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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 14553  OF 2015 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.11208/2015)

Dr. Janet Jeyapaul ………Appellant(s)

VERSUS

 SRM University & Ors.         ……Respondent(s)

                 J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. Leave granted.  

2. This appeal is filed by the appellant-in-person  

against the judgment and order dated 04.07.2013  

passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras  

in Writ Appeal No. 932 of 2013 whereby the Division  

Bench of  the  High  Court  allowed  the  writ  appeal  

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filed  by  the  respondents  herein  against  the  order  

dated 08.04.2013 passed by the Single Judge of the  

High  Court  in  W.P.  No.  12676  of  2012  and,  in  

consequence, dismissed the writ petition filed by the  

appellant herein as being not maintainable.

3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved  

in this appeal, which lie in a narrow compass, it is  

necessary to set out the relevant facts.  

(a) The S.R.M. University-respondent No.1 herein  

is  the  Institution  engaged  in  imparting  high  

education  in  various  subjects.   The  Central  

Government  has,  therefore,  on  the  advise  of  

University  Grants  Commission  (in  short  “UGC”)  

declared respondent No.1 as “Deemed University” by  

issuing  a  notification  under  Section  3  of  the  

University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (in short  

“the  UGC  Act”).   Respondent  No.1  is,  therefore,  

subjected  to  ensuring  compliance  of  all  the  

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provisions of UGC Act in its functioning.

(b) The  appellant  is  holding  M.Sc.  and  P.hd.  in  

applied Biology.  She was appointed as a Lecturer in  

the Department of Bio-technology in the Faculty of  

Sciences  and  Humanity  in  the  SRM  University-

respondent  No.1.  By order  dated 05.05.2010,  she  

was promoted as Senior Lecturer w.e.f. 01.04.2010.  

(c)  On 14.02.2012, the appellant was served with  

a memo calling upon her to show cause as to why  

disciplinary action should not be taken against her  

for the alleged failure to take classes of the students  

of B.Sc. Third Year degree course and M.Sc. First  

Year degree course.   The appellant  submitted her  

replies on 15.02.2012 and 20.02.2012 denying the  

allegations and claiming that  she took classes for  

both the courses.

(d) Thereafter,  another  memo  dated  22.02.2012  

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was  issued  by  the  Registrar  in-charge  of  the  

University referring certain complaints given against  

her  by  the  students.   Refuting  the  charges,  the  

appellant submitted her reply on 29.02.2012.

(e) Dissatisfied with the explanation given by the  

appellant,  respondent  No.1-SRM  University  

constituted  an  Enquiry  Committee  and  the  

appellant  appeared  before  the  said  Committee  on  

02.03.2012 and stated that she was not furnished  

the  documents  and  the  copies  of  the  complaints.  

Thereafter she submitted a detailed explanation on  

26.03.2012.   

(f) Thereafter  the  appellant  received  a  notice  

dated 04.04.2012 mentioning therein that the same  

shall  be  treated  as  one  month’s  notice  and  she  

would  be  relieved  from  the  services  w.e.f.  

04.05.2012.   According  to  the  appellant,  she  

received the notice on  16.04.2012.

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(g) Challenging the said notice, the appellant filed  

Writ  Petition  No.  12676  of  2012  before  the  High  

Court.  By order dated 08.04.2013, the Single Judge  

of the High Court allowed the writ petition, quashed  

the termination notice and directed the respondents  

to reinstate the appellant into service.  

(h) Against the said order, respondent No.1 herein  

filed Writ Appeal No. 932 of 2013 before the High  

Court.   By impugned judgment dated 04.07.2013,  

the Division Bench of  the High Court allowed the  

appeal.  It was held that the writ petition filed by the  

appellant  against  respondent  No.1  was  not  

maintainable  as  according  to  the  Division  Bench,  

respondent No.1 is neither a State nor an authority  

within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution  

of  India and hence it  cannot be subjected to writ  

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of  

the  Constitution  to  examine  the  legality  and  

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correctness  of  the  dismissal  order.   The  Division  

Bench, therefore, did not examine the merits of the  

case made out by the appellant successfully before  

the  Single  Judge.   The  Division  Bench,  however,  

granted  liberty  to  the  appellant  to  approach  the  

Tribunal for ventilating of her grievance on merits.

(i) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant  

has  preferred this  appeal  by  way of  special  leave  

before this Court.

4. Heard appellant-in-person and Mr. Sanjay R.  

Hegde, learned senior counsel for the respondents.

5. Since the appeal involved a legal issue and the  

appellant had no legal assistance, we requested Mr.  

Harish  Salve,  learned  senior  counsel,  who  was  

present in Court, to assist the Court to enable us to  

properly appreciate and decide the issues arising in  

the case.  

6. We record our deep sense of appreciation for  

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the  valuable  assistance  rendered  by  Mr.  Harish  

Salve with his usual fairness and industry and also  

for submitting his written note on the conclusion of  

the case on our request.  

7. Submissions  of  Mr.  Harish Salve  were  many  

fold.  According to him, while deciding the question  

as to whether the writ lies under Article 226 of the  

Constitution  of  India  against  any  person,  juristic  

body,  organization,  authority  etc.,  the  test  is  to  

examine in the first instance the object and purpose  

for  which  such  body/authority/organization  is  

formed so also the activity which it undertakes to  

fulfill the said object/purpose.  

8. Pointing out from various well known English  

commentaries  such  as  De  Smith's  Judicial  

Review,  7th Edition,  H.W.R.Wade  and  C.F.  

Forsyth  Administrative  law,  10th Edition,  

Michael J. Beloff in his article Pitch, Pool, Rink,

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……Court?  Judicial  Review  in  the  Sporting  

World, 1989 Public Law 95,  English decisions in  

Breen vs. A.E.U. (1971) 2 QB 175, R. vs. Panel on  

Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc and  

another  (Norton  Opax  Plc  and  another  

intervening)  (1987) 1 All ER 564, E.S. Evans vs.  

Charles E. Newton 382 US 296 (1966) and of this  

Court  in  Andi  Mukta  Sadguru  Shree  Muktajee  

Vandas  Swami  Suvarna  Jayanti  Mahotsav  

Smarak  Trust  &  Ors.  vs.  V.R.  Rudani  &  Ors.,  

(1989)  2  SCC  691  and  Zee  Telefilms  Ltd.  vs.  

Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649, Mr. Harish Salve  

submitted  that  perusal  of  these  

authorities/decisions would go to show that there  

has  been  a  consistent  view  of  all  the  learned  

authors and the Courts all over the world including  

in  India  that  the  approach  of  the  Court  while  

deciding such issue is always to test as to whether  

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the concerned body is formed for  discharging any  

"Public  function"  or  "Public  duty"  and  if  so,  

whether  it  is  actually  engaged  in  any  public  

function or/and performing any such duty.  

9. According to learned counsel, if the aforesaid  

twin test is  found present  in any case then such  

person/body/organization/authority,  as  the  case  

may be, would be subjected to writ jurisdiction of  

the  High  Court  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution.

10. Learned  senior  counsel  elaborated  his  

submission  by  pointing  out  that  the  expression  

"any person or authority" used in Article 226 are  

not  confined  only  to  statutory  authorities  and  

instrumentalities  of  the  State  but  may  in  

appropriate case include any other person or body  

performing  "public  function/duty".  Learned  

counsel  urged that  emphasis  is,  therefore,  always  

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on activity undertaken and the nature of the duty  

imposed on such authority to perform and not the  

form of such authority.   According to Mr. Harish  

Salve, once it is proved that the activity undertaken  

by  the  authority  has  a  public  element  then  

regardless of the form of such authority it would be  

subjected to the rigor of writ jurisdiction of Article  

226 of the Constitution.  

11. Learned counsel then urged that in the light of  

several  decisions  of  this  Court,  one  cannot  now  

perhaps  dispute  that  "imparting  education  to  

students  at  large" is  a  "public  function" and,  

therefore, if any body or authority, as the case may  

be, is found to have been engaged in the activity of  

imparting education to the students at large then  

irrespective of the status of any such authority, it  

should be made amenable to writ jurisdiction of the  

High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.  

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12. Learned counsel further pointed out that the  

case in  hand clearly shows that respondent No. 1 -  

a juristic body is engaged in imparting education in  

higher studies and what is more significant is that  

respondent  No.  1  is  conferred  with  a  status  of  a  

“Deemed University" by the  Central  Government  

under Section 3 of the UGC Act. These two factors,  

according  to  Mr.  Harish  Salve,  would  make  

respondent  No.  1 amenable  to  writ  jurisdiction of  

the  High  Court  under  Article  226  because  it  

satisfies the twin test laid down for attracting the  

rigor of writ jurisdiction of the High Court.      

13. In reply, Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned senior  

counsel for respondent No. 1 while supporting the  

impugned order contended that if this Court holds  

that  respondent  No.  1  is  amenable  to  writ  

jurisdiction then apart from employees even those  

who  are  otherwise  dealing  with  respondent  No.  1  

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would  start  invoking  writ  jurisdiction  which,  

according to learned counsel, would open the flood  

gate of litigation in courts.

14. Having heard learned counsel  for  the parties  

and on perusal  of  the record of  the case, we find  

force  in  the  submissions  urged  by  Mr.   Harish  

Salve.  

15. To examine the question urged, it is apposite  

to take note of what De Smith, a well-known treaty,  

on the subject  "Judicial Review" has said on this  

question  [See  De  Smith’s  Judicial  Review,  7th  

Edition, page 127 (3-027) and page 135 (3-038)].

“AMENABILITY TEST BASED ON THE  SOURCE OF POWER

The courts have adopted two complementary  approaches  to  determining  whether  a  function  falls  within  the  ambit  of  the  supervisory  jurisdiction.   First,  the  court  considers the legal source of power exercised  by  the  impugned  decision-maker.   In  identifying  the  “classes  of  case  in  which  judicial review is available”, the courts place  considerable  importance  on  the  source  of  legal  authority  exercised  by  the  defendant  public authority.  Secondly and additionally,  where the “source of  power” approach does  

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not yield a clear or satisfactory outcome, the  court may consider the characteristics of the  function being performed.  This has enabled  the  courts  to  extend  the  reach  of  the  supervisory jurisdiction to some activities of  non-statutory bodies (such as self-regulatory  organizations).   We begin by looking at the  first approach, based on the source of power.”

“JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS The  previous  section  considered  susceptibility to judicial review based on the  source of the power:  statute or prerogative.  The  courts  came  to  recognize  that  an  approach based solely on the source of  the  public authority’s power was too restrictive.  Since  1987  they  have  developed  an  additional  approach  to  determining  susceptibility  based  on  by  the  type  of  function  performed by  the  decision-maker.  The  “public  function”  approach  is,  since  2000, reflected in the Civil Procedure Rules:  CPR.54.1(2)(a)(ii), defines a claim for judicial  review  as  a  claim to  the  lawfulness  of   “a  decision, action or failure to act in relation to  the exercise of a public function.”  (Similar  terminology is used in the Human Rights Act  1998 s.6(3)(b) to define a public authority as  “any person certain  of  whose  functions  are  functions  of  a  public  nature”,  but  detailed  consideration of that provision is postponed  until later).  As we noted at the outset, the  term  “public”  is  usually  a  synonym  for  “governmental”.”

16. The English Courts applied the aforesaid test  

in  R. vs.  Panel  on Take-overs  and Mergers,  ex  

parte Datafin Plc and another (Norton Opax Plc  

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and  another  intervening)  (1987)  1  All  ER  564,  

wherein Sir John Donaldson MR speaking for three-

judge Bench of Court of Appeal (Civil Division), after  

examining the various case law on the subject, held  

as under:  

“In determining whether the decisions  of a particular body were subject to judicial  review,  the  court  was  not  confined  to  considering the source of that body’s powers  and  duties  but  could  also  look  to  their  nature. Accordingly, if the duty imposed on a  body,  whether  expressly  or  by  implication,  was  a  public  duty  and  the  body  was  exercising public law functions the court had  jurisdiction  to  entertain  an  application  for  judicial review of that body’s decisions…….”  

17. In  Andi  Mukta’s  case  (supra), the  question  

before  this  Court  arose as to whether  mandamus  

can  be  issued  at  the  instance  of  an  employee  

(teacher) against a Trust registered under Bombay  

Public  Trust  Act,  1950  which  was  running  an  

educational  institution  (college).   The  main  legal  

objection  of  the  Trust  while  opposing  the  writ  

petition of their employee was that since the Trust is  

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not  a  statutory  body  and  hence  it  cannot  be  

subjected to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.  

The  High  Court  accepted  the  writ  petition  and  

issued  mandamus  directing  the  Trust  to  make  

payments towards the employee’s claims of salary,  

provident  fund  and  other  dues.  The  Trust  

(Management) appealed to this Court.  

18. This Court examined the legal issue in detail.  

Justice  K.  Jagannatha  Shetty  speaking  for  the  

Bench agreed with the view taken by the High Court  

and held as under:  

“11. Two  questions,  however,  remain  for  consideration:  (i)  The  liability  of  the  appellants  to  pay  compensation  under  Ordinance 120-E and (ii) The maintainability  of the writ petition for mandamus as against  the management of the college………

12. The  essence  of  the  attack  on  the  maintainability  of  the  writ  petition  under  Article  226  may  now  be  examined.  It  is  argued that the management of  the college  being  a  trust  registered  under  the  Bombay  Public Trust Act is not amenable to the writ  jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court.  The  contention in other words, is that the trust is  a private institution against which no writ of  mandamus can be issued. In support of the  

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contention,  the  counsel  relied  upon  two  decisions  of  this  Court:  (a)  Executive  Committee of  Vaish Degree College,  Shamli  v.  Lakshmi Narain, (1976) 2 SCC 58 and (b)  Deepak Kumar Biswas v.  Director of Public  Instructions, (1987) 2 SCC 252. In the first of  the two cases,  the respondSLP No.11208 of  2015ent  institution  was  a  Degree  College  managed by a registered cooperative society.  A  suit  was  filed  against  the  college  by  the  dismissed principal for reinstatement. It was  contended that the Executive Committee of  the  college  which  was  registered  under  the  Cooperative  Societies  Act  and  affiliated  to  the  Agra  University  (and  subsequently  to  Meerut University) was a statutory body. The  importance of this contention lies in the fact  that in such a case, reinstatement could be  ordered  if  the  dismissal  is  in  violation  of  statutory  obligation.  But  this  Court  refused  to  accept  the  contention.  It  was  observed  that the management of the college was not a  statutory body since not created by or under  a  statute.  It  was  emphasised  that  an  institution  which  adopts  certain  statutory  provisions will not become a statutory body  and the dismissed employee cannot enforce a  contract  of  personal  service  against  a  non- statutory body.

15. If  the  rights  are  purely  of  a  private  character  no  mandamus  can  issue.  If  the  management of the college is purely a private  body with no public duty mandamus will not  lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus.  But once these are absent and when the party  has  no  other  equally  convenient  remedy,  mandamus  cannot  be  denied.  It  has  to  be  appreciated  that  the  appellants  trust  was  managing  the  affiliated  college  to  which  public  money  is  paid  as  government  aid.  Public money paid as government aid plays a  

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major role in the control,  maintenance and  working  of  educational  institutions.  The  aided  institutions  like  government  institutions discharge public function by way  of imparting education to students. They are  subject  to  the  rules  and  regulations  of  the  affiliating  University.  Their  activities  are  closely  supervised  by  the  University  authorities.  Employment  in  such  institutions,  therefore,  is not devoid of  any  public  character.3 So  are  the  service  conditions of  the  academic staff.  When the  University  takes  a  decision  regarding  their  pay  scales,  it  will  be  binding  on  the  management.  The service  conditions  of  the  academic staff are, therefore, not purely of a  private  character.  It  has  super-added  protection by University decisions creating a  legal right-duty relationship between the staff  and  the  management.  When  there  is  existence  of  this  relationship,  mandamus  cannot be refused to the aggrieved party.

20. The term “authority” used in Article 226,  in  the  context,  must  receive  a  liberal  meaning  unlike  the  term  in  Article  12.  Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights  under  Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the  High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of  the  fundamental  rights  as  well  as  non- fundamental rights. The words “any person or  authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore,  not  to  be  confined  only  to  statutory  authorities  and  instrumentalities  of  the  State.  They may cover any other person or  body performing public duty. The form of the  body concerned is  not  very  much relevant.  What  is  relevant  is  the  nature  of  the  duty  imposed  on  the  body.  The  duty  must  be  judged in the light of positive obligation owed  by  the  person  or  authority  to  the  affected  

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party. No matter by what means the duty is  imposed,  if  a  positive  obligation  exists  mandamus cannot be denied.”SLP No.11208  of 2015

19.  This issue was again examined in great detail  

by the Constitution Bench in Zee Telefilms Ltd. &  

Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 649  

wherein  the  question  which  fell  for  consideration  

was  whether  the  Board  of  Control  for  cricket  in  

India (in short “BCCI”) falls within the definition of  

“State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. This  

Court approved the ratio laid down in Andi Mukta’s  

case(supra)  but  on  facts  of  the  case  held,  by  

majority,  that  the  BCCI  does  not  fall  within  the  

purview of the term  State.   This Court, however,  

laid down the principle of law in Paras 31 and 33 as  

under :

“31. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied  that  the  Board  does  discharge  some duties  like the selection of an Indian cricket team,  controlling the activities of the players and  others involved in the game of cricket. These  activities  can  be  said  to  be  akin  to  public  

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duties or State functions and if there is any  violation  of  any  constitutional  or  statutory  obligation  or  rights  of  other  citizens,  the  aggrieved party may not have a relief by way  of a petition under Article 32. But that does  not  mean  that  the  violator  of  such  right  would go scot-free merely because it or he is  not a State. Under the Indian jurisprudence  there  is  always  a  just  remedy  for  the  violation of a right of a citizen. Though the  remedy under Article 32 is not available, an  aggrieved  party  can  always  seek  a  remedy  under the ordinary course of law or by way of  a  writ  petition  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution,  which  is  much  wider  than  Article 32.

33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body  exercises its public functions even if it is not  a State,  the aggrieved person has a remedy  not  only  under  the  ordinary  law  but  also  under  the  Constitution,  by  way  of  a  writ  petition under Article 226………………….”  

20. It is clear from reading of the ratio decidendi of  

judgment in Zee Telefilms Ltd. (supra) that firstly,  

it is held therein that the  BCCI discharges public  

duties and secondly, an aggrieved party can, for this  

reason,  seek a public law remedy against the BCCI  

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

21. Applying the aforesaid principle of law to the  

facts of the case in hand, we are of the considered  

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view that the Division Bench of the High Court erred  

in holding that respondent No. 1 is not subjected to  

the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article  

226 of the Constitution.  In other words, it should  

have been held that respondent No.1 is subjected to  

the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article  

226 of the Constitution.

22. This  we  say  for  the  reasons  that  firstly,  

respondent No. 1 is engaged in imparting education  

in higher studies to students at large. Secondly, it is  

discharging "public function" by way of imparting  

education.  Thirdly,  it  is  notified  as  a  "Deemed  

University" by  the  Central  Government  under  

Section  3  of  the  UGC  Act.  Fourthly,  being  a  

“Deemed University”, all the provisions of the UGC  

Act are made applicable to respondent No. 1, which  

inter  alia provides  for  effective  discharge  of  the  

public function - namely  education for the benefit  

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of public.  Fifthly, once respondent No. 1 is declared  

as   “Deemed University" whose all functions and  

activities are governed by the UGC Act, alike other  

universities  then it  is  an  "authority" within  the  

meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.   Lastly,  

once it is held to be an "authority" as provided in  

Article  12  then  as  a  necessary  consequence,  it  

becomes amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court  

under Article 226 of the Constitution.

23. In the light of foregoing discussion, we cannot  

concur  with  the  finding  rendered  by  the  Division  

Bench and accordingly while reversing the finding  

we  hold  that  the  appellant's  writ  petition  under  

Article 226 of the Constitution against respondent  

No. 1 is maintainable.   

24. This takes us to the next argument urged by  

learned  counsel  for  the  respondents.  Placing  

reliance on para 231 of the decision of this Court in  

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T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation  &  Ors.  vs.  State  of  

Karnataka  &  Ors. (2002)  8  SCC  481,  learned  

counsel  contended  that  even  assuming  that  the  

appellant's  writ  petition  is  maintainable,  yet  it  

should not be entertained for hearing on merits and  

instead the appellant be granted liberty to approach  

the District Judge/Additional District Judge of the  

concerned District which is designated as Tribunal  

till formation of regular Tribunal for redressal of her  

grievances as directed by the Constitution Bench in  

Para 231 of  T.M.A. Pai's case (supra).

25. In normal course, we would have been inclined  

to accept this submission made by learned counsel  

for  the  respondents  and would  have  also  granted  

liberty to the appellant to approach the Tribunal in  

term  of  the  directions  given  by  the  Constitution  

Bench  of  this  Court.  But  since  in  this  case,  the  

Single  Judge  not  only  entertained  the  appellant's  

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writ  petition  but  he  allowed  the  writ  petition  on  

merits  whereas  the  Division  Bench  held  the  writ  

petition as not maintainable  and thus declined to  

examine the  merits  of  the  controversy involved in  

the writ petition.  

26. We  do  not  consider  it  proper  to  direct  the  

appellant at this stage to approach the Tribunal and  

file  a  dispute  before  the  Tribunal.  Instead,  we  

consider it just and proper to remand the case to  

the Division Bench of the High Court to decide the  

respondent's appeal on merits on the question as to  

whether the Single Judge was justified in allowing  

the writ petition on merits.

27. Before parting,  we consider it apposite to state  

that we have not examined the controversy raised  

by the appellant in her writ petition on merits and  

confined our examination to the question whether  

the  writ  petition  against  respondent  No.  1  was  

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maintainable or not.    

28. In  view  of  foregoing  discussion,  the  appeal  

succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set  

aside. Writ Appeal No. 932 of 2013 out of which this  

appeal arises is restored to its original number. The  

Division  Bench  is  requested  to  decide  the  appeal  

expeditiously  on  merits  in  accordance  with  law  

without being influenced by any of our observations.

                                    .……...................................J.                     [J. CHELAMESWAR]

                               ………..................................J.                      [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi, December 15, 2015.

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