REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1193   OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 27535 of 2010)

Dr. Subramanian Swamy … Appellant

versus

Dr. Manmohan Singh and another … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

G. S. Singhvi, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Whether a complaint can be filed by a citizen for prosecuting  

a public servant for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption  

Act,  1988 (for short,  ‘the 1988 Act’)  and whether the authority  

competent to sanction prosecution of a public servant for offences  

under the 1988 Act is required to take an appropriate decision  

within the time specified in clause I(15) of the directions contained  

in paragraph 58 of the judgment of this Court in Vineet Narain v.  

Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226 and the guidelines issued by the  

1

Central Government, Department of Personnel and Training and  

the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) are the question which  

require consideration in this appeal.

3. For the last more than three years, the appellant has been  

vigorously  pursuing,  in  public  interest,  the  cases  allegedly  

involving  loss  of  thousands  of  crores  of  rupees  to  the  Public  

Exchequer  due to  arbitrary  and illegal  grant  of  licences at  the  

behest of Mr. A. Raja (respondent No. 2) who was appointed as  

Minister  for  Communication  and  Information  Technology  on  

16.5.2007 by the President on the advice of Dr. Manmohan Singh  

(respondent No. 1).  After collecting information about the grant of  

licences,  the  appellant  made  detailed  representation  dated  

29.11.2008  to  respondent  No.  1  to  accord  sanction  for  

prosecution of respondent No. 2 for offences under the 1988 Act.  

In his representation, the appellant pointed out that respondent  

No.  2 had allotted new licences in 2G mobile services on ‘first  

come, first served’ basis to novice telecom companies, viz., Swan  

Telecom and Unitech, which was in clear violation of Clause 8 of  

the Guidelines for United Access Services Licence issued by the  

Ministry  of  Communication  and  Information  Technology  vide  

letter  No.10-21/2005-BS.I(Vol.II)/49  dated  14.12.2005  and,  

2

thereby, caused loss of over Rs. 50,000 crores to the Government.  

The appellant gave details of the violation of Clause 8 and pointed  

out that the two officers, viz., R.J.S. Kushwaha and D. Jha of the  

Department of Telecom, who had opposed the showing of undue  

favour to Swan Telecom, were transferred just before the grant of  

licences and Bharat  Sanchar  Nigam Limited (BSNL)  which had  

never entered into a roaming agreement with any operator, was  

forced to enter into such an agreement with Swan Telecom. The  

appellant further pointed out that immediately after acquiring 2G  

spectrum licences, Swan Telecom and Unitech sold their stakes to  

foreign companies, i.e., Etisalat, a telecom operator from UAE and  

Telenor of Norway respectively and, thereby, made huge profits at  

the expense of public revenue. He claimed that by 2G spectrum  

allocation under respondent No. 2, the Government received only  

one-sixth of  what it  would have received if  it  had opted for an  

auction. The appellant pointed out how respondent No. 2 ignored  

the recommendations of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India  

(TRAI) and gave totally unwarranted benefits to the two companies  

and thereby caused loss to the Public Exchequer.  Some of the  

portions of the appellant’s representation are extracted below:

3

“Clause  8  has  been  violated  as  follows:  While  Anil  Dhirubhai  Ambani  Group  (ADAG),  the  promoters  of  Reliance Communications (R Com), had more than 10  per  cent  stake  in  Swan  Telecom,  the  figures  were  manipulated and showed as 9.99 per cent holding to  beat the said Clause.  The documents available disclose  that on March 2, 2007, when Swan Telecom applied for  United Access Services Licences, it was owned 100 per  cent  by  Reliance  Communications  and  its  associates  viz.  Reliance Telecom, and by Tiger Trustees Limited,  Swan  Infonet  Services  Private  Limited,  and  Swan  Advisory Services Private Limited (see Annexure I).  At  one  or  the  other  point  of  time,  employees  of  ADAG  (Himanshu Agarwal, Ashish Karyekar, Paresh Rathod)  or  its  associate  companies  have  been  acquiring  the  shares  of  Swan  Telecom  itself.   But  still  the  ADAG  manipulated the holdings in Swan to reduce it to only  9.99 per cent.  Ambani has now quietly sold his shares  in  Swan  to  Delphi  Investments,  a  Mauritius  based  company  owned  by  Ahmed  O.  Alfi,  specializing  in  automobile spare parts.  In turn,  Swan has sold 45%  of  its  shares to  UAE’s  Emirates  Telecom Corporation  (Etisalat)  for  Rs.9000  crores!   All  this  is  highly  suspicious  and  not  normal  business  transactions.  Swan  company  got  60% of  the  22  Telecom  licenced  areas at a throw away price of Rs.1650 crores, when it  was worth Rs.60,000 crores total.

Room has  operations  in  the  same circles  where  the application for Swan Telecom was filed.  Therefore,  under  Clause  8  of  the  Guidelines,  Swan  should  not  have been allotted spectrum by the Telecommunication  Ministry.   But  the  company  did  get  it  on  Minister’s  direction, which is an undue favour from him (Raja).  There was obviously a quid pro quo which only a CBI  enquiry can reveal, after an FIR is registered.  There is  no need for a P/E, because the CVC has already done  the preliminary enquiry.

Quite  surprisingly,  the  2G  spectrum  licences  were  priced at 2001 levels to benefit  these private players.  That  was  when  there  were  only  4  million  cellphone  

4

subscribers; now it is 350 million.  Hence 2001 price is  not applicable today.

Immediately after acquiring 2G spectrum licences both  Swan  and  Unitech  sold  their  stakes  to  foreign  companies at a huge profits.  While Swan Telecom sold  its  stakes  to  UAE telecom operator  Etisalat,  Unitech  signed  a  deal  with  Telenor  of  Norway  for  selling  its  share at huge premiums.

In  the  process  of  this  2G  spectrum  allocation,  the  government  received  only  one-sixth  of  what  it  would  have  got  had  it  gone  through a  fresh auction  route.  The total loss to the exchequer of giving away 2G GSM  spectrum  in  this  way  –  including  to  the  CDMA  operators – is over Rs.50,000 crores and is said to be  one of the biggest financial  scams of all  times in the  country.

While  approving  the  2G  licences,  Minister  Raja  turned a blind eye to the fact that these two companies  do not have any infrastructure to launch their services.  Falsely claiming that the Telecom Regulatory Authority  of  India had approved the first-cum-first  served rule,  Raja  went ahead with the  2G spectrum allocation to  two debutants in  the  Telecom sector.   In fact  earlier  TRAI had discussed the spectrum allocation issue with  existing  services  providers  and  suggested  to  the  Telecom  Ministry  that  spectrum  allocation  be  made  through  a  transparent  tender  and  auction  process.  This is confirmed by what the TRAI Chairman N. Misra  told  the  CII  organized  conference  on  November  28,  2008 (Annexure 2).  But Raja did not bother to listen to  the TRAI either and pursued the process on ‘first come,  first  served’  basis,  benefiting  those  who  had  inside  information, causing a loss of Rs.50,000 crores to the  Government.   His  dubious move has been to  ensure  benefit to others at the cost of the national exchequer.”

The request made in the representation,  which was relied  

upon  by  the  learned  Attorney  General  for  showing  that  the  

5

appellant had himself asked for an investigation, is also extracted  

below:

“According  to  an  uncontradicted  report  in  CNN-IBN  news channel of November 26, 2008, you are said to be  “very upset with A. Raja over the spectrum allocation  issue”.   This  confirms  that  an  investigation  is  necessary, for which I may be given sanction so that  the process of law can be initiated.

I,  therefore,  writ  to  demand the  grant  of  sanction to  prosecute  Mr.  A.  Raja,  Minister  for  Telecom  of  the  Union  of  India  for  offences  under  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act.   The  charges  in  brief  are  annexed  herewith (Annexure 3).”    

    4. Since  the  appellant  did  not  receive  any  response  from  

respondent  No.1,  he  sent  letters  dated  30.5.2009,  23.10.2009,  

31.10.2009,  8.3.2010  and  13.3.2010  and  reiterated  his  

request/demand for  grant  of  sanction  to  prosecute  respondent  

No.2.  In his letter dated 31.10.2009, the appellant referred to the  

fact that  on being directed by the CVC, the Central  Bureau of  

Investigation (CBI) had registered a first information report, and  

claimed that  prima facie case is established against respondent  

No. 2 for his prosecution under Sections 11 and 13(1)(d) of the  

1988 Act.  The appellant also claimed that according to various  

Supreme Court  judgments it  was not  necessary to carry out  a  

detailed  inquiry,  and  he  had  produced  sufficient  evidence  for  

6

grant  of  sanction  to  initiate  criminal  prosecution  against  

respondent No. 2 for the misuse of authority and pecuniary gains  

from corrupt practices.  In his subsequent letters, the appellant  

again  asserted  that  the  nation  had  suffered  loss  of  nearly  

Rs.65,000 crores due to arbitrary,  unreasonable  and mala fide  

action  of  respondent  No.2.   In  letter  dated  13.3.2010,  the  

appellant  referred to the proceedings of  the case in which this  

Court refused to interfere with the order of the Delhi High Court  

declaring that the decision of respondent No.2 to change the cut  

off date fixed for consideration of applications made for grant of  

licences was arbitrary and mala fide.

5. After 1 year and 4-1/2 months of the first letter written by  

him, Secretary, Department of Personnel and Training, Ministry of  

Personnel sent letter dated 19.3.2010 to the appellant mentioning  

therein that the CBI had registered a case on 21.10.2009 against  

unknown officers of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT),  

unknown  private  persons/companies  and  others  and  that  the  

issue of grant of sanction for prosecution would arise only after  

perusal of the evidence collected by the investigating agency and  

other material  provided to the Competent Authority and that it  

7

would be premature to consider sanction for prosecution at that  

stage.

6. On  receipt  of  the  aforesaid  communication,  the  appellant  

filed Civil  Writ Petition No. 2442/2010 in the Delhi High Court  

and prayed for issue of a mandamus to respondent No.1 to pass  

an order for grant of sanction for prosecution of respondent No. 2.  

The  Division  Bench  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  referred  to  the  

submission of the learned Solicitor General that when respondent  

No. 1 has directed investigation by the CBI and the investigation  

is  in  progress,  it  is  not  permissible  to  take  a  decision  on  the  

application of the appellant either to grant or refuse the sanction  

because that may affect the investigation, and dismissed the writ  

petition by recording the following observations:  

“The  question  that  emanates  for  consideration  is  whether,  at  this stage, when the investigation by the  CBI is in progress and this Court had earlier declined  to monitor  the  same by order dated 25th May,  2010,  which  has  been  pressed  into  service  by  the  learned  Solicitor  General  of  India,  it  would  be appropriate  to  direct  the  respondent  no.  1  to  take  a  decision  as  regards  the  application  submitted  by  the  petitioner  seeking sanction to prosecute.

In our considered opinion,  when the  matter  is  being  investigated  by  the  CBI,  and  the  investigation  is  in  progress, it would not be in fitness of things to issue a  mandamus to the first respondent to take a decision on  the application of the petitioner.”

8

7. The special leave petition filed by the appellant, out of which  

this appeal arises, was initially taken up for consideration along  

with SLP(C) No. 24873/2010 filed by the Center for Public Interest  

Litigation against order dated 25.5.2010 passed by the Division  

Bench of the High Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3522/2010 to  

which reference had been made in the impugned order.  During  

the  course  of  hearing  of  the  special  leave  petition  filed  by  the  

appellant,  the  learned  Solicitor  General,  who  had appeared on  

behalf of respondent No. 1, made a statement that he has got the  

record  and  is  prepared  to  place  the  same  before  the  Court.  

However, keeping in view the fact that the record sought to be  

produced  by  the  learned  Solicitor  General  may  not  be  readily  

available  to  the  appellant,  the  Court  passed  order  dated  

18.11.2010  requiring  the  filing  of  an  affidavit  on  behalf  of  

respondent No. 1. Thereafter, Shri V. Vidyavati,  Director in the  

PMO filed affidavit dated 20.11.2010, which reveals the following  

facts:  

“(i) On 1.12.2008, the Prime Minister perused the letter  and noted “Please examine and let me know the facts of  this case”. This was marked to the Principal Secretary  to  the  Prime  Minister  who  in  turn  marked  it  to  the  Secretary. The Secretary marked it to me as Director in  the PMO. I prepared a note dated 5.12.2008 factually  

9

summarizing  the  allegations  and seeking  approval  to  obtain the factual position from the sectoral side (in the  PMO dealing with Telecommunications).

(ii)  On 11.12.2008,  a  copy of  appellant’s  letter  dated  29.11.2008 was sent to the Secretary, Department of  Telecommunication  for  submitting  a  factual  report.  The Department of Telecommunication sent reply dated  13.02.2009 incorporating his comments.

(iii)  In  the  meanwhile,  letters  dated  10.11.2008  and  22.11.2008  were  received  from  Shri  Gurudas  Gupta  and  Shri  Suravaran  Sudhakar  Reddy  respectively  (copies of these letters have not been produced before  the Court). The same were forwarded to the Department  of  Telecommunication  on  25.03.2009  for  sending  an  appropriate reply to the appellant.  

(iv)  On  01.06.2009,  letter  dated  30.05.2009  received  from the appellant was placed before respondent No.1,  who  recorded  the  following  endorsement  “please  examine and discuss”.

(v) On 19.06.2009, the Director of the concerned Sector  in  the  PMO  recorded  that  the  Minister  of  Telecommunications  and  Information  Technology  has  sent  D.O.  letter  dated  18.06.2009  to  the  appellant.  When  letter  dated  23.10.2009  of  the  appellant  was  placed  before  respondent  No.1,  he  recorded  an  endorsement on 27.10.2009 “please discuss”.

(vi) In  response  to  letter  dated  31.10.2009  of  the  appellant,  respondent  No.1  made  an  endorsement  “please examine”.

(vii)  On  18.11.2009,  respondent  No.1  stated  that  Ministry  of  Law  and  Justice  should  examine  and  advice. The advice of Ministry of Law and Justice was  received on 8.2.2010.  Para 7 thereof was as follows:  

“From the perusal of letter dated 23.10.2009 and  31.10.2009, it is noticed that Shri Swamy wants  to  rely  upon the action and investigation of  the  CBI  to  collaborate  and  strengthen  the  said  

10

allegation  leveled  by  him  against  Shri  A.  Raja,  Minister  for  Communication  and  Information  Technology. It is specifically mentioned in Para 2  of the letter dated 31.10.2009 of Shri Swamy that  the  FIR  was  registered  by  the  CBI  and  “the  substance  of  the  allegation  made  by  me  in  the  above  cited  letters  to  you  are  already  under  investigation”. If it is so, then it may be stated that  decision to accord of sanction of prosecution may  be  determined  only  after  the  perusal  of  the  evidence  (oral  or  documentary)  collected  by  the  investigation agency, i.e., CBI and other materials  to be provided to the competent authority.”

(viii) On 05.03.2010, the deponent prepared a note that  an appropriate  reply  be  sent  to  the  appellant  in  the  light of  the advice given by the Law Department and  final reply was sent to the appellant after respondent  No.1 had approved note dated 17.03.2010.”

8. The appellant  filed rejoinder affidavit  on 22.11.2010 along  

with a copy of letter dated 18.6.2009 written to him by respondent  

No. 2 in the context of representation dated 29.11.2008 submitted  

by him to respondent No.1.  

9. Although,  respondent  No.2  resigned  from  the  Council  of  

Ministers on 14.11.2010, the appellant submitted that the issues  

relating  to  his  right  to  file  a  complaint  for  prosecution  of  

respondent No.2 and grant of sanction within the time specified in  

the judgment in Vineet Narain’s case should be decided.

11

10. During the course of hearing, the learned Attorney General  

filed  written  submissions.   After  the  hearing  concluded,  the  

learned Attorney General filed supplementary written submissions  

along with a compilation of 126 cases in which the sanction for  

prosecution is awaited for periods ranging from more than one  

year to few months

11. Final order in this case was deferred because it was felt that  

the directions given by this Court in Vineet Narain’s  case may  

require further elaboration in the light of the order passed in Civil  

Appeal No. 10660/2010 (arising out of SLP(C) No. 24873/2010)  

and the fact that decision on the question of grant of  sanction  

under the 1988 Act and other statutes is pending for a sufficiently  

long time in 126 cases. However, as the investigation with regard  

to some of the facets of what has come to be termed as 2G case is  

yet to be completed, we have considered it  appropriate to pass  

final order in the matter.

12. Appellant Dr. Subramanian Swamy argued that the embargo  

contained in Section 19(1) of the 1988 Act operates only against  

the  taking  of  cognizance  by  the  Court  in  respect  of  offences  

punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 committed by a  

public  servant,   but  there  is  no  bar  to  the  filing  of  a  private  

12

complaint  for  prosecution of  the  concerned public  servant  and  

grant  of  sanction  by  the  Competent  Authority,  and  that  

respondent No. 1 was duty bound to take appropriate decision on  

his representation within the time specified in clause I(15) of the  

directions  contained  in  paragraph  58  of  Vineet  Narain’s  case,  

more so because he had placed sufficient evidence to show that  

respondent No.2 had committed offences under the 1988 Act.  

13. The learned Attorney General  argued that  the  question of  

grant of sanction for prosecution of a public servant charged with  

any of the offences enumerated in Section 19(1) arises only at the  

stage when the Court decides to take cognizance and any request  

made prior to that is premature.  He submitted that the embargo  

contained in Section 19(1) of the Act is applicable to the Court  

which is competent to take cognizance of an offence punishable  

under  Sections  7,  10,  11,  13  and  15  alleged  to  have  been  

committed by a public servant and there is no provision for grant  

of sanction at a stage before the competent Court applies its mind  

to the issue of taking cognizance. Learned Attorney General relied  

upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Superintendent  

and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Abani Kumar Banerjee AIR  

1950 Cal. 437 as also the judgments of this Court in R.R. Chari v.  

13

State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  1951  SCR  312,  Devarapalli  

Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976) 3 SCC 252,  

Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana (1987) 1 SCC 476, Krishna Pillai  

v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 (Supp) SCC 121, State of West Bengal v.  

Mohd.  Khalid  (1995)  1  SCC  684,  State  through  C.B.I.  v.  Raj  

Kumar Jain (1998) 6 SCC 551, K. Kalimuthu v. State (2005) 4  

SCC 512, Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India  

(2005) 8 SCC 202 and State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju (2006)  

6 SCC 728 and argued that letter dated 29.11.2008 sent by the  

appellant for grant of sanction to prosecute respondent No.2 for  

the alleged offences under the 1988 Act was wholly misconceived  

and  respondent  No.1  did  not  commit  any  illegality  or  

constitutional impropriety by not entertaining his prayer, more so  

because the appellant had himself asked for an investigation into  

the alleged illegal grant of licences at the behest of  respondent  

No.2.  Learned Attorney General further argued that the appellant  

does not have the locus standi to file a complaint for prosecuting  

respondent  No.2  because  the  CBI  is  already  investigating  the  

allegations of irregularity committed in the grant of licences for 2G  

spectrum and the loss, if any, suffered by the Public Exchequer.

14

14. We have considered the respective submissions.  Section 19  

of the 1988 Act reads as under:

“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution. – (1)  No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable  under sections 7,  10,  11,  13 and 15 alleged to have  been committed by a public servant,  except with the  previous sanction, –  

(a)  in  the  case  of  a  person who is  employed in  connection with the affairs of the Union and is not  removable  from  his  office  save  by  or  with  the  sanction  of  the  Central  Government,  of  that  Government;

(b)  in  the  case  of  a  person who is  employed in  connection with the affairs of a State and is not  removable  from  his  office  save  by  or  with  the  sanction  of  the  State  Government,  of  that  Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority  competent to remove him from his office.

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises  as to whether the previous sanction as required under  sub-section  (1)  should  be  given  by  the  Central  Government  or  the  State  Government  or  any  other  authority,  such  sanction  shall  be  given  by  that  Government  or  authority  which  would  have  been  competent to remove the public servant from his office  at the time when the offence was alleged to have been  committed.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-    

(a)  no  finding,  sentence  or  order  passed  by  a  special  Judge  shall  be  reversed or  altered  by  a  court  in  appeal,  confirmation or  revision on the  ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or  irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-

15

section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a  failure  of  justice  has  in  fact  been  occasioned  thereby;

(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this  Act  on  the  ground  of  any  error,  omission  or  irregularity  in  the  sanction  granted  by  the  authority,  unless  it  is  satisfied  that  such error,  omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of  justice;

(c) no  court  shall  stay  the  proceedings  under  this Act on any other ground and no court shall  exercise the powers of revision in relation to any  interlocutory  order  passed  in  any  inquiry,  trial,  appeal or other proceedings.

(4)  In determining under  sub-section (3)  whether the  absence  of,  or  any  error,  omission  or  irregularity  in,  such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of  justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether  the objection could and should have been raised at any  earlier stage in the proceedings.  

Explanation. – For the purposes of this section,  

(a) error includes competency of the authority to  grant sanction;

(b)  a  sanction  required  for  prosecution  includes  reference to any requirement that the prosecution  shall be at the instance of a specified authority or  with  the  sanction  of  a  specified  person  or  any  requirement of a similar nature.”

15. The question whether sanction for prosecution of respondent  

No.2 for the offences allegedly committed by him under the 1988  

Act  is  required  even  after  he  resigned  from  the  Council  of  

Ministers,  though he continues to  be a Member of  Parliament,  

16

need not detain us because the same has already been answered  

by the Constitution Bench in R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay (1984) 2  

SCC 183 the relevant portions of which are extracted below:

“Now if the public servant holds two offices and he is  accused of  having abused one and from which he is  removed  but  continues  to  hold  the  other  which  is  neither  alleged  to  have  been  used  (sic misused)  nor  abused,  is  a  sanction  of  the  authority  competent  to  remove him from the office which is neither alleged or  shown to have been abused or misused necessary? The  submission  is  that  if  the  harassment  of  the  public  servant by a frivolous prosecution and criminal waste  of  his  time  in  law  courts  keeping  him  away  from  discharging  public  duty,  are  the  objects  underlying  Section 6, the same would be defeated if it is held that  the  sanction of  the  latter  authority  is  not  necessary.  The submission does not commend to us. We fail to see  how  the  competent  authority  entitled  to  remove  the  public servant from an office which is neither alleged to  have been used (sic  misused) or abused would be able  to  decide  whether  the  prosecution  is  frivolous  or  tendentious. An illustration was posed to the learned  counsel  that  a minister  who is  indisputably a public  servant  greased  his  palms  by  abusing  his  office  as  minister, and then ceased to hold the office before the  court was called upon to take cognizance of the offence  against him and therefore, sanction as contemplated by  Section  6  would  not  be  necessary;  but  if  after  committing the offence and before the date of taking of  cognizance of the offence, he was elected as a Municipal  President  in  which capacity  he  was a  public  servant  under the relevant municipal law, and was holding that  office  on the  date  on  which  court  proceeded to  take  cognizance  of  the  offence  committed  by  him  as  a  minister, would a sanction be necessary and that too of  that authority competent to remove him from the office  of  the  Municipal  President.  The  answer  was  in  affirmative. But the very illustration would show that  such  cannot  be  the  law.  Such  an  interpretation  of  

17

Section  6  would  render  it  as  a  shield  to  an  unscrupulous  public  servant.  Someone  interested  in  protecting  may  shift  him  from  one  office  of  public  servant to another and thereby defeat the process of  law. One can legitimately envisage a situation wherein  a person may hold a dozen different offices, each one  clothing him with the status of a public servant under  Section  21  IPC and even if  he  has  abused only  one  office  for  which  either  there  is  a  valid  sanction  to  prosecute him or he has ceased to hold that office by  the time court was called upon to take cognizance, yet  on this assumption, sanction of 11 different competent  authorities each of which was entitled to remove him  from  11  different  public  offices  would  be  necessary  before  the  court  can  take  cognizance  of  the  offence  committed by such public servant, while abusing one  office  which  he  may  have  ceased  to  hold.  Such  an  interpretation is contrary to all canons of construction  and leads to an absurd end product which of necessity  must  be  avoided.  Legislation  must  at  all  costs  be  interpreted in such a way that it would not operate as a  rogue's charter.

 We would  however,  like  to  make  it  abundantly  clear  that if the two decisions purport to lay down that even  if  a  public  servant  has  ceased to  hold  that  office  as  public servant which he is alleged to have abused or  misused for corrupt motives, but on the date of taking  cognizance  of  an  offence  alleged  to  have  been  committed by him as a public servant which he ceased  to be and holds an entirely different public office which  he  is  neither  alleged  to  have  misused  or  abused  for  corrupt  motives,  yet  the  sanction  of  authority  competent to remove him from such latter office would  be  necessary  before  taking  cognizance  of  the  offence  alleged to have been committed by the public servant  while  holding  an  office  which  he  is  alleged  to  have  abused or misused and which he has ceased to hold,  the decision in our opinion, do not lay down the correct  law  and  cannot  be  accepted  as  making  a  correct  interpretation of Section 6.”

18

16. The same view has been taken in Habibullsa Khan v. State of  

Orissa (1995) 2 SCC 437 (para 12), State of H.P. v. M. P. Gupta  

(2004)  2  SCC 349 (paras  17 and 19),  Parkash Singh Badal  v.  

State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1 and Balakrishnan Ravi Menon v.  

Union of India (2007) 1 SCC 45.  In Balakrishnan Ravi Menon’s  

case, it was argued that the observations made in para 25 of the  

judgment  in  Antulay’s  case  are  obiter.   While  negating  this  

submission, the Court observed :       

“Hence, it is difficult to accept the contention raised by  Mr.  U.R.  Lalit,  the  learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  petitioner that the aforesaid finding given by this Court  in Antulay case is obiter.

Further, under Section 19 of the PC Act, sanction is to  be  given  by  the  Government  or  the  authority  which  would  have  been  competent  to  remove  the  public  servant from his office at the time when the offence was  alleged  to  have  been  committed.  The  question  of  obtaining  sanction  would  arise  in  a  case  where  the  offence has been committed by a public servant who is  holding  the  office  and  by  misusing  or  abusing  the  powers of the office, he has committed the offence. The  word “office” repeatedly used in Section 19 would mean  the “office” which the public servant misuses or abuses  by  corrupt  motive  for  which  he  is  to  be  prosecuted.  Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 19 are as under:

“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution. —(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence  punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15  alleged  to  have  been  committed  by  a  public  servant, except with the previous sanction,— (a)  in  the  case  of  a  person who is  employed in  connection with the affairs of the Union and is not  

19

removable  from  his  office  save  by  or  with  the  sanction  of  the  Central  Government,  of  that  Government;

(b)  in  the  case  of  a  person who is  employed in  connection with the affairs of a State and is not  removable  from  his  office  save  by  or  with  the  sanction  of  the  State  Government,  of  that  Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority  competent to remove him from his office.

(2)  Where  for  any reason whatsoever  any doubt  arises  as  to  whether  the  previous  sanction  as  required under sub-section (1) should be given by  the Central Government or the State Government  or  any  other  authority,  such  sanction  shall  be  given  by  that  Government  or  authority  which  would have been competent to remove the public  servant  from  his  office  at  the  time  when  the  offence was alleged to have been committed.”

Clauses (  a  ) and (  b  ) of sub-section (1) specifically provide    that in case of a person who is employed and is not  removable from his office by the Central Government or  the State Government, as the case may be,   sanction   to    prosecute  is  required to  be  obtained  either  from the  Central  Government  or  the  State  Government.  The  emphasis  is  on  the  words  “who  is  employed”  in  connection with the affairs of  the Union or the State  Government.  If  he  is  not  employed  then  Section  19  nowhere provides for obtaining such sanction. Further,  under  sub-section  (2),  the  question  of  obtaining  sanction is relatable to the time of  holding the office  when the offence was alleged to have been committed.  In case where the person is not holding the said office  as he might have retired, superannuated, be discharged  or dismissed then the question of removing would not  arise.  Admittedly,  when  the  alleged  offence  was  committed, the petitioner was appointed by the Central  Government. He demitted his office after completion of  

20

five years' tenure. Therefore, at the relevant time when  the  charge-sheet  was  filed,  the  petitioner  was  not  holding the office of the Chairman of Goa Shipyard Ltd.  Hence, there is no question of obtaining any previous  sanction of the Central Government.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. The same view was reiterated in Parkash Singh Badal’s case  

and the argument that even though some of the accused persons  

had ceased to be Ministers, they continued to be the Members of  

the  Legislative  Assembly  and  one  of  them  was  a  Member  of  

Parliament and as such cognizance could not be taken against  

them without prior sanction, was rejected.

18. The next question which requires consideration is whether  

the  appellant  has  the  locus  standi to  file  a  complaint  for  

prosecution  of  respondent  No.2  for  the  offences  allegedly  

committed by him under the 1988 Act.   There is no provision  

either in the 1988 Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  

(CrPC) which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution  

of a public servant who is alleged to have committed an offence.  

Therefore, the argument of the learned Attorney General that the  

appellant cannot file a complaint for prosecuting respondent No.2  

merits  rejection.   A  similar  argument  was  negatived  by  the  

Constitution Bench in A.R.  Antulay v.  Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak  

21

(1984) 2 SCC 500.  The facts of that case show that on a private  

complaint  filed  by  the  respondent,  the  Special  Judge  took  

cognizance of the offences allegedly committed by the appellant.  

The latter objected to the jurisdiction of the Special Judge on two  

counts, including the one that the Court set up under Section 6 of  

the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (for short, ‘the 1952 Act’)  

was  not  competent  to  take  cognizance  of  any  of  the  offences  

enumerated in Section 6(1)(a) and (b) upon a private complaint.  

His objections were rejected by the Special Judge.  The revision  

filed by the appellant was heard by the Division Bench of the High  

Court  which  ruled  that  a  Special  Judge  is  competent  and  is  

entitled to take cognizance of offences under Section 6(1)(a) and  

(b) on a private complaint of  the facts constituting the offence.  

The High Court was of the opinion that a prior investigation under  

Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short,  

‘the 1947 Act’) by a police officer of the designated rank is not sine  

qua non for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 8(1) of  

the 1952 Act.  Before the Supreme Court, the argument against  

the  locus  standi of  the  respondent  was  reiterated  and  it  was  

submitted that Section 5A of the 1947 Act is mandatory and an  

investigation by the designated officer is a condition precedent to  

22

the taking of  cognizance by the Special  Judge of  an offence or  

offences committed by a public servant.  While dealing with the  

issue  relating  to  maintainability  of  a  private  complaint,  the  

Constitution Bench observed:

“It  is  a  well  recognised  principle  of  criminal  jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal  law into motion except where the statute enacting or  creating  an  offence  indicates  to  the  contrary.  The  scheme of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  envisages  two  parallel  and  independent  agencies  for  taking  criminal  offences to court.  Even for  the most serious  offence of  murder, it  was not disputed that a private  complaint can, not only be filed but can be entertained  and proceeded with according to law.  Locus standi of  the  complainant  is  a  concept  foreign  to  criminal  jurisprudence save and except that where the statute  creating  an  offence  provides  for  the  eligibility  of  the  complainant,  by  necessary  implication  the  general  principle  gets  excluded  by  such  statutory  provision.  Numerous statutory  provisions,  can be referred to  in  support of this legal position such as (i) Section 187-A  of Sea Customs Act, 1878 (ii) Section 97 of Gold Control  Act, 1968 (iii) Section 6 of Import and Export Control  Act,  1947  (iv)  Section  271  and  Section  279  of  the  Income  Tax  Act,  1961  (v)  Section  61  of  the  Foreign  Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi) Section 621 of the  Companies  Act,  1956  and  (vii)  Section  77  of  the  Electricity Supply Act. This list is only illustrative and  not  exhaustive.  While  Section  190  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  permits  anyone  to  approach  the  Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribe any  qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be  eligible  to  file  a  complaint.  But  where  an  eligibility  criterion  for  a  complainant  is  contemplated  specific  provisions  have  been  made  such  as  to  be  found  in  Sections  195  to  199  of  the  CrPC.  These  specific  provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any  such  statutory  provision,  a  locus  standi  of  a  

23

complainant  is  a  concept  foreign  to  criminal  jurisprudence.  In  other  words,  the  principle  that  anyone  can  set  or  put  the  criminal  law  in  motion  remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory  provision.  This  general  principle  of  nearly  universal  application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e.  an act or omission made punishable by any law for the  time being in force is not merely an offence committed  relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an  offence against society. The society for its orderly and  peaceful development is interested in the punishment  of  the  offender.  Therefore,  prosecution  for  serious  offences  is  undertaken  in  the  name  of  the  State  representing  the  people  which  would  exclude  any  element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the  public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an  act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of  the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial  and  irrelevant  unless  the  statute  indicates  to  the  contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of  the  society  being  one  of  the  objects  behind  penal  statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to  initiate  proceedings  cannot  be  whittled  down,  circumscribed  or  fettered  by  putting  it  into  a  strait- jacket  formula  of  locus  standi  unknown  to  criminal  jurisprudence,  save  and  except  specific  statutory  exception. To hold that such an exception exists that a  private complaint for offences of corruption committed  by public servant is not maintainable, the court would  require  an  unambiguous  statutory  provision  and  a  tangled  web  of  argument  for  drawing  a  far  fetched  implication,  cannot  be  a  substitute  for  an  express  statutory provision.”

(emphasis supplied)

The Constitution Bench then considered whether the Special  

Judge can take cognizance only on the basis of a police report and  

answered the same in negative in the following words:

24

“In  the  matter  of  initiation  of  proceeding  before  a  Special Judge under Section 8(1), the Legislature while  conferring  power  to  take  cognizance  had  three  opportunities to unambiguously state its mind whether  the cognizance can be taken on a private complaint or  not.  The  first  one  was  an  opportunity  to  provide  in  Section  8(1)  itself  by  merely  stating  that  the  Special  Judge may take cognizance of  an offence on a police  report  submitted  to  it  by  an  investigating  officer  conducting investigation as contemplated by Section 5- A. While providing for investigation by designated police  officers of superior rank, the Legislature did not fetter  the  power  of  Special  Judge  to  take  cognizance  in  a  manner  otherwise  than  on  police  report.  The  second  opportunity  was  when  by  Section  8(3)  a  status  of  a  deemed public prosecutor was conferred on a private  complainant if he chooses to conduct the prosecution.  The Legislature being aware of a provision like the one  contained in Section 225 of  the CrPC, could have as  well provided that in every trial before a Special Judge  the  prosecution  shall  be  conducted  by  a  Public  Prosecutor,  though  that  itself  would  not  have  been  decisive of the matter. And the third opportunity was  when the  Legislature while  prescribing the procedure  prescribed for warrant cases to be followed by Special  Judge did not exclude by a specific provision that the  only procedure which the Special Judge can follow is  the one prescribed for trial of warrant cases on a police  report.  The  disinclination  of  the  Legislature  to  so  provide  points  to  the  contrary  and  no  canon  of  construction  permits  the  court  to  go  in  search  of  a  hidden or implied limitation on the power of the Special  Judge  to  take  cognizance  unfettered  by  such  requirement of its being done on a police report alone.  In  our  opinion,  it  is  no  answer  to  this  fairly  well- established legal position that for the last 32 years no  case  has  come  to  the  notice  of  the  court  in  which  cognizance was taken by a Special Judge on a private  complaint for offences punishable under the 1947 Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

25

The Court then referred to Section 5A of the 1947 Act, the  

provisions of the 1952 Act, the judgments in H.N. Rishbud and  

Inder Singh v. State of Delhi (1955) 1 SCR 1150, State of M.P. v.  

Mubarak Ali 1959 Supp. (2) SCR 201, Union of India v. Mahesh  

Chandra AIR 1957 M.B. 43 and held:

“Having carefully examined these judgments in the light  of  the  submissions  made,  the  only  conclusion  that  unquestionably  emerges  is  that  Section  5-A  is  a  safeguard against  investigation of  offences committed  by public servants, by petty or lower rank police officer.  It has nothing to do directly or indirectly with the mode  and  method  of  taking  cognizance  of  offences  by  the  Court of Special Judge.  It also follows as a necessary  corollary that provision of Section 5-A is not a condition  precedent to initiation of proceedings before the Special  Judge who acquires power under Section 8(1) to take  cognizance  of  offences  enumerated  in  Section  6(1)(  a  )    and (  b  ), with this limitation alone that it shall not be    upon commitment to him by the Magistrate.

Once  the  contention  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  that  investigation  under  Section  5-A  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the  initiation  of  proceedings  before  a  Special  Judge and therefore cognizance of  an offence  cannot be taken except upon a police report, does not  commend to  us  and has  no  foundation  in  law,  it  is  unnecessary  to  refer  to  the  long  line  of  decisions  commencing  from    Taylor   v.    Taylor  ;    Nazir  Ahmad   v.    King-Emperor   and  ending  with    Chettiam  Veettil    Ammad   v.    Taluk  Land  Board  ,  laying  down  hitherto    uncontroverted  legal  principle  that  where  a  statute  requires  to  do  a  certain  thing  in  a  certain  way,  the  thing must be done in that  way or not  at  all.  Other  methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.

Once Section 5-A is  out  of  the  way in the  matter  of  taking  cognizance  of  offences  committed  by  public  servants by a Special Judge, the power of the Special  

26

Judge to take cognizance of such offences conferred by  Section 8(1) with only one limitation, in any one of the  known  methods  of  taking  cognizance  of  offences  by  courts of  original  jurisdiction remains undented. One  such  statutorily  recognised  well-known  method  of  taking cognizance of offences by a court competent to  take cognizance is upon receiving a complaint of facts  which  constitutes  the  offence.  And  Section  8(1)  says  that  the  Special  Judge  has  the  power  to  take  cognizance  of  offences  enumerated  in  Section  6(1)(a)  and  (b)  and  the  only  mode  of  taking  cognizance  excluded  by  the  provision  is  upon  commitment.  It  therefore,  follows  that  the  Special  Judge  can  take  cognizance  of  offences  committed  by  public  servants  upon receiving a complaint of facts constituting such  offences.

It was, however, submitted that even if it be held that  the  Special  Judge  is  entitled  to  entertain  a  private  complaint,  no  further  steps  can  be  taken  by  him  without directing an investigation under Section 5-A so  that the safeguard of Section 5-A is not whittled down.  This  is  the  selfsame  argument  under  a  different  apparel.  Accepting  such  a  submission  would  tantamount to saying that on receipt of the complaint  the Special Judge must direct an investigation under  Section 5-A, There is no warrant for such an approach.  Astounding as it appeared to us, in all solemnity it was  submitted that investigation of an offence by a superior  police officer affords a more solid safeguard compared  to a court. Myopic as this is, it would topsy turvy the  fundamental  belief  that  to  a  person  accused  of  an  offence there is no better safeguard than a court. And  this  is  constitutionally  epitomised  in  Article  22  that  upon  arrest  by  police,  the  arrested  person  must  be  produced before the nearest Magistrate within twenty- four hours of the arrest. Further, numerous provisions  of the Code of Criminal Procedure such as Section 161,  Section 164, and Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act  would  show  the  Legislature's  hesitation  in  placing  confidence  on  police  officers  away  from court's  gaze.  And  the  very  fact  that  power  is  conferred  on  a  Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class to  

27

permit police officers of lower rank to investigate these  offences would speak for  the  mind of  the  Legislature  that the court is a more reliable safeguard than even  superior police officers.”

(emphasis supplied)

19. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Constitution Bench,  

it must be held that the appellant has the right to file a complaint  

for  prosecution  of  respondent  No.2  in  respect  of  the  offences  

allegedly committed by him under the 1988 Act.  

20. The  argument  of  the  learned  Attorney  General  that  the  

question of granting sanction for prosecution of a public servant  

charged with an offence under the 1988 Act arises only at the  

stage  of  taking  cognizance  and  not  before  that  is  neither  

supported by the plain language of  the section nor the judicial  

precedents relied upon by him.  Though, the term ‘cognizance’ has  

not been defined either in the 1988 Act or the CrPC, the same has  

acquired a definite meaning and connotation from various judicial  

precedents.  In legal parlance cognizance is “taking judicial notice  

by the court of law, possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter  

presented before it so as to decide whether there is any basis for  

initiating proceedings and determination of the cause or matter  

judicially”.  In R. R. Chari v. State of U.P. (1951) SCR 312, the  

28

three Judge Bench approved the following observations made by  

the Calcutta High Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of  

Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abni Kumar Banerjee (supra):

"What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  and  I  have  no  desire  to  attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that  before  it  can  be  said  that  any  magistrate  has  taken  cognizance  of  any  offence  under  section  190(1)(a),  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  he  must  not  only  have  applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he  must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a  particular  way  as  indicated  in  the  subsequent  provisions of this Chapter - proceeding under section  200 and  thereafter  sending  it  for  inquiry  and  report  under  section  202.  When  the  magistrate  applies  his  mind  not  for  the  purpose  of  proceeding  under  the  subsequent  sections  of  this  Chapter,  but  for  taking  action of  some other  kind,  e.g.  ordering investigation  under section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for  the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to  have taken cognizance of the offence.”

21.  In Mohd. Khalid’s case, the Court referred to Section 190 of  

the CrPC and observed :

“In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of  an  offence.  This  would  include  the  intention  of  initiating  judicial  proceedings  against  the  offender  in  respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether  there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or  for other purposes. The word ‘cognizance’ indicates the  point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial  notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from  initiation  of  proceedings;  rather  it  is  the  condition  precedent  to  the  initiation  of  proceedings  by  the  

29

Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases  and not of persons.”

22. In Pastor P. Raju’s case, this Court referred to the provisions  

of Chapter XIV and Sections 190 and 196 (1-A) of the CrPC and  

observed :  

“There is no bar against registration of a criminal case  or investigation by the police agency or submission of a  report by the police on completion of investigation, as  contemplated by Section 173 CrPC. If a criminal case is  registered, investigation of the offence is done and the  police submits a report as a result of such investigation  before a Magistrate without the previous sanction of the  Central Government or of the State Government or of  the  District  Magistrate,  there  will  be  no  violation  of  Section  196(1-A)  CrPC  and  no  illegality  of  any  kind  would be committed.”

The Court then referred to some of the precedents including  

the judgment in Mohd. Khalid’s case and observed :

“It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance  of  an  offence  is  not  the  same  thing  as  issuance  of  process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when  the  Magistrate  applies  his  judicial  mind  to  the facts  mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon  information  received  from  any  other  person  that  an  offence has been committed. The issuance of process is  at  a  subsequent  stage  when  after  considering  the  material placed before it the court decides to proceed  against the offenders against whom a prima facie case  is made out.”

30

23. In Kalimuthu’s  case,  the only question considered by this  

Court  was whether  in  the  absence  of  requisite  sanction under  

Section 197 CrPC, the Special Judge for CBI cases, Chennai did  

not  have  the  jurisdiction  to  take  cognizance  of  the  alleged  

offences.  The High Court had taken the view that Section 197  

was not  applicable  to  the  appellant’s  case.   Affirming the  view  

taken by the High Court, this Court observed :  

“The question relating to the  need of  sanction under  Section  197  of  the  Code  is  not  necessarily  to  be  considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on  the  allegations  contained  therein.  This  question  may  arise  at  any  stage  of  the  proceeding.  The  question  whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be  determined from stage to stage. Further, in cases where  offences  under  the  Act  are  concerned,  the  effect  of  Section 197, dealing with the question of prejudice has  also to be noted.”

24. In Raj Kumar Jain’s case, this Court considered the question  

whether  the  CBI  was  required  to  obtain  sanction  from  the  

prosecuting authority before approaching the Court for accepting  

the report under Section 173(2) of the CrPC.  This question was  

considered in the backdrop of the fact that the CBI, which had  

investigated  the  case  registered  against  the  respondent  under  

Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act found that  

the  allegation  made  against  the  respondent  could  not  be  

31

substantiated.  The Special Judge declined to accept the report  

submitted under Section 173(2) CrPC by observing that the CBI  

was  required  to  place  materials  collected  during  investigation  

before  the  sanctioning  authority  and  it  was  for  the  concerned  

authority to grant or refuse sanction.  The Special Judge opined  

that only after the decision of the sanctioning authority, the CBI  

could submit the report under Section 173(2).  The High Court  

dismissed the petition filed by the CBI and confirmed the order of  

the Special Judge.  This Court referred to Section 6(1) of the 1947  

Act and observed:  

“From  a  plain  reading  of  the  above  section  it  is  evidently clear that a court cannot take cognizance of  the offences mentioned therein without sanction of the  appropriate  authority.  In  enacting  the  above  section,  the  legislature  thought  of  providing  a  reasonable  protection to public servants in the discharge of their  official functions so that they may perform their duties  and  obligations  undeterred  by  vexatious  and  unnecessary prosecutions. Viewed in that context, the  CBI  was  under  no  obligation  to  place  the  materials  collected  during  investigation  before  the  sanctioning  authority, when they found that no case was made out  against the respondent. To put it differently, if the CBI  had found on investigation that a prima facie case was  made out against the respondent to place him on trial  and  accordingly  prepared  a  charge-sheet  (challan)  against  him,  then  only  the  question  of  obtaining  sanction of the authority under Section 6(1) of the Act  would have arisen for without that the Court would not  be competent to take cognizance of the charge-sheet. It  must,  therefore,  be said that  both the Special  Judge  and the High Court were patently wrong in observing  

32

that the CBI was required to obtain sanction from the  prosecuting authority before approaching the Court for  accepting the report under Section 173(2) CrPC.”

25. In  our  view,  the  decisions  relied  upon  by  the  learned  

Attorney General do not have any bearing on the moot question  

whether  respondent  No.1,  being  the  Competent  Authority  to  

sanction  prosecution of  respondent  No.2,  was required to  take  

appropriate  decision  in  the  light  of  the  direction  contained  in  

Vineet Narain’s case.  

26. Before proceeding further, we would like to add that at the  

time of taking cognizance of the offence, the Court is required to  

consider the averments made in the complaint or the charge sheet  

filed under Section 173.  It is not open for the Court to analyse  

the evidence produced at that stage and come to the conclusion  

that no prima facie case is made out for proceeding further in the  

matter. However, before issuing the process, it that it is open to  

the  Court  to  record  the  evidence  and  on  consideration  of  the  

averments made in the complaint and the evidence thus adduced,  

find out whether an offence has been made out. On finding that  

such an offence has been made out the Court may direct the issue  

of process to the respondent and take further steps in the matter.  

33

If  it  is  a  charge-sheet  filed  under  Section 173 CrPC,  the  facts  

stated by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, on the basis of the  

evidence collected during investigation, would disclose the offence  

for which cognizance would be taken by the Court. Thus, it is not  

the province of the Court at that stage to embark upon and sift  

the evidence to come to the conclusion whether or not an offence  

has been made out.

27. We may also observe that grant or refusal of sanction is not  

a quasi judicial function and the person for whose prosecution the  

sanction is sought is not required to be heard by the Competent  

Authority  before  it  takes  a  decision  in  the  matter.    What  is  

required to be seen by the Competent Authority is whether the  

facts  placed before  it  which,  in  a  given case,  may include  the  

material collected by the complainant or the investigating agency  

prima facie disclose commission of an offence by a public servant.  

If the Competent Authority is satisfied that the material  placed  

before it is sufficient for prosecution of the public servant, then it  

is required to grant sanction. If the satisfaction of the Competent  

Authority is otherwise, then it can refuse sanction. In either case,  

the decision taken on the complaint made by a citizen is required  

34

to  be  communicated  to  him and if  he  feels  aggrieved by  such  

decision, then he can avail appropriate legal remedy.

28. In  Vineet  Narain’s  case,  the  Court  entertained  the  writ  

petitions  filed  in  public  interest  for  ensuring  investigation  into  

what  came  to  be  known  as  ‘Hawala  case’.   The  writ  petition  

remained  pending  for  almost  four  years.   During  that  period,  

several interim orders were passed which are reported as Vineet  

Narain v. Union of India 1996 (1) SCALE (SP) 42, Vineet Narain v.  

Union of India (1996) 2 SCC 199, Vineet Narain v. Union of India  

(1997) 4 SCC 778 and Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1997) 5  

SCALE 254.  The final order was passed in Vineet Narain v. Union  

of  India  (1998)  1  SCC 226.   In  (1996)  2  SCC 199,  the  Court  

referred  to  the  allegations  made  in  the  writ  petition  that  

Government  agencies  like  the  CBI  and the  revenue  authorities  

have failed to perform their duties and legal obligations inasmuch  

as they did not investigate into the matters arising out of seizure  

of the so-called “Jain Diaries” in certain raids conducted by the  

CBI. The Court took note of the allegation that the arrest of some  

terrorists  led  to  the  discovery  of  financial  support  to  them by  

clandestine  and  illegal  means  and  a  nexus  between  several  

important  politicians,  bureaucrats  and  criminals,  who  were  

35

recipients  of  money  from  unlawful  sources,  and  proceeded  to  

observe:  

“The facts  and circumstances of  the  present case do  indicate that it is of utmost public importance that this  matter is examined thoroughly by this Court to ensure  that all government agencies, entrusted with the duty  to  discharge  their  functions  and  obligations  in  accordance with law, do so, bearing in mind constantly  the concept of  equality enshrined in the Constitution  and the basic tenet of rule of law: “Be you ever so high,  the  law  is  above  you.”  Investigation  into  every  accusation made against each and every person on a  reasonable basis, irrespective of the position and status  of  that  person,  must  be  conducted  and  completed  expeditiously.  This  is  imperative  to  retain  public  confidence in the impartial working of the government  agencies.”

29. After examining various facets of  the matter in detail,  the  

three Judge Bench in its final order reported in (1998) 1 SCC 226  

observed :  

“These principles of public life are of general application  in every democracy and one is expected to bear them in  mind while scrutinising the conduct of every holder of a  public office. It is trite that the holders of public offices  are  entrusted with  certain  powers  to  be  exercised in  public interest alone and, therefore, the office is held by  them in trust  for  the  people.  Any deviation from the  path of rectitude by any of them amounts to a breach of  trust and must be severely dealt with instead of being  pushed under the carpet. If the conduct amounts to an  offence,  it  must  be  promptly  investigated  and  the  offender against whom a prima facie case is made out  should be prosecuted expeditiously so that the majesty  of law is upheld and the rule of law vindicated. It is the  

36

duty  of  the  judiciary  to  enforce  the  rule  of  law and,  therefore, to guard against erosion of the rule of law.

The  adverse  impact  of  lack  of  probity  in  public  life  leading to a high degree of  corruption is manifold.  It  also  has  adverse  effect  on  foreign  investment  and  funding from the International Monetary Fund and the  World  Bank  who  have  warned  that  future  aid  to  underdeveloped  countries  may  be  subject  to  the  requisite  steps  being  taken  to  eradicate  corruption,  which prevents international  aid from reaching those  for whom it is meant. Increasing corruption has led to  investigative  journalism  which  is  of  value  to  a  free  society. The need to highlight corruption in public life  through  the  medium  of  public  interest  litigation  invoking judicial review may be frequent in India but is  not unknown in other countries: R. v. Secy. of State for  Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.”

In  paragraph 58  of  the  judgment,  the  Court  gave  several  

directions in relation to the CBI, the CVC and the Enforcement  

Directorate.   In  para  58  (I)(15),  the  Court  gave  the  following  

direction:  

“Time-limit  of  three months for  grant  of  sanction for  prosecution  must  be  strictly  adhered  to.  However,  additional  time  of  one  month  may  be  allowed where  consultation is required with the Attorney General (AG)  or any other law officer in the AG's office.”

30. The CVC, after taking note of the judgment of  the Punjab  

and Haryana High Court in Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab (1996)  

Crl. Law Journal 2962, State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma 1991 Supp.  

1 SCC 222, Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary,  

37

(1995) 6 SC 225, framed guidelines which were circulated vide  

office order No.31/5/05 dated 12.5.2005.  The relevant clauses of  

the guidelines are extracted below:

“2(i) Grant of  sanction is an administrative act.  The  purpose  is  to  protect  the  public  servant  from  harassment by frivolous or vexatious prosecution and  not  to  shield  the  corrupt.   The  question  of  giving  opportunity to the public servant at that stage does not  arise.   The  sanctioning  authority  has  only  to  see  whether  the  facts  would  prima-facie  constitutes  the  offence.

(ii) The competent authority cannot embark upon an  inquiry to judge the truth of the allegations on the basis  of  representation which may be  filed by the  accused  person before the Sanctioning Authority, by asking the  I.O. to offer his comments or to further investigate the  matter  in  the  light  of  representation  made  by  the  accused  person  or  by  otherwise  holding  a  parallel  investigation/enquiry by calling for the record/report of  his department.

(vii) However, if in any case, the Sanctioning Authority  after consideration of the entire material placed before  it,  entertains  any doubt  on any point  the  competent  authority  may  specify  the  doubt  with  sufficient  particulars  and  may  request  the  Authority  who  has  sought sanction to clear the doubt.  But that would be  only to clear the doubt in order that the authority may  apply  its  mind  proper,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  considering the representations of  the accused which  may be filed while the matter is pending sanction.

38

(viii) If the Sanctioning Authority seeks the comments  of  the  IO  while  the  matter  is  pending  before  it for  sanction,  it  will  almost  be  impossible  for  the  Sanctioning  Authority  to  adhere  to  the  time  limit  allowed by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain’s case.”  

31. The aforementioned guidelines are in conformity with the law  

laid down by this Court that while considering the issue regarding  

grant or refusal of sanction, the only thing which the Competent  

Authority is required to see is whether the material placed by the  

complainant  or  the  investigating  agency  prima  facie discloses  

commission  of  an  offence.   The  Competent  Authority  cannot  

undertake  a  detailed  inquiry  to  decide  whether  or  not  the  

allegations made against the public servant are true.  

32. In the light of the above discussion, we shall now consider  

whether the High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the  

writ petition filed by the appellant.  In this context, it is apposite  

to  observe  that  the  High Court  had proceeded under  a  wholly  

erroneous  assumption  that  respondent  No.1  had  directed  

investigation by the CBI into the allegations of grave irregularities  

in  the  grant  of  licences.   As  a  matter  of  fact,  on  receipt  of  

representation  dated  4.5.2009  that  the  grant  of  licences  by  

respondent  No.2  had  resulted  in  huge  loss  to  the  Public  

39

Exchequer, the CVC got conducted an inquiry under Section 8(d)  

of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 and forwarded a  

copy of the report to the Director, CBI for making an investigation  

into  the  matter  to  establish  the  criminal  conspiracy  in  the  

allocation of 2G spectrum under the UASL policy of the DoT and  

to bring to book all the wrongdoers. Thereupon, the CBI registered  

FIR No.RC-DI-2009-A-0045 dated 21.10.2009 against  unknown  

officials  of  the  DoT,  unknown  private  persons/companies  and  

others for offences under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections  

13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the 1988 Act.  For the next about one year,  

the matter remained dormant and the CBI took steps for vigorous  

investigation only when this Court intervened in the matter.   The  

material  placed  on  record  does  not  show  that  the  CBI  had  

registered  a  case  or  started  investigation  at  the  instance  of  

respondent No.1.   

33. On his part, the appellant had submitted representation to  

respondent No. 1 almost one year prior to the registration of the  

first  information  report  by  the  CBI  and  highlighted  the  grave  

irregularities committed in the grant of licences resulting in the  

loss of thousands of crores of rupees to the Public Exchequer.  He  

continuously pursued the matter by sending letters to respondent  

40

No.1 at regular intervals.  The affidavit filed by Shri V. Vidyawati,  

Director  in  the  PMO shows that  the  matter  was  placed before  

respondent No.1 on 1.12.2008, who directed the concerned officer  

to  examine  and  apprise  him  with  the  facts  of  the  case.  

Surprisingly,  instead  of  complying  with  the  direction  given  by  

respondent  No.1  the  concerned  officer  sent  the  appellant’s  

representation to the DoT which was headed by none other than  

respondent No.2 against whom the appellant had made serious  

allegations of irregularities in the grant of licences.  It was natural  

for  respondent  No.2  to  have  seized  this  opportunity,  and  he  

promptly sent letter dated 18.6.2009 to the appellant justifying  

the  grant  of  licences.  The  concerned  officer  in  the  PMO  then  

referred the matter to the Ministry of Law and Justice for advice.  

It  is  not  possible  to  appreciate  that  even though the  appellant  

repeatedly  wrote  letters  to  respondent  No.1  highlighting  the  

seriousness of the allegations made in his first representation and  

the fact that he had already supplied the facts and documents  

which  could  be  made  basis  for  grant  of  sanction  to  prosecute  

respondent No.2 and also pointed out that as per the judgments  

of this Court, detailed inquiry was not required to be made into  

the allegations, the concerned officers in the PMO kept the matter  

41

pending and then took the shelter of the fact that the CBI had  

registered the  case and the investigation was pending.   In our  

view, the officers in the PMO and the Ministry of Law and Justice,  

were duty bound to apprise respondent No.1 about seriousness of  

allegations made by the appellant and the judgments of this Court  

including  the  directions  contained  in  paragraph  58(I)  of  the  

judgment in Vineet Narain’s case as also the guidelines framed by  

the CVC so as to enable him to take appropriate decision in the  

matter. By the very nature of the office held by him, respondent  

No. 1 is not expected to personally look into the minute details of  

each and every case placed before him and has to depend on his  

advisers  and  other  officers.  Unfortunately,  those  who  were  

expected to give proper advice to respondent No. 1 and place full  

facts and legal position before him failed to do so. We have no  

doubt  that  if  respondent  No.1  had  been  apprised  of  the  true  

factual and legal position regarding the representation made by  

the appellant,  he would have surely taken appropriate decision  

and would not have allowed the matter to linger for a period of  

more than one year.

34. In the result, the appeal is allowed.  The impugned order is  

set aside.  It is declared that the appellant had the right to file a  

42

complaint for prosecuting respondent No.2.  However, keeping in  

view the fact that the Court of  Special  Judge, CBI has already  

taken   cognizance   of  the    offences    allegedly   committed   by  

respondent  No.2  under  the  1988  Act,  we  do  not  consider  it  

necessary to give any other direction in the matter.   At the same  

time, we deem it proper to observe that in future every Competent  

Authority  shall  take  appropriate  action  on  the  representation  

made  by  a  citizen  for  sanction  of  the  prosecution  of  a  public  

servant  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  direction  contained  in  

Vineet  Narain  v.  Union  of  India  (1998)  1  SCC  226  and  the  

guidelines framed by the CVC.

…..…..…….………………….…J.        [G.S. Singhvi]

 …..…..……..…..………………..J.

      [Asok Kumar Ganguly]

New Delhi, January 31, 2012.

43

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1193 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.27535/2010)

Dr. Subramanian Swamy ....Appellant(s)

- Versus -

Dr. Manmohan Singh & another  ....Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J.

1. After going through the judgment rendered by my  

learned  brother  G.S.  Singhvi,  J.,  I  am  in  

agreement with the various conclusions reached by  

His Lordship. However, I have added my own views  

on certain important facts of the questions raised  

in this case.

2. Brother Singhvi, J., has come to a finding that  

having regard to the very nature of the office  

held by respondent No.1, it may not be expected of  

respondent No.1 to personally look into the minute  

4

details  of  each  and  every  matter  and  the  

respondent No.1, having regard to the burden of  

his  very  onerous  office,  has  to  depend  on  the  

officers advising him. At the same time it may be  

noted  that  in  the  course  of  submission,  the  

appellant,  who  argued  in  person,  did  not  ever  

allege any malafide or lack of good faith against  

the  respondent  No.1.  The  delay  which  had  taken  

place  in  the  office  of  the  respondent  No.1  is  

unfortunate but it has not even been alleged by  

the appellant that there was any deliberate action  

on the part of the respondent No.1 in causing the  

delay.  The  position  of  respondent  No.1  in  our  

democratic polity seems to have been summed up in  

the  words  of  Shakespeare  “Uneasy  lies  the  head  

that wears a crown” (Henry, The Fourth, Part 2 Act  

3, scene 1).

3. I  also  agree  with  the  conclusions  of  bother  

Singhvi, J., that the appellant has the locus to  

file  the  complaint  for  prosecution  of  the  

respondent No.2 in respect of the offences alleged  

to have been committed by him under the 1988 Act.  4

Therefore,  I  agree  with  the  finding  of  brother  

Singhvi,  J.,  that  the  argument  of  the  learned  

Attorney  General  to  the  contrary  cannot  be  

accepted.  Apart  from  that  the  learned  Attorney  

General in the course of his submission proceeded  

on the basis that the question of sanction has to  

be considered with reference to Section 19 of the  

Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  (hereinafter  “the  

P.C. Act”) or with reference to Section 197 of the  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter “the  

Code”), and the scheme of both the sections being  

similar  (Vide  paragraph  3  of  the  supplementary  

written submission filed by the learned Attorney  

General). In fact, the entire submission of the  

learned  Attorney  General  is  structured  on  the  

aforesaid  assumption.  I  fail  to  appreciate  the  

aforesaid argument as the same is contrary to the  

scheme  of  Section  19  of  the  P.C.  Act  and  also  

Section 197 of the Code. In  Kalicharan Mahapatra  vs. State of Orissa reported in (1998) 6 SCC 411,  this Court compared Section 19 of P.C. Act with  

Section 197 of the Code. After considering several  

4

decisions  on  the  point  and  also  considering  

Section  6  of  the  old  P.C.  Act,  1947  which  is  

almost identical with Section 19 of the P.C. Act,  

1988 and also noting Law Commission’s Report, this  

Court in paragraph 13 of  Kalicharan (supra) came  to the following conclusions:

“13. The  sanction  contemplated  in  Section  197  of  the  Code  concerns  a  public  servant  who  “is  accused  of  any  offence alleged to have been committed  by him while acting or purporting to act  in the discharge of his official duty”,  whereas the offences contemplated in the  PC Act are those which cannot be treated  as  acts  either  directly  or  even  purportedly done in the discharge of his  official  duties.  Parliament  must  have  desired to maintain the distinction and  hence the wording in the corresponding  provision  in  the  former  PC  Act  was  materially imported in the new PC Act,  1988 without any change in spite of the  change made in Section 197 of the Code.”

4. The above passage in  Kalicharan  (supra) has been  quoted with approval subsequently by this Court in  

Lalu Prasad vs.  State of Bihar reported in 2007  (1) SCC 49 at paragraph 9, page 54.  In paragraph  

10, (page 54 of the report) this Court held in  

4

Lalu Prasad (supra) that “Section 197 of the Code  and Section 19 of the Act operate in conceptually  

different fields”.

5. In view of such consistent view by this Court the  

basic submission of the learned Attorney General  

to the contrary is, with respect, untenable.

6. I  also  entirely  agree  with  the  conclusion  of  

learned brother Singhvi, J., that the argument of  

the  learned  Attorney  General  that  question  for  

granting  sanction  for  prosecution  of  a  public  

servant charged with offences under the 1988 Act  

arises only at the stage of cognizance is also not  

acceptable.  

7. In  formulating  this  submission,  the  learned  

Attorney  General  substantially  advanced  two  

contentions. The first contention is that an order  

granting  sanction  is  not  required  to  be  filed  4

along  with  a  complaint  in  connection  with  a  

prosecution under Section 19 of the P.C. Act. The  

aforesaid  submission  is  contrary  to  the  settled  

law laid down by this Court in various judgments.  

Recently a unanimous three-judge Bench decision of  

this Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh  vs. Paras Nath Singh, [(2009) 6 SCC 372], speaking  through  Justice  Pasayat  and  construing  the  

requirement  of  sanction,  held  that  without  

sanction:

“……The very cognizance is barred. That  is, the complaint cannot be taken notice  of. According to  Black's Law Dictionary  the  word  ‘cognizance’  means  ‘jurisdiction’  or  ‘the  exercise  of  jurisdiction’  or  ‘power  to  try  and  determine  causes’.  In  common  parlance,  it  means  taking  notice  of.  A  court,  therefore,  is  precluded  from  entertaining  a  complaint  or  taking  notice of it or exercising jurisdiction  if it is in respect of a public servant  who is accused of an offence alleged to  have been committed during discharge of  his official duty.”

(Para 6, page 375 of the report)

8. The  other  contention  of  the  learned  Attorney  

General  is  that  in  taking  cognizance  under  the  4

P.C. Act the Court is guided by the provisions  

under Section 190 of the Code and in support of  

that  contention  the  learned  Attorney  General  

relied  on  several  judgments.  However,  the  

aforesaid submissions were made without noticing  

the judgment of this Court in the case of Dilawar  Singh vs.  Parvinder Singh alias Iqbal Singh and  Another (2005) 12 SCC 709. Dealing with Section 19  of  P.C.  Act  and  Section  190  of  the  Code,  this  

Court  held  in  paragraph  8  at  page  713  of  the  

report as follows:

“……The Prevention of Corruption Act is a  special  statute  and  as  the  preamble  shows,  this  Act  has  been  enacted  to  consolidate and amend the law relating  to the prevention of corruption and for  matters  connected  therewith.  Here,  the  principle  expressed  in  the  maxim  generalia specialibus non derogant would  apply  which  means  that  if  a  special  provision  has  been  made  on  a  certain  matter, that matter is excluded from the  general  provisions.  (See  Godde  Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P., State  of  Bihar v.  Dr.  Yogendra  Singh and  Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and  Higher  Secondary  Education v.  Paritosh  Bhupeshkumar  Sheth.)  Therefore,  the  provisions of Section 19 of the Act will  have  an  overriding  effect  over  the  

5

general provisions contained in Section  190……”

9. Therefore, concurring with brother Singhvi, J., I  

am unable to uphold the submission of the learned  

Attorney General.

10. As I am of the humble opinion that the questions  

raised and argued in this case are of considerable  

constitutional and legal importance, I wish to add  

my own reasoning on the same.   

11. Today, corruption in our country not only poses a  

grave  danger  to  the  concept  of  constitutional  

governance, it also threatens the very foundation  

of  Indian  democracy  and  the  Rule  of  Law.  The  

magnitude  of  corruption  in  our  public  life  is  

incompatible  with  the  concept  of  a  socialist,  

secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed  

that  where  corruption  begins  all  rights  end.  

Corruption  devalues  human  rights,  chokes  

5

development  and  undermines  justice,  liberty,  

equality, fraternity which are the core values in  

our preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the  

Court is that any anti-corruption law has to be  

interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to  

strengthen the fight against corruption.  That is  

to say in a situation where two constructions are  

eminently reasonable, the Court has to accept the  

one that seeks to eradicate corruption to the one  

which seeks to perpetuate it.

12.    Time and again this Court has expressed its  

dismay and shock at the ever growing tentacles of  

corruption in our society but even then situations  

have not improved much. [See Sanjiv Kumar v. State  of Haryana & ors., (2005) 5 SCC 517; State of A.P.  v.  V.  Vasudeva  Rao, (2004)  9  SCC  319;  Shobha  Suresh  Jumani v.  Appellate  Tribunal  Forfeited  Property & another, (2001) 5 SCC 755;  State of  M.P. & ors. v.  Ram Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 88;  J.  Jayalalitha v. Union of India & another, (1999) 5  

5

SCC 138; Major S.K. Kale v. State of Maharashtra,  (1977) 2 SCC 394.]

13. Learned  Attorney  General  in  the  course  of  his  

submission fairly admitted before us that out of  

total 319 requests for sanction, in respect of 126  

of such requests, sanction is awaited. Therefore,  

in more than 1/3rd cases of request for prosecution  

in  corruption  cases  against  public  servants,  

sanctions  have  not  been  accorded.  The  aforesaid  

scenario  raises  very  important  constitutional  

issues  as  well  as  some  questions  relating  to  

interpretation of such sanctioning provision and  

also the role that an independent judiciary has to  

play in maintaining rule of law and common man’s  

faith in the justice delivering system.

14. Both  rule  of  law  and  equality  before  law  are  

cardinal questions in our Constitutional Laws as  

also in International law and in this context the  

role of the judiciary is very vital. In his famous  5

treatise  on  Administrative  Law,  Professor  Wade  

while  elaborating  the  concept  of  rule  of  law  

referred to the opinion of Lord Griffith’s which  

runs as follows:

“the judiciary accept a responsibility for  the maintenance of the rule of law that  embraces  a  willingness  to  oversee  executive  action  and  to  refuse  to  countenance  behaviour  that  threatens  either basic human rights or the rule of  law.”   [See  R.  v.  Horseferry  Road  Magistrates’  Court ex p. Bennett {1994) 1 AC 42 at 62]

15. I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid  

principle.

16. In this connection we might remind ourselves that  

courts  while  maintaining  rule  of  law  must  

structure  its  jurisprudence  on  the  famous  

formulation  of  Lord  Coke  where  the  learned  Law  

Lord  made  a  comparison  between  “the  golden  and  

straight  metwand  of  law”  as  opposed  to  “the  

uncertain and crooked cord of discretion”.  

5

17. The right of private citizen to file a complaint  

against a corrupt public servant must be equated  

with his right to access the Court in order to set  

the  criminal  law  in  motion  against  a  corrupt  

public  official.   This  right  of  access,  a  

Constitutional right should not be burdened with  

unreasonable  fetters.  When  a  private  citizen  

approaches a court of law against a corrupt public  

servant who is highly placed, what is at stake is  

not only a vindication of personal grievance of  

that  citizen  but  also  the  question  of  bringing  

orderliness  in  society  and  maintaining  equal  

balance in the rule of law. It was pointed out by  

the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sheonandan  Paswan vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1987) 1 SCC  288 at page 315:

“……It is now settled law that a criminal  proceeding  is  not  a  proceeding  for  vindication of a private grievance but  it  is  a  proceeding  initiated  for  the  purpose of punishment to the offender in  the interest of the society. It is for  maintaining stability and orderliness in  

5

the  society  that  certain  acts  are  constituted  offences  and  the  right  is  given  to  any  citizen  to  set  the  machinery of the criminal law in motion  for the purpose of bringing the offender  to book. It is for this reason that in  A.R. Antulay v.  R.S. Nayak this Court  pointed out that (SCC p. 509, para 6)  “punishment  of  the  offender  in  the  interest of the society being one of the  objects  behind  penal  statutes  enacted  for larger good of the society, right to  initiate proceedings cannot be whittled  down,  circumscribed  or  fettered  by  putting it into a strait jacket formula  of locus standi……”

18. Keeping those principles in mind, as we must, if  

we look at Section 19 of the P.C. Act which bars a  

Court  from  taking  cognizance  of  cases  of  

corruption against a public servant under Sections  

7,  10,  11,  13  and  15  of  the  Act,  unless  the  

Central or the State Government, as the case may  

be,  has  accorded  sanction,  virtually  imposes  

fetters  on  private  citizens  and  also  on  

prosecutors from approaching Court against corrupt  

public  servants.  These  protections  are  not  

available to other citizens. Public servants are  

treated as a special class of persons enjoying the  

5

said  protection  so  that  they  can  perform  their  

duties without fear and favour and without threats  

of  malicious  prosecution.   However,  the  said  

protection against malicious prosecution which was  

extended in public interest cannot become a shield  

to  protect  corrupt  officials.  These  provisions  

being  exceptions  to  the  equality  provision  of  

Article  14  are  analogous  to  provisions  of  

protective  discrimination  and  these  protections  

must be construed very narrowly. These procedural  

provisions relating to sanction must be construed  

in  such  a  manner  as  to  advance  the  causes  of  

honesty and justice and good governance as opposed  

to escalation of corruption. Therefore, in every  

case  where  an  application  is  made  to  an  

appropriate authority for grant of prosecution in  

connection with an offence under P.C. Act it is  

the bounden duty of such authority to apply its  

mind  urgently  to  the  situation  and  decide  the  

issue without being influenced by any extraneous  

consideration.  In  doing  so,  the  authority  must  

make a conscious effort to ensure the rule of law  

5

and cause of justice is advanced.  In considering  

the  question  of  granting  or  refusing  such  

sanction, the authority is answerable to law and  

law alone. Therefore, the requirement to take the  

decision  with  a  reasonable  dispatch  is  of  the  

essence  in  such  a  situation.  Delay  in  granting  

sanction  proposal  thwarts  a  very  valid  social  

purpose,  namely,  the  purpose  of  a  speedy  trial  

with the requirement to bring the culprit to book.  

Therefore,  in  this  case  the  right  of  the  

sanctioning authority, while either sanctioning or  

refusing  to  grant  sanction,  is  coupled  with  a  

duty. The sanctioning authority must bear in mind  

that what is at stake is the public confidence in  

the  maintenance  of  rule  of  law  which  is  

fundamental  in  the  administration  of  justice.  

Delay in granting such sanction has spoilt many  

valid  prosecution  and  is  adversely  viewed  in  

public  mind  that  in  the  name  of  considering  a  

prayer for  sanction, a protection is given to a  

corrupt  public  official  as  a  quid  pro  quo  for  

services rendered by the public official in the  

5

past or may be in the future and the sanctioning  

authority and the corrupt officials were or are  

partners in the same misdeeds. I may hasten to add  

that this may not be factual position in this but  

the general demoralizing effect of such a popular  

perception is profound and pernicious. By causing  

delay in considering the request for sanction, the  

sanctioning authority stultifies judicial scrutiny  

and  determination  of  the  allegations  against  

corrupt official and thus the legitimacy of the  

judicial  institutions  is  eroded.  It,  thus,  

deprives  a  citizen  of  his  legitimate  and  

fundamental right to get justice by setting the  

criminal law in motion and thereby frustrates his  

right  to  access  judicial  remedy  which  is  a  

constitutionally  protected  right.  In  this  

connection, if we look at Section 19 of the P.C.  

Act,  we  find  that  no  time  limit  is  mentioned  

therein. This has virtually armed the sanctioning  

authority  with  unbridled  power  which  has  often  

resulted in protecting the guilty and perpetuating  

criminality and injustice in society.  

5

19. There are instances where as a result of delayed  

grant of sanction prosecutions under the P.C. Act  

against  a  public  servant  has  been  quashed.  See  

Mahendra Lal Das vs.  State of Bihar and Others,  (2002) 1 SCC 149, wherein this Court quashed the  

prosecution as the sanctioning authority granted  

sanction after 13 years. Similarly, in the case of  

Santosh  De vs.  Archna  Guha  and  Others,  (1994)  Supp.3 SCC 735, this Court quashed prosecution in  

a case where grant of sanction was unduly delayed.  

There  are  several  such  cases.  The  aforesaid  

instances show a blatant subversion of the rule of  

law.  Thus,  in  many  cases  public  servants  whose  

sanction proposals are pending before authorities  

for  long  periods  of  time  are  being  allowed  to  

escape criminal prosecution.

20. Article  14  must  be  construed  as  a  guarantee  

against  uncanalized  and  arbitrary  power.  

Therefore,  the  absence  of  any  time  limit  in  

6

granting sanction in Section 19 of the P.C. Act is  

not in consonance with the requirement of the due  

process  of  law  which  has  been  read  into  our  

Constitution by the Constitution Bench decision of  

this Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and  Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248.  

21. I  may  not  be  understood  to  have  expressed  any  

doubt about the constitutional validity of Section  

19 of the P.C. Act, but in my judgment the power  

under  Section  19  of  the  P.C.  Act  must  be  

reasonably  exercised.  In  my  judgment  the  

Parliament  and  the  appropriate  authority  must  

consider restructuring Section 19 of the P.C. Act  

in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  it  consonant  with  

reason, justice and fair play.   

22. In  my  view,  the  Parliament  should  consider  the  

Constitutional imperative of Article 14 enshrining  

the rule of law wherein ‘due process of law’ has  

been  read  into  by  introducing  a  time  limit  in  6

Section 19 of the P.C. Act 1988 for its working in  

a  reasonable  manner.  The  Parliament  may,  in  my  

opinion, consider the following guidelines:  

a)All  proposals  for  sanction  placed  before  any  

Sanctioning  Authority,  empowered  to  grant  

sanction for the prosecution of a public servant  

under section 19 of the P.C. Act must be decided  

within a period of three months of the receipt  

of the proposal by the concerned authority.

b)Where consultation is required with the Attorney  

General or the Solicitor General or the Advocate  

General of the State, as the case may be, and  

the same is not possible within the three months  

mentioned in clause (a) above, an extension of  

one month period may be allowed, but the request  

for consultation is to be sent in writing within  

the three months mentioned in (a) above. A copy  

of  the  said  request  will  be  sent  to  the  

prosecuting agency or the private complainant to  6

intimate them about the extension of the time  

limit.  

c)At the end of the extended period of time limit,  

if no decision is taken, sanction will be deemed  

to  have  been  granted  to  the  proposal  for  

prosecution, and the prosecuting agency or the  

private  complainant  will  proceed  to  file  the  

chargesheet/complaint in the court to commence  

prosecution within 15 days of the expiry of the  

aforementioned time limit.  

23. With  these  additional  reasons,  as  indicated,  I  

agree  with  Brother  Singhvi,  J.,  and  allow  the  

appeal and the judgment of the High Court is set  

aside. No costs.

.......................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi 6

January 31, 2012

6