EASTERN COALFILEDS LTD. Vs BAJRANGI RABIDAS
Bench: ANIL R. DAVE,DIPAK MISRA
Case number: C.A. No.-008634-008634 / 2013
Diary number: 33545 / 2007
Advocates: Vs
BIJAN KUMAR GHOSH
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Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8634 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 22813 of 2007)
Eastern Coalfields Ltd. and others … Appellants
Versus
Bajrangi Rabidas …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
Leave granted.
2. Calling in question the legal sustainability of the
judgment and order dated 17.8.2007 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Calcutta in F.M.A. No. 169 of 2006
whereby the Division Bench has overturned the judgment
and order dated 14.6.2004 passed by the learned single
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Judge in W.P. No. 5700(W) of 2001 whereunder he had given
the stamp of approval to decision dated 26.2.2004 by the
General Manager of the appellant-company, who had
rejected the objection of the respondent for changing his
date of birth as recorded in his service excerpts and Form ‘B’
Register, the appellants have preferred their appeal by
special leave.
3. The facts which are requisite to be exposited are that
the respondent had joined at Chinakuri Mine No. 111 on
9.1.1970 as Mining Sirdar and for being selected on the said
post he had appeared in Gas Testing Examination held on
15.5.1969. He had also appeared in Sirdarship examination
held on 2.7.1969 and Overmanship certificate examination
on 3.7.1973. At every stage, he had mentioned his date of
birth as 2.4.1946. On the basis of the declaration made by
the respondent his date of birth was clearly reflected in Form
‘B’ Register and service book and he had signed both the
documents. Be it noted, the appointment of the respondent
as Mining Sirdar was in a private colliery. After enactment of
Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1973 all private collieries
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were taken over by the Central Government and handed
over to the Coal India Ltd. and its subsidiaries. It is not
disputed that the respondent was absorbed in the Eastern
Coalfields Ltd., a subsidiary of Coal India Ltd. It may be
noted here that as disputes with regard to date of birth of
employees had arisen, the “Implementation Instruction No.
76” was issued in the year 1987 laying down the procedure
for determination/verification of age of employees. On
15.5.1987 the respondent filed an objection stating that
there has been an erroneous entry as regards his date of
birth because his correct date of birth is 2.4.1948 and not
2.4.1946 as recorded in the service register and Form ‘B’
Register. After filing the said objection the respondent chose
to maintain silence and, eventually, approached the High
Court in Writ Petition No. 6156 (W) of 2001 stating, inter alia,
that his date of birth is 2.4.1948 as per the Matriculation
Certificate. The High Court vide order dated 30.7.2003
directed the respondent therein to take a decision on the
objections filed by the workman regarding his date of birth in
his service excerpts after offering a reasonable opportunity
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of being heard to him and further keeping in view the
provisions contained in “Implementation Instruction No. 76”.
4. In pursuance of the order passed by the High Court the
General Manager, Sodepur Area, conducted an enquiry give
due regard to the principles of natural justice and the
guidelines enumerated in “Implementation Instruction No.
76” and rejected his claim vide order dated 26.2.2004.
5. Being dissatisfied the respondent preferred W.P.(W) No.
5700 of 2001. The learned single Judge took note of series
of facts, namely, that the respondent was signatory to the
documents, namely, the Form ‘B’ Register and the service
book; that his date of birth as 2.4.1946 was mentioned in the
two certificates, namely, Gas Testing and Overmanship
Certificate and Sirdarship Certificate; the Gas Testing
examination was held on 15.5.1969 and as per Regulation
14(1) of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957 (for short “the
Regulations”) application for the said examination was
required to be submitted not less than sixty days prior to the
date fixed for the examination and as per Regulation 15(1) of
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the Regulations no person could have been admitted as a
candidate at any examination held by the Board unless he
had completed 21 years of age; that had the respondent
produced his Matriculation Certificate which reflected his
date of birth as 2.4.1948, he would not have been in a
position to appear in the Gas Testing examination as by the
time the form was filled up he would have been less than 21
years of age; that he had not correctly stated his age was
only to avail a benefit at that juncture is writ large; that he
had half-heartedly raised an objection in the year 1987
pertaining to the service record though it was within his
knowledge that as per the Matriculation Certificate his date
of birth is 2.4.1948; that he approached the court quite
belatedly in 2001 for redressal of his grievances; and that he
cannot be allowed to take the benefit of securing an
appointment by stating a different date of birth and
thereafter endeavour to have further advantage of
continuance of service on the basis of age mentioned in the
Matriculation Certificate. Being of this view the learned
single Judge dismissed the writ petition.
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6. Grieved by the order passed by the writ court the
respondent preferred an appeal and the Division Bench took
note of the fact that the Identity Card issued by the private
colliery at the time of initial appointment reflected his date
of birth to be as 2.4.1948; that the respondent-authorities
were not in a position to explain how and under what
circumstances the date of birth of the workman was
subsequently changed in the service book; that for
appearing in the Sirdarpur Certificate examination under the
Regulations the prescribed minimum age of a candidate is
20 years and not 21 years; that the authorities have not
taken the decision correctly in view of the “Implementation
Instruction No. 76”; and that when the initial date of birth in
the Identity Card mentioned the date of birth to be 2.4.1948,
the same could not have been changed by the ECL
authorities. Being of this view, the Division Bench directed
for rectification of the records and grant of admissible
arrears of salary and other consequential service benefits.
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7. We have heard Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned senior
counsel for the appellants and Mr. Bijan Ghose, learned
counsel for the respondent.
8. At the outset, it is essential to be stated that the
learned single Judge had dismissed the writ petition in a
summary manner and the Division Bench has taken note of
certain facts which are not correct and also relied upon the
amended regulation. As has been stated earlier, on the
basis of the order passed by the writ court on 30.7.2003 the
General Manager conducted an enquiry. The facts that have
been enumerated in the enquiry proceeding are absolutely
relevant for apposite delineation of the lis in question. The
concerned authority had issued notice to the respondent
who appeared before him on 6.2.2004. He had clearly
stated before him that he had joined the service on 9.1.1970
as Mining Sirdar and had appeared in the Gas Testing
Examination held on 15.5.1969, Sirdarship Examination on
2.7.1969 and Overmanship Certificate Examination on
3.7.1973. He had obtained all the three statutory
certificates where his date of birth was recorded as 2.4.1946.
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It is worthy to note that the Division Bench has referred to
Regulation 15(2) of the Regulations to express the view that
the appellant therein could not have been admitted as a
candidate to the said Examination in the year 1969 without
submitting the passed certificate of the secondary school
examination of a recognized Board or its equivalent. The
said assumption by the Division Bench is incorrect as it has
not at all taken note of the facts that have come out in the
enquiry conducted by the General Manager. The enquiry
report clearly reveals that the respondent could not produce
the Madhyamik certificate at the time of his appointment as
he had not received the same at that time and the said
certificate was received by him sometime in the year 1970.
He had categorically stated that he never produced the
certificate of Madhyamik examination before the
Management but verbally told the fact of his passing of the
said examination to the then Welfare Officer. It was also told
that he had not mentioned passing of the examination at the
time of submission of application to appear before the
statutory examination. This being the factual position, the
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finding of the Division Bench that he had produced the
Madhyamik School certificate at the time of appearance in
examination is not correct.
9. It is perceptible that the Division Bench has referred to
Regulation 15(1)(a) of the Regulations to come to the
conclusion that the respondent had not availed any benefit
as the prescribed minimum age of a candidate is twenty
years. In this context, we may refer to Regulation 15(1)(a)
and (b) which read as follows:-
15. Age and general qualifications of candidates – (1) (a) No person shall be admitted as a candidate at any examination held by the Board unless he is 20 years of age.
(b) No person shall be admitted as a candidate at any examination for a Manager’s, Surveyor’s, Overman’s, Sirdar’s, or Shotfirer’s Certificate unless he holds a valid first aid certificate of the standard of the St. John Ambulance Association (India):
Provided that if any candidate satisfies the Board that he has not sufficient opportunity to obtain such first-aid certificate, the Board may, by order in writing admit him to the examination on such conditions, if any as it thinks fit to impose :
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10. It is imperative to note that “20 years of age” occurring
in Regulation 15(1)(a) was substituted by Notification No.
G.S.R. 32 dated 16.12.1978. Regulation 15(1)(a) prior to
1978 read as follows: -
“15. Age and general qualifications of candidates – (1) (a) No person shall be admitted as a candidate at any examination held by the Board unless he is 21 years of age.”
Thus, in 1969 the above quoted regulation was in force.
11. At this juncture, we may fruitfully refer to Regulation 14
of the Regulations. It reads as follows: -
“14.Submission of application – (1) Application for an examination conducted by the Board shall be made to the Board not less than 60 days prior to the date fixed for the examination and on a form supplied for the purpose.
(2) Notice regarding the date and place of examination for the Manager’s, Surveyor’s and Overman’s certificate shall be published under the order of the Board in such periodicals as the Board may direct, not less than 60 days prior to the date fixed by the Board for receiving applications.”
12. From the conjoint reading of Regulations 14(1) and
15(1)(a) it is quite clear that an application has to be
submitted to the Board not less than 60 days prior to the
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date fixed for examination. The respondent had passed the
Matriculation Certificate examination in December, 1963. It
is quite unusual that he could not have obtained the
certificate till 1969. Be that as it may, if the date of birth, as
reflected in the certificate, is taken into account, then the
respondent would have been eligible to submit the
application for examination. The construction that can be
placed on reading of the clauses can only be that he has to
be 21 years of age by the time he submitted his application.
To avoid his disqualification to appear in the examination he
took the plea as has come out in the enquiry that he had
passed the examination and his date of birth was 2.4.1948.
13. Learned counsel for the respondent has invited our
attention to the “Implementation Instruction No. 76” has
tried to support the order passed by the Division Bench.
Para (A)(i) deals with Matriculation certificate. It reads as
follows: -
“(i) Matriculates.
In the case of appointees who have passed Matriculation or equivalent examinations, the
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date of birth recorded in the said certificate shall be treated as correct date of birth and the same will not be altered under any circumstances.”
14. Para (A)(v) deals with revision of determination of date
of birth in respect of existing employees. Paras (A)(v)(i)(a)
and (b) are as follows: -
“v) Review determination of date of birth in respect of existing employees.
i) (a) In the case of the existing employees Matriculation Certificate or Higher Secondary Certificate issued by the recognized Universities or Board or Middle pass Certificate issued by the Board of Education and/or Department of Public Instruction and admit cards issued by the aforesaid Bodies should be treated as correct provided they were issued by the said Universities/Boards/Institutions prior to the date of employment.
(b) Similarly, Mining Sirdarhip, Winding Engine or similar other statutory certificates where the Manager had to certify the date of birth will be treated as authentic.
Provided that where both documents mentioned in (i)(a) and (i)(b) above are available, the date of birth recorded in (i)(a) will be treated as authentic.”
15. On an apposite reading of the instructions there can be
no iota of doubt that the date of birth mentioned in
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Matriculation or Higher Secondary certificate has to be
accepted as authentic. But, a pregnant one, as has been
indicated hereinbefore, the case at hand depicts a different
picture. The respondent did not produce the Matriculate
Certificate, though he had passed the said examination. It
is because, we are inclined to think, had he produced the
said certificate, he could not have undertaken the
examination and consequently could not have been
appointed. To secure an appointment, as has been found in
the enquiry, he made a statement that he had not obtained
the certificate though he had passed the examination and
the same was accepted by the Welfare Officer of the then
private company.
16. The question that arises for consideration is that once
he had availed the benefit by not stating the correct fact,
whether the equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India should be extended to him. The
Division Bench has recorded a finding the respondent could
not have been allowed to participate in the examination
without producing the Matriculation certificate. The said
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finding is based on an assumption and has been arrived at
totally being oblivious of the enquiry report which records
the statement of the respondent. In this context, we may
profitably reproduce a passage from Union of India v. C.
Rama Swamy and others1: -
“In matters relating to appointment to service various factors are taken into consideration before making a selection or an appointment. One of the relevant circumstances is the age of the person who is sought to be appointed. It may not be possible to conclusively prove that an advantage had been gained by representing a date of birth which is different than that which is later sought to be incorporated. But it will not be unreasonable to presume that when a candidate, at the first instance, communicates a particular date of birth there is obviously his intention that his age calculated on the basis of that date of birth should be taken into consideration by the appointing authority for adjudging his suitability for a responsible office. In fact, where maturity is a relevant factor to access suitability, an older person is ordinarily considered to be more mature and, therefore, more suitable. In such a case, it cannot be said that advantage is not obtained by a person because of an earlier date of birth, if he subsequently claims to be younger in age, after taking that advantage. In such a situation, it would be against public policy to permit such a
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(1997) 4 SCC 647
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change to enable longer benefit to the person concerned.”
[Underlining is ours]
17. The controversy can be viewed from another angle.
Thereafter, the learned Judges opined that there is no
justification in the proposition that principle of estoppel
would not apply in such a situation. As is manifest, in the
case at hand the respondent stated this on the higher side to
gain the advantage of eligibility and hence, we have no trace
of doubt that principle of estoppel would apply on all fours.
It is well settled in law that jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution is equitable and
discretionary. The power of the High Court is required to be
exercised “to reach injustice wherever it is found”. In
Sangram Singh v. Election Commissioner, Kotah and
another2, it has been observed that jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution is not to be exercised whenever there
is an error of law. The powers are purely discretionary and
2
(1955) 2 SCR 1
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though no limits can be placed upon that discretion, it must
be exercised along recognized lines and not arbitrarily and
one of the limitations imposed by the courts on themselves
is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in such class of
cases unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to
ensue. That apart, the High Court while exercising the
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can always
take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances and
pass appropriate directions to balance the justice. The
jurisdiction being extraordinary it is required to be exercised
keeping in mind the principles of equity. It is a well-known
principle that one of the ends of equity is to promote honesty
and fair play. If a person has taken an undue advantage the
court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would be within its
domain to deny the discretionary relief. In fact, Mr. Singh,
learned senior counsel for the appellants, has basically
rested his submission on this axis. In our considered opinion,
the Division Bench has erred in extending the benefit to the
respondent who had taken undue advantage by not
producing the Matriculation Certificate solely on the motive
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to get an entry into service. It is apt to note here that this
Court in G.M., Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal v.
Shib Kumar Dushad and others3 has ruled that the
decision on the issue of date of birth of an employee is not
only important for the employee but for the employer also.
18. In view of our aforesaid premised reasons we are
unable to concur with the view taken by the High Court in
F.M.A. No. 169 of 2006 and, accordingly, the Judgment dated
17.8.2007 passed by the Division Bench is set aside.
19. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed with no order as to
costs.
……………………….J. [Anil R. Dave]
……………………….J. [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi; September 23, 2013.
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(2008) 8 SCC 696