2. We are now stating our reasons which led us to allow the appeal

of the appellants.   

3. First  Information  Report  under  the  provisions  of  Protection  of

Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (For short, POCSO Act)

has been registered in which charge sheet has been filed and the

case registered as Sessions Case No. 460 of 2017 is pending

before the Special Judge, Ernakulam.  The appellants herein are

arrayed as accused nos. 3, 4 and 5.  Insofar as the appellants are

concerned, allegations against them are under Sections 201 read

with  Section  34  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (for  short,  ‘IPC’),

Section 19(1) read with Section 21(1) of POCSO Act and Section

75 of the Juvenile Justice Act.   

4. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that accused no. 1 had

raped the victim when she was a minor in the year 2016.  As a

result, she became pregnant.  As per victim’s mother, when the

victim started complaining about pain in her stomach, thinking it

to be some problem related to stomach, she brought her to the

hospital  where  the  appellants  were  working,  on  7th February,

2017.   It  was  found  that  the  victim  was  in  advance  stage  of

pregnancy.  In fact, soon after she was brought to the hospital,

she went into labour.   She delivered the child.   Insofar as the

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appellants are concerned, their role is that they attended to the

victim.   Appellant  no.  1  is  a  66  years’  old  lady  who  is  a

Gynecologist and had conducted the delivery.  Appellant no. 2 is

a Paediatrician who had attended to the baby of the victim after

the  delivery.   Appellant  no.  3,  is  a  69  years’  old  Hospital

Administrative.  She is roped-in in that capacity though she did

not attend to the victim or the baby.   

5. It is not the case of the prosecution that these appellants had any

knowledge  about  the  alleged  rape  of  the  victim  allegedly

committed by accused No. 1 at any time earlier.  In fact, they did

not come into picture before 7th February, 2017 when the victim

was brought to the hospital.  However, the charge against these

appellants is primarily on account of purported commission of an

act under Sections 19(1) of POCSO Act. This Section reads as

under:

“Section 19 (I) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, any person (including the child), who has apprehension that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence  has  been  committed,  he  shall  provide  such information to—

(a) the Special Juvenile Police Unit; or  (b) the local police.  

(2) Every report given under sub-section(I) shall be--

(a) ascribed an entry number and recorded in writing; (b) be read over to the informant;  

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(c) shall be  entered  in  a book to be kept by the       Police Unit.

(3)  Where the report  under sub-section (I)  is  given by a child, the same shall be recorded under Section (2) in a simple  language  so  that  the  child  understands  contents being recorded.

(4) In case contents are being recorded in the language not understood  by  the  child  or  wherever  it  is  deemed necessary,  a  translator  or  an  interpreter,  having  such qualifications, experience and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, shall be provided to the child if he fails to understand the same.

(5) Where the Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police is satisfied that the child against whom an offence has been committed is in need of care and protection. then, it shall, after  recording  the  reasons  in  writing  make   immediate arrangement  to  give  him  such  care  and  protection (including admitting the child into shelter home or to the nearest hospital) within twenty-four hours of the report, as may be prescribed.

(6) The Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police shall, without unnecessary delay but within a period of  twenty- four  hours,  report  the  matter  to  the  Child  Welfare Committee  and  the  Special  Court  or  where  no  Special Court  has  been  designated,  to  the  Court  of  Session, including need of  the child  for  care and protection  and steps taken in this regard.

(7)  No  person  shall  incur  any  liability,  whether  civil  or criminal,  for  giving  the  information  in  good  faith  for  the purpose of sub-section (1).”

6. As is clear from the aforesaid provision, a person who had an

apprehension that an offence under the said Act is likely to be

committed  or  has  knowledge  that  such  an  offence  had  been

committed would be required to provide such information to the

relevant authorities.

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7. Thus, what is alleged against the appellants is that they had the

knowledge that  an offence under  the Act  had been committed

and, therefore, they were required to provide this information to

the relevant authorities which they failed to do.

8. After going through the record and hearing the counsel for the

parties, we are of the opinion that no such case is made out even

as per the material collected by the prosecution and filed in the

Court.  The statement of the mother of the victim was recorded by

the police.  The  statement of the victim was also recorded.  They

have not stated at all that when the victim was brought  to the

hospital, her mother informed the appellants that she had been

raped by the accused no. 1 when she was a minor.  Admittedly,

the victim was pregnant  and immediately  went  into labour.   In

these  circumstances,  it  was  even  the  professional  duty  of

Appellant No. 1 to attend to her and conduct the delivery, which

she did.  Likewise, after the baby was born, the Appellant No. 2

as a Paediatrician performed her professional duty.

9. The entire case set up against the appellants is on the basis that

when the victim was brought to the hospital her age was recorded

as 18 years.  On that basis appellants could have gathered that at

the time of conception she was less than 18 years and was, thus,

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a minor  and,  therefore,  the  appellants  should  have  taken  due

care in finding as to how the victim became pregnant.  Fastening

the criminal liability on the basis of the aforesaid allegation is too

far fetched.  The provisions of Section 19(1), reproduced above,

put  a  legal  obligation  on  a  person  to  inform  the  relevant

authorities, inter alia, when he/she has knowledge that an offence

under  the  Act  had  been  committed.   The  expression  used  is

“knowledge”  which  means  that  some  information  received  by

such a person gives him/her knowledge about the commission of

the crime.  There is no obligation on this person to investigate

and gather knowledge.  If at all, the appellants were not careful

enough to find the cause of pregnancy as the victim was only 18

years  of  age  at  the  time  of  delivery.   But  that  would  not  be

translated into criminality.   

10. The term “knowledge”has been interpreted by this Court in  AS

Krishnan and Others v. State of Kerala1 to mean an awareness

on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind.

Further, a person can be supposed to know only where there is a

direct appeal to his senses.  We have gone through the medical

records of the victim which were referred by Mr. Basant R., Senior

Advocate  for  the appellants.   The medical  records,  which are

1 (2004) 11 SCC 576

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relied upon by the prosecution,  only  show that  the victim was

admitted in the hospital at 9.15 am and she immediately went into

labour  and  at  9.25  am she  gave  birth  to  a  baby.   Therefore,

appellant no. 1 attended to the victim for the first time between

9.15 am and 9.25 am on 7th February, 2017.  The medical records

of the victim state that she was 18 years’ old as on 7 th February,

2017.  Appellant no. 1 did not know that the victim was a minor

when she had sexual intercourse.

11. Appellant no. 2 had not even examined the victim and was not in

contact with the victim. As per the medical records relied upon by

the prosecution, the baby was attended to by appellant no. 2 at

5.30 pm on 7th February,  2017.   He advised that  the baby be

given to the mother. Therefore, appellant no. 2 had no occasion

to examine/treat the victim.   

12. Appellant no. 3 had not come in contact with the victim or the

baby at  all.   Being the administrator  of  the hospital  it  was not

possible  for  her  to  be  aware  of  the  details  of  each  patient.

Considering that the victim was brought to the said hospital for

the first time on 7th February, 2017, it would not be possible for

appellant no. 3 to be aware of the circumstances surrounding the

admission of the victim.

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13. The knowledge requirement foisted on the appellants cannot be

that  they  ought  to  have  deduced  from  circumstances  that  an

offence has been committed.

14. Accordingly,  we  are  of  the  view  that  there  is  no  evidence  to

implicate the appellants.  Evidence should be such which should

at  least  indicate grave suspicion.   Mere likelihood of  suspicion

cannot  be  the  reason  to  charge  a  person  for  an  offence.

Accordingly,  these  appeals  are  allowed  and  the  proceedings

against the appellants in the aforesaid Sessions Case No. 460 of

2017 are hereby quashed.

.............................................J. (A.K. SIKRI)

.............................................J. (ASHOK BHUSHAN)

NEW DELHI; AUGUST 01, 2018.

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