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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8183-8184 OF  2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 24868-24869 of 2011)

Esha Bhattacharjee ... Appellant

Versus

Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others      ...Respondents  

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

1. Leave granted in both the special leave  

petitions.

2. The  singular  question  that  we  intend  to  

address in these appeals, by special leave, is  

whether the Division Bench of the High Court  

of Calcutta is justified in entertaining the CAN  

No. 365 of 2011 for condoning the delay of

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2449  days  in  A.S.T.A.  No.  10  of  2011  

preferred  against  the  interim  order  dated  

25.2.2004 passed by the learned single Judge  

in W.P. No. 6124(W) of 2004.  It is also worthy  

to note that the Division Bench in A.S.T.A No.  

10  of  2011  in  A.S.T.  No.  13  of  2011  had  

directed  stay  of  further  proceedings  in  

connection  with  A.S.T.  No.  346  of  2004.  

Needless  to  say,  the  said  order  is  

consequential  as whole thing would depend  

upon the issue pertaining to condonation of  

delay.

3. Sans unnecessary details, the facts which are  

essential  to  be  stated  for  the  purpose  of  

disposal of the present appeals are that the  

appellant,  an Assistant  Teacher  in  language  

group  (Bengali),  invoked  the  jurisdiction  of  

the  High  Court  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution  by  preferring  a  writ  petition  

seeking approval of her appointment and for

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certain  other  reliefs.   The  learned  single  

Judge  on  25.2.2004  taking  note  of  the  

submissions  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioner  therein  and  further  noticing  the  

fact that in spite of notice none had appeared  

on  behalf  of  the  concerned  respondents,  

issued a direction that during the pendency  

of  the  application  the  services  of  the  

petitioner as Assistant Teacher in Bengali in  

Raghunathpur  Nafar  Academy  (HS)  at  

Abhoynagar in the district of Howrah shall not  

be disturbed until further orders.  As the said  

order  was  not  complied  with,  the  appellant  

filed the contempt application being C.P.A.N.  

No.  1016  of  2004.   Be  it  noted,  learned  

counsel for the petitioner communicated the  

order to the school  authorities but  the said  

communication  was  not  paid  heed  to.   On  

24.1.2006  the  District  Inspector  of  Schools  

(SE),  Howrah,  directed  the  said  school

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authorities  to  comply  with  the  direction  

issued by the learned single  Judge.  Despite  

the said direction the order was not complied  

with.   It  may  be  mentioned  here  that  an  

undertaking  was  given  before  the  learned  

single  Judge  and on that  basis  C.P.A.N.  No.  

1016 of 2004 was disposed of.  As the factual  

matrix would further unfurl a new managing  

committee  was  constituted  in  place  of  the  

erstwhile managing committee of the school  

on  21.11.2009  and  the  appellant  was  not  

allowed to join her duty.  Being constrained,  

she preferred another contempt petition No.  

C.P.A.N.  No.  1506  of  2010  wherein  the  

learned  single  Judge  vide  order  dated  

13.5.2010  referred  to  his  earlier  order  and  

directed that the District Inspector of Schools  

(SE)  would  ensure  due  compliance  of  the  

order.  That apart, a direction was issued that  

the concerned police authority should see to

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it  that  the  Secretary  and  the  teacher-in-

charge  of  the  concerned  school  implement  

the order in allowing the petitioner to join her  

duties.   After  the  said  order  came  to  be  

passed, the appellant herein joined her duties  

as  Assistant  Teacher  with  effect  from  

14.6.2010.   Though  the  appellant  was  

allowed to join, yet she was neither permitted  

to  sign  the  daily  attendance  register,  nor  

allotted any work nor paid her salary.  Being  

impelled,  she  filed  an  application  for  

contempt, C.P.A.N. No. 1506 of 2010, and on  

24.12.2010 the learned single Judge directed  

for  personal  presence of  the  Secretary  and  

teacher-in-charge  of  the  school.   At  this  

juncture,  the  Managing  Committee  and  the  

Secretary of the school  preferred an appeal  

along with an application for condonation of  

delay.   The  said  application  was  seriously  

resisted by the appellant by filing an affidavit

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and, eventually, by the impugned order the  

Division  Bench  condoned  the  delay.   Be  it  

noted, the Division Bench has also passed an  

interim order of stay.  The said orders are the  

subject-matter of assail  in these appeals by  

special leave.

4. We have heard Mr. Kunal Chatterjee, learned  

counsel for the appellant, Mr. Anip Sachthey,  

learned counsel for respondent No. 1 and Mr.  

Sarad Kumar Singhania, learned counsel  for  

the respondent Nos. 3 to 5.

5. Before we delve into the factual scenario and  

the  defensibility  of  the  order  condoning  

delay, it is seemly to state the obligation of  

the court while dealing with an application for  

condonation of delay and the approach to be  

adopted  while  considering  the  grounds  for  

condonation of such colossal delay.

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6. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag  

and another v. Mst. Katiji and others1, a  

two-Judge  Bench  observed  that  the  

legislature  has  conferred  power  to  condone  

delay  by  enacting  Section  5  of  the  Indian  

Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the  

courts to do substantial justice to parties by  

disposing  of  matters  on  merits.   The  

expression  “sufficient  cause”  employed  by  

the legislature is adequately elastic to enable  

the courts to apply the law in a meaningful  

manner which subserves the ends of justice,  

for that is the life-purpose for the existence of  

the institution of courts.  The learned Judges  

emphasized on adoption of a liberal approach  

while  dealing  with  the  applications  for  

condonation of delay as ordinarily a litigant  

does  not  stand  to  benefit  by  lodging  an  

appeal late and refusal to condone delay can  1

(1987) 2 SCC 107

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result in an meritorious matter being thrown  

out at  the very threshold and the cause of  

justice being defeated.  It was stressed that  

there should not be a pedantic approach but  

the doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that  

the matter has to be dealt with in a rational  

commonsense pragmatic manner and cause  

of substantial justice deserves to be preferred  

over the technical considerations.  It was also  

ruled that there is no presumption that delay  

is  occasioned deliberately  or  on  account  of  

culpable negligence and that the courts are  

not  supposed  to  legalise  injustice  on  

technical  grounds  as  it  is  the  duty  of  the  

court to remove injustice.  In the said case  

the Division Bench observed that  the State  

which represents the collective cause of the  

community does not deserve a litigant-non-

grata status and the courts are required to be  

informed with the spirit and philosophy of the

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provision in the course of interpretation of the  

expression “sufficient cause”.

7. In  G.  Ramegowda,  Major  and others  v.  

Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer,  

Bangalore2,  Venkatachaliah,  J.  (as  his  

Lordship then was),  speaking for  the Court,  

has opined thus:-

“The  contours  of  the  area  of  discretion  of  the  courts in the matter of condonation of delays in  filing  appeals  are  set  out  in  a  number  of  pronouncements  of  this  Court.   See  :  Ramlal,  Motilal  and  Chhotelal  v.  Rewa  Coalfield  Ltd.3 ;   Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari4 ; Concord of  India  Insurance  Co.  Ltd.  V.  Nirmala  Devi5 ;  Lala  Mata  Din  v.  A.  Narayanan6 ;  Collector,  Land  Acquisition  v.  Katiji etc.   There  is,  it  is  true,  no  general  principle  saving  the  party  from  all  mistakes  of  its  counsel.   If  there  is  negligence,  deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fide on  

2  (1988) 2 SCC 142

3  (1962) 2 SCR 762

4  (1969) 1 SCR 1006

5  (1979) 3 SCR 694

6  (1970) 2 SCR 90

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the  part  of  the  party  or  its  counsel  there  is  no  reason why the opposite side should be exposed  to a time-barred appeal.  Each case will have to be  considered on the particularities of its own special  facts.  However, the expression ‘sufficient cause’  in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so  as  to  advance  substantial  justice  and  generally  delays  in  preferring  appeals  are  required  to  be  condoned in the interest of justice where no gross  negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona  fides  is  imputable  to  the  party  seeking  condonation of the delay.”

8. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead)  

and others7,  the  court  was  dealing  with  a  

fact-situation where the interim order passed  

by  the  court  of  first  instance  was  an  

interpolated  order  and  it  was  not  

ascertainable  as  to  when  the  order  was  

made.   The  said  order  was  under  appeal  

before  the  District  Judge  who  declined  to  

condone  the  delay  and  the  said  view  was  

concurred with by the High Court.  The Court,  

taking stock of the facts, came to hold that if  

such  an  interpolated  order  is  allowed  to  

stand, there would be failure of justice and,  7

(1984) 4 SCC 66

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accordingly,  set  aside  the  orders  impugned  

therein observing that the appeal before the  

District  Judge  deserved  to  be  heard  on  

merits.

9. In  State  of  Nagaland  v.  Lipok  AO  and  

others8,  the  Court,  after  referring  to  New  

India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Shanti Misra9,  

N.  Balakrishnan  v.  M.  Krishnamurthy10,  

State of Haryana  v.  Chandra Mani11 and  

Special  Tehsildar,  Land  Acquisition  v.  

K.V. Ayisumma12, came to hold that adoption  

of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to  

protect  public  justice  and  it  may  result  in  

public mischief. 8

(2005) 3 SCC 752

9  (1975) 2 SCC 840

10  AIR 1998 SC 3222

11  (1996) 3 SCC 132

12  (1996) 10 SCC 634

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10. In this context, we may refer with profit to the  

authority  in  Oriental  Aroma  Chemical  

Industries  Limited  v.  Gujarat  Industrial  

Development Corporation and another13,  

where a two-Judge Bench of  this  Court  has  

observed that the law of limitation is founded  

on  public  policy.   The  legislature  does  not  

prescribe  limitation  with  the  object  of  

destroying  the  rights  of  the  parties  but  to  

ensure  that  they  do  not  resort  to  dilatory  

tactics and seek remedy without delay.  The  

idea is that every legal remedy must be kept  

alive for a period fixed by the legislature.  To  

put  it  differently,  the  law  of  limitation  

prescribes a period within which legal remedy  

can be availed for redress of the legal injury.  

At the same time, the courts  are bestowed  

with  the  power  to  condone  the  delay,  if  

sufficient cause is shown for not availing the  13

(2010) 5 SCC 459

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remedy  within  the  stipulated  time.  

Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to  

state that this Court has justifiably advocated  

adoption of liberal approach in condoning the  

delay  of  short  duration  and  a  stricter  

approach where the delay is inordinate.

11. In  Improvement  Trust,  Ludhiana  v.  

Ujagar Singh and others14, it has been held  

that  while  considering  an  application  for  

condonation of delay no straitjacket formula  

is  prescribed  to  come  to  the  conclusion  if  

sufficient and good grounds have been made  

out or not.  It has been further stated therein  

that  each case has to  be weighed from its  

facts  and  the  circumstances  in  which  the  

party acts and behaves.

12. A  reference  to  the  principle  stated  in  

Balwant  Singh  (dead)  v.  Jagdish  Singh  

14  (2010) 6 SCC 786

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and others15 would be quite fruitful.  In the  

said  case  the  Court  referred  to  the  

pronouncements in  Union of India  v.  Ram  

Charan16, P.K. Ramachandran  v.  State of  

Kerala17  and  Katari  Suryanarayana  v.  

Koppisetti Subba Rao18 and stated thus:-

“25. We may state that even if the term “sufficient  cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must  squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time  and proper conduct of the party concerned.  The  purpose  of  introducing  liberal  construction  normally  is  to  introduce  the  concept  of  “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general  connotation.

26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and  has  definite  consequences  on  the  right  and  obligation  of  a  party  to  arise.   These  principles  should  be  adhered  to  and  applied  appropriately  depending  on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  a  given case.  Once a valuable right has accrued in  favour of one party as a result of the failure of the  other  party  to  explain  the  delay  by  showing  

15  (2010) 8 SCC 685

16  AIR 1964 SC 215

17  (1997) 7 SCC 556

18  (2009) 11 SCC 183

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sufficient  cause  and  its  own  conduct,  it  will  be  unreasonable to take away that right on the mere  asking  of  the  applicant,  particularly  when  the  delay is directly a result of negligence, default or  inaction  of  that  party.   Justice  must  be  done to  both  parties  equally.   Then  alone  the  ends  of  justice  can  be  achieved.   If  a  party  has  been  thoroughly  negligent  in  implementing  its  rights  and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive  the  other  party  of  a  valuable  right  that  has  accrued  to  it  in  law  as  a  result  of  his  acting  vigilantly.”

13. Recently  in  Maniben  Devraj  Shah  v.  

Municipal  Corporation  of  Brihan  

Mumbai19, the learned Judges referred to the  

pronouncement  in  Vedabai  v.  Shantaram  

Baburao Patil20 wherein it has been opined  

that a distinction must be made between a  

case where the delay is inordinate and a case  

where the delay is of few days and whereas  

in  the  former  case  the  consideration  of  

prejudice to the other side will be a relevant  

factor,  in  the  latter  case  no  such  19

(2012) 5 SCC 157

20  (2001) 9 SCC 106

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consideration  arises.   Thereafter,  the  two-

Judge Bench ruled thus: -

“23. What  needs to  be emphasized is  that  even  though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is  required to be adopted in the exercise of power  under  Section  5 of  the  Limitation  Act  and other  similar  statutes,  the  courts  can  neither  become  oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has  acquired  certain  rights  on  the  basis  of  the  judgment  under  challenge  and  a  lot  of  time  is  consumed at various stages of litigation apart from  the cost.

24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause”  would  get  in  the factual  matrix  of  a  given case  would largely depend on bona fide nature of the  explanation.  If the court finds that there has been  no negligence on the part of the applicant and the  cause  shown  for  the  delay  does  not  lack  bona  fides, then it may condone the delay.  If,  on the  other hand, the explanation given by the applicant  is  found  to  be  concocted  or  he  is  thoroughly  negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would  be  a  legitimate  exercise  of  discretion  not  to  condone the delay.” Eventually,  the Bench upon perusal of the application  

for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to  

hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent  

and,  accordingly,  reversed the  decision  of  the  High  Court  

which had condoned the delay of more than seven years.

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14. In  B.  Madhuri  Goud  v.  B.  Damodar  

Reddy21,  the  Court  referring  to  earlier  

decisions reversed the decision of the learned  

single Judge who had condoned delay of 1236  

days  as  the  explanation  given  in  the  

application  for  condonation  of  delay  was  

absolutely fanciful.

15. From  the  aforesaid  authorities  the  

principles that can broadly be culled out are:  

(i) There  should  be  a  liberal,  pragmatic,  justice-

oriented,  non-pedantic  approach  while  dealing  

with an application for  condonation of delay,  for  

the courts  are not  supposed to legalise injustice  

but are obliged to remove injustice.  

(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood  

in  their  proper  spirit,  philosophy  and  purpose  

regard being had to the fact that these terms are  

21  (2012) 12 SCC 693

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basically  elastic and are to be applied in  proper  

perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.  

(iii) Substantial  justice  being  paramount  and  pivotal  

the technical  considerations should not be given  

undue and uncalled for emphasis.  

(iv) No  presumption  can  be  attached  to  deliberate  

causation  of  delay  but,  gross  negligence on  the  

part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note  

of.  

(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking  

condonation of delay is a significant and relevant  

fact.  

(vi) It  is  to be kept in mind that adherence to strict  

proof  should  not  affect  public  justice  and  cause  

public mischief because the courts are required to  

be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there  

is no real failure of justice.

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(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule  

the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be  

allowed a totally unfettered free play.

(viii) There  is  a  distinction  between  inordinate  delay  

and a delay of short duration or few days, for to  

the  former  doctrine  of  prejudice  is  attracted  

whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.  That  

apart,  the  first  one  warrants  strict  approach  

whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

(ix) The  conduct,  behaviour  and  attitude  of  a  party  

relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant  

factors to be taken into consideration.  It is so as  

the  fundamental  principle  is  that  the  courts  are  

required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in  

respect  of  both  parties  and  the  said  principle  

cannot  be  given  a  total  go  by  in  the  name  of  

liberal approach.

(x) If  the  explanation  offered  is  concocted  or  the  

grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the

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courts should be vigilant not to expose the other  

side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away  

with  fraud,  misrepresentation or  interpolation by  

taking  recourse  to  the  technicalities  of  law  of  

limitation.

(xii) The  entire  gamut  of  facts  are  to  be  carefully  

scrutinized and the approach should be based on  

the  paradigm  of  judicial  discretion  which  is  

founded  on  objective  reasoning  and  not  on  

individual perception.

(xiii) The  State  or  a  public  body  or  an  entity  

representing  a  collective  cause  should  be  given  

some acceptable latitude.

16. To the aforesaid principles we may add  

some  more  guidelines  taking  note  of  the  

present day scenario.  They are: -

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(a) An  application  for  condonation  of  

delay  should  be  drafted  with  careful  concern  

and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the  

notion that the courts are required to condone  

delay  on  the  bedrock  of  the  principle  that  

adjudication  of  a  lis  on  merits  is  seminal  to  

justice dispensation system.

(b) An  application  for  condonation  of  

delay  should  not  be  dealt  with  in  a  routine  

manner  on  the  base  of  individual  philosophy  

which is basically subjective.

(c) Though no precise formula can be laid  

down regard being had to the concept of judicial  

discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving  

consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory  

system should be made as that is the ultimate  

institutional motto.

(d) The increasing tendency to  perceive  

delay  as  a  non-serious  matter  and,  hence,

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lackadaisical  propensity  can be exhibited  in  a  

non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of  

course, within legal parameters.

17. Presently to the assertions made in the  

application for condonation of delay and the  

asseverations in oppugnation of the same.  It  

may be stated here that the Division Bench  

while  dealing  with  the  application  for  

condonation of delay has also adverted to the  

legal  tenability  of  the  interim  order  in  a  

matter  of  appointment  and  approval  of  a  

teacher, and condoned the delay.  It does not  

require  Solomon’s  wisdom  to  perceive  that  

the delay was colossal.  In the application for  

condonation of delay the appellant before the  

High  Court  had  stated  about  the  

circumstances in which the order came to be  

passed by the learned single Judge, the order  

in  the  earlier  contempt  petition  and  the  

second petition for contempt, the extinction

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of  right  of  the  respondent  employee  to  

continue  in  the  post  and  thereafter  

proceeded  to  state  the  grounds  for  

condonation of delay.  We think it apposite to  

reproduce the grounds: -

“14. That from the record it appears that the order  impugned  was  communicated  to  the  then  managing committee including the head master in  question and the said fact is  totally unknown to  the  newly  elected  managing  committee  as  they  have been elected  on  20.9.2009 and they  have  been handed over charge on 21.11.09 and to the  teacher  in  charge  who  has  been  handed  over  charge on 1.3.10.  It is pertinent to mention in this  context that after having received the notice and  the contempt application the applicants entrusted  the Ld. Advocate for taking appropriate steps and  they have been advised to  defend the case but  due  to  miscommunication  the  applicant  herein  again  handed over  the brief  from Mr.  Banik,  Ld.  Advocate  to  Mr.  Baidya,  Ld.  Advocate.   After  having received the said papers and after perusing  all  the  records  he  opined  to  prefer  an  appeal  before the appeal court or to prefer an application  for vacating the interim order and ultimately the  same  was  filed  on  07.06.2010  after  several  pursuance  in  spite  of  taking  the  application  for  vacating the interim order the court below day to  day is proceeding with the contempt application.

15. Having  got  no  other  alternative  applicant  have  been  advised  to  prefer  an  appeal  without  certified copy and the leave has been prayed for  and the same was allowed.

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The photocopy of the receipt for application  of  Xerox  certified  copy  is  annexed herewith  and  marked with letter “A”.

16. That the delay occasioned in presenting the  said mandamus appeal has taken place due to the  aforesaid reasons which was beyond the control of  the applicants and was completely unintentional.”

18. Thereafter, the applicant therein stated  

about the duty of the court while dealing with  

the application for condonation of delay and  

in that context, proceeded to state as follows:  

-

“Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof  may  lead  to  grave  miscarriage  of  public  justice  apart  from resulting in  public  mischief  by skilful  management of delay in the process of filing the  appeal, the appellants/applicants do not stand to  benefit  from  the  delay  of  about  2449  days  occasioned  in  preferring  the  said  Mandamus  Appeal,  nor it  is  a fact  that  the writ  petitioners/  respondents  will  be  immense/prejudiced  if  such  non-deliberate delay is not condoned.  There has  not been deliberate delay as would be evidenced  from  the  foregoing  paragraphs.   Refusing  to  condone such non-deliberate delay may result in  meritorious  matters  like  the  instant  case,  being  thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of  justice being defeated.  As against this when delay  is  condoned the highest  that  can happen in the  instant case is that a cause would be decided on  merits after hearing the parties.”

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19. The said grounds were opposed by the  

contesting  respondent  therein  by  stating,  

inter  alia,  that  the  school  authorities  were  

very  much  aware  of  the  order  dated  

25.2.2004 as the same was communicated to  

them by her counsel as well as by the District  

Inspector  of  school.   That  apart,  an  

undertaking  was  given  before  the  learned  

single  Judge  by  the  managing  committee.  

Quite apart from above, in any case, the new  

managing  committee  that  had  come  into  

being in 2009 was aware of the order but it  

chose not to assail the order till there was a  

direction  for  personal  appearance  of  the  

Secretary and the teacher-in-charge.  It was  

further put forth that the grounds urged did  

not  justify  condonation  of  such  enormous  

delay and the plea of prejudice was not at all  

tenable.

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20. On a perusal of the grounds urged in the  

affidavit  and  the  stand  put  forth  by  the  

respondents herein for condonation of delay  

are  that  they  were  not  aware  of  the  order  

passed by the learned single Judge till  they  

received  the  notice  of  the  contempt  

application  and  thereafter  because  of  

miscommunication between the counsel and  

the  parties  no  steps  could  be  taken  and,  

eventually, an application for vacation of stay  

was  filed  and  thereafter,  the  appeal  was  

preferred.  That apart, it has been urged that  

if  delay is not condoned there will  be great  

miscarriage  of  public  justice  resulting  in  

public mischief and cause of justice would be  

defeated  if  the  meritorious  matter  like  the  

present one is thrown at the threshold.  The  

Division Bench of the High Court took note of  

the averments made in paragraph 14 of the  

application  and  thereafter,  noted  the

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submission of learned counsel for the parties,  

referred to the decision in  Oriental Aroma  

Chemical  Industries  Limited  (supra)  and  

came to hold as follows: -

“Now upon a close look at  the prayer  made for  condonation  of  delay  we  find  that  although  the  delay is substantial, the same has been sought to  be explained in a manner even if it may not be full  proof but is quite convincing.”

21. Barring  the  aforesaid,  most  of  the  

discussion pertains to the merits of the case.  

We are of the convinced opinion that the High  

Court  has  misdirected  itself  by  not  

considering certain facts, namely, (a) that the  

notice of the writ petition was served on the  

earlier  managing  committee;  (b)  that  the  

earlier  committee had appeared in  the writ  

court and was aware of the proceedings and  

the  order;  (c)  that  the  District  Inspector  of  

schools had communicated to the managing  

committee  to  comply  with  the order  of  the  

learned  single  Judge;  (d)  that  the  earlier

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managing committee had undertaken before  

the learned single Judge to comply with the  

order; (e) that the new managing committee  

had  taken  over  charge  from  the  earlier  

managing  committee;  (f)  that  nothing  has  

been  indicated  in  the  affidavit  that  under  

what  circumstances  the  new  managing  

committee, despite taking over charge, was  

not aware of the pending litigation or for that  

matter  the communication from the District  

Inspector; (g) that the writ court was still in  

seisin of the matter and no final verdict had  

come  and  hence,  it  would  not  be  a  case  

where  there  will  be  failure  of  justice  if  the  

appeal  against  the  interim  order  is  not  

entertained  on  the  ground  of  limitation  

inasmuch as  the  final  order  was  subject  to  

assail  in  appeal;  (h)  that  the  managing  

committee  had  exhibited  gross  negligence  

and,  in  any  way,  recklessness;  (i)  that  the

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conduct and attitude of the members of the  

committee before the writ court deserved to  

be decried since they should not have taken  

recourse to maladroit effort in complying with  

the order of the court; and (j) and that it was  

obvious  that  the  managing  committee  was  

really taking resort to dilatory tactics by not  

seeking  necessitous  legal  remedy  in  quite  

promptitude.

22. At this juncture, we are obliged to state  

that  the  persons  who  are  nominated  or  

inducted  as  members  or  chosen  as  

Secretaries  of  the  managing  committees  of  

schools  are  required  to  behave  with  

responsibility  and  not  to  adopt  a  casual  

approach.   It  is  a  public  responsibility  and  

anyone  who  is  desirous  of  taking  such  

responsibility has to devote time and act with  

due care and requisite caution.  Becoming a  

member of the committee should not become

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a  local  status  syndrome.   A  statutory  

committee  cannot  remain  totally  indifferent  

to an order passed by the court and sleep like  

“Kumbhakarna”.  The persons chosen to act  

on behalf of the Managing Committee cannot  

take recourse to fancy and rise like a phoenix  

and  move  the  court.   Neither  leisure  nor  

pleasure has any room while one moves an  

application seeking condonation of  delay of  

almost seven years on the ground of lack of  

knowledge or failure of justice.  Plea of lack of  

knowledge  in  the  present  case  really  lacks  

bona fide.   The Division Bench of  the High  

Court  has  failed  to  keep  itself  alive  to  the  

concept of exercise of judicial discretion that  

is governed by rules of reason and justice.  It  

should have kept itself alive to the following  

passage from N. Balakrishnan (supra): -

“The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal  remedy  for  the  redress  of  the  legal  injury  so  suffered.  Time is precious and wasted time would

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never  revisit.   During  the  efflux  of  time,  newer  causes  would  sprout  up  necessitating  newer  persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the  courts.   So  a  lifespan  must  be  fixed  for  each  remedy.   Unending  period  for  launching  the  remedy  may  lead  to  unending  uncertainty  and  consequential  anarchy.   The  law  of  limitation  is  thus founded on public policy.  It is enshrined in  the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it  is for the general welfare that a period be put to  litigation).   Rules  of  limitation  are  not  meant  to  destroy the rights of the parties.  They are meant  to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics  but seek their remedy promptly.  The idea is that  every  legal  remedy  must  be  kept  alive  for  a  legislatively fixed period of time.”

We have painfully re-stated the same.

23. Ex consequenti, the appeals are allowed  

and the order passed by the Division Bench  

condoning delay is set aside.  As a result of  

such extinction the appeal before the Division  

Bench  of  the  High  Court  shall  also  stand  

dismissed.   The  learned  single  Judge  is  

requested  to  dispose  of  Writ  Petition  No.  

6124(W) of 2003 as expeditiously as possible,  

preferably, within a period of six months as  

the lis involved is not likely to consume much

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time.  In the facts and circumstances of the  

case, there shall be no order as to costs.

……………….……….J. [Anil R. Dave]

……………….……….J. New Delhi; [Dipak Misra] September 13, 2013.