10 May 2011
Supreme Court
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DHARMATMA SINGH Vs HARMINDER SINGH .

Bench: R.V. RAVEENDRAN,A.K. PATNAIK, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001126-001126 / 2011
Diary number: 12358 / 2008
Advocates: SANJAY JAIN Vs RAKHI RAY


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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1126 of 2011  (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 3391 of 2008)

Dharmatma Singh                          …… Appellant

Versus

Harminder Singh & Ors.                          …… Respondents

J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.

Leave granted.

2. This is an appeal by way of Special Leave against the  

order dated 25.03.2008 of  the  High Court  of  Punjab and  

Haryana in Criminal Misc. No.10664-M of 2007 quashing a  

criminal proceeding against respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

3. The relevant facts briefly are that on 12.12.2004, F.I.R.  

No.276  was  registered   at  Police  Station  Sadar,  District  

Ludhiana, against the appellant under Sections 452, 324,  

323, 506, 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code

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(for short ‘the IPC’) on information furnished by respondent  

No.1.  The allegations in the F.I.R. were that on 12.12.2004,  

at  about  8.00 a.m.,  the  respondent  No.1 and his  mother  

were on their plot of land and they had engaged mason and  

labours for  erecting walls  on the plot  when the appellant  

with others came armed with weapons and started beating  

the respondent  No.1 and his  mother  and as a result  the  

respondent No.1 and his mother suffered injuries and were  

admitted in the hospital.  On 13.12.2004, the appellant gave  

a  different  version  of  the  incident  on  12.12.2004  to  the  

police alleging that when he along with his father Mohan  

Singh reached the plot, they saw the respondent Nos. 1 and  

2  along with  others  erecting  walls  on the plot  and when  

Mohan Singh stopped the mason saying that the plot was a  

disputed one, respondent no.2 gave a lalkara and all others  

attacked Mohan Singh and the appellant caused injuries on  

them  and  as  a  result  they  have  been  admitted  to  the  

hospital.  After investigation, the police filed two challans on  

02.02.2006  before  the  Judicial  Magistrate,  First  Class,  

Ludhiana.   Under  one  challan,  the  appellant,  his  father  

Mohan Singh and Bhupinder Singh were charge-sheeted for  

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offences  under  Sections  452,  323,  326,  506  read  with  

Section  34  of  the  IPC  and  under  the  other  challan,  

respondent  Nos.1  and  2  and  some  others  were  charge-

sheeted for offences under Sections 342, 323, 324, 148 of  

the IPC.  On 22.03.2006, the respondent No.1 submitted an  

application  to  the  Additional  Director  General  of  Police,  

Crime Branch, Punjab, pursuant to which the prosecution  

moved an application before the Judicial Magistrate,  First  

Class on 19.07.2006 for permission to investigate further in  

the case and on 27.07.2006 the Judicial Magistrate, First  

Class,  Ludhiana,  granted  such  permission  to  the  

prosecution.

4. After  further  investigation,  the  Superintendent  of  

Police, City-II, Ludhiana, submitted his report to the Deputy  

Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana Range.  The relevant  

portion of the report of the Superintendent of Police, City-II,  

Ludhiana,  which  contains  his  conclusions  after  further  

investigation, is extracted hereinbelow:

“I  found  during  my  investigation  that  Mohan  Singh, son of Shri Sher Singh , Dharmatma Singh,  Harpal Singh, Jagdev Singh and Bhupinder Singh,  sons of Mohan Singh, residents of Pullanwal, sold  one plot  of 1 kanal 13 marlas on 09.03.2004 to  Bharpur Sigh, Harnek Singh, sons of Balbir Singh,  

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Jagjit  Singh,  son  of  Amarjit  Singh,  Gurcharan  Singh, son of Hari Dass and Jagdev Singh, son of  Harpal  Singh,  resident  of  Phulanawal  through  registered  sale  deed  vasikha  No.23895  and  the  mutation No.10940 duly  entered in the  name of  purchasing  party.  The  purchasing  party  Harminder  Singh  @  Hindri,  son  of  Shri  Harnek  Singh on 12.12.2004 was constructing 4 walls on  this  plot  by  employing  labours  and  mason  and  while  so  in  the  meantime  Dharmatma  Sigh,  Bhupinder  Singh,  sons  of  Mohan  Singh  and  Mohan Singh came present on this plot and they  stopped forcibly  Harminder  Singh not  to  erect  4  walls and when Harminder Singh @ Hindri did not  stop,  they  started  beating  Harminder  Singh  @  Hindri  with their  weapons and he  ultimately  for  his  self  defence  ran  towards  his  house  and  all  these  three  persons  while  following  Harminder  Singh  entered  his  house.   Smt.  Kamaljit  Kaur,  mother  of  Harminder  Singh was  also  present  in  the  house  and  in  this  incident,  she  got  also  various  injuries.   During  this  incident,  Mann  Singh,  Bharpur  Singh,  son  of  Balbir  Singh  also  come  present  at  the  place  of  occurrence,  after  hearing  the  raula  of  Harminder  Singh  @  Hindri  and his mother Kamaljit kaur and none was other  present at the place of seen and Dharmatma Singh  party have wrongly mentioned the name of other  persons  in  the  cross  case.   In  this  incident,  Dharmatma Singh also got some injuries and as a  result  of  that  and  as  per  M.L.R.,  a  case  under  Sections 323, 324 IPC alleged to have been made  out  and  the  injuries,  which  got  by  Harminder  Singh @ Hindri  etc.,  a case under Sections 323,  324,  326  IPC is  made  out.   Since  Dharmatama  Singh, Bhupinder Singh and Mohan Singh while  entering  into  the  house  of  Harminder  Singh  @  Hindri  gave injury to Harminder Singh @ Hindri  and  the  aforesaid  Harminder  Singh  for  his  self  defence gave some injuries to Dharmatma Singh  etc. and the same shall come under the definition  of self defence and, therefore, no proceeding/case  

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can be initiated against Harminder Singh @ Hindri  party and therefore,  the cross case as registered  against  Harminder  Singh  @  Hindri  party  is  required  to  be  cancelled.   And  if  your  goodself  agree with the report, please necessary orders be  issued  in  this  regard  to  S.H.O.  Police  Station  Sadar, Ludhiana.  

     Sd/- (D. P. Singh)

S.  P.  City-II,  Ludhiana”

It will be clear from the aforesaid extract from the report of  

further investigation that Superintendent of Police, City II,  

Ludhiana,  was  of  the  opinion  that  respondent  No.1  gave  

some  injuries  to  the  appellant  and  others  for  his  self-

defence and such injuries come under the definition of right  

of private defence and, therefore, no proceedings could be  

initiated against  respondent  No.1 and the case registered  

against respondent No.1 should be cancelled.  

5. The  Deputy  Inspector  General  of  Police,  Ludhiana  

Range,  to  whom  the  aforesaid  report  was  submitted,  

referred  the  matter  to  the  Additional  Director  General  of  

Police,  Crime  Branch,  Punjab,  Chandigarh,  and  the  

Additional Director General of Police was of the opinion that  

as  the  challans  had  already  been  filed  against  the  

respondents  in  the  cross-case,  the  decision  of  the  case  

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should be left to the Court.  The opinion of the Additional  

Director General of Police as stated in his communication to  

the  Deputy  Inspector  General  of  Police,  Ludhiana  Range,  

Ludhiana, is quoted herein below:

“After  thoroughly  investigating  this  case,  finding  has  already  been  recorded  at  ADGP/Crime  level  that  Man  Singh,  Harminder Singh party did not cause injuries  to other party in self  defence.  In the main  case  and  cross  case,  challan  has  already  been presented in the court.  During further  investigation,  no  new  evidence  came  on  record.  In other words, report of S.P. City I,  Ludhiana is not based on any such evidence  which was not available at the time of inquiry  conducted by the Crime Wing.  So, the cross  case  does  not  deserve to  be  cancelled.   By  ignoring the above report, decision of the case  should be left to the court.

Sd/-

For  Addl.  Director  General  of  Police,

Crime, Punjab, Chandigarh”

6. However, before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate,  

First  Class,  Ludhiana,  could  apply  its  mind  and  take  a  

decision on the original challan against respondents No. 1  

and  2  and  on  the  report  of  further  investigation  

recommending dropping of the criminal proceedings against  

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them,  respondent  Nos.  1  and  2  filed  Criminal  Misc.  

Application No.10664-M of 2007 under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  

on 17.02.2007 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana  

praying for quashing of DDR No.15 dated 13.12.2004 and  

the challan filed against them by the police in the Court of  

Judicial  Magistrate,  First  Class.   After  considering  the  

report  of  further  investigation  recommending  dropping  of  

the  criminal  proceedings  against  respondent  No.1  and  

others,  the High Court  passed the impugned order dated  

25.03.2008  quashing  the  criminal  proceedings  initiated  

pursuant to the DDR No.15 dated 13.12.2004 and further  

directing that the criminal proceedings against the appellant  

at the behest of the respondent No.1 initiated pursuant to  

the F.I.R. No. 276 dated 12.12.2004 shall not be affected.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the  

power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be exercised  

only  in  the  exceptional  circumstances  and that  the  High  

Court should not have exercised this power and quashed  

the criminal proceedings against the respondents No.1 and  

2 when the Magistrate was yet to exercise his judicial mind  

under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. to the police reports filed  

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under Section 173 of  the Cr.P.C.   He submitted that the  

Magistrate  before  whom  the  entire  records  were  placed  

including  the  evidence  collected  during  the  investigation  

was  in  a  better  position  to  appreciate  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the case and pass orders whether to take  

cognizance of the offences against the respondents No.1 and  

2 registered pursuant to the DDR No.15 dated 13.12.2004  

on  the  basis  of  information  furnished  by  the  appellant.  

Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, on the  

other hand,  relied on the report of the Superintendent of  

Police,  City-II,  Ludhiana,  recommending  dropping  of  the  

criminal  proceedings  against  them  and  supported  the  

impugned  order  passed  by  the  High  Court  quashing  the  

criminal proceedings against them.

8.   For  deciding  the  issue,  we  must  first  refer  to  the  

provisions of  Section 173 of  the Cr.P.C.  under which the  

police submits reports after investigation and after further  

investigation, Section 190 of the Cr. P.C. under which the  

Magistrate  takes  cognizance  of  an  offence  upon  a  police  

report and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. under which the High  

Court  exercises  its  powers  to  quash  the  criminal  

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proceedings.   These  three  provisions  of  the  Cr.P.C.  are  

extracted below:

“173. Report of police officer on completion of  investigation. (1) Every investigation under this  Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary  delay.

[(1A)  The  Investigation  in  relation  to  rape  of  a  child may be completed within three months from  the date on which the information was recorded  by the officer in charge of the police station.]

(2)(i)  As  soon as  it  is  completed,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  police  station  shall  forward  to  a  Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the  offence on a police report,  a report in the form  prescribed by the State Government, stating-

(a) the names of the parties;

(b) the nature of the information;

(c) the names of the persons who appear  to be acquainted with the circumstances  of the case;

(d) whether any offence appears to have  been committed and, if so, by whom ;

(e)  whether  the  accused  has  been  arrested;

(f) whether he has been released on his  bond and, if so, weather with or without  sureties;

(g)  whether  he  has  been  forwarded  in  custody under section 170.

[(h)  whether  the  report  of  medical  examination  of  the  woman  has  been  

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attached  where  investigation  relates  to  an  offence  under  section  376,  376A,  376B, 376C or 376D of the Indian Penal  Code (45 of 1860)]

 (ii)  The officer  shall  also communicate,  in such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  State  Government,  the  action  taken  by  him,  to  the  person, if any, by whom the information relating  to the commission of the offence was first given.

(3)  Where  a  superior  officer  of  police  has  been  appointed under section 158, the report shall, in  any  case  in  which  the  State  Government  by  general or special order so directs, be submitted  through  that  officer,  and  he  may,  pending  the  orders  of  the  Magistrate,  direct  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  police  station  to  make  further  investigation.

(4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded  under  this  section  that  the  accused  has  been  released on his bond, the Magistrate shall make  such  order-  for  the  discharge  of  such bond  or  otherwise as he thinks fit.

(5) When such report is in respect of a case to  which section 170 applies, the police officer shall  forward to the Magistrate alongwith the report-

(a)  all  documents  or  relevant  extracts  thereof  on  which  the  prosecution  proposes  to  rely  other  than  those  already  sent  to  the  Magistrate  during  investigation;

(b)  the  statements-recorded  under  section 161 of all the persons whom the  prosecution proposes to examine as its  witnesses.

(6) If the police officer is of opinion that any part  of  any  such  statement  is  not  relevant  to  the  

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subject-matter  of  the  proceedings  or  that  its  disclosure to the accused is not essential in the  interests  of  justice  and  is  inexpedient  in  the  public interest, he shall indicate that part of the  statement  and  append  a  note  requesting  the  Magistrate to exclude that part from the copies to  be granted to the accused and stating his reasons  for making such request.

(7) Where the police officer investigating the case  finds it  convenient so to do, he may furnish to  the accused copies of all or any of the documents  referred to in sub-section (5).

(8)  Nothing  in  this  section  shall  be  deemed  to  preclude  further  investigation  in  respect  of  an  offence  after  a  report  under  subsection  (2)  has  been  forwarded  to  the  Magistrate  and,  where  upon such investigation, the officer in charge of  the police station obtains further evidence, oral  or  documentary,  he  shall  forward  to  the  Magistrate a further report or reports regarding  such evidence in the form prescribed ; and the  provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far  as  may be,  apply  in  relation to  such report  or  reports  as  they  apply  in  relation  to  a  report  forwarded under sub-section (2).

190.  Cognizance of offences by Magistrate.  –  (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any  Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate  of the second class specially empowered in this  behalf  under  sub-section  (2),  may  take  cognizance of any offence-

(a)  upon receiving a complaint  of  facts  which constitute such offence;

(b) upon a police report of such facts;

(c)  upon information received from any  person  other  than  a  police  officer,  or  

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upon  his  own  knowledge,  that  such  offence has been committed.

(2)  The Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  may empower  any  Magistrate  of  the  second  class  to  take  cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences  as are within his competence to inquire into or  try.

482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.-  Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or  affect the inherent powers of the High Court to  make such orders as may be necessary to give  effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent  abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to  secure the ends of justice.”

9. A reading  of  provisions  of  sub-section (2)  of  Section  

173, Cr.P.C. would show that as soon as the investigation is  

completed,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  police  station  is  

required  to  forward  the  police  report  to  the  Magistrate  

empowered to take cognizance of the offence stating  inter   

alia whether  an offence  appears  to  have  been committed  

and if so, by whom.  Sub-section (8) of Section 173 further  

provides that where upon further investigation, the officer in  

charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or  

documentary,  he  shall  also  forward  to  the  Magistrate  a  

further report regarding such evidence and the provisions of  

sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., shall, as far as may  

be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply  

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in  relation  to  a  report  forwarded  under  sub-section  (2).  

Thus, the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 after  

the initial investigation as well as the further report under  

sub-section  (8)  of  Section  173  after  further  investigation  

constitute “police report” and have to be forwarded to the  

Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence.  It  

will also be clear from Section 190 (b) of the Cr.P.C. that it  

is the Magistrate, who has the power to take cognizance of  

any  offence  upon  a  “police  report”  of  such  facts  which  

constitute  an  offence.   Thus,  when  a  police  report  is  

forwarded to the Magistrate either under sub-section (2) or  

under sub-section (8) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., it is for the  

Magistrate to apply his mind to the police report and take a  

view whether to take cognizance of an offence or not to take  

cognizance of offence against an accused person.  

10.  It follows that where the police report forwarded to the  

Magistrate under Section 173 (2) of the Cr.P.C. states that a  

person has committed an offence, but after investigation the  

further report under Section 173 (8)  of  the Cr.P.C. states  

that the person has not committed the offence, it is for the  

Magistrate to form an opinion whether the facts, set out in  

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the  two  reports,  make  out  an  offence  committed  by  the  

person.   This  interpretation  has  given  by  this  Court  in  

Abhinandan Jha & Ors. v. Dinesh Mishra [AIR 1968 SC 117]  

to  the  provisions  of  Section  173  and  Section  190  of  the  

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, which were the same as in  

the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973.   In  Abhinandan  Jha  

(supra), para 15 at page 122 of the AIR this Court observed:  

“…  The  police,  after  such  investigation,  may  submit a charge-sheet, or, again submit a final  report, depending upon the further investigation  made  by  them.   If  ultimately,  the  Magistrate  forms the opinion that the facts, set out in the  final report, constitute an offence, he can take  cognizance  of  the  offence,  under  Section  190(1)(b), notwithstanding the contrary opinion  of the police, expressed in the final report.”

11. After referring to the law laid down in Abhinandan Jha  

(supra) this Court has further held in Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj   

& Anr. v.  Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Anr. [AIR 1996 SC 309]  

that where the police in its report of investigation or further  

investigation recommends discharge of the accused, but the  

complainant seeks to satisfy the Court that a case for taking  

cognizance  was  made  out,  the  Court  must  consider  the  

objections  of  the  complainant  and  if  it  overrules  such  

objections,  it  is  just  and  desirable  that  the  reasons  for  

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overruling the objections of the complainant be recorded by  

the Court and this was necessary because the Court while  

exercising power under Section 190, Cr.P.C. whether to take  

cognizance  or  not  to  take  cognizance  exercises  judicial  

discretion.   

12. In the facts of the present case, the police in its report  

submitted to the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ludhiana,  

on  02.02.2006  had  filed  two  challans,  one  against  the  

appellant,  his  father  Mohan Singh  and  Bhupinder  Singh  

stating  that  they  had  committed  offences  under  Sections  

452, 323, 326, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC and the  

other challan against the respondent Nos.1 and 2 and some  

others  stating  that  they  had  committed  offences  under  

Sections  342,  323,  324,  148  of  the  IPC.   Pursuant  to  

permission  granted  by  the  learned  Magistrate  on  

27.07.2006 for  further  investigation,  a  further  report  has  

been  made  by  the  Superintendent  of  Police,  City-II,  

Ludhiana, stating that respondent no.1 for his self-defence  

had caused injuries to the appellant and others and hence  

the cross-case against the respondent no.1 is required to be  

cancelled.  This  further  report  has to  be forwarded to  the  

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learned Magistrate and as has been held by this Court in  

Abhinandan Jha (supra) and Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj  (supra)  

it was for the learned Magistrate to apply judicial mind to  

the facts stated in the reports submitted under sub-sections  

(2) and (8) respectively of Section 173, Cr.P.C., and to form  

an  opinion  whether  to  take  cognizance  or  not  to  take  

cognizance  against  the  respondent  no.1  after  considering  

the  objections,  if  any,  of  the  complainant,  namely,  the  

appellant.

13.    Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. saves the inherent powers  

of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary  

to  give  effect  to  any  order  under  the  Code  or  to  prevent  

abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the  

ends of  justice.   It  has been held by this  Court  in  R.  P.  

Kapur v.  State  of  Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866]  that Section  

561-A  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1898  (which  

corresponds to Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code,  

1973) saves the inherent power of the High Court to make  

such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order  

under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any  

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and such  

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inherent  power  cannot  be  exercised  in  regard  to  matters  

specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code and  

therefore  where  the  Magistrate  has  not  applied  his  mind  

under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. to the merits of the reports  

and passed order, the High Court ought not to consider a  

request for quashing the proceedings.  In the case of  R. P.  

Kapur (supra)  on  10.12.1958,  M.L.  Sethi  lodged  a  First  

Information Report against R.P. Kapur and alleged that he  

and  his  mother-in-law  had  committed  offences  under  

Sections 420-109, 114 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code.  

R.P.  Kapur  moved  the  Punjab  High  Court  under  Section  

561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the  

proceedings initiated by the First Information Report.  When  

the petition of R.P. Kapur was pending in the High Court,  

the police report was submitted under Section 173, Cr.P.C.  

and the High Court held that no case had been made out for  

quashing  the  proceedings  under  Section  561-A  of  the  

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and dismissed the petition.  

R. P. Kapur carried an appeal by way of Special Leave to  

this Court and this Court dismissed the appeal for inter alia  

the following reasons:  

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“ …  In the present case the magistrate before  whom the police report has been filed under S.  173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to  the  merits  of  the  said  report  and  it  may  be  assumed  in  favour  of  the  appellant  that  his  request for the quashing of the proceedings is  not at the present stage covered by any specific  provision of the Code.  It is well established that  the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can  be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper  case either to prevent the abuse of the process  of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of  justice.  Ordinarily,  criminal  proceedings  instituted against an accused person must be  tried under the provisions of the Code, and the  High Court would be reluctant to interfere with  the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage...”  

 As  we  have  found  in  the  present  case  that  learned  

Magistrate had not applied his mind to the merits of the  

reports  filed  under  Section  173,  Cr.P.C.,  we  are  of  the  

considered opinion that the exercise of power by the High  

Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C., was at an interlocutory  

stage and was not warranted in the facts of this case.

14.    In  the  result,  the  appeal  is  allowed  and  the  

impugned order dated 25.03.2008 is set aside. The police  

will  forward  the  further  report  of  the  Superintendent  of  

Police, City-II, Ludhiana, to the Magistrate concerned and  

the  learned  Magistrate  will  apply  his  mind  to  the  police  

report already forwarded to him and the further report of  

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further  investigation  forwarded  to  him  and  take  a  final  

decision  in  accordance  with  law  after  considering  the  

objections, if any, of the appellant against the further report  

of further investigation.   

 

……………………..J.                                                                (R.V. Raveendran)

……………………..J.                                                                (A. K. Patnaik) New Delhi, May 10, 2011.     

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