Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos.9064-9065 of 2018 [Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.32073-32074/2015]

FERANI HOTELS PVT. LTD.                        ….APPELLANT

versus

THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER GREATER MUMBAI & ORS.   ….RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

1. The present appeal raises the issue of disclosure under the Right to

Information Act,  2005 (hereinafter  referred to as  the ‘said Act’),  seeking

information  regarding  the  plans  submitted  to  public  authorities  by  a

developer of a project.

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2. Late  Shri  E.F.  Dinshaw was the owner  of  three plots  in  Malad

(West), Mumbai and Mr. Nusli Neville Wadia/respondent No.3 is the sole

administrator of the estate and effects of late Shri E.F. Dinshaw.  It may be

noted that there is litigation pending qua the functioning of respondent No.3

as an administrator, but it is not in doubt that at present, there is no interdict

against him in performing his role as the sole administrator.  A Development

Agreement  dated  2.1.1995  was  executed  inter  se respondent  No.3  and

Ferani Hotels Private Limited /appellant for carrying out the development on

the said three plots.  This Agreement was coupled with an irrevocable Power

of  Attorney  executed  by  respondent  No.3  in  favour  of  the  appellant.

However, disputes are stated to have arisen between the parties some time in

the year 2008.

3. As a consequence of the disputes having arisen, respondent No.3 is

stated  to  have  terminated  the  Power  of  Attorney  and  the  Development

Agreement on 12.5.2008 and, on the very next day, Suit No.1628/2008 was

filed by respondent No.3 for  inter alia declaration that the said Power of

Attorney  and  the  Development  Agreement  had  been  validly  terminated.

Interim relief, pending consideration of the suit, qua further construction and

demolition was also sought.

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4. The question of grant of interim relief has also had a chequered

history.  The interim relief was originally granted by learned Single Judge of

the Bombay High Court vide order dated 19.7.2010, limited to the extent of

restraining  the  appellant  from  putting  any  party  in  possession  of  any

constructed premises, except with the approval of respondent No.3, during

the pendency of the suit.  This order was assailed before the Division Bench,

which initially stayed the interim order on 26.7.2010, and finally vacated it

on 19.7.2012, calling upon the learned Single Judge to first  consider the

issue as to whether the suit  was within time.  The order of the Division

Bench was assailed before this Court, in  Nusli Neville Wadia vs. Ferani

Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. & Ors.,1 where the legal issue raised related to the local

amendment  in  Maharashtra,  to  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ‘said  Code’),  whereby  Section  9A was

inserted.  Section 9 of the said Code mandates trial of suits of civil nature

excepting suits in which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly

barred.  In terms of Section 9A, notwithstanding anything contained in the

said  Code,  or  any  other  law  for  the  time  being  in  force,  in  case  of  an

objection being raised as to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a suit,

the Court is mandated to proceed to determine the same as a preliminary

1 Order dated 8.4.2015  in CA No.3396/2015.

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issue, before proceeding with the question of granting or setting aside of an

interim order.  It is the interpretation of this provision, which received the

attention of the Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition filed in this

Court, against the order of the Division Bench.  In terms of the order dated

8.4.2015,  it  was  held  that  Section  9A,  introduced  as  the  Maharashtra

Amendment, was mandatory in nature.

5. The aforesaid proceedings are relevant for the present case only for

limited purposes, since we are only concerned, herein, with an application

under the provisions of the said Act.  In the application for interim relief

filed  before  the  learned  Single  Judge,  one  of  the  prayers  made  was  for

disclosure of a set of documents, as sought for by the counsel for respondent

No.3 vide letter dated 29.3.2012, which the counsel for the appellant had

refused to disclose.  However, neither in the adjudication before the learned

Single Judge, nor before the Division Bench, nor before this Court, was this

aspect discussed at all, even though this relief had been claimed throughout.

The adjudication, instead, rested on the issue of the provisions of Section

9A, inserted by way of a Maharashtra Amendment in the said Code, coupled

with the plea of limitation.  We may add here, that as per learned counsel for

respondent No.3, these set of documents are not identical to what forms the

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subject matter of information sought, now, under the said Act.

6. We may now turn  to  the  direct  controversy  in  question,  which

emanates from an application filed by respondent No.3 under Section 6(1) of

the  said  Act  before  the  Public  Information  Officer  (for  short  ‘PIO’),

Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Mumbai.   Vide  application  dated

10.12.2012, the following information in respect of the plots in question was

sought: “(a) Certified copies of all PR cards submitted.

(b) Certified copies of all plans and amendments therein from time to  time  submitted  by  the  Ferani  Hotels  Ltd.  and/or  by  its  any divisions and/or its Architect.

(c)  Certified  copies  of  all  Layouts,  Sub-Division  Plans  and amendments  therein  form(sic.)2 time  to  time  submitted  by  the Ferani Hotels Ltd. and/or by its any divisions and/or its Architect.

(d) Certified copies of all development plans and any amendments therein  from  time  to  time  submitted  by  the  Ferani  Hotels  Ltd. and/or its any divisions and/or its Architect.

(e)  Certified  copies  of  all  Reports  submitted  to  the  Municipal Commissioner and his approvals to the same.”

7. The  Advocates  for  the  appellant,  however,  objected  to  the

disclosure of the information on the grounds, as per Section 11(1) of the said

Act: (a) That it did not serve any social or public interest but was for the

2 To be read as ‘from’. 5

private  interest  of  respondent  No.3  in  the  suit  filed  before  the

Bombay High Court.

(b)  That the information sought in the suit  proceedings had not

been granted by the High Court of Bombay, and an appeal against

the said findings were pending before this Court, thereby making

the information sought, sub-judice.

(c) That respondent No.3 was a competitor in business and, thus,

disclosure  would  cause  harm  and  injury  to  the  appellant’s

competitive  position,  as  well  as  to  their  valuable  intellectual

property rights.  The information sought for was stated to involve

commercial  and  trade  secrets,  disclosure  of  which  would  be

detrimental to the interest of the appellant.

(d) That the architect of the appellant informed that all rights in

respect of the plans, clarifications, designs, drawings, etc. and the

work comprised therein, including intellectual property rights and

in particular copyright, were reserved and vested exclusively in the

appellant.

The PIO, vide its letter dated 8.1.2013, declined to give information in

view of the objections filed by the counsel for the appellant.   This

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communication stated that the information could not be given as per

Sections 8(1)(d), 8(1)(g), 8(1)(j) as well as Sections 9 and 11(1) of the

said Act, since there was no public interest, as also on account of the

claim of copyright.

8. Respondent No.3 filed an appeal under Section 19(1) of the said

Act on 12.2.2013, which was disposed of by the First Appellate Authority,

vide order dated 1.4.2013, permitting the information sought under the first

head to be given, while declining the information under heads 2 to 4 for the

same reasons as set out by the PIO.  The 5th information sought was stated to

be too detailed and hence was not possible to be given out.  This resulted in

a second appeal before the State Chief Information Commissioner (for short

‘SCIC’) under Section 19(3) of the said Act on 28.6.2013.  Respondent No.3

succeeded in the second appeal in terms of order dated 31.1.2015, the order

being predicated on the reasoning that the development of the property has

connection with public interest, as flats erected thereon would be purchased

by the citizens at large.

9. It was now the turn of the appellant to assail this order, before the

High Court, by filing a writ petition, being Writ Petition (L) No.1806/2015,

which was dismissed vide impugned order dated 30.10.2015.  The reasoning

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was based on the very object of the said Act being incorporated, which was

to secure access to information, under the control of public authorities, to

citizens,  in  order  to  promote  transparency  and  accountability.   The

documents sought, being for the development of land and being copies of

plans,  layouts,  sub-division  plans,  etc.,  which  had  in  turn  received  the

attention and approval  of the Commissioner of  the Corporation (a public

authority),  and  were  under  his  control,  the  same were  to  be  supplied  to

anyone seeking the same.  The Division Bench then proceeded to refer to the

exceptions carved out under Sections 8 & 9 of the said Act to ultimately

hold that the information sought for was part of public record and had to be

revealed in public interest, and could not be said to be in the nature of trade

secrets or of commercial confidence, or of a nature which would harm the

competitive position of the appellant.  It also dealt with the objection of the

appellant  qua the endeavour of respondent No.3 to seek the information in

the suit proceedings to hold that the said Act was a legislation which confers

independent legal right de hors inter se rights between the parties.

10. The aforesaid order has, thus, given rise to the present appeal filed

by the appellant.  We heard Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the

appellant  and Mr.  Gourab Banerji,  learned senior  counsel  for  respondent

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No.3, both seeking to forcefully put forth their stand.  We may note that the

private disputes inter se the appellant and respondent No.3 have given rise

to  this  contentious  proceeding,  where  the  issue  in  question  was,  in  our

opinion, really innocuous.  We have considered the submissions advanced

by learned counsel.

11. We  may note,  at  the  inception  itself,  that  Mr.  Gourab  Banerji,

learned senior counsel for respondent No.3 did not even press the last set of

documents sought, which was earlier held to be rather expansive in nature.

The first set of information sought is stated to have already been disclosed.

The controversy,  thus,  related to the 2nd to 4th set  of  information sought,

which consists of the plans with amendments, layouts, sub-division plans

with amendments and all other development plans with amendments.  At the

inception of the hearing, we had, in fact, put to learned senior counsel for

the appellant, as to what serious objection could they have to the disclosure

of  these  documents,  which  were  really  public  documents,  having  been

submitted  to  the  concerned  authority  and  forming  part  of  the  sanction

process.  The persistence over this issue, as noticed above, is clearly the

result of the private dispute, rather than any objective consideration qua the

issue of disclosure of information.  

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12. The  first  objection  raised  by  learned  senior  counsel  for  the

appellant flowed from the endeavour of respondent No.3 to seek information

in the suit proceedings, which endeavour had not been successful.  Learned

senior counsel contended that no leave had been taken qua that aspect of the

matter and, thus, applying any of the principles whether of issue estoppel,

constructive res judicata, or election of remedy, respondent No.3 could not

be permitted to agitate the issue twice over.  Learned counsel sought to refer

to  the  result  of  the  endeavour  to  obtain  interim  reliefs  in  general  by

respondent No.3, but that, to our mind, would be completely irrelevant.  In

this behalf, the information sought for, arising from the letter of the counsel

for respondent No.3, dated 29.3.2012, has to be examined.  We have perused

that letter.  In substance what has been sought is communications inter se the

appellant  and  public  authorities,  approvals  granted  by  the  Corporation,

compliances,  occupation  certificate,  application  submitted  to  authorities,

revenue  records,  documents  pertaining  to  stamp  duty,  agreement  with

prospective flat buyers,  etc.   If  we compare this information sought with

what  has  been  sought  under  the  said  Act,  there  is  little  doubt  that  the

information sought under the said Act is different and specific, i.e., dealing

with the approved plans and their modifications, which is part of the record

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of the public authority’s sanction.  Not only that,  even if  we look at the

aspect of the relief prayed for, arising from the letter;  that has not really

formed the subject matter of adjudication, before any of the three judicial

forums; what received the attention of the Court was quite different, and

related to preliminary determination arising from the provision introduced in

the Maharashtra  Amendment  by way of inserting Section 9A in the said

Code.  This is apart from the aspect, which we will discuss a little later, of

the scope and operation of  the said Act,  in respect  of  information being

sought by any person, even a third party.  We have, thus, no hesitation in

rejecting this objection that the plea for disclosure of information arose in

previous civil proceeding, inter se the parties, and had been denied.

13. The second defence against public disclosure of this information,

raised by learned senior counsel for the appellant, is that respondent No.3

has failed to disclose any ‘larger public interest’, as mandated under the said

Act,  and  that  the  third  respondent  has  no  locus  standi to  seek  such

information especially when the information falls under Sections 8(1)(d) &

8(1)(j) of the said Act.  To buttress the plea, a reference has been made to the

judgment of this Court in  Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. &

Ors. vs. State of Kerala & Ors.3 opining that if the information falls under

3 (2013) 16 SCC 82. 11

clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the said Act, in the absence of

bona fide public interest, such information is not to be disclosed. It may be

noted, at this stage, that even clause (d) of sub-section 1 of Section 8 of the

said  Act  allows  for  disclosure  of  exempted  information  in  larger  public

interest, and hence a similar test would apply.

14. To appreciate this submission, one would have to turn to the very

Statement  of  Objects  &  Reasons  of  the  said  Act,  which  has  also  been

discussed  in  the  impugned  order.   The  said  Act  was  a  milestone  in  the

endeavour to make government authorities more accountable to public at

large by facilitating greater and more effective access to information.  The

Preamble, thus, itself states that “the practical regime of right to information

for  citizens  to  secure  access  to  information  under  the  control  of  public

authorities,  in  order  to  promote  transparency  and  accountability  in  the

working of every public authority” was being established.  Section 2(f) of

the said Act defines ‘Information’ and reads as under: “2.  Definitions.  –  In  this  Act,  unless  the  context  otherwise requires, -  

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx  

(f)  “information”  means  any  material  in  any  form,  including records,  documents,  memos,  e-mails,  opinions,  advices,  press releases,  circulars,  orders,  logbooks,  contracts,  reports,  papers, samples,  models,  data  material  held in  any electronic  form and

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information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force;”

The ‘Right to Information’ is defined under Section 2(j) of the said

Act, which reads as under: “2.  Definitions.  –  In  this  Act,  unless  the  context  otherwise requires, -  

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(j) “right to information” means the right to information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes the right to—

(i) inspection of work, documents, records;

(ii)  taking  notes,  extracts,  or  certified  copies  of  documents  or records;

(iii) taking certified samples of material;

(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes, video  cassettes  or  in  any  other  electronic  mode  or  through printouts where such information is stored in a computer or in any other device;”

We may note  that  there  is  no dispute  that  the Corporation is  a

public authority within the definition of Section 2(h) of the said Act.

We may also note the definition of a ‘third party’ in Section 2(n) of

the said Act, which provides as follows:

“2.  Definitions.  –  In  this  Act,  unless  the  context  otherwise requires, -  

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xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(n) “third party” means a person other than the citizen making a request for information and includes a public authority.”

15. The purport of the said Act is apparent from Section 6 of the said

Act,  which  provides  for  the  manner  of  making  a  request  for  obtaining

information.  In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the said Act, there is

no  mandate  on  an  applicant  to  give  any  reason  for  requesting  the

information, i.e., anybody should be able to obtain the information as long

as it is part of the public record of a public authority.  Thus, even private

documents  submitted  to  public  authorities  may,  under  certain  situations,

form part of public record.  In this behalf, we may usefully refer to Section

74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, defining ‘public documents’ as under: “74. Public documents. —  The following documents are public documents:—

(1) Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts—

(i) of the sovereign authority,

(ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and

(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, [of any part of India or of the Commonwealth], or of a foreign country;

(2) Public records kept [in any State] of private documents.”

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16. The only exemption from disclosure of information, of whatever

nature, with the public authority is as per Sections 8 & 9 of the said Act.

Thus,  unless  the  information  sought  for  falls  under  these  provisions,  it

would be mandatory for the public authorities to disclose the information to

an applicant.

17. The endeavour of the appellant is to bring the information sought

for by respondent No.3, under the exemption of Section 8, more specifically

clauses (d) and (j) of sub-section (1), as also Section 9 of the said Act.  The

provisions read as under: “8. Exemption from disclosure of information.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen,

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(d) information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual  property,  the  disclosure  of  which  would  harm  the competitive  position  of  a  third  party,  unless  the  competent authority  is  satisfied  that  larger  public  interest  warrants  the disclosure of such information;

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has not relationship to any public activity or interest, or which  would  cause  unwarranted  invasion  of  the  privacy  of  the individual  unless  the  Central  Public  Information  Officer  or  the

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State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure  of  such  information:  Provided  that  the  information, which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.”

…. …. …. ….

“9. Grounds for rejection to access in certain cases.—Without prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  section  8,  a  Central  Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be may reject a request for information where such a request for providing access would involve an infringement of copyright subsisting in a person other than the State.”

18. The issue of the test of larger public interest would, thus, arise if it

falls within those exceptions.

19. Now turning to the information sought for, as enunciated above,

they are really, plans relating to the property in question.  These plans are

required  to  be  submitted  by  the  person  proposing  to  construct  on  the

property,  to  the  Commissioner  of  the  Corporation.   The  appellant  has

submitted these plans to the Corporation, in pursuance of the Development

Agreement and the Power of Attorney executed by respondent No.3.  As to

how  these  plans  are  processed,  is  referred  to  in  the  order  of  the  State

Information Commissioner dated 31.1.2015, in para 7, which reads as under: “(7)  On inquiry,  the  Public  Information Officer  in  the Building Proposal  Department  of  the  Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater Mumbai, clarified that there is prevailing procedure under Right to

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Information Act,  for  giving copy of map and proposal  received from developer.  The proposals received from developer, are being sent  to  the  Tax  Assessment  Department,  Water  Engineer Department, as well as to the office of concerned Administrative Ward.  Besides, also to the Rain Water Drainage Department, Road Department & Fire Brigade etc., of which department no objection or specific approval is required.  Besides this, if it is necessary as per  local  circumstance  the  reference  is  also  made  to  Railway Department, Airport Authority and to other Committees.   In the Building Proposals received, it includes the particulars of plot, the information  related  to  F.S.I.  of  open  space,  sectional  plan  and drawing.”

The aforesaid, thus, shows that considerable processing is required

before the plans reach the stage of sanction level.

20. The Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of

Construction,  Sale,  Management  and  Transfer)  Act,  1963  (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘Maharashtra Act’) in Section 3 provides for the General

Liabilities  of  Promoters.   In  terms  of  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  3,  a

promoter, who constructs or intends to construct a block or building of flats

was required to comply with many disclosure requirements, inter alia clause

(l), which reads as under: “(l)  display  or  keep  all  the  documents,  plans  or  specifications  (or copies thereof) referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c), at the site and permit inspection thereof to persons intending to take or taking one or more flats;”

21. The object of the aforesaid was that the purchaser should be able

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to get full information of the sanction plan.  It can hardly be said that while a

purchaser can get the information, the person who administers the land as

owner and grants the authority through a Power of Attorney to develop the

land, would not have such a right.

22. We may note that this Act was, however, repealed specifically by

Section  92  of  the  Real  Estate  (Regulation  and  Development)  Act,  2016

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘RERA’), which now, under Section 11 of the

RERA, provides the functions and duties of promoters.  The duties are more

elaborate, as under Section 11(1) of the RERA the promoter has to create his

web  page  on  the  website  of  the  Authority  and  enter  all  details  of  the

proposed project as provided under sub-section (2) of section 4, in all the

fields  as  provided,  for  public  viewing.   The  promoter,  in  terms  of  sub-

section (3) of Section 11 of the RERA is required to make available to the

allottee  information  about  sanctioned  plans,  layout  plans  along  with

specifications, approved by the competent authority, by display at the site or

such  other  place  as  may  be  specified  by  the  Regulations  made  by  the

Authority.  The object is clearly to bring greater transparency.

23. The fate of  purchase of  land development and investments  is  a

matter of public knowledge and debate.  Any judicial pronouncement must

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squarely weigh in favour of the fullest disclosure, in this behalf.  In fact, the

Division Bench of the Madras High Court in  Dr. V.I. Mathan & Ors. vs.

Corporation of Chennai & Ors.4 (to which one of us, Sanjay Kishan Kaul,

J. was a party) opined that though the Chennai Metropolitan Development

Authority  mandated  plans  to  be  displayed  at  the  site  and  also  be  made

available on the website, the same principle should apply to the Corporation

for all other sanctioned plans and, thus, issued directions for display of the

plans on the website of the Corporation, and at the site, with clear visibility.

This was just prior to the RERA coming into force.

24. In the aforesaid circumstances, even by a test of public interest, it

can hardly be said that the same would not apply in matters of full disclosure

of information of development plans to all and everyone.  If we turn to the

provisions of  Section 8 of  the said Act and the clauses under which the

exception is sought, clause (d) deals with information relating to commercial

confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, which has the potentiality

to  harm  the  competitive  position  of  a  third  party.   Firstly,  as  observed

aforesaid, the definition of a third party under Section 2(n) of the said Act

means a person other than a citizen requesting for information to a public

authority.  Under Section 11 of the said Act, the third party has a right to be

4 Order dated 22.3.2016 in WP No.4057/2016. 19

heard and to object to the disclosure of information.  The disclosure of plans,

which are required to be in public domain, whether under the repealed Act

or RERA, can hardly be said to be matters of commercial confidence or

trade secrets.  In fact, ex facie, these terms would not apply to the matter at

hand.   Similarly,  insofar  as  the  intellectual  property  is  concerned,  the

preparation of  the plan and its designs may give rise to the copyright  in

favour  of  a  particular  person,  but  the disclosure of  that  work would not

amount to an infringement and, in fact, Section 52(1)(f) of the Copyright

Act, 1957 specifically provides that there would be no such infringement if

there is reproduction of any work in a certified copy made or supplied in

accordance with any law for the time being in force.  This is what is exactly

sought for by respondent No.3 – certified copies of the approved plans and

its modifications, from the public authority, being the Corporation.  We may

also note that Section 22 of the said Act provides for an overriding effect

with a notwithstanding clause  qua any inconsistency with any other Act,

which reads as under: “22. Act to have overriding effect.—The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), and any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.”

25. The  aforesaid  provision  would  not  imply  that  a  disclosure

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permissible  under  the  Copyright  Act,  1957  is  taken  away  under  the

provisions of the said Act, but rather, if a disclosure is prescribed under any

other Act, the provisions of the said Act would have an overriding effect.

26. Similarly, clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the said Act

ex facie would have no relevance.  There is no ‘personal information’ of

which disclosure is sought.  Further it cannot be said that it has no relation to

public activity or interest, or that it is unwarranted, or there is an invasion of

privacy.  These are documents filed before public authorities, required to be

put  in  public  domain,  by  the  provisions  of  the  Maharashtra  Act  and the

RERA, and involves a public element of making builders accountable to one

and all.  That respondent No.3, in fact, happens to be the administrator of the

property in question, which will certainly not reduce his rights as opposed to

anyone else, including a flat buyer.

27. We, thus, reject the submission based on clauses of sub-section (1)

of Section 8 read with Section 9 of the said Act.

28. We also fail  to appreciate the submissions of the learned senior

counsel for the appellant of “vendetta”.  What is the vendetta involved in

seeking disclosure of plans approved by a builder?  To say the least, this is

really carrying things too far, just for the sake of creating an obstruction in

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disclosure.  Thus, the reference to the judgment in Reliance Industries Ltd.

vs. Gujarat State Information Commission & Ors.,5 would be of no avail.

29. Another limb of the submission of learned senior counsel for the

appellant was that the provisions of Sections 10 & 11 of the said Act have

been  rendered  nugatory.   The underlying  documents  of  the  development

plans, drawings, etc. ought not to have been directed to be disclosed and

only  the  grant  of  permission  and  approval  by  the  Corporation,  i.e.,

commencement  certificate  and  occupation  certificate  could  have  been so

directed at best.

30. Section 10 of the said Act refers to severability, i.e., information,

which ought to be disclosed and not to be disclosed can be severed.  This in

turn would require a pre-requisite that the information sought contains some

element which has been protected under Section 8 of the said Act.  Having

held that Section 8 of the said Act has no application, this plea is only stated

to be rejected.

31. Insofar as Section 11 of the said Act is concerned, dealing with

third  party  information,  and  the  right  to  make  submissions  regarding

disclosure  of  information,  that  provision  has  been  complied  with  by

permitting the appellant and even the architect to raise objections, and has

5 AIR 2007 Gujarat 203. 22

been dealt with by the PIO, and even by the State Information Commission,

on appeal.

32. Lastly,  the irony of  the situation.   The Development Agreement

and the Power of Attorney is sought to be relied upon, by the appellant, to

contend that it was the responsibility and authority of the attorney holder to

obtain necessary permissions, sanctions and approvals, and that respondent

No.3 is not entitled to deal with, nor liable to any authority in respect of the

same, but is entitled to only 12 per cent of the monetary shares from sale

proceeds  of  the  constructed  premises.  Thus,  no  information  should  be

disclosed under the said Act!

33. If we put this in the correct perspective, it means that the owner of

the property, who has given authority to a developer under an agreement to

develop the property and obtain sanctions, is precluded from obtaining any

information about the sanctions, because ultimately he would be entitled to

only  a  percentage  of  the  monetary  share  of  sale  proceeds  of  what  is

constructed  on  the  premises.   Such  a  proposition  is  only  stated  to  be

rejected, and in a sense seeks to put the developer and holder of the Power

of Attorney on a pedestal.  This is, of course, de hors any private lis pending

between the parties.

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34. In  the  end,  we  would  like  to  say  that  keeping  in  mind  the

provisions of RERA and their objective, the developer should mandatorily

display at the site the sanction plan.  The provision of sub-section (3) of

Section 11 of the RERA require the sanction plan/layout plans along with

specifications, approved by the competent authority, to be displayed at the

site or such other places, as may be specified by the Regulations made by

the Authority.  In our view, keeping in mind the ground reality of rampant

violations and the consequences thereof, it is advisable to issue directions

for display of such sanction plan/layout plans at  the site,  apart from any

other  manner  provided by the  Regulations made by the Authority.   This

aspect  should  be  given  appropriate  publicity  as  part  of  enforcement  of

RERA.

35. The result of the aforesaid is that we find no merit in the appeal

and consider  it  a  legal  misadventure.   The  dispute,  though in respect  of

information to be obtained,  derives its  colour from a private commercial

dispute.  We note this because, if judicial time is taken, and legal expenses

incurred by one side on account of such a misadventure, appropriate costs

should be the remedy.

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36. We, thus, dismiss the appeals with costs quantified at Rs.2.50 lakhs

(Rupees two lakhs & fifty thousand), payable by the appellant to respondent

No.3 (though hardly the actual expenses!).

..….….…………………….J. [Kurian Joseph]

              ...……………………………J. [Sanjay Kishan Kaul]

New Delhi. September 27, 2018.

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