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REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1948 OF 2013 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Crl.) No. 4531 of 2009)

GANESHA  ..… APPELLANT VERSUS

SHARANAPPA & ANR.        ..... RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T  

CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.

Petitioner,  besides  three  other  accused,  was  

put on trial for offence under Section 341, 323,  

324 and 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian  

Penal  Code.   Judicial  Magistrate,  First  Class,  

Yadgiri Taluk, Gulbarga District, Karnataka, by its  

judgment  and  order  dated  14th of  September,  2006  

passed in CC No. 355 of 2006, acquitted them of all  

the charges.

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Aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid,  the  informant  

preferred  Criminal  Revision  Petition  No.  147  of  

2007 and the High Court, by the impugned judgment  

and order dated 5th of August, 2008 maintained the  

order  of  acquittal  of  all  accused  persons,  

excepting accused no. 3, Ganesha who has been held  

guilty for the offence punishable under Section 324  

of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo  

simple imprisonment for a period of six months and  

also to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-,  and in default  

of  payment  of  fine,  to  undergo  further  simple  

imprisonment for a period of three months.

It  is  against  this  order  that  Ganesha  has  

preferred this special leave petition.

Leave granted.

The prosecution was set in motion on the basis  

of  a  report  given  by  the  informant,  Sharanappa,  

inter alia, alleging that he made a protest when he  

saw the accused persons grazing their cattle in his  

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land and thereby damaging the mulberry crop.  It  

was  alleged  that  Ganesha,  the  appellant  herein  

assaulted the informant with a Badige (stick) which  

caused injury near his left eye. The rest of the  

prosecution  story  is  not  being  narrated  as  the  

accused  who  have  allegedly  participated  in  that  

have been acquitted and we are not concerned with  

that in the present appeal.  The trial court, on  

appraisal of the evidence, came to the conclusion  

that the prosecution has not been able to prove its  

case beyond all reasonable doubt and, accordingly,  

acquitted all the accused.  However, in revision,  

the High Court re-appraised the evidence and found  

the reasoning assigned by the trial court to be  

totally perverse and contrary to the evidence on  

record.  The High Court relied on the evidence of  

Sharanappa, the informant (PW-2), Maremma (PW-4),  

Sujatha (PW-5) and Hussainappa (PW-6), who claimed  

to be the eye-witnesses of the occurrence.  The  

High  Court  found  Maremma  (PW-4)  and  Hussainappa  

(PW-6)  to  be  the  independent  eye-witnesses  and  

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reliable.  The High Court further observed that the  

evidence of Dr. Surekha (PW-1), who examined the  

injured and gave the wound certificate (Exhibit 2)  

corroborated  the  case  of  the  prosecution.  

Accordingly, the High Court set aside the order of  

acquittal of the present appellant and convicted  

him  as  above.   While  doing  so,  the  High  Court  

observed as follows:

“17.  In  my  view,  the  aforesaid  reasoning  of  the  trial  court  is  totally perverse and contrary to the  evidence on record.  We have seen from  the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 4, 5 and 6  that  all  of  them  have  come  out  successfully  in  their  cross- examination  and  all  of  them  have  spoken to the fact of A-3 assaulting  P.W. 2 with a stick near his left eye  and the other accused persons catching  hold  of  P.W.2.   Furthermore,  it  is  also clear from the evidence of P.Ws.  2 and 5 that the incident happened in  the land of the complainant when the  cattle belonging to the accused went  to  the  land  of  the  complainant  for  grazing the crop.  Therefore, no doubt  arises as to the place of incident.”   

Mr.  Akshat  Shrivastav,  learned  counsel  

appearing on behalf of the appellant raises a very  

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short point.  He submits that the High Court in  

revision could not convert a finding of acquittal  

into  one  of  conviction  and  at  most,  while  

exercising  the  revisional  jurisdiction,  could  

direct for re-trial.  Mr. V.N. Raghupathy, learned  

counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  respondents,  

however, submits that the High Court having found  

the reasoning assigned by the trial court to be  

totally perverse and contrary to the evidence on  

record  is  not  precluded  from  setting  aside  the  

order of acquittal and convicting the accused for  

the offence charged.

Having  appreciated  the  rival  submissions  we  

find substance in the submission of learned counsel  

for the appellant.  Section 401 of the Code of  

Criminal Procedure, for short ‘the Code’, confers  

power of revision to the High Court, same reads  

as follows:

“401.   High  Court’s  powers  of  revision.-  (1)  In  the  case  of  any  proceeding  the  record  of  which  has  been  called  for  by  itself  or  which  

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otherwise comes to its knowledge, the  High  Court  may,  in  its  discretion,  exercise any of the powers conferred  on a Court of Appeal by sections 386,  389,  390  and  391  or  on  a  Court  of  Session by section 307 and, when the  Judges composing the Court of revision  are  equally  divided  in  opinion,  the  case  shall  be  disposed  of  in  the  manner provided by section 392.

(2)  No  order  under  this  section  shall be made to the prejudice of the  accused or other person unless he has  had  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  either personally or by pleader in his  own defence.

(3) Nothing in this section shall  be deemed to authorise a High court to  convert  a  finding  of  acquittal  into  one of conviction.   

(4)  Where  under  this  Code  an  appeal lies and no appeal is brought,  no proceeding by way of revision shall  be entertained at the instance of the  party who could have appealed.

(5)  Where  under  this  Code  an  appeal  lies  but  an  application  for  revision  has  been  made  to  the  High  Court by any person and the High Court  is satisfied that such application was  made under the erroneous belief that  no appeal lies thereto and that it is  necessary in the interests of justice  so to do, the High Court may treat the  application for revision as a petition  of  appeal  and  deal  with  the  same  accordingly.”

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From  a  plain  reading  of  sub-section  (1)  of  

Section 401 of the Code it is evident that the High  

Court, while exercising the powers of revision, can  

exercise any of the powers conferred on a court of  

appeal including the power under Section 386 of the  

Code, relevant portion whereof reads as follows:

“386.  Powers  of  the  Appellate  Court. –  After  perusing  such  record  and  hearing  the  appellant  or  his  pleader, if he appears, and the Public  Prosecutor, if he appears, and in case  of  an  appeal  under  section  377  or  section  378,  the  accused,  if  he  appears, the Appellate Court may, if  it  considers  that  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for  interfering,  dismiss the appeal, or may –

(a) in  an  appeal  from  an  order  of  acquittal, reverse such order and  direct  that  further  inquiry  be  made, or that the accused be re- tried or committed for trial, as  the  case  may  be,  or  find  him  guilty  and  pass  sentence  on  him  according to law;

xxx xxx xxx”

 Section 386(a) thus authorizes the appellate  

court to reverse an order of acquittal, find the  

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accused  guilty  and  pass  sentence  on  the  person  

found guilty.  However, sub-section (3) of Section  

401  of  the  Code  contemplates  that  the  power  of  

revision does not authorize a High Court to convert  

a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.  On  

the face of it, the High Court while exercising the  

powers of revision can exercise all those powers  

which have been conferred on the court of appeal  

under Section 386 of the Code but, in view of sub  

section  (3)  of  Section  401  of  the  Code,  while  

exercising such power, cannot convert a finding of  

acquittal into one of conviction.  

However,  in  a  case  where  the  finding  of  

acquittal is recorded on account of  misreading of  

evidence  or  non-consideration  of  evidence  or  

perverse appreciation of evidence, nothing prevents  

the  High  Court  from  setting  aside  the  order  of  

acquittal  at  the  instance  of  the  informant  in  

revision and directing fresh disposal on merit by  

the trial court.  In the event of such direction,  

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the trial court shall be obliged to re-appraise the  

evidence  in  light  of  the  observation  of  the  

revisional  court  and  take  an  independent  view  

uninfluenced  by  any  of  the  observations  of  the  

revisional court on the merit of the case. By way  

of  abundant  caution,  we  may  herein  observe  that  

interference  with  the  order  of  acquittal  in  

revision is called for only in cases where there is  

manifest error of law or procedure and in those  

exceptional cases in which it is found that the  

order of acquittal suffers from glaring illegality,  

resulting into miscarriage of justice.  The High  

Court  may  also  interfere  in  those  cases  of  

acquittal caused by shutting out the evidence which  

otherwise ought to have been considered or where  

the material evidence which clinches the issue has  

been overlooked.  In such an exceptional case, the  

High Court in revision can set aside an order of  

acquittal  but  it  cannot  convert  an  order  of  

acquittal into that of an order of conviction.  The  

only  course  left  to  the  High  Court  in  such  

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exceptional cases is to order re-trial.  The view,  

which we have taken finds support from a decision  

of this Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs. State  of Bihar (2002) 6 SCC 650,  in which it has been  held as follows:

“12.………Sub-section (3) of Section  401 in terms provides that nothing in  Section  401  shall  be  deemed  to  authorize a High Court to convert a  finding  of  acquittal  into  one  of  conviction.   The  aforesaid  sub- section, which places a limitation on  the  powers  of  the  revisional  court,  prohibiting  it  from  converting  a  finding  of  acquittal  into  one  of  conviction,  is  itself  indicative  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  revisional power conferred by Section  401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  If the High Court could not convert a  finding  of  acquittal  into  one  of  conviction directly, it could not do  so  indirectly  by  the  method  of  ordering  a  retrial.   It  is  well  settled by a catena of decisions of  this Court that the High Court will  ordinarily  not  interfere  in  revision  with an order of acquittal except in  exceptional  cases  where  the  interest  of  public  justice  requires  interference for the correction of a  manifest illegality or the prevention  of gross miscarriage of justice.  The  High Court will not be justified in  interfering with an order of acquittal  merely  because  the  trial  court  has  

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taken a wrong view of the law or has  erred in appreciation of evidence.  It  is neither possible nor advisable to  make  an  exhaustive  list  of  circumstances  in  which  exercise  of  revisional  jurisdiction  may  be  justified, but decisions of this Court  have  laid  down  the  parameters  of  exercise of revisional jurisdiction by  the High Court under Section 401 of  the Code of Criminal Procedure in an  appeal against acquittal by a private  party.”

In  the  present  case,  the  High  Court  in  our  

opinion, rightly came to the conclusion that it is  

one  of  the  exceptional  cases  as  the  finding  of  

acquittal  is  on  a  total  misreading  and  perverse  

appreciation of evidence.  On the face of it, the  

High Court rightly set aside the order of acquittal  

but it gravely erred in converting the order of  

acquittal  into  that  of  conviction,  instead  of  

directing  re-hearing  by  the  trial  court.  

Ordinarily we would have set aside the order of the  

revisional  court  to  the  extent  aforesaid  and  

directed  for  re-hearing  by  the  trial  court,  but  

taking into account the nature of offence, at such  

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a distance of time we would not like to charter  

that course.

Before we part with the case, we may observe a  

common  error  creeping  in  many  of  the  judgments  

including the present one. No distinction is made  

while  using  the  words  ‘informant’  and  

‘complainant’. In many of the judgments, the person  

giving the report under Section 154 of the Code is  

described  as  the  ‘complainant’  or  the  ‘de  facto  

complainant’ instead of ‘informant’, assuming that  

the State is the complainant.  These are not words  

of literature.  In a case registered under Section  

154 of the Code, the State is the prosecutor and  

the  person  whose  information  is  the  cause  for  

lodging  the  report  is  the  informant.   This  is  

obvious from sub-section (2) of Section 154 of the  

Code which, inter alia, provides for giving a copy  

of the information to the ‘informant’ and not to  

the ‘complainant’.  However the complainant is the  

person  who  lodges  the  complaint.   The  word  

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‘complaint’ is defined under Section 2(d) of the  

Code  to  mean  any  allegation  made  orally  or  in  

writing to a Magistrate and the person who makes  

the allegation is the complainant, which would be  

evident  from  Section  200  of  the  Code,  which  

provides for examination of the complainant in a  

complaint-case.   Therefore,  these  words  carry  

different meanings and are not interchangeable.  In  

short, the person giving information, which leads  

to lodging of the report under Section 154 of the  

Code is the informant and the person who files the  

complaint is the complainant.

In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside  

the order of the High Court and decline to direct  

re-hearing by the trial court.  

    ........................J     [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD]

.......................J  [KURIAN JOSEPH]

NEW DELHI NOVEMBER 19, 2013

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