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                                                                                Rep ortable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL  NO. 4665 OF 2013

G. Jayalal ...Appellant

Versus

Union of India and others              ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

In  this  appeal,  the  pregnability  of  the  order  dated  

17.2.2012 passed by the High Court of Delhi in WP (C) No.  

61 of 2012 affirming the order dated 30.11.2011 passed  

by  the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal,  Principal  Bench,  

New Delhi (for short “the Tribunal”) in O.A. No. 1290 of  

2011 is called in question.

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2.      The  facts,  as  have  been  exposited,  are  that  

advertisements  were  issued  to  fill  up  the  posts  of  

Director General in All India Radio and Doordarshan  

on  20.10.2010  and  20.12.2010  respectively.   A  

Committee  headed  by  the  Chairperson,  Prasar  

Bharati  Board,  was  constituted  to  make  the  

recommendations  for  appointment  to  the  aforesaid  

two posts.  Names of nine persons including that of  

the appellant and the fourth respondent herein were  

recommended  to  be  interviewed  by  the  Selection  

Committee.  The recommendations of the Selection  

Committee  were  forwarded  to  the  Government  of  

India  vide  letter  dated  16.3.2011  by  the  Member  

(Personnel),  Prasar  Bharati.   The  Committee  

forwarded  three  names  for  the  post  of  Director  

General,  Doordarshan  and  names  of  two  persons,  

that of the appellant and the fourth respondent, for  

the  post  of  Director  General,  All  India  Radio.   On  

receipt  of  the  recommendations,  a  letter  dated  

21.3.2011 was circulated by the  Officer  on Special  

Duty  in  Prasar  Bharati  to  all  the  Members  of  the  

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Selection Committee.  It was mentioned in the letter  

that in the special  meeting held on 15.3.2011, the  

Selection  Board,  after  interviewing  the  candidates  

and taking into account all the relevant factors, had  

decided to recommend a panel of candidates for the  

two posts but as the names recommended were not  

put  in  any  particular  order  of  preference  by  the  

Selection  Board,  the  Government  had  desired  that  

the  names  in  the  panel  be  put  in  the  order  of  

preference.  After receipt of the letter, it was decided  

by the Board to short-list the candidates in order of  

preference by way of  circulation.   Thereafter,  each  

Member  of  the  Selection  Committee  gave  his  

recommendation  by  way of  separate  endorsement.  

Eight  Members  of  the  Selection  Committee,  that  

constituted  of  nine  Members,  placed  the  fourth  

respondent at serial No. 1 and the appellant at serial  

No. 2 in order of preference for the post of Director  

General, All India Radio.  Five out of nine Members of  

the Committee placed Shri Tripurari Sharan at serial  

No. 1,  Shri  Ram Subhag Singh at serial  No. 2,  and  

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Shri L.D. Mandloi at serial No. 3 in the said order of  

preference  for  the  post  of  Director  General,  

Doordarshan.  It is evident from the record that the  

majority of the members of the Selection Committee  

placed the fourth respondent in order of preference  

at  No.  1 for  the post  of  Director  General,  All  India  

Radio  and  Shri  Tripurari  Sharan  for  the  post  of  

Director  General,  Doordarshan.   Be  it  noted,  the  

name of the appellant was also recommended for the  

post of Director General, Doordarshan.  The aforesaid  

recommendations  of  the  Selection  Committee  

indicating preference were sent to the Government  

of  India  as per  letter  dated 21.3.2011 by the Joint  

Secretary  (B),  Ministry  of  Information  and  

Broadcasting.

3.      At that stage, the appellant preferred O.A. No.  

1290 of 2011 before the tribunal seeking quashment  

of  the  recommendations  dated 21.3.2011 and also  

sought for issuance of a direction to the respondents  

to act as per the recommendations dated 15.3.2011.  

Such  a  prayer  was  made  as  the  stand  of  the  

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appellant was that he was placed at No. 1 in order of  

preference for  appointment  to  the post  of  Director  

General, All India Radio.  The tribunal did not accept  

the contentions raised by the appellant pertaining to  

placing of names in order of preference.  The plea of  

mala fide pertaining to the act of any authority in the  

Government in changing the decision of the Selection  

Committee  was  also  not  accepted.   However,  the  

tribunal opined that the order of preference that has  

been decided on 21.3.2011 could not have been so  

decided  by  circulation  and  a  meeting  of  Prasar  

Bharati Board (Selection Committee) was required to  

be held for  the said purpose and the decision was  

required  to  be  taken  after  due  deliberations  and  

consultations  amongst  the  Members  of  the  Board.  

Being  of  this  view,  the  tribunal  directed  the  

respondents to convene a meeting of the Board to  

determine the order of merit of  the candidates.  It  

was  further  observed  by  the  tribunal  that  if  the  

outcome  of  the  meeting  would  result  in  the  

endorsement of the earlier view, nothing more was  

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required  to  be  done.   In  pursuance  of  the  order  

passed by the tribunal, a meeting of the Board was  

convened  and  the  decision  that  was  taken  by  

circulation was reiterated.

4.        Being dissatisfied with the said confirmation, the  

appellant approached the High Court as the tribunal  

had  foreclosed  the  issue  by  stating  that  if  there  

would be confirmation or endorsement of the earlier  

view, nothing more was required to be done.   Be it  

noted, by the time the tribunal decided the Original  

Application, the tenure of three Members had come  

to an end either by virtue of retirement or expiry of  

the term.  It  was urged before the High Court  that  

since  three  new  Members  of  the  Board  had  not  

interviewed  the  candidates,  they  were  not  in  a  

position to take an informed view with respect to the  

merits of the candidates.  The High Court declined to  

enter  into  the  said  arena  by  holding  that  if  the  

appellant is aggrieved by the decision taken in the  

meeting  of  the  Board  convened  pursuant  to  the  

direction  of  the  tribunal,  it  was  open  to  file  an  

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application  before  the  tribunal.   The  High  Court  

adverted to the singular issue whether the Selection  

Committee,  in  its  meeting  held  on  15.3.2011,  had  

placed  the appellant herein, in order of preference,  

for the post of Director General,  All  India Radio,  or  

not.  After perusing the minutes of the meeting, the  

High Court opined that the recommendations could  

not be interpreted to mean that  the person whose  

name was shown at  No.  1  ranked first  in  order  of  

merit.   The  allegation  that  someone  in  the  

Government  was  instrumental  in  influencing  the  

Members of the Selection Committee to change the  

recommendation  as  decided  in  the  meeting  on  

15.3.2011  to  deprive  the  appellant  of  a  legitimate  

claim was not accepted.  The High Court proceeded  

to deal with the allegation of mala fide and opined  

that  as  no  particulars  were  given  about  any  

Governmental  authority  showing any favour  to  any  

particular  candidate,  the  said  allegations  were  not  

acceptable.   The plea of  legal  malice to the effect  

that the Government directed Prasar Bharati Board to  

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act in a particular manner was repelled by the High  

Court as the same was not based on any material.  

Being of this view, the High Court dismissed the writ  

petition.

5.      We have heard Mr. M.N. Krishnamani,  learned  

senior  counsel  for  the  appellant,  Mr.  Paras  Kuhad,  

learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Vikas Singh,  

learned senior counsel for the fifth respondent,  Mr.  

M.C.  Dhingra,  learned  counsel  for  the  fourth  

respondent,   Mr.  Rajeev  Sharma  and  Mr.  Rajesh  

Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents.

6.       Mr.  Krishnamani,  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing  for  the  appellant,  has  basically  raised  

three  contentions,  namely,  (i)  on  a  perusal  of  the  

recommendations of  the Selection Committee,  it  is  

clearly demonstrable that it had sent the names in  

order  of  preference,  regard  being  had  to  the  

seniority,  merit  and  suitability,  but  the  same  was  

changed by the Board which had no authority to do  

so;  (ii)  after  the tribunal  had quashed the decision  

taken by way of circulation, the matter was directed  

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to be reconsidered by proper deliberation but three  

Members  of  the Selection  Committee  who had not  

interviewed the candidates  had been replaced and  

hence,  the decision of the Board is vitiated; and (iii)  

the  Government  has  indirectly  influenced  the  

decision by a proposal and the same tantamounts to  

legal malice which makes the selection vulnerable in  

law.

7.      Mr.  Paras  Kuhad,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  

General,  has  submitted  that  the  recommendations  

did not indicate any preference based on merit and,  

therefore,  the  presumption  in  that  regard  is  

absolutely  erroneous.   It  is  urged by  him that  the  

Officer  on  Special  Duty  had  clarified  the  position  

before  the  tribunal  that  as  per  his  understanding,  

there  was  no  preference  and  there  was  no  

interference  by  the  Government  requiring  the  

Committee to do any act in  any particular  manner  

and  hence,  there  is  nothing  to  suggest  any  legal  

malice.   He  has  produced  the  proceedings  of  

selection before this Court.

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8.      Mr. Dhingra, learned counsel appearing for the  

fourth  respondent,  has  submitted  that  the  order  

passed by the High Court is absolutely impregnable  

and defensible and does not warrant any interference  

by this Court.

9.       Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing  

for  the  fifth  respondent,  the  Director  General,  

Doordarshan,  submitted  that  there  was  no  

recommendation  by  preference  and  further  non-

availability  of  the  three  Members  due  to  their  

retirement or expiry of tenure and constitution of the  

Board  by  inducting  three  new Members  would  not  

vitiate the selection.  For the aforesaid purpose, he  

has  placed  reliance  on  Section  4(2)  of  the  Prasar  

Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990  

(for  short  “the  Act”)  and  commended  us  to  the  

decision in B.K. Srinivasan and others v. State of  

Karnataka and others1.

1 (1987) 1 SCC 658

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10.      To appreciate the aforesaid submissions, we shall  

refer to the minutes of the meeting dated 15.3.2011.  

The relevant part of the minutes reads as under: -

“2. The  Board  interviewed  the  following  officers  (who  responded  to  the  intimation  in  respect of the interview) for the post of Director  General, All India Radio: -

i. Shri G. Jayalal

ii. Shri L.D. Mandloi

iii. Shri Ashok Jailkhani

3. The  Board  interviewed  the  following  officers  (who  responded  to  the  intimation  in  respect of the interview) for the post of Director  General, Doordarshan: -

EXTERNAL CANDIDATES

(i) Shri Sunil Kumar Singh

(ii) Shri Ram Subhag Singh

(iii) Shri Anil Kumar Aggarwal

(iv) Shri Manoj Kumar Panda

(v) Shri Jagmohan Singh Raju

(vi) Shri Tripurari Sharan

DEPARTMENTAL CANDIDATES

(i) Shri G. Jayalal

(ii) Shri L.D. Mandloi

(iii) Shri Ashok Jailkhani

4. Taking into account the considerations of  overall  merit  and  experience  and  with  due  

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regard  to  an  assessment  of  suitability,  the  Board decided to forward recommendations to  the Government of India, as given below: -

For  the  post  of  Director  General,  Doordarshan

1. Sh. L.D. Mandloi

2. Sh. Tripurari Sharan

3. Sh. Ramsubhag Singh

For the post of Director General, All India  Radio

1. Sh. G. Jayalal

2. Sh. L.D. Mandloi”

11.      It  has  been  contended  that  it  was  a  

recommendation  in  order  of  preference.   On  a  

perusal  of  the  file,  it  is  perceptible  that  after  the  

recommendations  were  sent,  the  OSD circulated  a  

letter stating that the Board had not sent the names  

in order of merit or preference and, therefore, it was  

necessary that the names should be short-listed in  

order  of  preference.   It  is  also  evident  from  the  

record  that  each  of  the  Members  of  the  Selection  

Committee gave his recommendation separately on  

the  proposed  decision  circulated  by  the  OSD.   No  

Member of the Selection Committee, while giving his  

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recommendation, stated that in the meeting held on  

15.3.2011, the Board had recommended the names  

in order of merit.  It is also noticeable that one of the  

Members,  namely,  Dr.  George  Verghese,  who  had  

recommended the appellant to be placed at No. 1,  

had also not mentioned that the names had already  

been placed in order of preference of merit.  We have  

only  referred  to  the  same  to  indicate  that  the  

Members of the Board had understood the minutes in  

that perspective.

12.      At this juncture, we think it appropriate to advert  

to when preference is given on the basis of merit and  

suitability.   Conceptual  preference,  fundamentally,  

would  mean  that  all  aspects,  namely,  merit,  

suitability,  fitness,  etc.  being  equal,  preference  is  

given  regard  being  had  to  some  other  higher  

qualifications or experience, etc.  In this regard, we  

may refer  with  profit  to  the  dictum in  Secretary,  

A.P.  Public  Service  Commission  v.  Y.V.V.R.  

Srinivasulu  and  others2 wherein  a  two-Judge  

2 (2003) 5 SCC 341

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Bench  stated  about  the  preference.   Though  the  

principle was laid down in the context of a particular  

rule, yet we reproduce the same with profit: -

“Whenever,  a  selection is  to  be made on the  basis  of  merit  performance  involving  competition,  and  possession  of  any  additional  qualification  or  factor  is  also  envisaged  to  accord preference, it cannot be for the purpose  of putting them as a whole lot ahead of others,  dehors their  intrinsic worth or proven inter se  merit  and  suitability,  duly  assessed  by  the  competent authority. Preference, in the context  of  all  such  competitive  scheme  of  selection  would  only  mean  that  other  things  being  qualitatively  and  quantitatively  equal,  those  with  the  additional  qualification  have  to  be  preferred.”

13.      In the case at hand, it is not disputed that both  

the candidates were eligible.  If the minutes of the  

meeting which we have reproduced hereinbefore are  

minutely  studied,  it  is  perceptible  that  three  

departmental  candidates  were  interviewed  for  the  

post of Director General, All India Radio.  The names  

of  the  appellant  and  the  fourth  respondent  were  

placed at serial Nos. 1 and 2 respectively.  When the  

Committee recommended, it also placed them in the  

same seriatim.   The language used in paragraph 4 of  

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the  minutes  states  that  taking  into  account  the  

consideration  of  overall  merit  and  experience  and  

with due regard to the assessment of suitability, the  

Board  decided  to  forward  the  recommendations  to  

the Government of India.  But it does not specifically  

state  that  the  recommendations  were  in  order  of  

merit or in order of preference as determined by the  

Board.  On the contrary, it is suggestive of the fact  

that  the Board has placed the names in  the same  

order as sent by the department for  consideration.  

Thus,  the  submission  of  Mr.  Krishnamani  that  the  

names were sent in order of merit or preference does  

not merit acceptance.

14.      The next  limb of  argument  is  that  there was  

interference by the Government to take the decision  

in a particular manner.  The said aspect is linked with  

legal malice and hence, it is necessary to deal with  

both  the  aspects  in  a  singular  compartment.   The  

High Court has referred to the facts in detail  after  

referring  to  the  affidavit  filed  by  the  Officer  on  

Special Duty.  In the letter circulated on 21.3.2011 by  

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the Officer on Special Duty, he had only suggested  

that  the  Board  was  required  to  short-list  the  

candidates in order of preference.   The decision in  

entirety was left  to the Board.   No suggestion was  

given.   Mr.  Krishnamani  has very fairly  stated that  

the appellant does not intend to allege any kind of  

personal mala fide but legal malice as the suggestion  

had been given for short-listing the candidates which  

was  absolutely  unnecessary.   In  essence,  the  

submission of the learned senior counsel is that the  

action of the authorities is not bonafide in law.  In this  

context, we may refer with profit to the decision in  

State of A.P. and others  v.  Goverdhanlal Pitti3  

wherein this Court has ruled thus: -

“  “Legal  malice”  or  “malice  in  law”  means  “something  done  without  lawful  excuse”.  In  other words, “it is an act done wrongfully and  wilfully  without  reasonable or  probable cause,  and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling  and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard of  the rights of others”. (See  Words and Phrases  Legally Defined, 3rd Edn., London Butterworths,  1989.)”

xxx xxx xxx

3 (2003) 4 SCC 739

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“Where malice is attributed to the State, it can  never be a case of personal ill-will or spite on  the part of the State. If at all it is malice in legal  sense,  it  can be described as an act which is  taken with an oblique or indirect object.”

15.      Similar view has been expressed in West Bengal  

State Electricity Board v.  Dilip Kumar Ray4 and  

Kalabharati  Advertising  v.  Hemant  Vimalnath  

Narichania and others5.

16.      Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles of  

law, it cannot be said that any wrongful act has been  

done to inflict any legal injury on the appellant.  It is  

difficult  to  hold  that  any  act  has  been  done  to  

disregard or defeat his legal rights.  What has been  

stated by the OSD is basically requiring the Board to  

short-list  the  names  in  order  of  preference.   The  

Members  of  the  Board  could  have  reiterated  that  

they  had  earlier  recommended  the  names  in  

accordance with preference.  They, we are inclined to  

think  correctly,  did  not  say  that  the  

recommendations  already  made  were  in  order  of  

preference  but  gave  the  preference  initially  by  

4 (2007) 14 SCC 568 5 (2010) 9 SCC 437

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circulation and when it was set aside by the tribunal,  

thereafter,  by  deliberation.   Thus,  the  submission  

pertaining  to  legal  malice,  being  sans  substratum,  

stands repelled.

17.      The last plank of argument of the learned senior  

counsel is that the inclusion of three new Members  

who had not interviewed the candidates would vitiate  

the decision of the Board.  The High Court has not  

dealt with it and opined that if the said decision was  

required to be assailed, it was open to the appellant  

to knock at the doors of the tribunal.   There is  no  

dispute from any quarter that three Members had to  

be  substituted  because  some  had  retired  and  the  

tenure of  some had expired.   Section 4 of  the Act  

deals  with  appointment  of  Chairman  and  other  

Members.  Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 read  

thus: -

“4.  Appointment  of  Chairman  and  other  Members.  –  (1)  The Chairman and the  other  Members,  except  the  ex  officio  Members,  the  nominated  Member  and  the  elected  Members  shall be appointed by the President of India on  the recommendation of a committee consisting  of-

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(a) the Chairman of the Council of States, who  shall be the Chairman of the Committee;

(b) the Chairman of the Press Council of India  established  under  section  4  of  the  Press  Council Act, 1978 (37 of 1978); and

(c) one nominee of the President of India.

(2) No  appointment  of  Member  shall  be  invalidated merely by reason of any vacancy in,  or  any  defect  in  the  constitution  of,  the  committee appointed under sub-section (1).”

18.      Regulation 5 of the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting  

Corporation  of  India)  Director  General  (Akashvani)  

and  Director  General  (Doordarshan)  (Recruitment)  

Regulations, 2001 reads as follows: -

“5.  Appointing Authority :  The appointment to  the post specified in column 1 of the Schedule  shall  be  made  by  the  Corporation,  after  consultation  with  the  Recruitment  Board  established under sub-section (1) of Section 10  of the Act.”

19.      There is no cavil that three Members, who have  

been  appointed,  have  been  validly  appointed.  

Though Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel, has  

drawn  inspiration  from  the  concept  of  principle  of  

“Ganga”  clause  as  enshrined  in  B.K.  Srinivasan  

(supra),  yet  the  same need not  be adverted to  as  

neither the appointment of the Member of the Board  

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nor their  holding the office as Member is  called in  

question.  The issue is slightly different.  By efflux of  

time,  some  of  the  Members  of  the  Board  were  

substituted  and  different  Members  were  inducted.  

The  tribunal  thought  it  appropriate  to  remit  the  

matter to the Board to reconsider the matter after  

due deliberation.  Keeping in view the minutes of the  

meeting,  it  is  manifest  that  the  Board  has  gone  

through  the  whole  deliberations  by  the  

recommending  authority,  as  we  find  from  the  

records, and expressed the view.  Thus, it was not  

necessary to hold a further interview to find out the  

preference as the minutes were absolutely clear as  

day that no preference was given.  Therefore, we do  

not find any flaw in the three Members participating  

in  the  short-listing  of  the  names  and  giving  

preference.   That  apart,  the majority of the earlier  

Members were there and they had given preference  

in  favour  of  the  fourth  respondent  and,  therefore,  

factually,  it  would  not  have  made  any  difference.  

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Thus  analysed,  we  perceive  no  merit  in  this  

contention.

20.      In view of the aforesaid premised reasons, the  

appeal is devoid of any substance and, accordingly,  

stands dismissed without any order as to costs.

…………………………….J.       [Dr. B.S. Chauhan]

….………………………….J.                                                    [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; May 29, 2013.

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