REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5448 OF 2006

Fida Hussain & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5382 OF 2006

Dhyan Singh & Ors.                ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr.  …………..Respondents

1

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5387 OF 2006

Het Ram (Dead) through LRs.           .............…Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5388 OF 2006

Sompal & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5389 OF 2006

Vipin Chandra & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

2

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5391 OF 2006

Mohan Singh & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5394 OF 2006

Hari Singh (Dead) through LRs. ...……….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5395 OF 2006

Roshan & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

3

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5397 OF 2006

Ram Ratan & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5412 OF 2006

Lalman (Dead) through L.R. ........……….. Appellant

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5421 OF 2006

Gaj Ram (Dead) through LRs.    ................…Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

4

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5428 OF 2006

Chandan & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5429 OF 2006

Hussain Bux (Dead) through LRs. ...……….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5432 OF 2006

Waheed (Dead) through LRs. ...……….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

5

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5436 OF 2006

Sunil Kumar Sharma alias Sonu & Ors. ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5444 OF 2006

Karan Singh & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5445 OF 2006

Mahesh & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

6

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5446 OF 2006

Ram Chandra & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5455 OF 2006

Komal Singh         ………….. Appellant

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5457 OF 2006

Laloo Singh alias Baloo Singh & Ors. ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

7

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5499 OF 2006

Khoob Chand & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5501 OF 2006

Babu Ram & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5502 OF 2006

Harbansh & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

8

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5504 OF 2006

Dori Lal & Ors.           ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Ors. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5506 OF 2006

Jafsar         ………….. Appellant

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5507 OF 2006

Bal Kisan & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

9

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5508 OF 2006

Bankey Lal & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5511 OF 2006

Jai Pal & Ors.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5533 OF 2006

Abhay Kumar Bhatnagar & Anr.        ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

10

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5452 OF 2006

Ram Lal & Anr.         ………….. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. …………..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

H.L. Dattu, J.

1) This batch of appeals is directed against the separate orders passed  

by the High Court of Allahabad in Regular First Appeals filed by  

land  owners  for  enhancement  of  compensation  awarded  by  the  

Reference  Court for the lands acquired under the Land Acquisition  

Act,  1894, [hereinafter  referred to as ‘the Act’]  in the villages of  

Harthala and Mukkarrabpur. There are in all 30 appeals before us,  

out of which, 23 are in relation to the village of Harthala and 7 in  

relation to the village of Mukkarrabpur.  

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2) In view of the orders we propose to pass in all these appeals, we  

deem it  unnecessary  to  state  the  facts  giving  rise  to  the  present  

appeals in greater details and a brief reference thereto would suffice  

to appreciate the controversy.     

3) Lands  in  Village  of  Harthala:-  There  are  twenty  three  appeals  

relating to this village.  Under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the  

Act, Notification dated 20.09.1990 was issued and published by the  

State Government for the acquisition of the lands of the appellants.  

Subsequently, a declaration dated 10.06.1991 was published in the  

Gazette, under Section 6 of the Act. The lands acquired were taken  

physical  possession by the State  Government.  In accordance with  

Section  11  of  the  Act,  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  [hereinafter  

referred to as ‘the LAO’] assessed  the market value of the acquired  

lands  at  `80  per  sq.  meter  vide  order  dated  18.09.1993  as  

compensation.  Dissatisfied  with  the  award  of  the  LAO,  the  land  

owners filed objections, inter-alia claiming that the market value of  

the acquired lands is `1000 per sq. meter, due to the proximity of the  

lands to the city of Moradabad. After scrutinizing the evidence on  

record,  the  Reference  Court  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  

market value of the nearby land was  `550 per sq. meter, however,  

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taking into consideration the location and potentiality of the lands  

and also proximity of the lands from the city of Moradabad and other  

relevant factors, enhanced the compensation awarded to `270 per sq.  

meter. The State preferred appeals against the enhancement so made  

by the Reference Court and the High Court has allowed the same in  

the light of the judgment of the Court in First Appeal No. 247 of  

1997 dated 05.03.2004.

4) Lands in village of Mukkarabbpur:- Seven of the present appeals  

relate to the village of Mukkarabbpur. A Notification for acquisition  

of the lands under the Act was issued and published on 20.08.1992.  

In pursuance of the Notification, the State took possession of the said  

lands on 06.05.1997 by paying 80% of the estimated compensation  

at  the  rate  of  `150  per  sq.  meter.  However,  vide  order  dated  

29.08.1997, the LAO fixed the compensation at the rate of `92.59 per  

sq.  meter.  Aggrieved  by  the  same,  the  appellants  moved  the  

Reference Court and produced evidence in support of their claim that  

the prevailing rates of land in that village and its roundabouts were  

much higher.  After giving due consideration to the claim made and  

the  evidence  on  record,  the  Reference  Court  enhanced  the  

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compensation  to  `350  per  sq.  meter.  The  respondents  preferred  

appeals  to  the  High  Court,  and  the  same  came  to  be  allowed,  

reviving the award passed by the LAO.

5) Shri. M.L. Varma, learned senior counsel, appears for the appellants,  

and Shri.  M.P. Shorawala, learned counsel,  holds the brief for the  

respondents.  

6) At the outset, it is relevant to note that the question of adequacy of  

compensation for the lands acquired in these two villages under the  

same notification has been gone into by this Court in the case of  

Gafar and Ors. v. Moradabad Development Authority, (2007) 7 SCC  

614.  In that case, this Court made a detailed enquiry into the method  

of  valuation  adopted  by  the  LAO  and  the  enhancement  of  

compensation by the Reference Court. This Court took the view that  

the evidence relied upon by the Reference Court while enhancing the  

compensation were not reliable, and, therefore, the High Court was  

justified in setting aside the order passed by the Reference Court and  

restoring the award passed by the LAO.  

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7) In Gafar’s case for the lands acquired in the village of Harthala under  

Notification dated 13.09.1991, after a detailed consideration of the  

compensation awarded by the LAO, this Court held:

“15. We find that the Awarding Officer had taken note of a   sale  deed,  which was at  a time proximate to the date of   notifications in these cases and it related to a piece of land,   though  a  small  extent,  which  was  not  distant  from  the   acquired lands,  to borrow the language of  the Awarding  Officer.  We  are  inclined  to  see  some  force  in  the  stand  adopted  by  the  High  Court  that  the  Awarding  Officer  himself  had  been  generous  in  his  award.  Since  he  has  adopted  such  a  rate,  the  question  is  whether  this  Court   should  interfere  with  the  decision  of  the  High  Court   restoring that Award or award any further compensation.

16. The scope of interference by this Court was delineated  by the decision in  Kanta Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar  wherein this Court held that there was an element of guess   work inherent in most cases involving determination of the   market value of the acquired land. If the judgment of the  High Court revealed that it  had taken into consideration  the relevant factors prescribed by the Act, in appeal under   Article  133  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  assessment  of   market  value  thus  made  should  not  be  disturbed  by  the  Supreme Court.  For the purpose of  deciding whether  we  should interfere, we have taken note of the position adopted  by  the  Awarding  Officer,  the  stand  adopted  by  the   Reference Court and the relevant aspects discussed by the  High  Court.  On  such  appreciation  of  the  facts  and  circumstances of the case as a whole, we are of the view   that  the  sum  of  Rs.  80  per  square  meter  awarded  as   compensation in these cases is just compensation paid to   the  land  owners.  Once  we  have  thus  found  the   compensation to be just, there arises no occasion for this   Court  to  interfere  with  the  decision  of  the  High  Court   restoring the award of the Land Acquisition Officer.

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17.  In  view of  our  conclusion  as  above,  all  the  appeals   relating to Harthala have only to be dismissed.”

8) In respect  to  the  lands  acquired in  village  of  Mukkarabbpur,  this  

Court, in Gafar’s case, held:

“18. In respect of the lands at Mukkarrabpur, the claim for   enhancement was allowed by the Reference Court in spite   of the finding that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 adduced  on behalf of the claimants was unreliable. It also found that   the two sale deeds relied on by the claimant in support of   the  claim for  enhancement  were also  not  comparable or  reliable in the light of the evidence of the claimant himself   and  that  it  has  not  been  shown  that  the  lands  involved   therein were comparable to the lands acquired. In spite of   it, the Reference Court granted an enhancement only based   on its award in L.A.R. No. 134 of 1988 and on that basis   the  award  was  made  at  Rs.  192/-  per  square  meter.   Obviously,  the award in L.A.R.  No. 134 of 1988 was set   aside by the High Court. Hence, the award of the Reference   Court  in  the  case  on  hand  became  untenable.  Once  no  reliance  could  be  placed  on  that  award  to  enhance  the   compensation,  it  is  clear  that  even on the  finding of  the   Reference Court, no claim for enhancement has been made  out by the claimants. In that situation, the High Court was   fully justified in setting aside the award of the Reference   Court and in restoring the award of the Land Acquisition  Officer.  

19.  We  may  incidentally  notice  that  the  lands  were  agricultural lands being used for cultivation and even the   method of valuing it on the basis of price per square meter   does not appear to be justified. All the same, the award has   adopted that method and the State cannot go back on it. In   the absence of any acceptable legal evidence to support the   claim  for  enhancement,  no  grounds  are  made  out  for   interference  with  the  decision  of  the  High  Court  in  the  appeals relating to village Mukkarrabpur.”

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9) This Court also held that it could not be said that the High Court had  

adopted an erroneous approach or employed the wrong principles in  

regard to the claim for enhancement of compensation, or that, it has  

so  erred  as  to  warrant  interference  under  Article  136  of  the  

Constitution of India.

10)  A  review  petition  filed  by  the  appellants  therein  was  also  

dismissed by this Court.  

11) Shri. M.L. Varma, learned senior counsel, submits that the findings  

and the  conclusions  in  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  

Gafar are  flawed for  the  reason  that  the  exemplars  relied  on  for  

deciding the compensation was for inundated land, and hence, the  

same could not reflect the true value of the land. He further submits  

that  relevant  sale  deeds  were  not  taken  into  consideration  by  the  

Court  while  concluding  that  the  Reference  Court  had  erred  in  

enhancing the compensation and that the High Court was correct in  

setting aside the same.  The learned senior counsel also submits that  

this Court should have remanded the matters to the High Court in the  

case of Gafar, as the High Court, being the first appellate Court, was  

required to give a reasoned judgment while allowing appeals against  

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the order of the Reference Court enhancing the compensation.  In the  

alternative, Shri. Varma contends that the decision in  Gafar’s case  

does not operate as a binding precedent on the present set of appeals,  

since this Court has not decided any legal issue.  It is also stated that  

the decision does not operate as a  res judicata, as the parties were  

different. It is further argued that out of the thirty appeals that are  

listed before us, in the seven appeals relating to the acquisition of  

lands in the village of Mukkarrbpur, the matters were not shown on  

the cause list on the day they were disposed of. He further states that  

in some other cases (six appeals), the learned counsel appearing for  

the  respondents  before  the  High Court  (appellants  before  us)  had  

submitted  an  “illness  slip”  and had not  appeared  on the  day,  the  

matters  were disposed of.  Shri.  Varma further contends that in as  

many as seventeen appeals  before us,  the  Development  Authority  

had filed applications for substitution to bring on record the legal  

representatives of the deceased land owners and without considering  

and deciding the applications, the High Court could not have passed  

the impugned orders.   Despite all  these procedural infirmities, the  

High Court could not have allowed the Regular First Appeals filed  

by the State, is the contention of learned senior counsel Shri Varma.  

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12) Pursuant to the direction issued by this Court, an affidavit has been  

filed by Shri. V.P. Rai, learned counsel, who had appeared before the  

High Court,  in  support  of  factual  assertion  made  by  Sri  Varma.  

Learned counsel in his affidavit has stated that seven appeals before  

the High Court (listed as C.A. No. 5502/2006, C.A. No. 5499/2006,  

C.A.  No.  5501/2006,  C.A.  No.  5404/2006,  C.A.  No.  5507/2006,  

C.A.  No.  5508/2006 and 5511/2006 before  us,  all  relating  to  the  

village of Mukkarrabpur) were not shown on the cause list of the  

High Court on the day they were disposed of, and hence, he had no  

knowledge about the hearing of the appeals. Shri. Rai, has further  

stated, that as many six appeals (listed as C.A. No. 5448/2006, C.A.  

No. 5391/2006, C.A. No. 5397/2006, C.A. No. 5445/2006, C.A. No.  

5452/2006  and  C.A.  No.  5455/2006  before  us)  in  which  he  was  

appearing, were disposed of on the day, he had submitted an “illness  

slip” due to his ill health.  

13) Per contra, Shri. M.P. Shorawala, learned counsel, has argued that  

there is no legal or factual infirmity in the judgment of this Court in  

the case of Gafar. He submits that this Court has already dealt with  

the merits of the matter at length in the case of Gafar and the same  

need not be gone into, once over, again by this Court. With regard to  

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the point of non-listing of cases, the learned counsel contends that  

the cause lists are prepared under the authority of Hon’ble the Chief  

Justice of the High Court, and it was not the practice of the Court to  

send the files of matters that were not listed, to the Court Hall, let  

alone hear them and dispose them of.  

14) Having carefully considered the submissions of the learned senior  

counsel Shri Varma, we are of the view that the judgment in Gafar’s  

case does not require reconsideration by this Court. In Gafar’s case,  

this  Court  had  meticulously  examined  all  the  legal  contentions  

canvassed by the parties to the lis and had come to the conclusion  

that  the  High Court  has  not  committed  any error  which  warrants  

interference.   In  the  present  appeals,  the  challenge  is  for  the  

compensation assessed for the lands notified and acquired under the  

same  notification  pertaining  to  the  same  villages.   Therefore,  it  

would not be proper for us to take a different view, on the ground  

that  what  was  considered  by  this  Court  was  on  a  different  fact  

situation. This view of ours is fortified by the Judgment of this Court  

in the case of B.M. Lakhani v. Municipal Committee, (1970) 2 SCC  

267, wherein it is held that a decision of this Court is binding when  

the  same  question  is  raised  again  before  this  Court,  and  

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reconsideration  cannot  be  pleaded  on  the  ground  that  relevant  

provisions, etc., were not considered by the Court in the former case.  

15) With regard to the contention that the decision of the Court in the  

case of Gafar did not operate as res judicata for the present batch of  

cases, we are of the view that the principles of Resjudicata would  

apply only when the lis was inter-parties and had attained finality of  

the  issues  involved.   The  said  Principles  will,  however,  have  no  

application interalia in a case where the Judgment and/or order had  

been  passed  by  a  Court  having  no  jurisdiction  thereof  and/or  

involving a pure question of law.  The principle of Resjudicata will,  

therefore, have no application in the facts of the present case.    

16) To examine the other limb of the contention of the learned senior  

counsel that the judgment in the case of  Gafar did not operate as a  

precedent  for  the  present  batch  of  cases,  as  no  point  of  law was  

decided,  this  issue  requires  to  be  considered  in  the  light  of  the  

judicial pronouncement of this Court.    

17) In the case of Shenoy & Co. v. CTO, (1985) 2 SCC 512, a number of  

writ petitions were allowed by the High Court. However, the State  

chose to file appeal only in one case, which came to be allowed by  

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this Court in the said case.  In this fact situation, this Court took the  

view that  the  decision  of  this  Court  was  binding  on  all  the  writ  

petitioners  before  the  High  Court,  even  though  they  were  not  

respondents in the appeal before this Court. It was held:

“22. Though a large number of  writ  petitions  were filed  challenging the Act, all those writ petitions were grouped   together, heard together and were disposed of by the High  Court by a common judgment. No petitioner advanced any  contention  peculiar  or  individual  to  his  petition,  not   common to others. To be precise, the dispute in the cause   or controversy between the State and each petitioner had   no personal or individual element in it or anything personal   or  peculiar  to  each  petitioner.  The  challenge  to  the   constitutional validity of 1979 Act proceeded on identical   grounds  common  to  all  petitioners.  This  challenge  was  accepted by the High Court by a common judgment and it   was this common judgment that was the subject-matter of   appeal before this Court in Hansa Corporation case. When  the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act   constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal   in Hansa Corporation case alone, but petitions in which the   High Court issued mandamus on the non-existent ground  that  the  1979  Act  was  constitutionally  invalid.  It  is,   therefore,  idle  to contend that  the law laid down by this   Court  in  that  judgment  would  bind  only  the  Hansa  Corporation and not the other petitioners against whom the   State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal. To do so is to   ignore the binding nature of a judgment of this Court under   Article  141  of  the  Constitution.  Article  141  reads  as   follows:

“The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be   binding on all courts within the territory of India. A  mere reading of this article brings into sharp focus   its  expanse and its  all  pervasive  nature.  In  cases   like this, where numerous petitions are disposed of   

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by a common judgment and only one appeal is filed,   the parties to the common judgment could very well   have  and should  have  intervened  and could  have   requested the Court to hear them also. They cannot   be heard to say that the decision was taken by this   Court behind their back or profess ignorance of the   fact  that  an  appeal  had  been  filed  by  the  State  against  the  common  judgment.  We  would  like  to  observe  that,  in  the  fitness  of  things,  it  would be   desirable that the State Government also took out   publication in such cases to alert parties bound by  the judgment, of the fact that an appeal had been  preferred before this Court by them. We do not find  fault with the State for having filed only one appeal.   It is, of course, an economising procedure.”

23. The judgment in  Hansa Corporation case rendered by  one of us (Desai, J.) concludes as follows:

“As  we  are  not  able  to  uphold  the  contentions   which found favour with the High Court in striking  down the impugned Act and the notification issued   thereunder  and  as  we  find  no  merit  in  other   contentions canvassed on behalf of the respondent   for sustaining the judgment of the High Court, this   appeal  must  succeed.  Accordingly,  this  appeal  is   allowed  and  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  is   quashed and set aside and the petition filed by the  respondent  in  the  High  Court  is  dismissed  with   costs throughout.”

To contend that this  conclusion applies only to the party   before this Court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of   the  judgment  and  to  make  the  mandate  of  Article  141  illusory. But setting aside the common judgment of the High   Court, the mandamus issued by the High Court is rendered   ineffective not only in one case but in all cases.

24. A  writ  or  an  order  in  the  nature  of  mandamus  has  always been understood to mean a command issuing from  the Court, competent to do the same, to a public servant   amongst others, to perform a duty attaching to the office,   

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failure to perform which leads to the initiation of action. In   this  case,  the  petitioners-appellants  assert  that  the   mandamus  in  their  case  was  issued  by  the  High  Court   commanding  the  authority  to  desist  or  forbear  from  enforcing the provisions of an Act which was not validly   enacted.  In  other  words,  a  writ  of  mandamus  was   predicated upon the view that the High Court took that the   1979  Act  was  constitutionally  invalid.  Consequently  the   Court directed the authorities under the said Act to forbear  from enforcing the provisions of the Act qua the petitioners.   The Act was subsequently declared constitutionally valid by  this Court. The Act, therefore, was under an eclipse, for a   short duration; but with the declaration of the law by this   Court, the temporary shadow cast on it by the mandamus  disappeared  and the  Act  revived with  its  full  vigour,  the  constitutional  invalidity  held  by  the  High  Court  having  been removed by the judgment of this Court. If the law so   declared invalid is held constitutionally valid, effective and  binding by the Supreme Court,  the mandamus forbearing   the authorities from enforcing its provisions would become  ineffective  and  the  authorities  cannot  be  compelled  to   perform  a  negative  duty.  The  declaration  of  the  law  is   binding on everyone and it  is therefore,  futile to contend  that the mandamus would survive in favour of those parties   against whom appeals were not filed.

25. The fallacy of the argument can be better illustrated by  looking at the submissions made from a slightly different   angle. Assume for argument's sake that the mandamus in  favour  of  the  appellants  survived  notwithstanding  the  judgment  of  this  Court.  How  do  they  enforce  the  mandamus? The normal procedure is to move the Court in   contempt  when  the  parties  against  whom  mandamus  is   issued disrespect it. Supposing contempt petitions are filed  and notices are issued to the State. The State's answer to  the Court will be: “Can I be punished for disrespecting the   mandamus, when the law of the land has been laid down by  the  Supreme  Court  against  the  mandamus  issued,  which  law is equally binding on me and on you?” Which Court   can  punish  a  party  for  contempt  under  these   circumstances?  The  answer  can  be  only  in  the  negative   

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because the mandamus issued by the High Court becomes  ineffective  and unenforceable when the basis on which it   was issued falls, by the declaration by the Supreme Court,   of the validity of 1979 Act.

26. In view of this conclusion of ours, we do not think it   necessary to refer to the other arguments raised before the  High  Court  and  which  the  learned  counsel  for  the   appellants attempted to raise before us also. The appeals   can be disposed of  on this  short point  stated above.  The   judgment  of  this  Court  in  Hansa  Corporation  case is   binding on all concerned whether they were parties to the   judgment or not. We would like to make it clear that there   is no inconsistency in the finding of this Court in Joginder  Singh case and Makhanlal Waza case. The ratio is the same  and  the  appellants  cannot  take  advantage  of  certain  observations made by this Court in Joginder Singh case for  the reasons indicated above.”

18) In the case of Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao, (2002)  

4 SCC 638, this Court held:

“7. So far as the first question is concerned, Article 141 of   the  Constitution  unequivocally  indicates  that  the  law  declared  by  the  Supreme  Court  shall  be  binding  on  all   courts within the territory of India. The aforesaid Article   empowers  the  Supreme  Court  to  declare  the  law.  It  is,   therefore, an essential function of the Court to interpret a   legislation.  The statements of the Court on matters other  than law like facts may have no binding force as the facts of   two cases may not be similar. But what is binding is the   ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts. It is the   principle  found  out  upon  a  reading  of  a  judgment  as  a   whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that   forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence…  A judgment of the Court has to be read in the context of   questions  which  arose  for  consideration  in  the  case  in   which the judgment was delivered. … The law which will be   

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binding under Article 141 would, therefore,  extend to all   observations of points raised and decided by the Court in a  given case…”

19) The position was made clear by the decision of this Court in the case  

of Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453. In this  

case, 14 properties were notified for acquisition under the provisions  

of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1898.  Only  two  persons,  namely  

Banwari  Lal  &  Sons  and  Shakuntala  Gupta,  had  previously  

challenged  the  validity  of  the  acquisition  by  filing  writ  petitions  

before the High Court and having the cases decided in their favour  

finally by this Court. This Court held that the decisions in the earlier  

cases were a binding precedent for this subsequent appeal that was  

preferred by the Union of India.  This Court held:

“12.…The decision in  Banwari Lal and  Shakuntala Gupta  of this Court in relation to the same notification may not be  binding  on  the  principle  of  res  judicata.  The  argument,   however, cannot be accepted that those decisions are not   binding  being  “property-specific”  in  those  cases.  In  our  considered opinion, the decisions are binding as precedents   on the question of validity of the notification, which invokes  urgency  clause  under  Section  17  of  the  Act.  We  find   ourselves in full agreement with the ratio of the decisions in   those  cases  that  urgency  clause,  on  the  facts  and  circumstances,  which  are  similar  to  the  present  cases,   could  not  have  been  invoked.  The  two  decisions  are,   therefore, binding as precedents of this Court. We are not   able to find any distinction or difference as to the ground of   

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urgency  in  regard  to  the  properties  covered  by  these   appeals.”

20) It is now well settled that a decision of this Court based on specific  

facts  does  not  operate  as  a  precedent  for  future  cases.  Only  the  

principles of law that emanate from a judgment of this Court, which  

have  aided  in  reaching  a  conclusion  of  the  problem,  are  binding  

precedents  within  the  meaning  of  Article  141.  However,  if  the  

question of law before the Court is same as in the previous case, the  

judgment of the Court in the former is binding in the latter, for the  

reason that the question of law before the Court is already settled. In  

other words, if the Court determines a certain issue for a certain set  

of facts, then, that issue stands determined for any other matter on  

the same set of facts.  

21) The  other  reasons  given  by  Shri.  M.L.  Varma,  learned  senior  

counsel, for contending that the case of  Gafar does not apply as a  

precedent in other cases are threefold: (a) that seven of the present  

appeals relating to Mukkarrabpur were not heard due to non-listing;  

(b) in six matters relating to Harthala, the matters were disposed of  

in the absence of the counsel, who was absent due to his ill health  

and submission of “illness slip”; and (c) in some of the cases, the  

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applications for substitution was pending before the High Court, and  

these matters could not be disposed of by allowing the appeal against  

the dead persons. We are not impressed by these contentions.  

22) In  the  factual  matrix  of  the  present  case,  the  adequacy  of  

compensation for the acquisition of land, in the aforesaid villages,  

was the issue before this Court in the case of  Gafar and in these  

appeals also. The issue is now settled by this Court in the case of  

Gafar and Ors. (supra).  The decision of co-equal Bench is binding  

on this Court.  We may usefully note the decision of this Court in the  

case of Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (1989) 178 ITR 548.  The  

Court observed that the pronouncement of law by a Division Bench  

of this Court is binding on a subsequent Division Bench of the same  

or a smaller number of Judges and in order that such decision be  

binding, it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by  

the  Full  Court  or  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court.   Judicial  

decorum and certainty of law require a Division Bench to follow the  

decision of another Division Bench and of a larger Bench and, even  

if,  the reasons to be stated,  a different view was necessitated,  the  

matter  should  be  only  referred  to  Hon’ble  The  Chief  Justice  for  

referring the question to a larger Bench.

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23) The  learned  senior  counsel  emphasizes  the  fact  that  the  present  

appellants  were  not  heard  when the appeals  were  decided  by the  

High Court, due to non-listing or disposal of the matters when their  

counsel had submitted “illness slip” and was not present in Court. He  

further states that in several cases, the appellants had died, and the  

applications  for  substitution  of  legal  heirs  were  filed  by  the  

Development Authority, which were pending in all but in one case.  

In the one case [presently numbered as C.A. No. 5421/2006], Shri.  

Varma states that the application was dismissed by the Court.  He  

contends that the rules of natural justice of providing a fair hearing  

have not been followed. He states that it would be in the interest of  

justice to remand the matters back to the High Court to decide the  

appeals on merits, keeping in view the parameters while disposing of  

the first appeals by the High Court. Shri. Shorawala, learned counsel  

for the respondent, does not seriously dispute the issue of non-listing  

raised  by  the  appellants,  except  stating  that  the  cause  list  was  

published under the authority  of  Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice of  the  

High Court, and it was not the practice of any Court to dispose of a  

matter without it being listed.  

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24) We  have  considered  the  contention  canvassed  by  Shri.  Varma,  

learned  senior counsel and the affidavit filed by Shri. V.P. Rai in  

this regard. It is possible that due to the same nature of the matters,  

the learned Division Bench sitting in appeal may have considered it  

proper to dispose of the matters though they were not listed on the  

said day or  the  advocate  for the  appellants  was  not  present.  This  

issue is raised only in thirteen appeals filed before us. With regard to  

seventeen  appeals,  the  appellants  have  contended  that  the  

substitution of legal heirs had not happened, and that the matter had  

abated.  

25) It  is  in  C.A.  No.  5421  of  2006,  in  which  the  appellants  have  

contended that the application for substitution was rejected, and by  

that order, the appeal had abated. We have perused the appeal paper  

books,  and do not find any ground taken in this  regard. Even the  

order dated 7/1/2004, by which the application for substitution was  

supposedly rejected by the High Court, has not been annexed. In the  

light  of  this,  we are  not  inclined to  accept  the  argument that  the  

appeal had abated.

26) On perusal of the appeal paper books of the thirty appeals before us,  

we find that in some of the appeals [namely C.A. Nos. 5429/2006  

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and  5457/2006],  the  presence  of  the  learned  counsel  is  recorded  

Though some of the appellants before us may not have been heard  

by the High Court due to non-listing of the matter or disposal in the  

absence  of  the  advocate,  it  is  clear  from  the  impugned  orders  

enclosed in some of the appeal paper books that the learned counsel  

for some of the appellants have been heard. It is settled position that  

the Court speaks through its order and whatever stated therein has to  

be read as correct and, therefore, we will go by what is recorded in  

the impugned judgment, rather than what the counsel have stated at  

the time of hearing of these appeals.  In this view of the matter, we  

are not inclined to accept that the learned counsel were not heard in  

all the matters against which appeals are filed.  

27) Having regard to the submissions urged on behalf of the appellants  

in so far as not considering the application for substitution of the  

L.Rs.  of  deceased  appellants,  we  would  have  remitted  the  matter  

back  to  the  High  Court  to  give  an  opportunity  to  the  appellants  

herein,  who are the legal  representatives  of some of the deceased  

appellants to afford an opportunity of hearing and decide the appeals  

on merits.  That, however, would only be a formality because having  

regard to the law laid down by this Court in Gafar’s case, the High  

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Court  is  bound  to  follow that  decision,  since  the  notification  for  

acquiring the lands in respect of the villages are one and the same.   

28) The learned senior counsel may be, as a last salvo, submits that in  

the event, we are not inclined to grant any of the reliefs that he has  

asked  for,  then  we  may  direct  that  the  amounts  paid  by  way  of  

compensation pursuant to the judgment of the Reference Court need  

not  be  recovered  and  the  securities  furnished  by  some  of  the  

appellants  need  not  be  enforced.  This  prayer  is  contested  by  the  

learned  counsel  for  the  respondents.  This  request  of  Shri.  Varma  

appears to be reasonable. The land acquisition in question is of two  

decades old, and it is plausible that the landowners have utilized the  

compensation  amount  paid  for  one  purpose  or  the  other.  In  such  

circumstances,  we  are  not  inclined  to  put  an  extra  burden  of  

repayment  on them.  Therefore,  while  dismissing the appeals,  we  

clarify that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in  

the interest of justice, we restrain the respondents from recovering  

the  amounts  paid  as  compensation  or  enforcing  security  offered  

while  withdrawing  the  compensation  amount  pursuant  to  order  

passed by the Reference Court.       

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29) In light  of the above,  the appeals  are dismissed with the rider  as  

indicated by us at paragraph 28 of the judgment.  Costs are made  

easy.  

…………………………J.                                                                                         [ D.K. JAIN ]

             …………………… ……J.  

             [ H. L. DATTU ] New Delhi, July 19, 2011.

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