GAURI SHANKAR Vs RAKESH KUMAR .
Bench: DIPAK MISRA,A.M. KHANWILKAR,MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR
Case number: C.A. No.-004513-004514 / 2017
Diary number: 39419 / 2014
Advocates: RAJ SINGH RANA Vs
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NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4513-4514 OF_2017 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 29019-29020 of 2015)
Gauri Shankar …. Appellant
Versus
Rakesh Kumar and Ors. .... Respondents
J U D G M E N T
A.M.KHANWILKAR, J.
1. The Appellant filed a suit for dissolution of partnership of
a jewellery shop and rendition of accounts against Rakesh
Kumar (Respondent No. 1), Maya Devi (Respondent No. 2) and
Bal Mukund Verma (predecessor of Respondents). The suit
was decreed in favour of the Appellant inter alia with a
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declaration that the possession of the suit shop was for the
benefit of the Appellant and Respondent No. 1 as
joint-tenants.
2. The Respondents filed two separate appeals which were
disposed of by the first appellate Court vide a common
judgment on 03.02.2005. In the said appeal, the declaration
regarding the tenancy rights of the Appellant in the suit shop
was reversed on the finding that the tenancy was surrendered
by one partner. The first appellate court relying on the
decisions in the cases of Kanji Manji Vs. Trustee of Port of
Bombay1; H.C. Pandey Vs. G.C. Paul2; and H.C. Pandey Vs.
G. C Kaul3, opined that notice of surrender of tenancy given
by one of the co-tenants and a decree of possession of the
tenanted premises passed on that basis will bind the other.
The first appellate court found that the tenancy surrendered
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AIR 1963 SC 468 2
AIR 1989 SC 1470 3
AIE 1995 SC 676
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by one of the joint tenants, even if without the consent of the
other, would bind the other joint tenant.
3. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed a second appeal before the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi being RSA 146/2005. By the
impugned judgment dated 02.12.2013, the second appeal was
dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the sole ground that
the question as to whether the tenancy rights could be
surrendered by one of the joint-tenants without the consent or
concurrence of the other is a question of fact and not a
question of law much less a substantial question of law. The
Appellant filed a review/recall application against the
aforementioned impugned judgment before the High Court,
which was rejected on 22.08.2014. The Appellant has
challenged both these judgments of the High Court in the
present appeals.
4. The grievance of the Appellant is that the Appellant had
raised substantial questions of law as articulated in the Memo
of Second Appeal, in paragraph 8(K). The main grievance of
the Appellant was that the Respondent No. 1 – joint-tenant
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had surrendered the entire tenancy rights in the suit shop
without the consent or knowledge of the Appellant, in a
deceitful and fraudulent manner. In that, the surrender of the
tenancy was unilateral, unauthorized and collusive between
the landlady who is the mother of Respondent No. 1 and the
new tenant inducted in the suit shop (original defendant No. 3
before the Trial Court) who was none other than the father of
Respondent No. 1. According to the Appellant, in the present
case, the act of surrender of joint-tenancy by the Respondent
No. 1 was a subterfuge and fraud played so as to defeat the
rights of the Appellant in the suit shop. Further, the first
appellate Court, without dealing with the finding of fact
recorded by the trial court on this aspect, reversed the well
considered view taken by the trial court. The first appellate
court merely relied upon the decisions which could be
distinguished and not relevant to the specific plea taken by the
Appellant. This grievance made by the Appellant has been
completely glossed over by the learned single Judge of the
High Court. The High Court proceeded to reject the second
appeal without addressing the real issues, by merely stating
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that the fact as to whether the tenancy rights could be
surrendered by one of the partners is a question of fact.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. With
their able assistance, we have perused the relevant records
and the judgments impugned in the present appeals. We
agree with the Appellant that the learned single Judge of the
High Court has failed to refer to the substantial questions of
law formulated by the Appellant in the Memo of Appeal in
Paragraph 8(K). Further, the specific plea taken by the
Appellant, that the alleged surrender of joint tenancy by
Respondent No. 1 was a deceitful and fraudulent act not
binding on the Appellant nor could impact the joint tenancy in
respect of the suit shop, has not been examined by the High
Court. The material facts to establish that plea have been
brought on record by the Appellant and duly noticed by the
trial court. However, the efficacy thereof has not been
considered either by the first appellate Court or the High
Court. The High Court was obliged to examine the
aforementioned pleas taken by the Appellant including that
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the decisions of this Court relied upon by the first appellate
Court to answer the issue against the Appellant were
inapplicable to the fact situation of the present case and could
be distinguished.
6. As a result, we find merit in the argument of the
Appellant that the parties be relegated before the High Court
for a fresh consideration of the second appeal on its own merit
in accordance with law and more so, the substantial questions
of law formulated by the Appellant which are as under:-
“i. Whether the tenancy of Respondent No. 1 and 2 as created w.e.f. 01.09.1975 in respect of Suit premises No. 47, UB, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi – 11006 jointly in their name can be said to be joint tenancy as contemplated in the judgment AIR 1988 SC 1470 “S.C. Pandey versus G.C. Paul” which were passed in the context of joint tenancy conferred on the body of the legal heir of deceased or not?
ii. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court was duty bound to address all issues and give finding therein after re-appraisal of the facts and was not competent to uphold the finding summarily as sought to be done by the judgment dated 03.02.2005 or not?
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iii. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court was duty bound to deal with other issues except Issue No. 6?
iv. Whether the Judgment/Decree of the Ld. Appellate Court dated 03.02.2005 was perverse and in breach of its jurisdiction as the appellate court by not giving independent finding passed on re-appraisal of pleading and evidence on record?
v. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court upholding other issues ought to have passed such further direction for passing of the preliminary decree of rendition of account to its logical end as appointment of Local Commissioner and its terms set lapsed by then or not?”
7. We may not be understood to have formulated the above
noted questions while remitting the second appeal. It will be
open to the High Court to reformulate the substantial
questions of law or permit the parties to urge any further
substantial questions of law that may require consideration by
the High Court.
8. Accordingly, we set aside the judgments and orders
passed by the High Court dated 02.12.2013 and 22.08.2014
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and instead restore the second appeal to the file of the High
Court to its original number for fresh consideration on its own
merit in accordance with law. The parties shall appear before
the High Court on 17th April, 2017 when the High Court may
assign a suitable date for hearing of the second appeal. We
request the High Court to expeditiously dispose of the second
appeal.
9. The appeals are allowed in the above terms. No order as
to costs.
…..……………………………..J. (Dipak Misra)
.…..…………………………..J. (A.M.Khanwilkar)
.…..…………………………..J. (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)
New Delhi, Dated: March 29, 2017
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