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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 2277-2278  OF 2009

DURYODHAN ROUT    … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF ORISSA             … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.

These appeals are directed against the common judgment  

dated 8th January, 2008 passed by the High Court of Orissa at  

Cuttack in Death Reference Case No.2 of 2007 and J. Crl.  

A.No.12 of 2007. By the impugned judgment, the High Court  

upheld the conviction of the appellant for the offence under  

Section  376,  302  and  201  IPC.  However,  taking  into  

consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the  

age of the appellant, his family background and the fact  

that the appellant had no criminal antecedent, the capital  

sentence for the offence under Section 302 IPC has been  

commuted to life imprisonment; and rest of sentence remain  

unaltered.

2. The case of the prosecution is that on 11th September,  

2004, at about 3 p.m. accused Duryodhan Rout, on the pretext

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that the deceased, Subhasini, a minor girl aged about 10  

years would talk over phone with his brother, Bamodev Bhoi  

took her on a bicycle. When the evening set in, the accused  

alone  returned  to  the  village  and  on  enquiry  about  

Subhasini, by Mulia Bhoi (PW-5), father of the deceased, he  

told that she had gone with a woman of Ranibandha to her  

house. On the next day, as she did not return Mulia Boi (PW-

5) again questioned the accused regarding the where about of  

the  deceased.  The  accused  confessed  in  presence  of  Rabi  

Biswal (PW-3), Dasarathi Bhoi (PW-4) and Subashini Bhoi that  

he killed the deceased by pressing her neck. With the help  

of these three witnesses, Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) took the accused  

to Thakurgarh P.S. got the FIR scribed by one Laxman Senapti  

and lodged it before Udit Narayan Pany, Officer-in-charge of  

the  said  Police  Station.  A  P.S.  Case  No.51  dated  12th  

September, 2004 under Section 302/201 IPC was instituted.  

The accused was arrested, his statement was recorded under  

Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act on the basis of which  

he went to the spot made recovery of the dead body of the  

deceased,  held  inquest  over  it,  seized  the  Chadi  

(underwear)  of  the  victim  lying  near  the  spot,  prepared  

seizure list in respect thereof and sent the dead body to  

Adhamalik Hospital for autopsy. He also seized the wearing  

apparels  of  the  accused,  forwarded  to  the  Court  on  13th  

December, 2004 and handed over charge of investigation of

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the  case  to  the  C.I.  of  Police.  After  completion  of  

investigation, Investigating Officer (I.O.) submitted charge  

sheet against the accused under Sections 376/302/201 IPC.

3. Learned  Session  Judge  secured  the  presence  of  the  

accused, framed charges u/s 376/302/201 I.P.C. The accused  

pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.  

4. In  order  to  establish  its  case,  the  prosecution  

examined 8 witnesses. The accused examined himself as DW-1  

besides examined DW-2, his father to prove his stand. After  

assessing the evidence on record, the Trial Court found the  

accused guilty for the offence under Sections 376(f)/302/201  

IPC convicted him thereunder and sentenced him to death for  

the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The Session  

Judge also sentenced him to undergo RI for 10 years and to  

pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence punishable under  

Section 376(f)IPC and RI for one year and to pay a fine of  

Rs.1,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC.  

It was further ordered that in default of payment of fine,  

the convict would suffer imprisonment for one year for the  

offence punishable under Section 376(f) IPC and three months  

for the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC and the  

substantive sentences would run consecutively.  

5. The  High  Court,  as  noticed  above  in  Reference,  

converted the  capital  sentenced  to life imprisonment but  

ordered that rest of the sentence remain unaltered.

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6. Admittedly, there was no eye-witness to the occurrence,  

the  order  of  conviction  was  based  on  the  circumstantial  

evidence only. From the evidence of Paramla Nahak (PW-1) and  

Pechi @ Bilas Bhoi (PW-2), it transpires that on the date  

occurrence at about 4 p.m. while they were making chips by  

braking boulders by the side of road, they saw the accused  

carrying the deceased on a cycle and at about 5 p.m. they  

saw him returning alone. Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) and Kalpana Bhoi  

(PW-6),  the  father  and  the  mother  of  the  deceased  

respectively, stated that the accused took the deceased on a  

cycle  on  the  pretext  that  the  later  would  talk  to  her  

brother, working at Bargarh, over phone from the house of  

Bijaya Bhoi of village Anandpur. While the accused was in  

Police custody, he confessed his guilt which was recorded  

under Ext.7. The Ext.7 reflects that on 11th September, 2004  

afternoon  he  took  the  deceased  near  Arakhkuda  Salabani  

Jungle, undraped her and then committed rape on her. When  

she cried. He strangulated her to death and left the dead  

body covering it with branches of trees. On the basis of  

statement of the accused the I.O recovered the dead body and  

the Chadi (underwear) of the deceased lying nearby, from  

Arakhkuda Salabani Jungle. The statement of the accused made  

before the Police Officer which distinctly relates to the  

facts of recovery is admissible under the law.

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7. Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9) stated that on 12th September,  

2004 he was attached to Sub-Divisional Hospital, Athamallik  

as a Specialist in O and G. On that date at 5 p.m. on Police  

requisition, he conducted autopsy over the dead body of the  

deceased-Subhasini Bhoi aged about 10 years and found as  

follows:

"(i) Bleeding from nostrils and mouth and both the ears   with small clotting of blood.

(ii) Eyes were half opened. (iii) Bloody froth present in the nostrils and mouth. (iv) Stool had been discharged from anus. (v) Thumb  marks  were  present  on  the  front  of  the   neck. (vi) Two linear abrasions of size 3” x 4” on the front of   

the neck due to scratching by some sharp weapon  like human nail.

(vii) Finger  marks  were  present  on  both  sides  of  the   neck and back of the neck.

(viii) Extravasation  of  blood  in  to  the  sub-cutaneous   tissues  under  the  thumb  and  finger  marks  and  adjacent muscles of the neck.

(ix) Muscles of neck corresponding to the thumb and   finger marks were mildly lacerated.

(x) Multiple abrasions (linear) of size varying from 2”  and  3”  on  both  sides  of  scapular  region.  Most   probably caused by weapon like human nails.

(xi) Multiple abrasions on the back of both buttocks due   to friction on a rough surface,  like  rough ground   and the abrasions were associated with very mild   bleeding. The size of multiple abrasions varies from  ½” x ½” to ¾” x ½”.

(xii) Laceration of the vagina with bleeding with clots,   most probably because of attempt to introduce the   penis-forcibly.  The penis most probably was large  in size and the vaginal orifice of the deceased girl,   aged  about  10  years  was  very  narrow.  The  laceration appears to have been caused by several   attempts to introduce the penis into the vagine.

(xiii) All  the injuries  were ante mortem in nature.  The   throttling was also ante mortem in nature. There   was  no  evidence  of  seminal  fluid  in  or  around   vagina or on any part of the body of anywhere in   the clothings of the victim.

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According to Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9), the cause of  

death  was  due  to  throttling  and  probably  homicidal  in  

nature.  He  further  stated  that  the  accused  might  have  

attempted three to four times to introduce his penis into  

the vaginal orifice of the deceased. From his evidence, it  

further transpires that on 13th September, 2004, he examined  

the accused and found seminal fluid marks on his pant. He  

also found one linear abrasion of size ¼ on the postero-

lateral aspect of the left elbow and another linear abrasion  

of the same size on the medial aspect of his right knees.  

According to him, those injuries might have been caused 12  

hours earlier to the alleged incident. Therefore, it is not  

safe to hold that in course of rape and murder of deceased,  

the  accused  sustained  those  injuries.  Dr. Narayan  Udgata  

(PW-9),however, could not notice any sign of recent sexual  

intercourse on the private part of the accused.  

8. Mulia Bhoi (PW-5), stated that the accused confessed  

before him and Rabindra Biswal (PW-3) and Dasarathi Bhoi  

(PW-4) that he killed the deceased. Rabindra Biswal (PW-3)  

and Dasarathi Bhoi (PW-4) turned hostile and did not support  

the prosecution. However, Kalpana Bhoi (PW-6) corroborated  

this part of evidence of Mulia Bhoi (PW-5). When asked by  

Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) regarding the whereabout of the deceased,  

accused told that she went with a woman of Ranibandha, which  

was found to be incorrect.

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9. The Trial Court convicted the appellant on the basis of  

the chain of circumstantial evidence available against the  

accused.  It  was  found  that  the  accused  carried  on  the  

deceased in his cycle at about 4 p.m. but returned alone at  

5 p.m. He confessed to have murdered the deceased before  

Mulia Bhoi (PW-5). On the basis of the statement of the  

accused recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the  

I.O. discovered the dead body; the opion of the Doctor was  

that  the  deceased  was  raped  and  murdered.  The  Doctor  

examined the accused and found seminal fluid marks on his  

pant. The accused gave false statement that the deceased  

went with a woman of Ranibandha. Paramla Nahak (PW-1) and  

Pechi  @  Bilas  Bhoi  (PW-2)saw  the  accused  carried  the  

deceased on a cycle at about 4 p.m. and returned alone one  

hour thereafter. Thus, the accused was last seen with the  

deceased. There is nothing to indicate that within one hour,  

there was any scope for anybody else, other than the accused  

to commit rape and murder of the deceased. The chain of  

circumstances of the case thereby leads to the hypothesis  

that the accused and the accused alone was the author of the  

crime, and therefore, the Trial Court rightly convicted the  

accused under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC.

10. During the arguments, learned counsel for the appellant  

mainly argued on the question of consecutive sentence as  

passed by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court. It

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was contended that Trial Court and the High Court wrongly  

held that the sentences under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC to  

run consecutively.

11. The question arises whether the judgment passed by the  

Trial  Court  as  affirmed  by  the  High  Court,  that  the  

sentences  under  Sections  376(f)/302/201  IPC  are  to  run  

consecutively is contrary to the proviso to sub Section (2)  

of  Section  31  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  

(hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”).

12. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent-

State of Orissa proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 31 of  

the Cr.P.C. cannot be made applicable to a conviction for  

life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC.

13. It was submitted that imprisonment can be rigorous or  

simple (Section 60 of the Indian Penal Code). As far as life  

imprisonment is concerned, there is no such classification.  

The first classification was attempted by the Law Commission  

of India through its 39th report to qualify it as rigorous  

but the same was never translated into legislation. But such  

submission is not based on any reasoning.  

14. In order to fully appreciate the question involved in  

the present case it is desirable to notice the relevant  

provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and Indian Penal Code.

15. Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. relates to sentences in cases  

of  conviction  of  several  offences  at  one  trial.  Under

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proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 31 of Cr.P.C. in no  

case a person can be sentenced to imprisonment for a period  

longer  than  fourteen  years  and  the  aggregate  punishment  

shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the  

Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. Section  

31 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows:

“31. Sentences in cases of conviction of sev- eral offences at one trial.  

(1) When a person is convicted at one trial  of two or more offences, the Court may, sub- ject to the provisions of section 71 of the  Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ), sentence him  for such offences, to the several punishments  prescribed therefor which such Court is com- petent to inflict; such punishments when con- sisting of imprisonment to commence the one  after  the expiration of the other in such order as  the Court may direct, unless the Court di- rects that such punishments shall run con- currently.  

(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it  shall not be necessary for the Court by rea- son only of the aggregate punishment for the  several offences being in excess of the pun- ishment which it is competent to inflict on  conviction of a single offence, to send the  offender for trial before a higher Court:  

Provided that-  

(a) in  no  case  shall  such  person  be  sentenced to imprisonment for longer pe- riod than fourteen years;   (b) the aggregate punishment shall not  exceed twice the amount of punishment  which the Court is competent to inflict  for a single offence.

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release  for  such  person  unless  he  has  served  at  least  

fourteen years of imprisonment.  

Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code merely relates to  

calculating fractions of terms of punishment by providing a  

numerical value of 20 years to life imprisonment.  

Section  53  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  lists  the  

punishments to which offenders are liable under the Code  

which reads as follows:

“First-Death;  Secondly-Imprisonment for life;  Fourthly-Imprisonment, which is of two           Descriptions, namely:-

(1)Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;

(2)Simple

Fifty-Forfeiture of property;

Sixthly-Fine.”

Therefore, a person sentenced to life imprisonment is  

bound to serve the remainder of his life in prison unless  

the sentence is commuted by the appropriate Government in  

terms  of  the  Section  55,  433  and  433A  of  the  Code  of  

Criminal Procedure.

18. In Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra &  

Ors., AIR 1961 SC 600, the Constitution Bench of this Court  

while dealing with the question as to whether there is any  

provision  of  law  whereunder  a  sentence  for  life  

imprisonment,  without  any  formal  remission  by  the

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appropriate Government can be automatically treated as one  

for a definite period. In the said case this Court held:

“5. If  so,  the  next  question  is  whether  there is any provision of law where under a  sentence for life imprisonment, without any  formal remission by appropriate Government,  can  be  automatically treated  as  one  for a  definite period. No such provision is found  in the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal  Procedure or the Prisons Act. Though the Gov- ernment of India stated before the Judicial  Committee in the case cited supra that, hav- ing regard to Section 57 of the Indian Penal  Code, 20 years' imprisonment was equivalent  to a sentence of transportation for life, the  Judicial Committee did not express its final  opinion on that question. The Judicial Com- mittee observed in that case thus at p. 10:

“Assuming  that  the  sentence  is  to  be  regarded  as  one  of  twenty  years,  and  subject to remission for good conduct,  he had not earned remission sufficient  to entitle him to discharge at the time  of his application, and it was there- fore  rightly dismissed,  but  in  saying  this,  Their  Lordships  are  not  to  be  taken as meaning that a life sentence  must in all cases be treated as one of  not more than twenty years, or that the  convict is necessarily entitled to re- mission.”

Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code has no  real bearing on the question raised before  us.  For  calculating  fractions  of  terms  of  punishment the section provides that trans- portation  for  life  shall  be  regarded  as  equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years.  It does not say that transportation for life  shall  be  deemed  to  be  transportation  for  twenty years for all purposes; nor does the  amended section which substitutes the words  “imprisonment for life” for “transportation  for life” enable the drawing of any such all  embracing fiction. A sentence of transporta-

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tion for life or imprisonment for life must  prima facie be treated as transportation or  imprisonment for the whole of the remaining  period  of  the  convicted  person's  natural  life.”

19. In State of  Madhya Pradesh vs. Ratan Singh & Ors.,  

(1976)  3  SCC  470,  this  Court  held  that  sentence  of  

imprisonment for life does not automatically expire at the  

end of 20 years. This Court held:

“9. From a review of the authorities and  the statutory provisions of the Code of Crim- inal  Procedure  the  following  propositions  emerge:

“(1) that a sentence of imprisonment for  life does not automatically expire at the end  of 20 years including the remissions, because  the  administrative  rules  framed  under  the  various Jail Manuals or under the Prisons Act  cannot supersede the statutory provisions of  the Indian Penal Code. A sentence of impris- onment for life means a sentence for the en- tire life of the prisoner unless the appro- priate  Government  chooses  to  exercise  its  discretion  to  remit  either  the  whole  or  a  part of the sentence under Section 401 of the  Code of Criminal Procedure;”

20. This Court in  Naib Singh vs. State of Punbaj & Ors.,  

(1983) 2 SCC 454, relying upon the judgment made by the  

Privy  Council  in  ‘Kishor  Lal’ and  Constitution  Bench  

decision of this Court in  ‘Gopal Vinayak Godse’  held that  

the appellant in the  said  case  was  liable  to serve  the  

sentence until the remainder of his life in prison.  

21. In Ashok Kumar vs. Union of India & Ors., (1991) 3 SCC  

498, this Court held that the expression “life imprisonment”

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must be read in the context of Section 45 of the Indian  

Penal Code which would mean imprisonment for the full or  

complete span of life. This Court further held that the  

provisions in Section 57 that imprisonment for life shall be  

reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years is for  

the purpose of working out the fraction of the terms of  

punishment.

22. This Court endorsed the view taken by this Court in the  

case of Niab Singh, the Privy Council judgment in  Kishori  

Lal and the judgment in the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse in  

Satpal vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (1992) 4 SCC 172.

23. In Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal & Ors., (2001) 4 SCC  

458,  this  Court  held  that  life  imprisonment  means  

imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the  

convicted  person’s  natural  life  unless  the  appropriate  

Government  chooses  to  exercise  its  discretion  to  remit  

either the whole or a part of the sentence under Section 401  

Cr.P.C.

Similar  was  the  view  taken  by  this  Court  in  Shri  

Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296.

24. This Court reiterated that life imprisonment was not  

equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years in Mohd.  

Munna vs. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 417. The Court  

held that the life imprisonment means imprisonment for whole  

of the remaining period of the convicted person’s natural

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life. There is no provision either in the Indian Penal Code  

or in the Criminal Procedure Code, whereby life imprisonment  

could be treated as either 14 years or 20 years without  

there  being  of  formal  remission  by  the  appropriate  

Government.

25. In Swamy Shraddananda vs.State of Karnataka, (2008) 13  

SCC 767, this Court while substituting the sentence of death  

to life imprisonment held that the prisoner shall not be  

released from prison till the rest of his life.

Similar view was taken by this Court in Sangeet & Anr.  

vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452. In the said case  

this Court held that a prisoner serving a life sentence has  

no indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14  

years or 20 years imprisonment. A convict undergoing life  

imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end  

of  his  life  subject  to  any  remission  granted  by  the  

appropriate Government under Section 432 Cr.P.C.

26.  From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court,  

it is  clear that a sentence of imprisonment for life means  

a  sentence  for  entire  life  of  the  prisoner  unless  the  

appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to  

remit either the whole or a part of the sentence under the  

provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

27. Section 31 of Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases of  

conviction of several offences at one trial. Proviso to Sub

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Section (2) to Section 31 lays down the embargo whether the  

aggregate punishment of prisoner is for a period of longer  

than 14 years. In view of the fact that life imprisonment  

means imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the  

question of consecutive sentences in case of conviction for  

several offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore, in  

case  a  person  is  sentenced  of  conviction  of  several  

offences,  including  one  that  of  life  imprisonment,  the  

proviso  to  Section  31(2)  shall  come  into  play  and  no  

consecutive sentence can be imposed.

28. In the case of  Kamalanantha and others vs. State of  

T.N., (2005) 5 SCC 194, this Court held:

“75. Regarding the  sentence,  the trial court  resorted to Section 31 CrPC and ordered the sen- tence to run consecutively, subject to proviso (a)  of the said section.

76. The contention of Mr Jethmalani that the  term “imprisonment” enjoined in Section 31 CrPC  does not include imprisonment for life is unac- ceptable. The term “imprisonment” is not defined  under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 31  of the Code falls under Chapter III of the Code  which deals with power of courts. Section 28 of  the Code empowers the High Court to pass any sen- tence authorised by law. Similarly, the Sessions  Judge and Additional Sessions Judge may pass any  sentence authorised by law, except the sentence of  death which shall be subject to confirmation by  the High Court. In our opinion the term “impris- onment” would include the sentence of imprison- ment for life.”

29. The aforesaid judgment was relied upon by this Court in  

Chatar Singh vs. State of M.P., (2006) 12 SCC 37, and held:

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“9. Although, the power of the court to impose  consecutive  sentence  under  Section  31  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  was  also  noticed  by  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  K.  Prab-

hakaran v. P. Jayarajan2, but, therein the ques- tion of construing proviso appended thereto did  not and could not have fallen for consideration.

10. The question, however, came up for consid-

eration in Zulfiwar Ali v. State of U.P.3 wherein  it was held: (All LJ p. 1181, para 25)

“25. The opening words ‘In the case of con- secutive sentences’ in sub-section (2) of  Section 31 make it clear that this sub-sec- tion refers to a case in which ‘consecutive  sentences’  are  ordered.  After  providing  that in such a case if an aggregate of pun- ishment for several offences is found to be  in excess of punishment which the court is  competent  to  inflict  on  a  conviction  of  single offence, it shall not be necessary  for the court to send the offender for trial  before a higher court. After making such a  provision,  proviso  (a)  is  added  to  this  sub-section to limit the aggregate of sen- tences which such a court pass while making  the  sentences  consecutive.  That  is  this  proviso has provided that in no case the  aggregate  of  consecutive  sentences  passed  against an accused shall exceed 14 years.  In the instant case the aggregate of the  two sentences passed against the appellant  being 28 years clearly infringes the above  proviso. It is accordingly not liable to be  sustained.”

11. In view of the proviso appended to Section  31 of the Criminal Procedure Code, we are of the  opinion that the High Court committed a manifest  error in sentencing the appellant for 20 years’  rigorous imprisonment. The maximum sentence im- posable being 14 years and having regard to the  fact that the appellant is in custody for more  than 12 years. Now, we are of the opinion that  interest of justice would be subserved if the ap- pellant is directed to be sentenced to the period  already undergone.”

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30. In  the  recent  judgment  in  Ramesh  Chilwal  alias  

Bambayya vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2012) 11 SCC  629, this  

Court held:

“4. Since this Court issued notice only to  clarify  the  sentence  awarded  by  the  trial  Judge, there is no need to go into all the  factual details. We are not inclined to mod- ify  the  sentence.  However, considering  the  fact that the trial Judge has awarded life  sentence for an offence under Section 302, in  view of Section 31 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1973, we make it clear that all  the sentences imposed under IPC, the Gang- sters Act and the Arms Act are to run concur- rently.”

31. In  view  of  the  aforesaid  discussions  and  decisions  

rendered by this Court, we hold that the Trial Court was not  

justified  in  imposing  the  sentence  under  Section  

376(f)/302/201  IPC  to  run  consecutively.  The  High  court  

failed to address the said issue.

32. For the reasons stated above, while we are not inclined  

to interfere with the order of conviction and the sentence,  

considering the fact that the accused has been awarded life  

imprisonment for the offence under Section 302, we direct  

that all the sentences imposed under Indian Penal Code are  

to  run  concurrently. The  judgment  passed  by  the  Session  

Judge as affirmed by the High Court stands modified to the  

extent  above.  The  appeals  are  allowed  in  part  with  the  

aforesaid observations.

Page 19

19

……………………………………………………………………………J.                   (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

……………………………………………………………………………J.                (DIPAK MISRA)

NEW DELHI, JULY 01, 2014.

Page 20

ITEM NO.1D               COURT NO.6                 SECTION IIB (For Judgment)

              S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                           RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2277-2278/2009

DURYODHAN ROUT                                     Appellant(s)

                               VERSUS

STATE OF ORISSA                                    Respondent(s)

Date : 01/07/2014 These appeals were called on for pronouncement  of Judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. T. N. Singh ,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Shibashish Misra ,Adv.

       Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya pronounced  the reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and  Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra.

The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable  judgment.

Page 21

(MEENAKSHI KOHLI)                               (USHA SHARMA)   COURT MASTER                                   COURT MASTER  

[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]