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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL     LEAVE     PETITION     (CRL.)     NO.     8989     OF     2010   

Gian Singh       …Petitioner

Versus   State of Punjab & Another                …Respondents

WITH

SPECIAL     LEAVE     PETITION     (CRL.)     NO.     6138     OF     2006   

SPECIAL     LEAVE     PETITION     (CRL.)     NO.     5203     OF     2011   

SPECIAL     LEAVE     PETITION     (CRL.)     NO.     259     OF     2011   

SPECIAL     LEAVE     PETITION     (CRL.)     NO.     5921     OF     2009   

SPECIAL     LEAVE     PETITION     (CRL.)     NO.     7148     OF     2009   

SPECIAL     LEAVE     PETITION     (CRL.)     NO.     6324     OF     2009   

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NOS.     2107-2125     OF     2011   

JUDGEMENT      R.M.     LODHA,     J  .  

When the special leave petition in  Gian Singh v. State of  

Punjab and another came up for hearing, a two-Judge Bench (Markandey  

Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra, JJ.) doubted the correctness of the  

decisions of this Court in B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana  and  

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another1, Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another2  

and Manoj Sharma v. State and others3 and referred the matter  to a  

larger Bench. The reference order reads as follows :

“Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

The petitioner has been convicted under  Section 420 and Section 120B, IPC by the learned  Magistrate. He filed an appeal challenging his  conviction before the learned Sessions Judge. While  his appeal was pending, he filed an application before  the learned Sessions Judge for compounding the  offence, which, according to the learned counsel, was  directed to be taken up along with the main appeal.  Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition under Section  482, Cr.P.C. for quashing of the FIR on the ground of  compounding the offence. That petition under Section  482 Cr.P.C. has been dismissed by the High Court by  its impugned order. Hence, this petition has been filed  in this Court.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on  three decisions of this Court, all by two Judge  Benches. They are B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana  (2003) 4 SCC 675; Nikhil Merchant vs. Central  Bureau of Investigation and Another (2008) 9 SCC  677; and Manoj Sharma vs. State and Others (2008)  16 SCC 1. In these decisions, this Court has indirectly  permitted compounding of non-compoundable  offences. One of us, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Markandey  Katju, was a member to the last two decisions.

Section 320, Cr.P.C. mentions certain offences  as compoundable, certain other offences as  compoundable with the permission of the Court, and  the other offences as non-compoundable vide Section  320(7).

Section 420, IPC, one of the counts on which  the petitioner has been convicted, no doubt, is a  compoundable offence with permission of the Court in  

1  (2003) 4 SCC 675 2  (2008) 9 SCC 677 3  (2008) 16 SCC 1

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view of Section 320, Cr.P.C. but Section 120B IPC,  the other count on which the petitioner has been  convicted, is a non-compoundable offence. Section  120B (Criminal conspiracy) is a separate offence and  since it is a non-compoundable offence, we cannot  permit it to be compounded.

The Court cannot amend the statute and must  maintain judicial restraint in this connection. The  Courts should not try to take over the function of the  Parliament or executive. It is the legislature alone  which can amend Section 320 Cr.P.C.

We are of the opinion that the above three  decisions require to be re-considered as, in our  opinion, something which cannot be done directly  cannot be done indirectly. In our, prima facie, opinion,  non-compoundable offences cannot be permitted to  be compounded by the Court, whether directly or  indirectly. Hence, the above three decisions do not  appear to us to be correctly decided.

It is true that in the last two decisions, one of  us, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju, was a  member but a Judge should always be open to  correct his mistakes. We feel that these decisions  require re-consideration and hence we direct that this  matter be placed before a larger Bench to reconsider  the correctness of the aforesaid three decisions.

Let the papers of this case be placed before  Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger  Bench.”            

2. This is how these matters have come up for consideration  

before us.

3. Two provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for  

short, ‘Code’) which are vital for consideration of the issue referred to the  

larger Bench are Sections 320 and 482. Section 320 of the Code provides  

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for compounding of certain offences punishable under the Indian Penal  

Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). It reads as follows :

“S. 320. Compounding of offences.—(1) The  offences punishable under the sections of the Indian  Penal Code, (45 of 1860) specified in the first two  columns of the Table next following may be  compounded by the persons mentioned in the third  column of that Table :

TABLE

Offence Section of  the Indian  Penal Code  applicable

Person by whom offence  may be compounded

1 2 3

(2) The offences punishable under the sections of  the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the  first two columns of the table next following may, with  the permission of the Court before which any  prosecution for such offence is pending, be  compounded by the persons mentioned in the third  column of that Table:--

TABLE

Offence Section of  the Indian  Penal Code  applicable

Person by whom  offence may be  compounded

1 2 3

(3) When an offence is compoundable under this  section, the abatement of such offence or an attempt  to commit such offence (when such attempt is itself  an offence) or where the accused is liable under  section 34 or  149 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of  1860)  may be compounded in like manner.

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(4)       (a) When the person who would otherwise  be competent to compound an offence  under this section is under the age of  eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic,  any person competent to contract on his  behalf,  may, with the permission of the  Court, compound such offence.

(b) When the person who would otherwise  be competent to compound an offence  under this section is dead, the legal  representative, as defined in the Code  of Civil Procedure, 1908  of such person  may, with the consent of the Court,  compound such offence.

(5) When the accused has been committed for trial  or when he has been convicted  and an appeal is  pending, no composition for the offence shall be  allowed without the leave of the Court to which he is  committed, or, as the case may be, before which the  appeal is to be heard.

(6) A High Court or Court of Session acting in the  exercise of its powers of revision under section 401  may allow any person to compound any offence  which such person is competent to compound under  this section.

(7) No offence shall be compounded if the  accused is, by reason of a previous conviction, liable  either to enhanced punishment or to a punishment of  a different kind for such offence.

(8) The composition of an offence under this  section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the  accused with whom the offence has been  compounded.

(9) No offence shall be compounded except as  provided by this section.”

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4. Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court and  

it reads as follows :

“S. 482.  Saving of inherent power of High Court.— Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect  the inherent powers of the High Court to make such  orders as may be necessary to give effect to any  order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the  process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends  of justice.”     

5. In B.S. Joshi1 , the undisputed facts were these : the husband  

was one of the appellants while the wife was respondent no. 2 in the  

appeal before this Court. They were married on 21.7.1999 and were living  

separately since 15.7.2000. An FIR was registered under Sections  

498-A/323 and 406, IPC at the instance of the wife on 2.1.2002. When the  

criminal case registered at the instance of the wife was pending, the  

dispute between the husband and wife and their family members was  

settled. It appears that the wife filed an affidavit that her disputes with the  

husband and the other members of his family had been finally settled and  

she and her husband had agreed for mutual divorce. Based on the said  

affidavit, the matter was taken to the High Court by both the parties and  

they jointly prayed for quashing the criminal proceedings launched  

against the husband and his family members on the basis of the FIR  

registered at the wife’s instance under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC. The  

High Court dismissed the petition for quashing the FIR as in its view the  

offences under Sections 498-A and 406, IPC were non-compoundable  

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and the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code could not be  

invoked to by-pass Section 320 of the Code. It is from this order that the  

matter reached this Court. This Court held that the High Court in exercise  

of its inherent powers could quash criminal proceedings or FIR or  

complaint and Section 320 of the Code did not limit or affect the powers  

under Section 482 of the Code. The Court in paragraphs 14 and 15 (Pg.  

682) of the Report held as under :

“14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing  Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian  Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her  husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498- A was added with a view to punishing a husband and  his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce  her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of  dowry. The hypertechnical view would be  counterproductive and would act against interests of  women and against the object for which this provision  was added. There is every likelihood that non- exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings  to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from  settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A  of the Indian Penal Code.

15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the  High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can  quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and  Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the  powers under Section 482 of the Code.”

6. In Nikhil Merchant2, a company, M/s. Neemuch Emballage  

Ltd., Mumbai was granted financial assistance by Andhra Bank under  

various facilities. On account of default in repayment of loans, the bank  

filed a suit for recovery of the amount payable by the borrower company.  

The bank also filed a complaint against the company, its Managing  7

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Director and the officials of Andhra Bank for diverse offences, namely,  

Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the IPC read with  

Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and  

Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption  

Act, 1988. The suit for recovery filed by the bank against the company  

and the Managing Director of the Company was compromised. The suit  

was compromised upon the defendants agreeing to pay the amounts due  

as per the schedule mentioned in the consent terms. Clause 11 of the  

consent terms read, “agreed that save as aforesaid neither party has any  

claim against the other and parties do hereby withdraw all the allegations  

and counter-allegations made against each other”. Based on clause 11 of  

the consent terms, the Managing Director of the Company, the appellant  

who was accused no. 3 in charge sheet filed by CBI, made application for  

discharge from the criminal complaint. The said application was rejected  

by the Special Judge (CBI), Greater Bombay, which came to be  

challenged before the Bombay High Court. The contention before the  

High Court was that since the subject matter of the dispute had been  

settled between the appellant and the bank, it would be unreasonable to  

continue with the criminal proceedings. The High Court rejected the  

application for discharge from the criminal cases. It is from this order that  

the matter reached this Court by way of special leave. The Court having  

regard to the facts of the case and the earlier decision of this Court in  8

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B.S. Joshi1, set aside the order of the High Court and quashed the  

criminal proceedings by consideration of the matter thus:

“28. The basic intention of the accused in this case  appears to have been to misrepresent the financial  status of the Company, M/s Neemuch Emballage Ltd.,  Mumbai, in order to avail of the credit facilities to an  extent to which the Company was not entitled. In  other words, the main intention of the Company and  its officers was to cheat the Bank and induce it to part  with additional amounts of credit to which the  Company was not otherwise entitled.

29. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of  an offence of cheating punishable under Section 420  IPC, the same has been made compoundable under  sub-section (2) of Section 320 CrPC with the leave of  the court. Of course, forgery has not been included as  one of the compoundable offences, but it is in such  cases that the principle enunciated in B.S. Joshi case  becomes relevant.

30. In the instant case, the disputes between the  Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the  basis of the compromise arrived at by them  whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared  and the Bank does not appear to have any further  claim against the Company. What, however, remains  is the fact that certain documents were alleged to  have been created by the appellant herein in order to  avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the  Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein  has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal  facets. The question which is required to be answered  in this case is whether the power which independently  lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings  pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all  be exercised?

31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated  hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this  Court in B.S. Joshi case and the compromise arrived  at between the Company and the Bank as also  Clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by  

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the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where  technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way  in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in  our view, the continuance of the same after the  compromise arrived at between the parties would be  a futile exercise.”

  7. In Manoj Sharma3, the Court was concerned with the  

question whether an F.I.R. under Sections 420/468/471/34/120-B IPC can  

be quashed either under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of  

the Constitution when the accused and the complainant have  

compromised and settled the matter between themselves. Altamas Kabir,  

J., who delivered the lead judgment referred to B.S. Joshi1  and the  

submission made on behalf of the State that B.S. Joshi1 required a  

second look and held that the Court was not inclined to accept the  

contention made on behalf of the State that the decision in B.S. Joshi1  

required reconsideration, at least not in the facts of the case. It was held  

that what was decided in B.S. Joshi1  was the power and authority of the  

High Court to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or under  

Article 226 of the Constitution to quash offences which were not  

compoundable. The law stated in B.S. Joshi1  simply indicated the powers  

of the High Court to quash any criminal proceeding or first information  

report or complaint whether the offences were compoundable or not.  

Altamas Kabir, J. further observed, “The ultimate exercise of discretion  

under Section 482 CrPC or under Article 226 of the Constitution is with  

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the court which has to exercise such jurisdiction in the facts of each case.  

It has been explained that the said power is in no way limited by the  

provisions of Section 320 CrPC. We are unable to disagree with such  

statement of law. In any event, in this case, we are only required to  

consider whether the High Court had exercised its jurisdiction under  

Section 482 CrPC legally and correctly.”  Then in paragraphs 8 and 9  

(pg. 5) of the Report, Altamas Kabir, J., inter alia, held as under :  

“8. …..Once the complainant decided not to pursue  the matter further, the High Court could have taken a  more pragmatic view of the matter. We do not  suggest that while exercising its powers under Article  226 of the Constitution the High Court could not have  refused to quash the first information report, but what  we do say is that the matter could have been  considered by the High Court with greater pragmatism  in the facts of the case.

9.   ……In the facts of this case we are of the view  that continuing with the criminal proceedings would be  an exercise in futility………”

8. Markandey Katju, J. although concurred with the view of  

Altamas Kabir, J. that criminal proceedings in that case deserved to be  

quashed but observed that question may have to be decided in some  

subsequent decision or decisions (preferably by a larger Bench) as to  

which non-compoundable cases can be quashed under Section 482 of  

the Code or Article 226 of the Constitution on the basis that the parties  

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have entered into compromise. In paragraphs 27 and 28 (pg. 10) of the  

report he held as under:

“27. There can be no doubt that a case under Section  302 IPC or other serious offences like those under  Sections 395, 307 or 304-B cannot be compounded  and hence proceedings in those provisions cannot be  quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power  under Section 482 CrPC or in writ jurisdiction on the  basis of compromise. However, in some other cases  (like those akin to a civil nature), the proceedings can  be quashed by the High Court if the parties have come  to an amicable settlement even though the provisions  are not compoundable. Where a line is to be drawn will  have to be decided in some later decisions of this  Court, preferably by a larger Bench (so as to make it  more authoritative). Some guidelines will have to be  evolved in this connection and the matter cannot be left  at the sole unguided discretion of Judges, otherwise  there may be conflicting decisions and judicial anarchy.  A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some  objective guiding principles and criteria, and not on the  whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discretion,  after all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot.

28. I am expressing this opinion because Shri B.B.  Singh, learned counsel for the respondent has rightly  expressed his concern that the decision in B.S. Joshi  case should not be understood to have meant that  Judges can quash any kind of criminal case merely  because there has been a compromise between the  parties. After all, a crime is an offence against society,  and not merely against a private individual.”

9. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the  

petitioner in SLP(Crl.) No. 6324 of 2009 submitted that the inherent power  

of the High Court to quash a non-compoundable offence was not  

circumscribed by any of the provisions of the Code, including Section 320.  

Section 482 is a declaration of the inherent power pre-existing in the High  

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Court and so long as the exercise of the inherent power falls within the  

parameters of Section 482, it shall have an overriding effect over any of  

the provisions of the Code. He, thus, submitted that in exercise of its  

inherent powers under Section 482, the High Court may permit  

compounding of a non-compoundable offence provided that in doing so it  

satisfies the conditions mentioned therein. Learned senior counsel would  

submit that the power to quash the criminal proceedings under Section  

482 of the Code exists even in non-compoundable offence but its actual  

exercise will depend on facts of a particular case. He submitted that some  

or all of the following tests may be relevant to decide whether to quash or  

not to quash the criminal proceedings in a given case; (a) the nature and  

gravity of case; (b) does the dispute reflect overwhelming and pre-

dominantly civil flavour; (c) would the quashing involve settlement of  

entire or almost the entire dispute; (d) the compromise/settlement  

between parties and/or other facts and the circumstances render  

possibility  of conviction remote and bleak; (e) not to quash would cause  

extreme injustice and would not serve ends of justice and (f) not to quash  

would result in abuse of process of court.         

10. Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in  

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 5921 of 2009 submitted that Section 482  

of the Code is complete answer to the reference made to the larger  

Bench. He analysed Section 482 and Section 320 of the Code and  13

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submitted that Section 320 did not limit or affect the inherent powers of  

the High Court. Notwithstanding Section 320, High Court can exercise its  

inherent power, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of any court or  

otherwise to secure the ends of justice.  To secure the ends of justice is a  

wholesome and definite guideline. It requires formation of opinion by High  

Court on the basis of material on record as to whether the ends of justice  

would justify quashing of a particular criminal complaint, FIR or a  

proceeding.  When the Court exercises its inherent power under Section  

482 in respect of offences which are not compoundable taking into  

account the fact that the accused and the complainant have settled their  

differences amicably, it cannot be viewed as permitting compounding of  

offence which is not compoundable.

11. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel submitted that in cases  

of civil wrongs which also constitute criminal offences, the High Court may  

pass order under Section 482 once both parties jointly pray for dropping  

the criminal proceeding initiated by one of them to put an end to the  

dispute and restore peace between the parties.

12. Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel for the respondent  

(accused) in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 6138 of 2006 submitted that  

the real question that needs to be considered by this Court in the  

reference is whether Section 320(9) of the Code creates a bar or limits or  

affects the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the  14

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Code. It was submitted that Section 320(9) does not create a bar or limit  

or affect the inherent powers of the High Court in the matter of quashing  

any criminal proceedings. Relying upon various decisions of this Court, it  

was submitted that it has been consistently held that the High Court has  

unfettered powers under Section 482 of the Code to secure the ends of  

justice and prevent abuse of the process of the Court. He also submitted  

that on compromise between the parties, the High Court in exercise of  

powers under Section 482 can quash the criminal proceedings, more so  

the matters arising from matrimonial dispute, property dispute, dispute  

between close relations, partners or business concerns which are  

predominantly of civil, financial or commercial nature.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner in Special Leave Petition  

(Crl.) No. 8989 of 2010 submitted that the court should have positive view  

to quash the proceedings once the aggrieved party has compromised the  

matter with the wrong doer. It was submitted that if the court did not allow  

the quashing of FIR or complaint or criminal case where the parties  

settled their dispute amicably, it would encourage the parties to speak lie  

in the court and witnesses would become hostile and the criminal  

proceeding would not end in conviction. Learned counsel submitted that  

the court could also consider the two questions (1) can there be partial  

quashing of the FIR qua accused with whom the complainant/aggrieved  

party enters into compromise. (2) can the court quash the proceedings in  15

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the cases which have not arisen from the matrimonial or civil disputes but  

the offences are personal in nature like grievous hurt (S.326), attempt to  

murder (S.307), rape (S.376), trespassing (S.452) and kidnapping (S.364,  

365) etc.

14. Mr. P. P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General  

referred to the scheme of the Code. He submitted that in any criminal  

case investigated by police on filing the report under Section 173 of the  

Code, the Magistrate, after applying his mind to the chargesheet and the  

documents accompanying the same, if takes cognizance of the offences  

and summons the accused and/or frames charges and in certain grave  

and serious offences, commits the accused to be tried by a court of  

Sessions and the Sessions Court after satisfying itself and after hearing  

the accused frames charges for the offences alleged to have been  

committed by him, the Code provides a remedy to accused to challenge  

the  order taking cognizance or of framing charges. Similar situation may  

follow in a complaint case. Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted  

that power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be invoked in the non-

compoundable offences since Section 320(9) expressly prohibits the  

compounding of such offences. Quashing of criminal proceedings of the  

offences which are non-compoundable would negative the effect of the  

order of framing charges or taking cognizance and therefore quashing  

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would amount to taking away the order of cognizance passed by the  

Magistrate.

15. Learned Additional Solicitor General would submit that when  

the Court takes cognizance or frames charges, it is in accordance with the  

procedure established by law.  Once the court takes cognizance or  

frames charges, the method to challenge such order is by way of  

appropriate application to the superior court under the provisions of the  

Code.   

16.  If  power under Section 482 is exercised, in relation to non-

compoundable offences, it will amount to what is prohibited by law and  

such cases cannot be brought within the parameters ‘to secure ends of  

justice’. Any order in violation and breach of statutory provisions, learned  

Additional Solicitor General would submit, would be a case against the  

ends of justice. He heavily relied upon a Constitution Bench decision of  

this Court in Central Bureau of Investigation and others v. Keshub  

Mahindra and others4 wherein  this Court held, ‘no decision by any court,  

this Court not excluded, can be read in a manner as to nullify the express  

provisions of an Act or the Code.’  With reference to B.S. Joshi1, learned  

Additional Solicitor General submitted that that was a case where the  

dispute was between the husband and wife and the court felt that if the  

proceedings were not quashed, it would prevent the woman from settling  

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in life and the wife had already filed an affidavit that there were  

temperamental differences and she was not supporting continuation of  

criminal proceedings. As regards, Nikhil Merchant2, learned Additional  

Solicitor General submitted that this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v.  

Rameshwar and others5 held that the said decision was a decision under  

Article 142 of the Constitution. With regard to Manoj Sharma3, learned  

Additional Solicitor General referred to the observations made by  

Markandey Katju, J. in paragraphs 24 and 28 of the Report.  

17. Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the High  

Court has no power to quash criminal proceedings in regard to offences in  

which a cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate merely because  

there has been settlement between the victim and the offender because  

the criminal offence is against the society.

18. More than 65 years back, in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir  

Ahmed6, it was observed by the Privy Council that Section 561A  

(corresponding to Section 482 of the Code) had not given increased  

powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was  

enacted. It was observed, `The section gives no new powers, it only  

provides that those which the court already inherently possess shall be  

preserved and is inserted lest, as their Lordships think,  it should be  

considered that the only powers possessed by the court  are those  

5  (2009) 11 SCC 424 6  (1945) 47 Bom. L.R. 245

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expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent  

power had survived the passing of the Code’.  

19. In Khushi Ram v. Hashim and others7, this Court held as  

under :

“It is unnecessary to emphasise  that the inherent  power of the High Court under Section 561A cannot be  invoked in regard to matters which are directly covered  by the specific provisions of the Code…”  

20. The above view of Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed6 and  

another decision in Lala Jairam Das & Ors. v. Emperor8 was expressly  

accepted by this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh. v. Mohammad Naim9 .  

The Court said :

“7. It is now well settled that the section confers no new  powers on the High Court. It merely safeguards all  existing inherent powers possessed by a High Court  necessary (among other purposes) to secure the ends  of justice. The section provides that those powers  which the court inherently possesses shall be  preserved lest it be considered that the only powers  possessed by the court are those expressly conferred  by the Code and that no inherent powers had survived  the passing of the Code………..”

21. In Pampathy v. State of Mysore10, a three-Judge Bench of  

this Court stated as follows :

“  The inherent power of the High Court mentioned in  Section 561A, Criminal Procedure Code can be  exercised only for either of the three purposes  specifically mentioned in the section. The inherent  

7  AIR 1959 SC 542 8  AIR 1945 PC 94 9  AIR 1964 SC 703 10  1966 (Suppl) SCR 477

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power cannot be invoked in respect of any matter  covered by the specific provisions of the Code. It  cannot also be invoked if its exercise would be  inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the  Code. It is only if the matter in question is not covered  by any specific provisions of the Code that s. 561A can  come into operation…….”   

22. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others11, a three-

Judge Bench of this Court referred to Section 482 of the Code and in  

paragraph 7 (pg. 703) of the Report held as under :

“7.  …….. In the exercise of this wholesome power,  the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it  comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding  to continue would be an abuse of the process of the  Court or that the ends of justice require that the  proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the  High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and  criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary  public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought  not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of  harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the  veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very  nature of the material on which the structure of the  prosecution rests and the like would justify the High  Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of  justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends  of mere law though justice has got to be administered  according to laws made by the legislature. The  compelling necessity for making these observations is  that without a proper realisation of the object and  purpose of the provision which seeks to save the  inherent powers of the High Court to do justice  between the State and its subjects, it would be  impossible to appreciate the width and contours of  that salient jurisdiction.”

23. The Court then observed that the considerations justifying  

the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends of justice naturally  

11  (1977) 2 SCC 699 20

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vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one  

conferred by Section 482 ought not to be encased within the straitjacket  

of a rigid formula.

24. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Madhu Limaye v. The  

State of Maharashtra12, dealt with the invocation of inherent power under  

Section 482 for quashing interlocutory order  even though revision under  

Section 397(2) of the Code was prohibited. The Court noticed the  

principles in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High  

Court as under :

“(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a  specific provision in the Code for the redress of the  grievance of the aggrieved party;

(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent  abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the  ends of justice;

(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express  bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.”

25. In Raj Kapoor and others v. State and others13, the Court  

explained the width and amplitude of the inherent power of the High Court  

under Section 482 vis-à-vis revisional power under Section 397 as  

follows:

“10. …….The opening words of Section 482  contradict this contention because nothing of the  Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude  of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by  

12  (1977) 4 SCC 551 13  (1980) 1 SCC 43

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the language of Section 482. Even so, a general  principle pervades this branch of law when a specific  provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not  right except under compelling circumstances. Not that  there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power  should not invade areas set apart for specific power  under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye’s case this  Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great  respect, correctly discussed and delineated the law  beyond mistake. While it is true that Section 482 is  pervasive it should not subvert legal interdicts written  into the same Code, such, for instance, in Section  397(2). Apparent conflict may arise in some situations  between the two provisions and a happy solution

“would be to say that the bar provided in sub- section (2) of Section 397 operates only in  exercise of the revisional power of the High  Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will  have no power of revision in relation to any  interlocutory order. Then in accordance with  one or the other principles enunciated above,  the inherent power will come into play, there  being no other provision in the Code for the  redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.  But then, if the order assailed is purely of an  interlocutory character which could be  corrected in exercise of the revisional power of  the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High  Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power.  But in case the impugned order clearly brings  about a situation which is an abuse of the  process of the Court or for the purpose of  securing the ends of justice interference by the  High Court is absolutely necessary, then  nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or  affect the exercise of the inherent power by the  High Court. But such cases would be few and  far between. The High Court must exercise the  inherent power very sparingly. One such case  would be the desirability of the quashing of a  criminal proceeding initiated illegally,  vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction”.

In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of  inherent power where abuse of the process of the  

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court or other extraordinary situation excites the  court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint,  nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that  interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be  taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary  litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders  are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of  inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in  the face. In between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J.  has pointed out as for example, where it is more than  a purely interlocutory order and less than a final  disposal. The present case falls under that category  where the accused complain of harassment through  the court's process. Can we state that in this third  category the inherent power can be exercised? In the  words of Untwalia, J.: (SCC p. 556, para 10)

“The answer is obvious that the bar will not  operate to prevent the abuse of the process of  the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.  The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved  party is immaterial. The High Court can  examine the matter in an appropriate case  under its inherent powers. The present case  undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of  the High Court in accordance with Section 482  of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although  not accepting, that invoking the revisional  power of the High Court is impermissible.”

I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent  power is not rebuffed in the case situation before us.  Counsel on both sides, sensitively responding to our  allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that the fanatical  insistence on the formal filing of a copy of the order  under cessation need not take up this court's time.  Our conclusion concurs with the concession of  counsel on both sides that merely because a copy of  the order has not been produced, despite its presence  in the records in the court, it is not possible for me to  hold that the entire revisory power stands frustrated  and the inherent power stultified.”

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26. In Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and  

another14, the Court considered the scope of Section 482 of the Code in a  

case where on dismissal of petition under Section 482, a second petition  

under Section 482 of the Code was made. The contention before this  

Court was that the second petition under Section 482 of the Code was not  

entertainable; the exercise of power under Section 482 on a second  

petition by the same party on the same ground virtually amounts to  

review of the earlier order and is contrary to the spirit of Section 362 of  

the Code and the High Court was in error in having quashed the  

proceedings by adopting that course. While accepting this argument, this  

Court held as follows :

“3.    ……The inherent power under Section 482 is  intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the  court and to secure ends of justice. Such power  cannot be exercised to do something which is  expressly barred under the Code. If any consideration  of the facts by way of review is not permissible under  the Code and is expressly barred, it is not for the  court to exercise its inherent power to reconsider the  matter and record a conflicting decision. If there had  been change in the circumstances of the case, it  would be in order for the High Court to exercise its  inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and  pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice  or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court.  Where there is no such changed circumstances and  the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that  existed as on the date of the earlier order, the  exercise of the power to reconsider the same  materials to arrive at different conclusion is in effect a  review, which is expressly barred under Section 362.

14  (1990) 2 SCC 437 24

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5. Section 362 of the Code expressly provides that no  court when it has signed its judgment or final order  disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same  except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error save  as otherwise provided by the Code. Section 482  enables the High Court to make such order as may be  necessary to give effect to any order under the Code  or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or  otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent  powers, however, as much are controlled by principle  and precedent as are its express powers by statute. If  a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the  court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions  and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of  inherent jurisdiction.

7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot  be invoked to override bar of review under Section  362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal,  that the inherent power of the court cannot be  exercised for doing that which is specifically  prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that  the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that  which cannot be done on account of the bar under  other provisions of the Code. The court is not  empowered to review its own decision under the  purported exercise of inherent power. We find that the  impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing  the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same  materials. The High Court has grievously erred in  doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any  compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that  stage.”

27. In Dharampal & Ors. v.  Ramshri (Smt.) and others15, this  

Court observed as follows :

“……It is now well settled that the inherent powers  under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for  exercising powers which are expressly barred by the  Code…….”

15  1993 Crl. L.J. 1049 25

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28. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors.16 ,  

a two-Judge Bench of this Court held as under :

“….It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the  High Court has inherent powers to make such orders  as may be necessary to give effect to any order under  the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any  court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But  the expressions “abuse of the process of law”  or “to  secure the ends of justice”  do not confer unlimited  jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse  of the process of law or the ends of justice could only  be secured in accordance with law including  procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent  powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to  be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned  in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no  express provision empowering the High Court to  achieve the said object. It is well-neigh settled that  inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any  matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if  its exercise would infringe any specific provision of  the Code. In the present case, the High Court  overlooked the procedural law which empowered the  convicted accused to prefer statutory appeal against  conviction of the offence. The High Court has  intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled  the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the  trial.”  

29. In G. Sagar Suri and another v. State of U.P. and others17,  

the Court was concerned with the order of the High Court whereby the  

application under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the criminal  

proceedings under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC pending in the Court  

of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad was dismissed. In paragraph    8  

(pg. 643) of the Report, the Court held as under: 16  AIR 1999 SC 2554 17  (2000) 2 SCC 636

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“8. Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to  be exercised with great care. In exercise of its  jurisdiction the High Court is not to examine the  matter superficially. It is to be seen if a matter, which  is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak  of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a  short cut of other remedies available in law. Before  issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a  great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious  matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the  basis of which the High Court is to exercise its  jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code.  Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to  prevent abuse of the process of any court or  otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

30. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.  

Devendrappa and another18 restated what has been stated in earlier  

decisions that Section 482 does not confer any new powers on the High  

Court, it only saves the inherent power which the court possessed before  

the commencement of the Code. The Court went on to explain the  

exercise of inherent power by the High Court  in paragraph 6 (Pg.94) of  

the Report as under :

“6.  ………It envisages three circumstances under  which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised,  namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code,  (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to  otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither  possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule  which would govern the exercise of inherent  jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with  procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly  arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart  from express provisions of law which are necessary  for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed  upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds  expression in the section which merely recognizes  

18  (2002) 3 SCC 89 27

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and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All  courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the  absence of any express provision, as inherent in their  constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do  the right and to undo a wrong in course of  administration of justice on the principle quando lex  aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine  quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a  person anything it gives him that without which it  cannot exist). While exercising powers under the  section, the court does not function as a court of  appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the  section though wide has to be exercised sparingly,  carefully and with caution and only when such  exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down  in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito  justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the  administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of  the court exists for advancement of justice and if any  attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to  produce injustice, the court has power to prevent  abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to  allow any action which would result in injustice and  prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers  court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it  finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse  of the process of court or quashing of these  proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of  justice……..”  

The Court in paragraph 9 (Pg. 96) further stated :

“9.  ………the powers possessed by the High Court  under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the  very plenitude of the power requires great caution in  its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its  decision in exercise of this power is based on sound  principles. The inherent power should not be  exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High  Court being the highest court of a State should  normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a  case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy,  more so when the evidence has not been collected  and produced before the Court and the issues  involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude  and cannot be seen in their true perspective without  sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule  

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can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High  Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of  quashing the proceeding at any stage……”

31. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Ravishankar Prasad  

and others19, the Court observed in paragraphs 17,19,20 and 39 (Pgs.  

356, 357 and 363) of the Report as follows :

“17. Undoubtedly, the High Court possesses  inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure. These inherent powers of the  High Court are meant to act ex debito justitiae to do  real and substantial justice, for the administration of  which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the  process of the court.

19. This Court time and again has observed that the  extraordinary power under Section 482 CrPC should  be exercised sparingly and with great care and  caution. The Court would be justified in exercising  the power when it is imperative to exercise the  power in order to prevent injustice. In order to  understand the nature and scope of power under  Section 482 CrPC it has become necessary to  recapitulate the ratio of the decided cases.

20. Reference to the following cases would reveal  that the Courts have consistently taken the view that  they must use the court's extraordinary power only to  prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. We  have largely inherited the provisions of inherent  powers from the English jurisprudence, therefore the  principles decided by the English courts would be of  relevance for us. It is generally agreed that the  Crown Court has inherent power to protect its  process from abuse. The English courts have also  used inherent power to achieve the same objective.

39. Careful analysis of all these judgments clearly  reveals that the exercise of inherent powers would  entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of  each case. The object of incorporating inherent  

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powers in the Code is to prevent abuse of the process  of the court or to secure ends of justice.”

32 In Devendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and  

another20, while dealing with the question whether a pure civil dispute can  

be subject matter of a criminal proceeding under Sections 420, 467, 468  

and 469 IPC, a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the High  

Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the  

Code if the allegations made in the First Information Report, even if given  

face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any  

offence.  

33. In Sushil Suri v. Central Bureau of Investigation and  

another21, the Court considered the scope and ambit of the inherent  

jurisdiction of the High Court and made the following observations in para  

16 (pg. 715) of the Report:  

“16. Section 482 CrPC itself envisages three  circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction  may be exercised by the High Court, namely, (i) to  give effect to an order under CrPC; (ii) to prevent an  abuse of the process of court; and (iii) to otherwise  secure the ends of justice. It is trite that although the  power possessed by the High Court under the said  provision is very wide but it is not unbridled. It has to  be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, ex  debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for  which alone the Court exists. Nevertheless, it is  neither feasible nor desirable to lay down any  inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of  inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Yet, in numerous  cases, this Court has laid down certain broad  

20  (2009) 7 SCC 495 21  (2011) 5 SCC 708

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principles which may be borne in mind while  exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.  Though it is emphasised that exercise of inherent  powers would depend on the facts and circumstances  of each case, but the common thread which runs  through all the decisions on the subject is that the  Court would be justified in invoking its inherent  jurisdiction where the allegations made in the  complaint or charge-sheet, as the case may be, taken  at their face value and accepted in their entirety do  not constitute the offence alleged.”

34. Besides B.S. Joshi1, Nikhil Merchant2 and Manoj Sharma3,  

there are other decisions of this Court where the scope of Section 320  

vis-à-vis the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the  

Code has come up for consideration.

35. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab22, in the appeal  

before this Court which arose from an order of the High Court refusing to  

quash the FIR against the appellant lodged under Sections 379, 406, 409,  

418, 506/34, IPC on account of compromise entered into between the  

complainant and the accused, in paragraphs 5 and 6 (pg. 584) of the  

Report, the Court held as under :

“5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the  application was filed in the High Court for quashing of  proceedings which has been dismissed by the  impugned order. We notice from a reading of the FIR  and the other documents on record that the dispute  was purely a personal one between two contesting  parties and that it arose out of extensive business  dealings between them and that there was absolutely  no public policy involved in the nature of the  allegations made against the accused. We are,  therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would  

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be served in continuing with the proceedings in the  light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact  that the complainant has on 11-1-2004 passed away  and the possibility of a conviction being recorded has  thus to be ruled out.

6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable  that in disputes where the question involved is of a  purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily  accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal  proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no  possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a  luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they  are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be  utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful  litigation. This is a common sense approach to the  matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the  technicalities of the law.”

36. In Ishwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh23, the Court was  

concerned with a case where the accused – appellant was convicted and  

sentenced by the Additional Sessions Judge for an offence punishable  

under Section 307, IPC. The High Court dismissed the appeal from the  

judgment and conviction.  In the appeal, by special leave, the injured –  

complainant was ordered to be joined as party as it was stated by the  

counsel for the appellant that mutual compromise has been arrived at  

between the parties, i.e. accused on the one hand and the complainant –  

victim on the other hand during the pendency of the proceedings before  

this Court. It was prayed on behalf of the appellant that the appeal be  

disposed of on the basis of compromise between the parties. In para 12  

(pg. 670) of the Report, the Court observed as follows :

23  (2008) 15 SCC 667 32

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“12. Now, it cannot be gainsaid that an offence  punishable under Section 307 IPC is not a  compoundable offence. Section 320 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 expressly states that no  offence shall be compounded if it is not  compoundable under the Code. At the same time,  however, while dealing with such matters, this Court  may take into account a relevant and important  consideration about compromise between the parties  for the purpose of reduction of sentence.”

37. The Court also referred to the earlier decisions of this Court  

in Jetha Ram v. State of Rajasthan24, Murugesan v. Ganapathy Velar25,  

Ishwarlal  v. State of M.P.26 and Mahesh Chand & another v. State of  

Rajasthan27 and noted in paragraph 13 (pg. 670) of the Report as follows:  

“13. In Jetha Ram v. State of Rajasthan, Murugesan  v. Ganapathy Velar and Ishwarlal v. State of M.P. this  Court, while taking into account the fact of  compromise between the parties, reduced sentence  imposed on the appellant-accused to already  undergone, though the offences were not  compoundable. But it was also stated that in Mahesh  Chand v. State of Rajasthan such offence was  ordered to be compounded.”

Then, in paragraphs 14 and 15 (pg. 670) the Court held as under :

“14. In our considered opinion, it would not be  appropriate to order compounding of an offence not  compoundable under the Code ignoring and keeping  aside statutory provisions. In our judgment, however,  limited submission of the learned counsel for the  appellant deserves consideration that while imposing  substantive sentence, the factum of compromise  between the parties is indeed a relevant circumstance  which the Court may keep in mind.

24  (2006) 9 SCC 255 25  (2001) 10 SCC 504 26  (2008) 15 SCC 671 27  1990 (supp) SCC 681  

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15. In the instant case, the incident took place before  more than fifteen years; the parties are residing in one  and the same village and they are also relatives. The  appellant was about 20 years of age at the time of  commission of crime. It was his first offence. After  conviction, the petitioner was taken into custody.  During the pendency of appeal before the High Court,  he was enlarged on bail but, after the decision of the  High Court, he again surrendered and is in jail at  present. Though he had applied for bail, the prayer  was not granted and he was not released on bail.  Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, in  our opinion, the ends of justice would be met if the  sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant  (Accused 1) is reduced to the period already  undergone.”

38.           In Rumi Dhar (Smt.) v. State of West Bengal and another28 ,  

the Court was concerned with applicability of Section 320 of the Code  

where the accused was being prosecuted for commission of offences  

under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/471 of the IPC along with the bank  

officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with  

Section 13(1)(d)  of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused  

had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in  

the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The  

accused  prayed for her discharge on the grounds (i) having regard to  

the settlement arrived at between her and the bank, no case for  

proceeding against her has been made out; (ii) the amount having  

already been paid and the title deeds having been returned, the  

criminal proceedings should be dropped on the basis of the settlement  

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and (iii) the dispute between the parties were purely civil in nature and  

that she had not fabricated any document or cheated the bank in any  

way whatsoever and charges could not have been framed against her.  

The CBI contested the application for discharge on the ground that  

mere repayment to the bank could not exonerate the accused from the  

criminal proceeding. The two-Judge Bench of this Court referred to  

Section 320 of the Code and the earlier decisions of this Court in CBI  

v. Duncans Agro Industries Limited29, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal30,  

State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma31, Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary32 and  

Nikhil Merchant2 which followed the decision in B.S. Joshi1  and then  

with reference to Article 142 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the  

Code refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding as  

under:

“24. The jurisdiction of the Court under Article 142 of  the Constitution of India is not in dispute. Exercise of  such power would, however, depend on the facts and  circumstances of each case. The High Court, in  exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the  Code of Criminal Procedure, and this Court, in terms  of Article 142 of the Constitution of India, would not  direct quashing of a case involving crime against the  society particularly when both the learned Special  Judge as also the High Court have found that a prima  facie case has been made out against the appellant  herein for framing the charge.”

29  (1996) 5 SCC 591 30  1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 31  1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 32  (1992) 4 SCC 305

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39. In Shiji alias Pappu and others vs. Radhika and another33  

this Court considered the exercise of inherent power by the High Court  

under Section 482 in a matter where the offence was not compoundable  

as the accused was already involved in commission of the offences  

punishable under Sections 354 and 394 IPC. The High Court rejected the  

prayer by holding that the offences with    which appellants were charged  

are not ‘personal in nature’ to justify quashing the criminal proceedings on  

the basis of a compromise arrived at between the complainant and the  

appellants. This Court considered earlier decisions of this Court, the  

provisions contained in Sections 320 and 394 of the Code and in  

paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 (pgs. 712 and 713) of the Report held as  

under:  

“17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is  not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC is by  itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise  of its power under Section 482 CrPC. That power can  in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no  chance of recording a conviction against the accused  and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an  exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction  between compounding of offences by the parties  before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand and  the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the  prosecution under Section 482 CrPC on the other.  While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal  against conviction, may not be competent to permit  compounding of an offence based on a settlement  arrived at between the parties in cases where the  offences are not compoundable under Section 320,  the High Court may quash the prosecution even in  cases where the offences with which the accused  

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stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent  powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC are  not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 CrPC.

18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the  plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by  itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to  exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The  width and the nature of the power itself demands that  its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the  High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear  view that continuance of the prosecution would be  nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is  neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the  situations in which the exercise of power under  Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say  is that the exercise of power must be for securing the  ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to  exercise that power may result in the abuse of the  process of law. The High Court may be justified in  declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate  evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate  court while dealing with a petition under Section 482  of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above,  the High Court will have to consider the facts and  circumstances of each case to determine whether it is  a fit case in which the inherent powers may be  invoked.

19. Coming to the case at hand, we are of the view  that the incident in question had its genesis in a  dispute relating to the access to the two plots which  are adjacent to each other. It was not a case of broad  daylight robbery for gain. It was a case which has its  origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which  dispute has, it appears, been resolved by them. That  being so, continuance of the prosecution where the  complainant is not ready to support the allegations  which are now described by her as arising out of  some “misunderstanding and misconception” will be a  futile exercise that will serve no purpose. It is  noteworthy that the two alleged eyewitnesses, who  are closely related to the complainant, are also no  longer supportive of the prosecution version. The  continuance of the proceedings is thus nothing but an  empty formality. Section 482 CrPC could, in such  circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High  

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Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and  thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts  below”.

40. In Ashok Sadarangani and Anr. vs. Union of India and  

others34,  the issue under consideration was whether an offence which  

was not compoundable under the provisions of the Code could be  

quashed.   That was a case where   a  criminal case  was registered  

against the accused persons under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and  

471 of IPC.  The allegation was that accused secured the credit facilities  

by submitting forged property documents as collaterals  and utilized such  

facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening Letters of  

Credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing  

any goods but inducing the Bank to negotiate the Letters of Credit in  

favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash credit facility.  

The Court considered the earlier  decisions of this Court including B.S.  

Joshi1, Nikhil Merchant2, Manoj Sharma3, Shiji alias Pappu33, Duncans  

Agro Industries Limited29, Rumi Dhar (Smt.)28 and Sushil Suri21  and also  

referred  to the order of reference in one of  the cases before us.  In  

paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Report it was held as under:-  

“17. Having carefully considered the facts and  circumstances of the case, as also the law relating to  the continuance of criminal cases where the  complainant and the accused had settled their  differences and had arrived at an amicable  arrangement, we see no reason to differ with the  

34  JT 2012  (3) SC  469  38

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views that had been taken in Nikhil Merchant's case  or Manoj Sharma's case (supra) or the several  decisions that have come thereafter. It is, however, no  coincidence that the golden thread which runs  through all the decisions cited, indicates that  continuance of a criminal proceeding after a  compromise has been arrived at between the  complainant and the accused, would amount to abuse  of the process of court and an exercise in futility,  since the trial could be prolonged and ultimately, may  conclude in a decision which may be of any  consequence to any of the other parties. Even in  Sushil Suri's case on which the learned Additional  Solicitor General had relied, the learned Judges who  decided the said case, took note of the decisions in  various other cases, where it had been reiterated that  the exercise of inherent powers would depend entirely  on the facts and circumstances of each case. In other  words, not that there is any restriction on the power or  authority vested in the Supreme Court in exercising  powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, but that  in exercising such powers the Court has to be  circumspect, and has to exercise such power  sparingly in the facts of each case. Furthermore, the  issue, which has been referred to a larger Bench in  Gian Singh's case (supra) in relation to the decisions  of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case, Nikhil Merchant's  case, as also Manoj Sharma's case, deal with a  situation which is different from that of the present  case. While in the cases referred to hereinabove, the  main question was whether offences which were not  compoundable, under Section 320 Cr.P.C.  could be  quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in Gian Singh's  case the Court was of the view that a non- compoundable offence could not be compounded and  that the Courts should not try to take over the function  of the Parliament or executive. In fact, in none of the  cases referred to in Gian Singh's case, did this Court  permit compounding of non-compoundable offences.  On the other hand, upon taking various factors into  consideration, including the futility of continuing with  the criminal proceedings, this Court ultimately  quashed the same.

18. In addition to the above, even with regard to the  decision of this Court in Central Bureau of  

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Investigation v. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Ors. :  [(2009) 6 SCC 351], this Court observed that the High  Court can exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  to do real and substantial justice and to prevent abuse  of the process of Court when exceptional  circumstances warranted the exercise of such power.  Once the circumstances in a given case were held to  be such as to attract the provisions of Article 142 or  Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, it would be  open to the Supreme Court to exercise its  extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the  Constitution to quash the proceedings, the  continuance whereof would only amount to abuse of  the process of Court. In the instant case the dispute  between the petitioners and the Banks having been  compromised, we have to examine whether the  continuance of the criminal proceeding could turn out  to be an exercise in futility without anything positive  being ultimately achieved.

19. As was indicated in Harbhajan Singh's case  (supra), the pendency of a reference to a larger  Bench, does not mean that all other proceedings  involving the same issue would remain stayed till a  decision was rendered in the reference. The  reference made in Gian Singh's case (supra) need  not, therefore, detain us. Till such time as the  decisions cited at the Bar are not modified or altered  in any way, they continue to hold the field.

20. In the present case, the fact situation is different  from that in Nikhil Merchant's case (supra). While in  Nikhil Merchant's case the accused had  misrepresented the financial status of the company in  question in order to avail of credit facilities to an  extent to which the company was not entitled, in the  instant case, the allegation is that as part of a larger  conspiracy, property acquired on lease from a person  who had no title to the leased properties, was offered  as collateral security for loans obtained. Apart from  the above, the actual owner of the property has filed a  criminal complaint against Shri Kersi V. Mehta who  had held himself out as the Attorney of the owner and  his family members. The ratio of the decisions in B.S.  Joshi's case and in Nikhil Merchant's case or for that  matter, even in Manoj Sharma's case, does not help  

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the case of the writ petitioners. In Nikhil Merchant's  case, this Court had in the facts of the case observed  that the dispute involved had overtures of a civil  dispute with criminal facets. This is not so in the  instant case, where the emphasis is more on the  criminal intent of the Petitioners than on the civil  aspect involving the dues of the Bank in respect of  which a compromise was worked out.”

The Court distinguished  B.S. Joshi1 and Nikhil Merchant2   by observing  

that those cases  dealt with different fact situation.  

41. In Rajiv  Saxena and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and  

another35,  this Court allowed the  quashment of criminal case under  

Sections 498-A and 496 read with Section 34 IPC  by a brief order.  It was  

observed that since the parties had settled their disputes and the  

complainant agreed that the criminal proceedings need not be continued,  

the criminal proceedings could be quashed.   

42. In a very recent judgment decided by this Court in the month  

of July, 2012 in Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v. State of Gujarat and  

another36, this Court was again concerned with the question of quashment  

of an FIR alleging offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420  

and 120-B IPC. The High Court refused to quash the criminal case under  

Section 482 of the Code.  The question for consideration was that  

inasmuch as all those offences, except Section 420 IPC,  were non-

compoundable offences  under  Section 320 of the Code, whether it  

35 (2012) 5 SCC 627 36  JT 2012 (6) SC 504  

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would  be possible to quash the FIR by the High Court under Section 482  

of the Code or by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.  

The  Bench elaborately considered the decision of this Court in Shiji alias  

Pappu33 and by invoking  Article 142 of the Constitution quashed the  

criminal proceedings.  It was held  as under:-    

“10. In the light of the principles mentioned above,  inasmuch as Respondent No. 2 - the Complainant  has filed an affidavit highlighting the stand taken by  the Appellant (Accused No. 3) during the pendency of  the appeal before this Court and the terms of  settlement as stated in the said affidavit, by applying  the same analogy and in order to do complete justice  under Article 142 of the Constitution, we accept the  terms of settlement insofar as the Appellant herein  (Accused No. 3) is concerned.  

11. In view of the same, we quash and set aside  the impugned FIR No. 45/2011 registered with  Sanand Police Station, Ahmedabad for offences  punishable Under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and  120-B of IPC  insofar as the Appellant (Accused No.  3) is concerned.  The appeal is allowed to the extent  mentioned above”.   

43. In Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A. P.37  decided  on April 29,  

1987, this Court allowed the compounding of an offence under Section  

326 IPC  even though such compounding was not permitted by Section  

320 of the Code.     However, in Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of J & K38 , this  

Court observed that  Y. Suresh Babu37 was per incuriam.  It was held that  

37 (2005) 1 SCC 347   38 (1999 2 SCC 213  

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an offence which law declares to be non-compoundable cannot be  

compounded at all even with the permission of the Court.  

44. Having surveyed the decisions of this Court which throw light  

on the question raised before us, two decisions, one given by the  Punjab  

and Haryana High Court and the other by  Bombay High  Court deserve  

to be noticed.   

45. A five-Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in  

Kulwinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another39 was called  

upon to determine, inter alia, the question whether the High Court has the  

power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings  

or allow the compounding of the offences  in the cases which have been  

specified as non-compoundable offences under the provisions of Section  

320 of the Code.  The five-Judge Bench referred to quite a few decisions  

of this Court including the decisions in Madhu Limaye12 , Bhajan Lal30 , L.  

Muniswamy11 , Simrikhia14, B.S. Joshi1  and Ram Lal38  and framed the  

following guidelines:  

“a. Cases arising from matrimonial discord, even if  other offences are introduced for aggravation of the  case.  

b. Cases pertaining to property disputes between  close relations, which are predominantly civil in nature  and they have a genuine or belaboured dimension of  criminal liability. Notwithstanding a touch of criminal  

39  (2007) 4 CTC 769 43

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liability, the settlement would bring lasting peace and  harmony to larger number of people.  

c. Cases of dispute between old partners or business  concerns with dealings over a long period which are  predominantly civil and are given or acquire a criminal  dimension but the parties are essentially seeking a  redressal of their financial or commercial claim.  

d. Minor offences as under Section 279, IPC may be  permitted to be compounded on the basis of  legitimate settlement between the parties. Yet another  offence which remains non- compoundable is Section  506 (II), IPC, which is punishable with 7 years  imprisonment. It is the judicial experience that an  offence under Section 506 IPC in most cases is  based on the oral declaration with different shades of  intention. Another set of offences, which ought to be  liberally compounded, are Sections 147 and 148, IPC,  more particularly where other offences are  compoundable. It may be added here that the State of  Madhya Pradesh vide M.P. Act No. 17 of 1999  (Section 3) has made Sections 506(II) IPC, 147 IPC  and  148, IPC compoundable offences by amending  the schedule under Section 320, Cr.P.C.  

e. The offences against human body other than  murder and culpable homicide where the victim dies  in the course of transaction would fall in the category  where compounding may not be permitted. Heinous  offences like highway robbery, dacoity or a case  involving clear-cut allegations of rape should also fall  in the prohibited category. Offences committed by  Public Servants purporting to act in that capacity as  also offences against public servant while the victims  are acting in the discharge of their duty must remain  non-compoundable. Offences against the State  enshrined in Chapter-VII (relating to army, navy and  air force) must remain non-compoundable.  

f. That as a broad guideline the offences against  human body other than murder and culpable homicide  may be permitted to be compounded when the court  is in the position to record a finding that the settlement  between the parties is voluntary and fair.  

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While parting with this part, it appears necessary to  add that the settlement or compromise must satisfy  the conscience of the court. The settlement must be  just and fair besides being free from the undue  pressure, the court must examine the cases of  weaker and vulnerable victims with necessary  caution."  

To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never  be any hard and fast category which can be  prescribed to enable the Court to exercise its power  under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The only principle  that can be laid down is the one which has been  incorporated in the Section itself, i.e., "to prevent  abuse of the process of any Court" or "to secure the  ends of justice".  

It was  further held as under :

“23. No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of  the Cr.P.C., or any other such curtailment, can whittle  down the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

25. The only inevitable conclusion from the above  discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the  Cr.P.C. which can affect the inherent power of this  Court under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be  limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has  the wide power to quash the proceedings even in  non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar  under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., in order to prevent  the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.  The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be  exercised ex-debito Justitiae to prevent an abuse of  process of Court. There can neither be an exhaustive  list nor the defined para-meters to enable a High  Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will  always depend upon the facts and circumstances of  each case. The power under Section 482 of the  Cr.P.C. has no limits. However, the High Court will  exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and  caution. The exercise of power has to be with  circumspection and restraint. The Court is a vital and  an extra-ordinary effective instrument to maintain and  control social order. The Courts play role of  paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony  

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and ever-lasting congeniality in society. Resolution of  a dispute by way of a compromise between two  warring groups, therefore, should attract the  immediate and prompt attention of a Court which  should endeavour to give full effect to the same  unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful  composition of the society or would promote  savagery.”  

46. A three-Judge Bench of the Bombay High Court in Abasaheb  

Yadav Honmane v. State of Maharashtra40 dealt with the inherent power  

of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code vis-à-vis the express bar  

for compounding of the non-compoundable offences in Section 320(9) of  

the Code. The High Court referred to various decisions of this Court and  

also the decisions of the various High Courts and then stated as follows :

“The power of compounding on one hand and  quashing of criminal proceedings in exercise of  inherent powers on the other, are incapable of  being treated as synonymous or even inter- changeable in law. The conditions precedent and  satisfaction of criteria in each of these cases are  distinct and different. May be, the only aspect  where they have any commonality is the result of  exercise of such power in favour of the accused,  as acquittal is the end result in both these cases.  Both these powers are to be exercised for valid  grounds and with some element of objectivity.  Particularly, the power of quashing the FIR or  criminal proceedings by the Court by taking  recourse to inherent powers is expected to be  used sparingly and that too without losing sight of  impact of such order on the criminal justice  delivery system. It may be obligatory upon the  Court to strike a balance between the nature of  the offence and the need to pass an order in  

40   2008 (2) Mh.L.J.856 46

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exercise of inherent powers, as the object of  criminal law is protection of public by  maintenance of law and order.”   

47. Section 320 of the Code articulates public policy with regard  

to the compounding of offences. It catalogues the offences punishable  

under IPC which may be compounded by the parties without permission  

of the Court and the composition of certain offences with the permission  

of the court. The offences punishable under the special statutes are not  

covered by Section 320.   When an offence is compoundable under  

Section 320, abatement of such offence or an attempt to commit such  

offence or where the accused is liable under Section 34 or 149 of the IPC  

can also be compounded in the same manner. A person who is under 18  

years of age or is an idiot or a lunatic is not competent to contract  

compounding of  offence  but the same can be done on his behalf with the  

permission of the court.  If a person is otherwise competent to compound  

an offence is dead, his legal representatives may also compound the  

offence with the permission of the court.  Where the accused has been  

committed for trial or he has been convicted and the appeal is pending,  

composition can only be done with the leave of the court to which he has  

been committed or with the leave of the appeal court, as the case may be.  

The revisional court is also competent to allow any person to compound  

any offence who is competent to compound. The consequence of the  

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composition of an offence is acquittal of the accused. Sub-section (9) of  

Section 320 mandates that no offence shall be compounded except as  

provided by this Section. Obviously, in view thereof the composition of an  

offence has to be in accord with Section 320 and in no other manner.

48. The question is with regard to the inherent power of the High  

Court in quashing the criminal proceedings against an offender who has  

settled his dispute with the victim of the crime but the crime in which he is  

allegedly involved is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code.  

49. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests,  

saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it  

being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or  

otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, ‘nothing  

in this Code’  which means that the provision is an overriding provision.  

These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the  

Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of  

such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the  

process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.  As has  

been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on High  

Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by High  

Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to  

secure the ends of justice.   It is equally well settled that the power is not  

to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of  48

Page 49

the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly  

and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted  

in any other provision of the Code.     

50. In different situations, the inherent power may be exercised  

in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation of opinion by  

the High Court before it exercises inherent power under Section 482 on  

either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any  

court or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.  

51. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation  

of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or  

to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded  

on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id  

sine qua res ipsa esse non potest.  The full import of which is whenever  

anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to  

be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something  

else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done,  

then that something else will be supplied by necessary  intendment. Ex  

debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real,  

complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed  

by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but  

requires exercise with great caution and circumspection.  

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52. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the  

High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each  

case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a  

straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under  

Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.

53. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of  

settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as  

compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable.  

Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court  

under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal  

proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In  

compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by  

the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and  

squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the  

High Court for quashing  a  criminal offence or criminal proceeding or  

criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the  

ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate  

consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.   

54. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having  

regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been  

settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its  

opinion, continuation of  criminal proceedings will  be an exercise in futility  50

Page 51

and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is  

put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being  

the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful  

effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers  

and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime-

doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or  

that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been  

made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court.  In  

respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other  

offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude  

under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences  

committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the  

settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all.  

However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear  

civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial,  

partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of  

matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the  family dispute, where  

the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all  

disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such  

offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within  

the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or  

criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such  51

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settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and  

by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be  casualty and  

ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not  

exhaustive.  Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast  

category can be prescribed.  

55. B.S. Joshi1, Nikhil Merchant2, Manoj Sharma3 and Shiji alias  

Pappu33 do illustrate the principle that High Court may quash criminal  

proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under  

Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the  

powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by  

quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi1, Nikhil Merchant2, Manoj  

Sharma3 and Shiji alias Pappu33, this Court has compounded the non-

compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so.  There does exist  

the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320  

and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent  

power under Section 482.  The two powers are distinct and different  

although ultimate consequence may be same viz., acquittal of the  

accused or dismissal of indictment.  

56.  We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the  

decisions of this Court in Simrikhia14, Dharampal15, Arun Shankar  

Shukla16, Ishwar Singh23, Rumi Dhar (Smt.).28 and Ashok Sadarangani34.  

The principle propounded in Simrikhia14 that the inherent jurisdiction of the  52

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High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is  

by now well settled. In Dharampal15, the Court observed the same thing  

that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized  

for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code.  Similar  

statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla16. In Ishwar Singh23, the  

accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under  

Section 307, IPC and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was  

held that the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was not  

compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no  

offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In  

Rumi Dhar (Smt.)28 although the accused had paid the entire due amount  

as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the  

Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for  

commission of offences under Section 120-B/420/467/468/471 of the IPC  

along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section  

13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court  

refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the  

Court would not quash a case involving a crime against the society when  

a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing  

the charge. Ashok Sadarangani34  was again a case where the accused  

persons were charged of having committed offences under Sections 120-

B, 465, 467, 468 and 471, IPC and the allegations were that the accused  53

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secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as  

collaterals and utilized such facilities in a  dishonest and fraudulent  

manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of  

goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to  

negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by  

misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference  

made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi1,  

Nikhil Merchant2 and Manoj Sharma3 and it was held that B.S. Joshi1, and  

Nikhil Merchant2 dealt with different factual situation as the dispute  

involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration  

in Ashok Sadarangani34 was more on the criminal intent than on a civil  

aspect.  The decision in Ashok Sadarangani34  supports the view that the  

criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different  

footing.

57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be  

summarised thus:  the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal  

proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is  

distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for  

compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.  Inherent  

power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be  

exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to  

secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent  abuse of the process of any  54

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Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint  

or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their  

dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and  

no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,  

the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the  

crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like  

murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the  

victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such  

offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society.  

Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender  in relation to  

the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or  

the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity  

etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings  

involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly  

and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the  

purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial,  

financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the  

offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family  

disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and  

the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases,  

High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the  

compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction  55

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is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused  

to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused  

to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete  

settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court  

must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of  

justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the  

criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite  

settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and  

whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is  

put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative,  

the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal  

proceeding.  

58. In view of the above, it cannot be said that B.S. Joshi1,  Nikhil  

Merchant2  and Manoj Sharma3  were not correctly decided. We answer  

the reference accordingly. Let these matters be now listed before the  

concerned Bench(es).

              …………………….J.            (R.M. Lodha)

    …………………….J.         (Anil R. Dave)

              …….............…………………….J.  (Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)

NEW DELHI. SEPTEMBER 24, 2012.  

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