicalities over substantial justice.  

Petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.  

                                                            ....…………….....................J.                                              ( Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN )

                                                          .…………............................J.                 ( SWATANTER KUMAR )  New Delhi,           July 16, 2012

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