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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 441 OF 2015

DM Wayanad Institute of Medical Sciences  …..Petitioner(s)

versus Union of India and another …..Respondent(s)

AND

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 448 OF 2015

P. Krishna Das and another …..Petitioner(s) versus

Union of India and others      …..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T M. Y. EQBAL, J.   Knocking the doors of  this Court in the first instance

under  the  garb  of  a  petition  under  Article  32  of  the

Constitution, instead of approaching the High Court, for the

enforcement  of  right  claimed  in  these  writ  petitions  is  the

preliminary question we are deciding herein.

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2. In these two writ petitions, the petitioners have invoked

the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  under  Article  32  of  the

Constitution of  India  challenging  the  refusal  of  the  Medical

Council of India (MCI) to recommend the renewal of permission

for admitting students for the academic year 2015-16 in the

MBBS Course of the petitioner institutes and the consequent

refusal of the Union Government to renew such permission.

W.P. (Civil) No. 441 of 2015:

3. The petitioner  institute  was said to  have been granted

permission for admitting 150 students in the MBBS course for

the academic year 2013-14 and permission was renewed for

the academic year 2014-15. The petitioner applied for renewal

of  permission  for  the  academic  year  2015-16  pursuant  to

which the assessors from the MCI conducted an inspection on

12th and 13th December, 2014 and submitted a report dated

15.12.2014 in which no deficiencies were alleged to have been

pointed out.  

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4. However,  the assessors from MCI were alleged to have

made another  surprise  inspection on 6th February,  2015 at

3.00 PM and directed the Dean to call for a faculty meeting at

3.30 PM.  Many teachers could not attend the meeting alleged

to have left the college for lunch or Friday prayers or having

gone home for the weekend while many others who came after

3.30 PM from different parts of the campus were not allowed

to  attend  the  meeting.  Many  of  the  Resident  Doctors  were

stated to have been absent on account of the imminent State

Level PG Entrance Test.  Another inspection was conducted on

7th February, 2015. The inspection report was alleged to have

been inaccurate and signed in protest by the Dean.

5.  The  aforesaid  report  was  considered  by  the  Executive

Committee  of  the  MCI  on  10th February,  2015  and  it  was

decided not to recommend the renewal of the permission of the

petitioner  and  the  same  was  communicated  to  the  Union

Government,  which  sent  letter  dated  04.03.2015  to  the

petitioner to appear for a hearing. After the hearing where the

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petitioner was said to have justified the deficiencies that were

pointed  out,  the  Central  Government  sent  letter  dated

22.05.2015  directing  the  MCI  to  conduct  a  reassessment.

However, the MCI was alleged to have not done a re-inspection

as directed on the ground that a decision had already been

made not to recommend the renewal by invoking Regulation 8

(3) (1) (a) of the Establishment of Medical College Regulations,

1999.

6. Thereafter,  the  Union  Government  published  a  list  on

17.06.2015 stating that the permission of the petitioner college

for the academic year 2015-16 had not been renewed and a

letter dated 15.06.2015 was sent to the petitioner informing

the same.

7.  The  petitioner  filed  the  present  petition  praying  for

declaring  the  second  inspection  conducted  on  6th and  7th

February,  2015  to  be  illegal  and  for  directing  the  MCI  to

recommend  the  renewal  of  the  approval  of  the  petitioner

college for the academic year 2015-16 on the basis of the first

inspection  conducted  on  12th and  13th December,  2014.  A

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prayer  has  also  been  made  for  directing  the  Central

Government to issue the letter of renewal accordingly.      

W.P. (Civil) No.448 of 2015 8.  The petitioner-college was granted provisional affiliation

for starting  the  MBBS  course  for  the academic session

2014-15  with  150  students.   It  appears  that  a  surprise

inspection  was  made  by  MCI  and  many  deficiencies  were

pointed  out.   The  Executive  Committee  of  MCI  after

considering the inspection report recommended disapproval of

the  college.   The  Central  Government  directed  the  MCI  to

reconsider the matter.  However, the MCI reiterated its stand

of  not  recommending  the  renewal  of  permission  for  the

sessions 2015-16. The petitioner has challenged the decision

of the Medical Council of India.

9. We have heard Mr. Kapil  Sibal,  learned senior counsel

appearing  in  W.P.  (Civil)  No.441  of  2015  and  Mr.  V.  Giri,

learned  senior  counsel  appearing  in  W.P.(Civil)  No.  448  of

2015 on the maintainability  of the writ petition under Article

32 of the Constitution of India.

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10. Mr.  Sibal,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the

petitioner, submitted that because of the time schedule fixed

in Priya Gupta’s case, 2012 (7) SCC 433, the petitioner has no

option but  to  move this  Court  in  order  to  get  the  relief  by

issuance  of  appropriate  directions  to  the  respondents.

Learned senior counsel also drawn our attention to para 13 of

the judgment rendered by this Court in Priyadarshini Dental

College and Hospital vs. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 4

SCC 623.  

11. Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel appearing in one of

the writ petitions, advanced the same arguments for filing the

writ  petition  before  this  Court  under  Article  32  of  the

Constitution instead of approaching the High Court.

12.  Both the learned senior counsel, however, claimed their

right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of

India.

13. At the very outset, we wish to extract the relevant portion

of Article 19 of the Constitution which reads as under:-

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“19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc (1) All citizens shall have the right

(a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or unions; (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) to  reside  and  settle  in  any  part  of  the territory of India; and (f) omitted (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business

(2) ----------------- (3) ------------------ (4) --------------------- (5) --------------------- (6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general  public,  reasonable  restrictions  on  the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause,  and,  in particular,  nothing in the said sub  clause  shall  affect  the  operation  of  any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,

(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary  for  practising  any  profession  or carrying  on  any  occupation,  trade  or business, or (ii) the  carrying  on  by  the  State,  or  by  a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of  any  trade,  business,  industry  or  service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.”

14.  From a bare reading of the provision contained in Article

19(1)(g)  it  is  evidently  clear   that  the  citizens  have  been

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conferred with the right to practice any profession or carry on

any occupation, trade or business, but such right is subject to

the restriction and imposition of condition as provided under

Article 19(6) of the Constitution.

15. In  Unni Krishnan’s case, 1993 (1) SCC 645, the right

guaranteed  under  Article  19(1)(g)  has  been  elaborately

discussed by the five Judges Constitution Bench.  The Court

held that imparting education cannot be treated as a trade or

business.  Trade  or  business  normally  connotes  an  activity

carried  on  with  a  profit  motive.   This  Court  observed  that

education has  never  been nor  can it  be  allowed to  become

commerce in this country.  Education has always been treated

in this country as religious and charitable activity and making

it  commercial  is  opposed  to  the  ethos,  tradition  and

sensibilities of this nation.  A citizen of this country may have

a right to establish an educational institution but no citizen,

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person or institution has a right  much less of  fundamental

right to affiliation or recognition.  Their Lordships observed:-

“67. Even  on  general  principles,  the  matter could  be  approached  this  way.  Educational institutions  can  be  classified  under  two categories: 1. Those requiring recognition by the State and 2. Those who do not require such a recognition.

67a. It  is  not  merely  an  establishment  of educational  institution,  that  is  urged  by  the petitioners,  but,  to  run  the  educational institution  dependent  on  recognition  by  the State. There is absolutely no fundamental right to  recognition  in  any  citizen.  The  right  to establishment  and  run  the  educational institution  with  State’s  recognition  arises  only on  the  State  permitting,  pursuant  to  a  policy decision or on the fulfilment of the conditions of the statute. Therefore, where it is dependent on the permission under the statute or the exercise of an executive power, it cannot qualify to be a fundamental right. Then again, the State policy may dictate a different course.

xxx xxx xxx 72. Accordingly,  it  is  held  that  there  is  no fundamental  right  under  Article  19(1)(g)  to establish  an  educational  institution,  if recognition or affiliation is sought for  such an educational  institution.  It  may  be  made  clear that  anyone desirous of  starting an institution purely  for  the  purposes  of  educating  the students could do so but Sections 22 and 23 of the  University  Grants  Commission  Act  which prohibits  the  award  of  degrees  except  by  a University must be kept in mind.”

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16. Considering  the  facts  of  the  case  as  averred  by  the

petitioners  and  the  rights  claimed  therein,  we  are  of  the

considered opinion that the petitioners, even though have a

right  to  establish  institutions  for  imparting  medical  and

technical education, such right is not a fundamental right.

17. From reading of Article 32, it is manifest that clause 1(i)

of Article 32 guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court

for  an  appropriate  writ  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the

Fundamental Rights included in Part-III  of the Constitution.

The  sole  object  of  Article  32  is  the  enforcement  of

Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It follows

that no question other than relating to the Fundamental Right

will  be  determined  in  a  proceeding  under  Article  32  of  the

Constitution.  The difference between Article 32 and 226 of the

Constitution is that while an application under Article 32 lies

only  for  the  enforcement  of  Fundamental  Rights,  the  High

Court  under  Article  226  has  a  wider  power  to  exercise  its

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jurisdiction  not  only  for  the  enforcement  of  Fundamental

Rights but also ordinary legal right.

18.  It is equally well settled that this Court under Article 32

will  not  interfere  with  an  administrative  order  where  the

constitutionality of the statute or the order made thereunder is

not challenged on the ground of contravention of Fundamental

Rights.  At the same time if the validity of the provisions of

statute  is  challenged  on  the  ground  other  than  the

contravention  of  Fundamental  Rights,  this  Court  will  not

entertain that challenge in a proceeding under Article 32 of the

Constitution.

19.  In the case of Northern Corporation vs. Union of India,

(1990)  4  SCC  239,  a  petition  under  Article  32  of  the

Constitution  of  India  was  moved  by  the  transferee  licence

holder.  The maintainability of the application under Article 32

of  the  Constitution  of  India  was  seriously  objected  by  the

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Union  of  India.   Writing  the  judgment,  Hon’ble  Sabyasachi

Mukherjee, the then CJI, held:-

“11. However,  there  is  a  far  more  serious objection in entertaining this application under Article 32 of the Constitution, Article 32 of the Constitution  guarantees  the  right  to  move  the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights.  If  there  is  breach  of  the  fundamental rights, the petitioner can certainly have recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution provided other conditions  are  satisfied.  But  we  must,  in  all such cases, be circumventive of what is the right claimed. In this case, the petitioner as such has no  fundamental  right  to  clear  the  goods imported except in due process of law. Now in the facts of this case, such clearance can only be made  on  payment  of  duty  as  enjoined  by  the Customs Act. In a particular situation whether customs duty is payable at the rate prevalent on a particular  date or  not  has to  be determined within  the  four  corners  of  the  Customs  Act, 1962. The petitioner has no fundamental right as  such  to  clear  any  goods  imported  without payment of duties in accordance with the law. There  is  procedure  provided  by  law  for determination of the payment of customs duty. The revenue has proceeded on that basis.  The petitioner contends that duty at a particular rate prevalent at a particular date was not payable. The petitioner cannot seek to remove the goods without payment at that rate or without having the  matter  determined  by  the  procedure envisaged  and  enjoined  by  the  law  for  that determination. The petitioner without seeking to take any relief  within the procedure  envisaged under the Act had moved this Court for breach of fundamental right. This is not permissible and should never be entertained. In a matter of this nature  where  liability  of  a  citizen  to  pay  a particular duty depends on interpretation of law

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and determination of facts and the provision of a particular statute for which elaborate procedure is  prescribed,  it  cannot  conceivably  be contended that enforcing of those provisions of the Act would breach fundamental right which entitle a citizen to seek recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion  that  relief  under  Article  32  of  the Constitution is wholly inappropriate in the facts and  the  circumstances  of  this  case.  It  has further to be reiterated that for enforcement of fundamental  right  which  is  dependent  upon adjudication  or  determination  of  questions  of law as well  as question of  fact  without  taking any resort to the provisions of the Act, it is not permissible to move this Court on the theoretical basis  that  there  is  breach of  the  fundamental right. Whenever a person complains and claims that  there  is  a  violation  of  law,  it  does  not automatically  involve  breach  of  fundamental right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32  of  the  Constitution is  attracted.  It  appears that  the  facts  of  this  nature  require  elaborate procedural investigation and this Court should not be moved and should not entertain on these averments  (sic)  of  the  Article  32  of  the Constitution. This position is clearly well settled, but sometimes we are persuaded to accept that an allegation of  breach of  law is  an action in breach of fundamental right.”

20. In  the  case  of  Kanubhai  Brahmbhatt  vs.  State  of

Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1159, this Court took serious concern

of the litigants coming to this Court under Article 32 of the

Constitution  instead  of  first  moving  the  appropriate  High

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Court  for  the  redressal  of  their  grievances.   This  Court

observed as under:

“3. If  this  Court  takes  upon  itself  to  do everything which even the High Court can do, this Court will not be able to do what this Court alone  can  do  under  Article  136  of  the Constitution  of  India,  and  other  provisions conferring  exclusive  jurisdiction on this  Court. There is no reason to assume that the concerned High Court will not do justice. Or that this Court alone can do justice. If this Court entertains writ petitions at the instance of parties who approach this  Court  directly  instead  of  approaching  the concerned High Court in the first instance, tens of thousands of writ petitions would in course of time  be  instituted  in  this  Court  directly.  The inevitable  result  will  be  that  the  arrears pertaining  to  matters  in  respect  of  which  this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution  will  assume  more  alarming proportions.  As it  is,  more than ten years old civil  appeals and criminal  appeals  are sobbing for attention. It will  occasion great misery and immense  hardship  to  tens  of  thousands  of litigants if the seriousness of this aspect is not sufficiently  realized.  And  this  is  no  imaginary phobia. A dismissed government servant has to wait  for  nearly  ten  years  for  redress  in  this Court.  Kashinth  Dikshita  v.  Union  of  India, (1986)  3  SCC  229:  (AIR  1986)  SC  2118).  A litigant  whose  appeal  has  been  dismissed  by wrongly refusing to condone delay has to wait for 14 years before his wrong is righted by this Court. Shankarrao v. Chandrasenkunwar, Civil Appeal No.1335(N) of 1973 decided on January 29,  1987. The time for  imposing self-discipline has already come, even if it involves shedding of some amount of institutional ego, or raising of some eyebrows. Again, it is as important to do justice at this level, as to inspire confidence in

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the  litigants  that  justice  will  be  meted  out  to them at the High Court level, and other levels. Faith must be inspired in the hierarchy of courts and the institution as a whole, not only in this Court alone. And this objective can be achieved only this Court showing trust in the High Court by directing the litigants to approach the High Court in the first instance. Besides, as a matter of  fact,  if  matters  like  the  present  one  are instituted in the High Court, there is a likelihood of  the  same  being  disposed  of  much  more quickly,  and  equally  effectively,  on  account  of the  decentralisation  of  the  process  of administering justice. We are of the opinion that the petitioner should be directed to adopt this course and approach the High Court.”

21. In  the  case  of   Ram  Jawaya  Kapur  vs.  State  of

Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549 = (1955) 2 SCR 225, the petitioner

was carrying on business of printing, publishing books for sale

including text books used in the schools of State of Punjab.

The State of Punjab decided in furtherance of their policy of

nationalization  of  text  books  for  the  school  students.

According to the Policy, all  recognized schools had to follow

the  course  of  studies  approved  by  the  Government.   The

petitioners alleged in support of their petitions under Article

32  that  the  Punjab  Government  has  in  pursuance  of  their

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policy  of  nationalization  of  text  books  issued  a  series  of

notifications  regarding  the  printing,  publication  and  sale  of

these  books  and  thereby  ousted  them  from  the  business

altogether.   Dismissing  the  writ  petition,  a  five  Judges

Constitution  Bench,  headed  by  the  then  Chief  Justice

observed:-

“21. As  in  our  view  the  petitioners  have  no fundamental right in the present case which can be said to have been infringed by the action of the Government, the petition is bound to fail on that ground. This being the position, the other two points raised by Mr Pathak do not require consideration at all. As the petitioners have no fundamental  right  under  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the Constitution,  the  question  whether  the Government could establish a monopoly without any  legislation  under  Article  19(6)  of  the Constitution is altogether immaterial.  Again  a  mere  chance  or  prospect  of  having particular customers cannot be said to be a right to property or to any interest in an undertaking within  the  meaning  of  Article  31(2)  of  the Constitution  and  no  question  of  payment  of compensation can arise because the petitioners have been deprived of  the same.  The result  is that the petition is dismissed with costs.”

22. In the case of  Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti vs. Union of

India,  (1990) 2 SCC 352, a similar question relating to the

maintainability  of  the  writ  petition  under  Article  32  of  the

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Constitution  came  for  consideration  before  a  three  Judges’

Bench of this Court for the enforcement of any Government

policy.  In the writ petition, the petitioner sought for issuance

of the writ of mandamus directing Central Government to hold

pre-medical and pre-dental examination in Hindi and regional

languages, which according to the petitioner is mandated by

Article 29(2) of the Constitution of India.  While permitting the

petitioner  to  withdraw its  petition,  the  Court  observed  that

Article  32  of  the  Constitution  guarantees  enforcement  of

Fundamental Rights but violation of Fundamental Right is the

sine qua non for seeking enforcement of those rights by the

Supreme  Court.   In  order  to  establish  the  violation  of

fundamental right, the Court has to consider the direct and

inevitable consequences of the action which is sought to be

remedied or the guarantee of which is sought to be enforced.

Where  the  existence  of  fundamental  right  has  to  be

established by acceptance of a particular policy, or a course of

action  for  which  there  is  no  legal  compulsion  or  statutory

imperative and on which there are divergent views, the same

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cannot  be  sought  to  be  enforced  by  Article  32  of  the

Constitution.

 23. In  the  case  of  J.  Fernandes  &  Co.  vs.  Dy.  Chief

Controller of Imports and Exports, (1975) 1 SCC 716, this

Court, while considering writ petition under Article 32 of the

Constitution, observed that a petition under Article 32 will not

be  competent  to  challenge  any  erroneous  decision  of  an

authority.  A wrong application of law would not amount to a

violation of fundamental right. If the provisions of law are good

and  the  orders  passed  are  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the

authorities, there is no infraction of fundamental right if the

authorities are right or wrong on facts.  

24. In the case of Ujjam Bai vs. State of U.P, AIR 1962 SC

1621=(1963) 1 SCR 778, before the seven Judges’ Constitution

Bench, a question came for consideration as to whether an

assessment  made by  an authority  under  the  taxing  statute

which  is  intra  vires and  in  the  undoubted  exercise  of  its

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jurisdiction  can  be  challenged  under  Article  32  of  the

Constitution  of  India?   Answering  the  question,  Their

Lordships held as under:

“21. In my opinion, the correct answer to the two questions which have been referred to this larger Bench  must  be  in  the  negative.  An  order  of assessment  made  by  an  authority  under  a taxing  statute  which  is  intra  vires  and in  the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction cannot be challenged on the sole ground that it is passed on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued thereunder. Nor can the validity  of  such  an  order  be  questioned  in  a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The proper remedy for correcting an error in such an order is to proceed by way of appeal,  or if the error  is  an  error  apparent  on  the  face  of  the record, then by an application under Article 226 of  the  Constitution.  It  is  necessary  to  observe here that Article 32 of the Constitution does not give this Court an appellate jurisdiction such as is  given  by  Arts  132  to  136.  Article  32 guarantees the right to a constitutional remedy and relates only to the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. Unless a question of the enforcement of a fundamental right arises, Article 32 does not apply. There can be  no  question  of  the  enforcement  of  a fundamental  right  if  the  order  challenged  is  a valid and legal order, in spite of the allegation that it  is erroneous. I  have,  therefore,  come to the  conclusion  that  no  question  of  the enforcement of fundamental right arises in this case and the writ petition is not maintainable.”

25. Their Lordships further observed:

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“38. As I have said above, the submission of the learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  is  well founded.  It  has  the  support  of  the  following decisions of  this Court which I  shall  now deal with.  In  Gulabdas  v.  Assistant  Collector  of Custom 1957 AIR(SC) 733, 736.) it was held that if  the  order  impugned  is  made  under  the provisions of a statue which is intra vires and the  order  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the authority making it then whether it  is right or wrong, there is no infraction of the fundamental rights and it has to be challenged in the manner provided  in  the  Statute  and not  by  a  petition under Article 32. In that case the petitioner was aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Collector of  Customs  who  assessed  the  goods  imported under  a  licence  under  a  different  entry  and consequently a higher Excise Duty was imposed. The  petitioners  feeling  aggrieved  by  the  order filed  a  petition  under  Article  32  and  the objection  to  its  maintainability  was  that  the application could not be sustained because no fundamental  right  had  been  violated  by  the impugned  order  it  having  been  properly  and correctly made by the authorities competent to make it. The petitioner there contended that the goods  imported,  which  were  called  &'Lyra&' brand  Crayons  were  not  crayons  at  all  and therefore imposition of a higher duty by holding them  to  be  crayons  was  an  infringement  of fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) & (g).”

26. Coming back to the instant writ petitions, indisputably,

the petitioners have challenged the decision of MCI and the

Central Government refusing to grant permission or renewal to

carry on their courses for the Academic Session 2015-16.  The

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decisions are based on the inspection reports submitted by the

teams  of  MCI.   The  jurisdiction  of  MCI  or  the  Central

Government to grant or  refuse to grant permission has not

been challenged.  Hence,  it  is  well  within  the jurisdiction of

MCI which is statutory body to take a decision based on the

inspection  of  the  college  to  satisfy  itself  the  compliance  of

various provisions of the acts, rules and regulations.

27. Under Article  32 of  the Constitution,  this Court is not

supposed to go into finding of facts recorded by the authorities

and  to  come  to  a  different  conclusion.   Moreover,  having

regard to the law settled by Constitution Bench of this Court

in number of decisions, in our considered opinion, the rights

so  claimed  by  the  petitioners  are  not  fundamental  rights;

hence the same cannot be agitated directly before this Court

under Article 32 of the constitution.

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28. We,  therefore,  dismiss  these  writ  petitions  filed  under

Article 32 of the Constitution.  However, this will not prevent

the  petitioners  from  agitating  their  grievances  before  the

appropriate  forum  including  the  High  Court  having

jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

…………………………….J. (M.Y. Eqbal)

…………………………….J. (Arun Mishra)

New Delhi July 23, 2015

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