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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1245 OF 2009

Ganga Bai … Appellant (s)   

Versus

State of Rajasthan … Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T  

KURIAN, J.:   

1. The appellant-Ganga Bai was tried before the Additional

Sessions Judge, Nimbahera, Rajasthan along with one Udai Lal

and Daulat Ram under Section 302 read with Section 34 and

Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (hereinafter

referred to as ‘IPC’) for the murder of her daughter-in-law and

her  two  minor  children.  All  the  three  were  convicted  under

Section  302  IPC  and  were  sentenced  to  undergo  life

imprisonment. There was also a sentence of fine with default

clause.  

2. In appeal, the High Court acquitted Udai Lal and Daulat

Ram holding that the offences against them were not proved

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beyond  doubt.  However,  in  the  case  of  the  appellant,  the

conviction was confirmed with no modification in sentence.

3. The incident is of the year 1999. First Information Report

was registered on the complaint given by PW-29. It was stated

that  while  he  was  in  the  field  gazing  cattle,  he  heard  PW-3

crying loudly of having seen a dead body of a lady lying in a

trench. Along with PW-4, they also found the dead bodies of two

children dumped in the trench.  On 06.09.1999, the appellant

and Udai Lal were arrested, and Daulat Ram was arrested on

09.09.1999. All of them were charged under Section 302 read

with Section 34 and Section 201 IPC.  

4. Though  at  the  trial,  many  of  the  witnesses  turned

hostile,  the Sessions Court  convicted all  the accused holding

that the circumstantial evidence, the evidence of recovery and

the presence of blood stains on the clothes of appellant and

Udai Lal, were sufficient to convict them for the offence under

Section 302 IPC. The High Court acquitted Udai Lal and Daulat

Ram, and hence, the appeal is only at the instance of Ganga

Bai.

5. It is contented that the conviction cannot be sustained

since the chain of evidence on circumstantial evidence is not

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complete.  It  is  further  contended  that  Udai  Lal,  at  whose

instance, one of the blood stained weapons, viz., dhariya was

recovered, having been acquitted, the appellant also is liable to

be acquitted.

6. We have heard the Counsel appearing for the State also.

7.  The prosecution has relied on the following evidence:  

“(1) The deceased was last seen in the company of appellant Smt. Ganga Bai.

(2) The  verification  of  place  of  incident  at  the instance of appellant Smt. Ganga Bai.

(3) The  recovery  of  weapon  of  offence  namely Dharia, spade and kulhari.

(4) Recovery  of  blood-stained  clothes  of appellant Smt. Ganga Bai.

(5) Recovery  of  anklet  of  the  deceased  in pursuance  of  the  information  given  by appellant Ganga Bai.”

8. It  has come out in  the evidence of  PW-5-Shanti  Devi,

who  is  the  wife  of  PW-6-Naresh  Kumar,  the  landlord  of  the

deceased-Sunanda  and  her  husband-Ratanlal  (son  of  the

appellant),  that  accused-Ganga  Bai  used  to  visit  the

deceased-Sunanda in her  room. The said witness stated that

she had seen Sunanda with appellant before her disappearance.

It has also come out in her evidence that the appellant, after

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the incident, came back to her, paid the rent and took away the

belongings of the deceased. PW-6- Naresh Kumar has supported

the version of PW-5. PW-7- is Sultana who has also stated that

the  deceased  along  with  her  children  was  seen  with  the

appellant in the market and the deceased had told her that the

appellant was taking them to Morvan. PW-8-husband of Sultana

has supported her version. Thus, on the basis of the evidence of

PWs-5 to 8, both the courts below have come to the conclusion

that all the deceased were last seen with the appellant.  

9. It has also come out from the evidence of PW-5 that the

appellant  was not happy with the deceased for  two reasons,

viz., (i) she had already been married to another person and he

had  left  her  with  her  two  children  born  to  him and  (ii)  she

belonged to a different caste.  Therefore, if the appellant had

accepted them in their family, they would have been cast out

from the village. It is because of that only the deceased along

with her family had left the appellant’s house and stayed in the

rented accommodation provided by PW-5. It has also come out

from  her  evidence  that  the  deceased  had  given  the  phone

number of  paternal  house and family  photo of  the deceased

along with her husband and children to her to be handed over

to  her  father  in  case  she  did  not  return.  Yet  another

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incriminating circumstance is the conduct of the appellant, after

the  incident,  of  settling  the  rent  with  PW-5  and  removing

belongings of the deceased.  

10. On the second circumstance on verification of the place

of incident by the appellant,  the High Court rightly discarded

the  same  holding  that  the  Police  had  already  identified  the

place  where  the  dead  bodies  were  dumped.  The  other

circumstantial evidence against the appellant is on the recovery

of weapon of offence. It has come in evidence that the recovery

was effected only on the basis of the disclosure made by the

appellant  as  per  Exhibit-P67.  It  has  come  in  evidence  that

Exhibit-P53-dharia contained human blood.  The third piece of

circumstantial  evidence  found  against  the  appellant  is  the

recovery  of  blood-stained  clothes  belonging  to  her  as  per

Exhibit-P66-disclosure.  The  appellant  could  not  give  any

explanation  of  the  presence  of  human  blood  on  her  clothes

recovered  as  per  Exhibit-P52.  Though  the  anklet,  said  to  be

belonging  to  the  deceased-Sunanda,  was  also  recovered

pursuant to her disclosure,  the High Court has discarded the

same on the ground that there was no proper identification.  

11. Having gone through the records, we find it difficult to

be persuaded to take a different view on the evidence against

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the appellant which according to both the trial court and the

High Court  formed an unbroken chain which led only  to  one

hypothesis,  viz.,  the  involvement  of  the  appellant  in  the

offences under Section 302 and Section 201 IPC. It has to be

specially noted that even under Section 313 IPC statement, the

appellant  did  not  have  any  explanation  on  the  presence  of

human blood stains on her clothes which were duly recovered

on her disclosure.  

12. In  Nana Keshav Lagad v.  State of Maharashtra1,

this Court had an occasion to consider a similar situation. Since

the factual background, as such, is also explained therein, we

shall extract the relevant paragraph as such:  

“27. The other submission made on behalf of the appellants was with reference to the human blood found on the clothes worn by A-1 and A-4. It was  contended  that  the  prosecution  failed  to satisfactorily  establish  through  any  independent evidence  about  the  bloodstains  found  on  the clothes of A-1, as well as the appellant in Crl. A. No.  1010  of  2008.  In  that  respect  instead  of reiterating the details, it will be sufficient to refer to the conclusion reached by the trial court, while dealing with the said contention, which is found in para 63. The relevant part of it reads as under:

“63. In the present case, the evidence of API Padwal  in  this  respect  is  not  seriously challenged or  shattered.  After  all  the accused

1 (2013) 12 SCC 721

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were  arrested  under  panchnama  and  at  the time  of  arrest  panchnama  of  accused  Nana bloodstained clothes were seized. It is not in any way  contended  or  for  that  matter  even whispered that  IO API  Padwal  was having any rancour  against  the  accused  or  he  was motivated  or  interested  in  one-sided investigation with the sole object of implicating the  accused.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the investigation in this case appears to be totally impartial. When it transpired that two accused by  name  Sandeep  and  Ganesh,  the  juvenile delinquent have not taken part in the assault, their names were deleted from the prosecution case by filing  report  under  Section  169 CrPC. Therefore, here the investigation has proceeded impartially and it is also not even for the sake of it,  is  suggested  to  API  Padwal  that,  no  such bloodstained clothes  were  recovered  from the accused  Nana,  moreover,  as  per  the  settled position of law, there is no presumption in law that  a  police  officer  acts  dishonestly  and  his evidence cannot be acted upon. Therefore, here the evidence of API Padwal is sufficient to prove the recovery of the bloodstained clothes of the accused. His evidence also goes to prove that all  these  articles,  bloodstained  clothes,  etc. were sent to CA and as per the CA report, Ext. 61 the blood was detected on the clothes of the accused and the deceased and this blood was human blood…. In the present case, though the CA report, Ext. 61 shows that, the said human blood was of Group B, CA report, Ext. 62 about the blood sample of the accused states that the blood  group  could  not  be  ascertained  as  the results were inconclusive, moreover, there is no CA  of  the  blood  sample  of  the  deceased  to prove  that  he  was  having  Blood  Group  B. However,  the  fact  remains  that,  the  stains  of human  blood  were  found  on  the  clothes  of accused  Nana  and  he  has  not  explained  how these  bloodstains  were  on  his  clothes  and therefore,  as  observed  in  this  authority,  it becomes  one  more  highly  incriminating circumstance against the accused.”

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In fact, as rightly noted by the trial court, it was for the  appellants  to  have explained as  to  how the clothes worn by them contained human blood. In Section  313  questioning,  no  explanation  was forthcoming  from  the  appellants.  In  these circumstances, the said contention also does not merit any consideration.”

13. The last contention is on parity. It is submitted that Udai

Lal, whose clothes were duly recovered, also contained stains of

human blood, for which also, there was no explanation and he

had also given disclosure on the recovery of weapon of offence.

Though we find that the acquittal made by the High Court could

require a revisit, in view of the fact that there is no appeal by

the State against the acquittal of Udai Lal and that the incident

is of the year 1999, we do not propose to pursue the matter as

against Udai Lal. However, we may state that only because Udai

Lal  was  acquitted,  in  view  of  the  clinching  evidence  on  the

involvement  of  the  appellant  in  the  offences  of  murder  and

destruction of evidence charged against her, she is not entitled

for a similar treatment as that of Udai Lal. Merely because one

or more of those charged with the substantial offences and also

charged under Section 34 IPC have been acquitted, the one in

the group who shared the common intention,  in  whose case

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there is conclusive evidence of direct involvement, cannot claim

parity.  

14. Thus, we respectfully agree with the concurrent findings

on the conviction and sentence of  the appellant.  We find no

merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.

15. It  is brought to our notice that by virtue of the Order

dated 09.04.2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature for

Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in D.B. Civil Writ Petition (Parole)

No. 3026 of 2014, the High Court, taking note of the fact that

the appellant had served more than fourteen and a half years of

sentence in jail without parole and that she was aged about 79

years, has granted her permanent parole. We make it clear that

dismissal of this appeal shall not, in any way, affect either the

permanent parole or commutation of her sentence.   

                     ....…………………..J.

                                    (T. S. THAKUR)

                                                     ……………………..J.                                    (KURIAN JOSEPH)

New Delhi; September 30, 2015.  

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