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PETITIONER: DHANANJOY DAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DISTRICT MAGISTRATE & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/08/1982

BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) TULZAPURKAR, V.D.

CITATION:  1982 AIR 1315            1983 SCR  (1) 122  1982 SCC  (2) 521        1982 SCALE  (1)636

ACT:      Constitution of India-Article 22(5)-Rights of detenu.      National Security  Act,  1980-Section  3(3)-Grounds  of detention-Inclusion of  paragraph in  the nature of preamble or introduction-Validity.      National  Security   Act,  1980-Section  3(3)-Order  of detention-Proof  of   satisfaction  of  detaining  authority Extraneous evidence not admissible.      National Security  Act,  1980-section  3(3)-Grounds  of detention-Vagueness-Determination of.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  was detained  by  an  order  made  under section 3 (3) of the Act. The grounds of detention served on him consisted of 4 paragraphs. The first part of paragraph 1 was admittedly introductory. The latter part of paragraph  1 was in the following terms:           "Shri Das  has been  playing a leading part in the current agitation  on foreigners issue in collaboration with other active  agitators who  are leaders of AASU, Karmachari Parishad and  Gana Sangram  Parishad, by  organising bundhs, non-cooperation programme,  inciting people  to violate  law from time  to time. Such activities have disturbed peaceful, tolerant and harmonious life of society".      Paragraphs 2  and 3  gave details as to the part played by the  appellant in  a programme relating to obstruction of road and  rail traffic  and violation of curfew by thousands of people.  The first  sentence of paragraph 4 stated: "Such activities of  Shri Dhananjoy  Das are  prejudicial  to  the interest of maintenance of public order."      The appellant  challenged the order by a petition under Article 226 which was dismissed by the High Court.      In appeal,  counsel for  the appellant  contended  that paragraph 1  of the  grounds was  so vague that the order of detention  must  be  quashed  on  that  ground  alone,  that paragraphs 2  and 3  also sufferred  from vagueness  for the reason that they did not mention certain necessary facts and that the facts 123 alleged in the grounds of detention only made out a case for maintenance of law and order and not of public order.      Counsel for  the respondent  submitted that paragraph 1

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was only  a prelude or introductory and it did not deal with the  grounds  on  which  the  District  Magistrate  had  his subjective satisfaction in passing the order.      Counsel for  the appellant,  on the other hand, relying on certain  observations in  Mohd. Yousuf Rather v. State of Jammu &  Kashmir, contended  that Article 22(5) provided for supplying of  grounds and  there could  be  no  preamble  or introduction to  the grounds  of detention. It was submitted that the  District Magistrate  himself had  in his  counter- affidavit treated  paragraph 1  as constituting  one of  the grounds of  detention although  he had  subsequently changed his position  by filing  a supplementary  affidavit  on  the basis of  a note  made by  him earlier in his correspondence with the  State Government. Counsel contended that the order of detention  was conclusive  as to the state of mind of the person who  made it  and no  such  extraneous  evidence  was admissible.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: The  law is by now well settled that a detenu has two rights  under Article  22(5) of the Constitution: (1) to be informed,  as soon as may be, of the grounds on which the order of  detention is  made, that is, the grounds which led to the  subjective satisfaction  of the detaining authority; and (2)  to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against  the order  of detention, that is, to be furnished  with sufficient  particulars to  enable him to make a  representation which  on being considered may obtain relief to  him. The  inclusion  of  an  irrelevant  or  non- existent  ground,   among  other  relevant  grounds,  is  an infringement of the first of the rights and the inclusion of an obscure  or vague  ground among  other clear and definite grounds is an infrigement of the second of the rights. It is by virtue  of the  second right that the detaining authority has to  supply the  material facts  on the  basis  of  which subjective satisfaction was derived for passing the order of detention and this is how the facts from which the inference is drawn  also become a part and parcel of the grounds. [134 D-G]      (b) There  is no bar to have introductory paragraphs in the grounds  of detention.  The observations in Mohd. Yousuf Rather’s case  do not indicate that there can be no preamble or introductory paragraph; those observations only mean that all allegations  of facts  which have  led to the passing of the order  of detention  will form  part of  the grounds  of detention. [129 G]      (c) Whether  a  particular  paragraph  in  the  grounds amounts only  to a  preamble or introduction or contains the grounds on  the basis  of which  the detaining authority had the subjective  satisfaction for  passing the order is to be determined on  the facts  and circumstances of each case and it is  open to the court to come to its own conclusion. [130 A-B] 124      (d) The  grounds of  detention must  be in existence on the date  of the order and the authority concerned has to be satisfied  about   them  on  the  date  of  the  order.  The satisfaction of the detaining authority must be clear on the face of  the order  and no extraneous evidence is admissible to prove  what actually  weighed with  the  authority  while passing the  order. It is not what a party chooses to put as a gloss  on the  grounds of detention but it is the document itself which  will be  taken to be the proof of what weighed with the  detaining authority  while passing the order. [135 D-E-F]

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    Mohd. Yousuf Rather v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1979) 4 S.C.C. 370, explained.      Naresh Chandra  Ganguli v. State of West Bengal, [1960] 1 S.C.R.  411; Dr.  Ram Manohar  Lohia v.  State  of  Bihar, [1966] 1  S.C.R. 709 and State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, [1951] S.C.R. 167, referred to.      In the  instant case  the tenor  of the  document  only indicates that  the three  organisations named  therein have been taking  part in  the current  agitation  on  foreigners issue in  the manner stipulated in paragraph 1, in which the appellant has also been playing a leading part. Paragraphs 2 and  3  deal  with  the  specific  part  attributed  to  the appellant on  specific days  and at specific places. That is why the  first sentence  of paragraph 4 stipulates that such activities of the appellant are prejudicial to the interests of maintenance  of public  order and  he was  called upon to make  a  representation  against  the  allegations  made  in paragraphs 2  and 3  of the  grounds. Significance  must  be attached to  the difference  in language  used in  the  last sentence of  paragraph 1 and the first sentence of paragraph 4.  Paragraf   1  only   contemplates   that   the   various organisations have been taking part in the current agitation on foreigners issue in the various modes enumerated therein. The document  read as  a whole indicates that paragraph 1 of the grounds  of detention  is only by way of introduction or preamble. The  vagueness in  paragraph 1  cannot be  made  a ground of attack on the impugned order. [131 C-F; 131 A; 133 C-D]      2. The  question whether  a particular  ground is vague will depend  on the  facts and  circumstances of  each  case because vagueness  is a  relative term. What may be vague in one case  may not  be so in similar circumstances of another case. If  the basic  facts have  been given  in a particular case constituting  the grounds of detention which enable the detenu to  make an  effective representation, merely because meticulous details  of facts  are not given will not vitiate the order of detention. [142 E-G]      Chaju Ram  v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1970) 1 S.C.C. 536; Gopal  Bauri v.  District Magistrate,  Burdwan &  Ors., [1953] S.C.C.  522; Dr.  Ram Krishan  Bhardwaj v.  State  of Delhi &  Ors., [1953]  S.C.R. 708;  Bhupen Deka  v. State of Assam, (1981)  Cri. L.J.  1743; Kamla  Kanyalal Khusalani v. State of  Maharashtra &  Anr., (1981)  1 S.C.C.  748; Naresh Chandra Ganguli  v. State  of West  Bengal, [1960]  1 S.C.R. 411; Masood Alam etc. v. Union of India & Ors. 125 [1973] 3 S.C.R. 268; Bidya Deb Barma v. District Magistrate, Tripura Agartala,  [1969] 1  S.C.R. 562;  and Vakil Singh v. State of  Jammu &  Kashmir, A.I.R.  1974 S.C. 2337, referred to.      In the  instant case  basic facts  have been  given  in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention to enable the appellant to make an effective representation. [142 G]      3. The  situation in  Assam is  a  grave  one  and  the agitation on  the issue  of foreigners has been going on for years and  it has  taken an  ugly and  serious turn, and the statement of facts made in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention,  in  the  prevalent  circumstances  in  Assam, relate to the maintenance of public order in view of the law laid down in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration & Ors. [143 H; 144 A]      Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709 and  Ashok Kumar  v. Delhi Administration & Ors., A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1143, referred to.

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JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal No. 199 of 1982.      From the  Judgment dated the 23rd February, 1982 of the High Court of Gauhati in Civil Rule No. 6 (HC) of 1982.      S.  Rangarajan,   Prabir  Chowdhury,  B.P.  Maheshwari, Suresh Sethi and Miss Asha Rani Jain, for the Appellant.      A.M. Mazumdar, Advocate General of Assam and S.K. Nandy for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      MISRA, J. The present appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Gauhati dated 23rd of February,  1982 dismissing the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution  challenging the  order of detention of the appellant.      The District  Magistrate, Darrang  passed an  order  of detention on  3rd of  January, 1982  against  the  appellant under s. 3 (3) of the National Security Act, 1980. The order of detention  along with  the grounds  was supplied  to  the appellant on the same day, that is, on 3rd of January, 1982. The appellant  was also  arrested on the same day. He made a representation on the 9th of January, 1982 126 through the Superintendent of Special Jail who forwarded the same to  the Government  on 10th of January, 1982. The State Government received the same on 11th of January, 1982 and it was rejected on 13th of January, 1982.      The order  of detention was challenged by the appellant on two  grounds :  (1) that  the grounds  of detention  were vague, and  (2) that  the  facts  narrated  in  the  grounds related to  law and order situation and not to public order. The High  Court repelled  both the grounds and dismissed the writ petition by its order dated 23rd of February, 1982. The High Court,  however, granted  a certificate  for  leave  to appeal to this Court.      Before dealing  with the  contentions in  this case  on behalf of  the parties  it will be appropriate at this stage to refer  to the  grounds of  detention which were served on the appellant :      "1.  Sri Dhananjay  Das,aged about  50 is the President           of Purbanchalia Lok Parishad, Tezpur Unit. He is a           contractor by profession. Sri Das has been playing           a  leading   part  in  the  current  agitation  on           foreigners  issue   in  collaboration  with  other           active  agitators   who  are   leaders  of   AASU,           Karmachari Parishad  and Gana Sangram Parishad, by           organising  bundhs,   non-cooperation   programme,           inciting people  to violate law from time to time.           Such activities  have disturbed peaceful, tolerant           and harmonious life of society.      2.   In connection  with the  programme of  Rasta  Roko           commencing from 0/50 hrs. of 31.12.81 to 1700 hrs.           of 1.1.82  Sri Das  in collaboration  with  others           like Nabab Shahjamal, Biren Baishya etc. mobilised           thousands  of  people  from  Parbatia,  and  other           neighbouring   areas   of   the   town   to   give           obstructions to  motor vehicles  on  31.12.81  and           railway traffic  on 1.1.82.  At the instigation of           Sri Das the people came in large numbers violating           prohibitory  orders.   On  1.1.82  the  crowd  was           instigated by him and aforesaid associates to pelt           stones, brickbats  etc.  on  police  personnel  on           duty.  This  led  to  greater  violence  in  which

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         railway slippers were burnt, and driver of fire- 127           brigade  was   shot  at.   Ultimately  firing  was           resorted to  and  three  persons  died  of  bullet           injury.      3.   On 2.1.82,  when the  whole Tezpur  Town was under           curfew, Sri  Das along  with his  other associates           mobilised  people  of  Parbatia  etc.  and  led  a           procession of  thousands of people through curfew-           bound areas  raisng slogans  instigating people to           violate curfew.  This crowd had to be dispersed by           use of force.      4.   Such  activities   of  Sri   Dhananjoy   Das   are           prejudicial to  the  interest  of  maintenance  of           public order.  It is  essential therefore  that in           order to  prevent him  from indulging in such like           prejudicial  acts,   Sri  Das  is  detained  under           National Security Act."      Shri Rangarajan,  counsel for  the appellant, seriously contended that  the first  paragraph of  the grounds  is  so vague that  the order  of detention  must be quashed on this ground alone. Shri A.M. Majumdar, Advocate General of Assam, on the  other hand  has contended  that the Ist paragraph of the grounds  was only a prelude or introductory and does not deal with  the grounds  on which the District Magistrate had his  subjective   satisfaction  for  passing  the  order  of detentio.      There is  no doubt  that if  the first paragraph of the grounds constitute the grounds of detention, it is vague and the order  of detention  must be  quashed on  the ground  of vagueness with  regard to  the statements contained therein. Therefore, the  main question for consideration in this case is whether  the first  paragraph of  the grounds  is  merely introductory or  a preamble  or a  prelude. Shri  Rangarajan contends that  there could  be no prelude or preamble to the grounds. Article  22 (5)  of the  Constitution provides  for supplying the  grounds  of  detention.  In  support  of  his contention he  placed reliance  on Mohd.  Yousuf  Rather  v. State of  Jammu & Kashmir & Ors.(1) In that case Dr. Singhvi for the State strenuously submitted that the first paragraph of  the  grounds  supplied  to  the  petitioner  was  of  an introductory nature,  that paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 referred to the events which furnished the      (1) [1979] 4 SCC 370. 128 background  and   that  the   penultimate  paragraph   alone contained the  grounds of  detention as  such. He  submitted that it was permissible to separate the introduction and the recital of  events  constituting  the  background  from  the grounds of  detention and  if that  was  done  it  would  be apparent that  the  order  of  detention  suffered  from  no infirmity. He sought to draw support for his submission from the decision  in Naresh  Chandra Ganguli  v. State  of  West Bengal.(1) In  that case  sections 3 and 7 of the Preventive Detention Act  1950 were the subject matter of consideration and this  Court held  that the  two sections  read  together contemplate that  the  copy  of  the  order  passed  by  the detaining authority  under s.  3 (2) of the Act to be served on the  detenu should  contain, (1)  a preamble  reciting in terms one  or more of the sub-clauses of cls. (a) and (b) of s.  3  (1)  as  its  object  or  objects,  (2)  the  grounds contemplated by s. 7, namely, the conclusions of fact, which led to  the passing of the order of detention, informing the detenu as  to why  he was  detained, and (3) particulars, if and where  necessary, but not those referred to in sub-ss. 3

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and (4) of s. 3 of the Act. This case thus contemplated of a preamble or introductory part in the grounds of detention      Shri Rangarajan  for the  appellant, however, contended that the  view taken in N.C. Ganguli’s case (supra) does not hold the field and he referred to the following observations made by  Chinnappa Reddy  J. in  Mohd. Yousuf  Rather’s case (supra) :           "It is  impossible to agree with the submission of           Dr.  Singhvi.   The  annexure   to  the  order  of           detention detailing  the grounds  of detention has           been  fully   extracted  by   my  learned  brother           Shinghal J.  We are  unable  to  see  how  factual           allegations  such   as  those   contained  in  the           paragraphs 1  to 5 of the grounds of detention can           be  said   to  be   merely  introductory   or   as           constituting the  background.  In  Naresh  Chandra           Ganguli v.  State of  W.B. what  was read  by  the           Supreme Court as the ’preamble’ was the recital in           terms of  section 3  (1) clause (a) and (b) of the           Preventive Detention Act, namely : that the detenu           was being detained in pursuance of a deten- 129           tion order made in exercise of the power conferred           by section  3 of  the Preventive  Detention Act on           the ground  that the detenu was acting in a manner           prejudicial to  the maintenance of public order as           evidenced by the particulars given thereafter. The           particulars given  in the  subsequent  paragraphs,           the Court said, constituted the grounds. We do not           understand Naresh Chandra Ganguli v. State of W.B.           as laying  down that  it is permissible to dissect           or  trisect   the  grounds   of   detention   into           introduction, background  and ’grounds’  as  such.           There is no warrant for any such division.           The distinction  made in  Naresh  Chandra  Ganguli           case between  the ’preamble’,  meaning thereby the           recital in  terms of  the statutory  provision and           the ’grounds’  meaning thereby  the conclusions of           fact which  led to  the passing  of the  order  of           detention does  not justify  any distinction being           made between introductory facts, background facts,           and ’grounds’  as such.  All allegations  of  fact           which have  led to  the passing  of the  order  of           detention are  ’grounds’  of  detention.  If  such           allegations are  irrelevant or vague the detenu is           entitled to be released." Shinghal J.,  with whom  Sarkaria J. concurred, however, did not go  to the  extent of  saying that  there  cannot  be  a preamble or  introduction to  the grounds.  According to the counsel for the appellant the observations made by Chinnappa Reddy J.  would be  taken to be the observations made by the Full Court  inasmuch as he agreed with the view expressed by Sarkaria and Shinghal JJ.      Be that  as it  may, the observations referred to above do  not   indicate  that   there  can   be  no  preamble  or introductory para  in the  grounds of detention. There is no bar to  have introductory  paragraphs in  the  grounds.  The observations only  mean all  allegations of facts which have led to  the passing of the order of detention will form part of the  grounds of detention. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the  contention that  there could  be no introductory para in the grounds. 130      Whether a  particular paragraph  in the grounds amounts only to  a preamble  or introduction  is to be determined on

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the facts  and circumstances  of each case and it is open to the Court  to  come  to  its  own  conclusion  whether  that paragraph is  only an  introductory  para  or  contains  the grounds on  the basis  of which  the detaining authority had the  subjective   satisfaction  for  passing  the  order  of detention.      ’Preamble’ has  been  defined  in  the  Oxford  English Dictionary to  mean a  preliminary statement  in  speech  or writing; an  introductory paragraph,  section, or  clause; a preface, prologue, introduction. It has further been defined there as  "an introductory  paragraph" or part in a statute, deed,  or  other  document  setting  forth  the  ground  and intention of  it." The  preamble thus  betokens  that  which follows.      The first part of paragraph 1 of the order of detention in the instant case is admittedly introductory where it says :           "Sri Dhananjoy  Das, aged  about 50  years is  the      President of Purbanchalia Lok Parishad, Tezpur Unit. He      is a contractor by profession."      The dispute  is about  the nature of the latter part of paragraph 1. It says :           "Sri Das  has been  playing a  leading part in the      current agitation  on foreigners issue in collaboration      with other  active agitators  who are  leaders of AASU,      Karmachari  Parishad  and  Gana  Sangram  Parishad,  by      organising bundhs,  non-cooperation programme, inciting      people  to   violate  law   from  time  to  time.  Such      activities  have   disturbed  peaceful,   tolerant  and      harmonious life of society." Paragraphs 2  and 3  of the  grounds of  detention deal with specific instances  of the  activities of the appellant. The penultimate paragraph 4 of the grounds says :           "Such  activities   of  Sri   Dhananjoy  Das   are      prejudicial to  the interest  of maintenance  of public      order." 131 Significance must  be attached  to the  language used in the last sentence  of the  Ist paragraph and the 1st sentence of the last paragraph, the former says:           "Such activities have disturbed peaceful, tolerant      and harmonious life of society." While  the  latter  i.e.,  the  1st  sentence  of  the  last paragraph 4 states that :           "Such  activities   of  Sri   Dhananjoy  Das   are      prejudicial to  the interest  of maintenance  of public      order." The tenor  of the  document indicate  that the appellant has been playing  a leading  part in  the current  agitation  on foreigners  issue   in  collaboration   with  other   active agitators who  are leaders  of AASU, Karmachari Parishad and Gana Sangram  Parishad by organising bundhs, non-cooperation programme, inciting people to violate law from time to time. It only  indicates that  the three  organisations have  been taking part  in the current agitation on foreigners issue in the manner  stipulated in  the first paragraph, in which the appellant has also been playing a leading part. Paragraphs 2 and 3  of the  grounds deal with specific part attributed to the appellant  on specific days and at specific places. That is why the first sentence of the last paragraph 4 stipulates such activities  of Sri Dhananjoy Das are prejudicial to the interests of  maintenance of  public order and the appellant was  called  upon  to  make  a  representation  against  the allegations made  against him  in paragraphs  2 and 3 of the grounds. The  first paragraph  only  contemplates  that  the

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various organisations  have been  taking part in the current agitation against  the foreigners issue in the various modes enumerated therein.      Shri  Rangarajan  sought  to  derive  support  for  his contention from averments made in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit filed  by  the  District  Magistrate  on  24th  of January, 1982 wherein it has been stated that ground No 1 is clear,  specific   and  eloquent   which  provided  all  the opportunities to  the detenu  to submit  his representation. This averment  was in  reply to  the allegation  made in the writ petition  that paragraph 1 of the grounds was vague and indefinite. Therefore,  on the  own showing  of the District Magistrate, he  treated paragraph  1 as  constituting one of the grounds  of detention.  Later on he sought permission of the Court to file a 132 supplementary  affidavit,   which  was   allowed.   In   the supplementary affidavit  he averred  that paragraph 1 of the grounds constitute  only a preamble or introductory para and the grounds  on which  he had  subjective  satisfaction  for passing the  order of  detention against  the appellant were contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention. In support  of the  application for  permission  to  file  a supplementary affidavit by way of clarification he relied on the parawise  comments made  by him which he had sent to the Government under  his memo.  No. DCM. 49/81/29 dated 15th of January 1982  with a copy to the Senior Government Advocate. While dealing  with paragraphs  9 and 10 of the petition the District Magistrate had commented that para 1 of the grounds of detention  is of the nature of introduction and para 4 is of the  nature of  conclusion. It was also submitted for the appellant that  the District Magistrate having once admitted in the  counter affidavit  that para  1 of  the  grounds  of detention constitute  grounds  of  detention  he  could  not subsequently turn  turtle and say that it was only by way of introduction or  preamble and he could not have been allowed to change  his position by filing a supplementary affidavit. The order  of detention,  said the counsel, is conclusive as to the  state of  mind of the person who made it and that no extraneous evidence can be taken into consideration to prove that state of mind and hence any additional evidence such as the note  made by the District Magistrate was not admissible to prove that the rule has been complied with. Such evidence could not have been given by the District Magistrate in view of  the  earlier  affidavit  dated  24th  of  January,  1982 expressly saying  that paragraph  1 is  the ground  which is clear, specific  and eloquent.  In support of his contention he placed  reliance on  Dr. Ram  Manohar Lohia  v. State  of Bihar.(1)      The Advocate  General of  Assam, on the other hand, has contended that  the counter  affidavit filed  earlier by the District Magistrate  was just in reply to the averments made in the  writ petition  and therein it was stated that ground No. 1  of the  grounds of detention was vague and indefinite and in  reply thereto  the District  Magistrate  denied  the vagueness of  that ground. The District Magistrate, however, has clarified  the position  in his para-wise comments which he had sent to the Government by memo. 133 No. DCM.  49/81/29 dated 15th of January, 1982. He clarified the position  that paragraph  1 of  the grounds of detention was only  a preamble  or introduction.  This was done by him long before  the filing  of the  writ petition  itself  and, therefore,  the   supplementary  affidavit   filed  by   him clarifying the  position cannot  be said  to  be  an  after-

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thought and  the High  Court accepted  the position that the District Magistrate  did not  take  into  consideration  the statement of  facts made  in paragraph  1 of  the grounds of detention.      The grounds  of detention read as a whole leave no room for doubt  that paragraph  1 of the grounds of detention was only by  way of introduction or as a preamble. In substance, it only  indicates the modus operandi adopted by the various organisations to  the current  agitation on foreigners issue in Assam.  The 2nd  and 3rd  paragraphs of  the  grounds  of detention allege  a specific part played by the appellant in that agitation.  On a  perusal of  grounds of detention as a whole we are satisfied that the view taken by the High Court that the  1st paragraph of the grounds of detention was only a preamble,  prelude, or  introductory para  is correct.  If this be the position then the vagueness in the 1st paragraph cannot be made a ground of attack on the impugned order.      The Advocate  General feebly  sought  to  contend  that assuming that  1st paragraph of the grounds also constituted the grounds  for detention there was no vagueness in as much as the  material facts  detailed in  paragraphs 2 and 3 were sufficient to  enable the  appellant to  make  an  effective representation. For  example, bundh referred to in paragraph 1 has  been detailed  in the  2nd paragraph, non-cooperation referred to  in paragraph  1  has  also  been  clarified  by necessary implication  in para  2 in  as much  as Rasta Roko programme or  creating obstacles  in the  roads  necessarily helped  the   non-cooperation  by   preventing  people  from attending  their   offices  or  performing  their  statutory duties.      In the  view that  we have taken that the 1st paragraph of the  grounds is  only introductory it is not necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter at length.      This takes us to the vagueness in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds  of detention  which specifically  refer to  the part played  by the  appellant in  the agitation on specific dates. 134      In ground  No. 2  it has  not been mentioned that Nabab Shahjamal and  Biren  Baishya  etc.  were  leaders  or  even connected with  any of the organisations mentioned in ground No. 1.  It was  not  even  stated  that  all  the  instances referred to  took place in Tezpur town. It has also not been stated what  were exactly  the acts  of instigation  by  the detenu. The place and the manner of inciting people who came in large  numbers to  violate prohibitory  orders or to pelt stones has not been mentioned.      In ground  No. 3  no particulars  were given about when the order  of curfew was promulgated and by whom. It is only baldly stated  that the  detenu "with  his other  associates mobilised people  of parbatia etc." The people assembled had come from  other places.  These places  were not  mentioned. None of  the details  of the  slogans by  way of instigating people to  violate the  curfew had  been mentioned  and thus grounds Nos. 2 and 3 also suffer from vagueness and this was quite sufficient to vitiate the proceedings.      The law  is by  now well  settled that a detenu has two rights under  Art. 22  (5) of  the Constitution  : (1) to be informed, as  soon as  may be,  of the  grounds on which the order of  detention is  made, that is, the grounds which led to the  subjective satisfaction  of the detaining authority, and (2)  to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against  the order  of detention, that is, to be furnished  with sufficient  particulars to  enable him to make a  representation which  on being considered may obtain

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relief to  him. The  inclusion  of  an  irrelevant  or  non- existent  ground,   among  other   relevant  grounds  is  an infringement of the first of the rights and the inclusion of an obscure  or vague  ground among  other clear and definite grounds is  an infringement  of the  second of  the  rights. Therefore in  this view of the legal position if the grounds are  vague   and  indefinite   that  would   amount  to   an infringement of  the second right of the appellant. It is by virtue of  the second right that the detaining authority has to  supply   the  material  facts  on  the  basis  of  which subjective satisfaction was derived for passing the order of detention and this is how the facts from which the inference is drawn  also become  a part  and parcel  of  the  grounds. Therefore, the  important question is whether grounds Nos. 2 and 3  are so  vague as  to infringe the second right of the appellant conferred by Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. 135      Shri Rangarajan  referred to  Dr. Ram  Manohar Lohia v. State of  Bihar and  Ors.(1) wherein  the Constitution Bench held :           "If on  its face an order of detention is in terms      of the  rule, ordinarily,  a court is bound to stay its      hands and  uphold the  order. When  an order  is on the      face of  it not  in terms  of the  rule, a court cannot      enter  into  an  investigation  whether  the  order  of      detention was  in fact  in terms  of the  rule. So  the      State cannot be heard to say or prove that an order was      in fact  made to  prevent acts  prejudicial  to  public      order though  the order  does not say so...The order is      conclusive as  to the  state of  the mind of the person      who made it and no evidence is admissible to prove that      state of  mind. Extraneous  evidence such  as the  note      made by  the District  Magistrate was not admissible to      prove that the rule has been complied with."      There is  no  denying  the  fact  that  the  ground  of detention must  be in  existence on  the date when the order was passed  and the  authority concerned has to be satisfied about the  grounds of detention on the date of the order and the satisfaction of the detaining authority must be clear on the face  of  it  from  the  grounds  of  detention  and  no extraneous evidence  is admissible  to prove  what  actually weighed with the detaining authority while passing the order of detention.      It must, however, be kept in mind that it is not what a party choose  to put a gloss on the grounds of detention but it is  the document  itself which  will be  taken to  be the proof of  what weighed  with the  detaining authority  while passing the  order of  detention and  it is for the Court to decide  whether   certain  paragraphs   of  the  grounds  of detention were  only by  way of  introduction or preamble or constitute the  grounds of  detention  itself.  As  observed earlier,  we   have  meticulously  perused  the  grounds  of detention and  the tenor  of the  document read  as a  whole indicates that the 1st paragraph of the grounds of detention is only by way of introduction or preamble.      Before dealing  with this  question of  vagueness about paragraph 136 No. 2  and 3  of the  grounds we  would like  to  deal  with certain authorities  which have  been cited on behalf of the appellant  to  indicate  what  constitutes  the  grounds  of detention. In the State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (1) this Court held :           "Clause (5)  of Art.  22 confers two rights on the      detenu, namely,  first, a  right to  be informed of the

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    grounds on  which the order of detention has been made,      and secondly,  to be  afforded the earliest opportunity      to make  a representation against the order; and though      these rights  are linked together they are two distinct      rights. If  grounds which  have a  rational  connection      with the  objects mentioned  in s.  3 are supplied, the      first condition is complied with. But the right to make      a representation  implies that  the detenu  should have      information  so   as  to   enable   him   to   make   a      representation, and  if the  grounds supplied  are  not      sufficient   to   enable   the   detenu   to   make   a      representation, he can rely on the second right. He may      if he  likes ask  for further  particulars  which  will      enable him to make a representation. On an infringement      of either of these two rights the detained person has a      right  to   approach  the   court,  and   even  if   an      infringement of  the second  right under Art. 22 (5) is      alone established he is entitled to be released."      As observed  earlier it  is on  account of  the  second right that  it becomes  necessary to give facts on which the conclusion is  based. By  now it  is well  settled that  the grounds of  detention constitute the facts also on which the conclusion has been drawn.      The learned  counsel for  the appellant  cited  various cases by  way  of  example  in  which  in  somewhat  similar situation the grounds of detention were branded as vague. In Chaju Ram  v. State  of Jammu  and  Kashmir(2)  the  grounds charged the  detenu with  having conspired with some leaders of Democratic  Conference and having incited landless people of R.S. Pura Tehsil to forcibly occupy the land comprised in Nandpur Mechanised Farm and to have persuaded them to resist violently any attempt to evict them. No details 137 of the  leaders of  the conference or of the persons incited or the  dates on which he conspired or incited the squatters or the time when such conference took place, were mentioned. In the  facts and  circumstances of  the case it was held by this Court :           "It would  be impossible  for anybody  to  make  a      representation against  such grounds. These grounds, on      the authorities of this Court, too numerous to be cited      here, must be held to be vague."      The next case cited was that of Gopal Bauri v. District Magistrate Burdwan  & Ors.(1)  The grounds  which  had  been furnished  to   the  detenu   in  that  case  described  the occurrences of two successive days, namely, March 20 and 21, 1973. Ground  No. 1  charged the  detenu with  regard to the incidence of  March 20,  1973 that  he with other associates committed theft  of ball  bearings and  wheels of the bucket carriages of  the rope-way  lines near Harishpur village and the  supply   of  sand  to  the  collieries  was  suspended. Likewise, about  the incidence  of March 21, 1973 the second ground charged  the detenu  that he  with  other  associates committed theft  of ball  bearings and  wheels of the bucket carriages from  the  rope-way  lines  at  Palashbon  village causing suspension  of supply of sand to the collieries. The detenu was  not communicated  the names  of  the  particular associates from  whose possession  recovery  of  the  stolen articles, the  subject matter of thefts disclosed in the two grounds, was made and on the facts and circumstances of that case it was found that the grounds of detention were vague.      In Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. State of Delhi & Ors.(2) one of the grounds of detention mentioned was that:           "You have  been  organising  the  movement  (Praja      Parishad Movement)  by enrolling  volunteers among  the

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    refugees in  your capacity  as President of the Refugee      Association of Bara Hindu Rao." This ground  was held  to be vague and even though the other grounds were not vague, the detention was held to be not in 138 accordance with  the procedure  established by  law and  was therefore illegal.      In Bhupen  Deka v.  State of Assam(1) only ground No. 1 was germane  to the  supplies and  services essential to the community. The  other grounds did not pertain to maintenance of supplies  and services  essential to  the community.  The Court on the facts held that :           "...there  is   nothing  in  the  ground  to  show      disclosure of  any material fact as to when, where, how      and in  what manner  the bundhs, picketings, satyagraha      had taken  place  and  how  and  in  what  manner  they      affected the  supplies and  services essential  to  the      community. There  is not a single specific date or time      of the  bundhs, picketings, satyagraha nor is there any      indication  as  to  how  the  "supplies  and  services"      essential to the community were affected." In the  circumstances the  order of  detention was  declared invalid and void on the ground of vagueness.      Shri  Rangarajan   also  referred   to  Kamla  Kanyalal Khushalani v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.(2) to contend that this case has added new dimension to various features of and concept of  liberty enshrined  in Art. 21. In the above case this Court observed :           "This Court  in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(3)      has widened  the horizon  of Article  21 and  added new      dimensions  to  various  features  of  and  concept  of      liberty  enshrined  in  Article  21.  In  view  of  the      decision in  the aforesaid  case, Article  22(5) of the      Constitution assumes  a new  complexion and  has to  be      construed liberally  and meaningfully  so as  to permit      the legislature to impose the minimum possible curbs on      the  precious   rights  of  a  citizen,  by  virtue  of      preventive detention.  If a  procedure under Article 21      has to  be reasonable,  fair and  just, then  the words      ’effective representation’  appearing in  Article 22(5)      must be 139      construed so  as  to  provide  a  real  and  meaningful      opportunity to  the detenu  to explain  his case to the      detaining authority in his representation. If the words      ’effective  representation’   are  interpreted   in  an      artificial or fanciful manner, then it would defeat the      very object  not only  of Article  22 (5)  but also  of      Article 21 of the Constitution."      The Advocate  General of  Assam, however,  on the other hand cited  cases in which in similar situations the grounds were not  branded as  vague. He  referred to  Naresh Chandra Ganguli v.  State of  West Bengal  (supra). In that case the argument was  that the grounds contained in paragraph 4 were vague and indefinite and not enabling the person detained to make his representation. It appeared from the said paragraph that the detenu in that case intended to proceed to Delhi on October 9,  1958 with  a view to instigate plans against the personal security of the Prime Minister. The place, date and purpose of  the planned  nefarious activities  had all  been stated as  clearly  as  could  be  expected.  The  argument, however, was  that it  was necessary to state the details of the plans  hatched in  Delhi. This  Court dealing  with  the point observed :      "There  are   several  answers   to  this   contention.

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    Paragraph  4  has  reference  to  something  which  was      apprehended but lay in the womb of the future. From the      nature of  the fact  that it was not an event which had      already happended but what was apprehended to be in the      contemplation of the detenu and his associates, if any,      no further  details  of  the  plan  could  possibly  be      disclosed." Reliance was  placed in  that case on the State of Bombay v. Atma Ram  Sridhar Vaidya  (supra) wherein  it was  held that vagueness is a relative term. It was observed further:           "Its  meaning   must  vary   with  the  facts  and      circumstances of  each case.  What may  be said  to  be      vague in  one case  may not  be so  in another,  and it      could not  be asserted  as a general rule that a ground      is necessarily vague if the only answer of the detained      person can  be to deny it. If the statement of facts is      capable of being clearly understood 140      and is  sufficiently definite  to enable  the  detained      person to  make his  representation, it  cannot be said      that it  is vague.  Further, it  cannot be  denied that      particulars of  what  has  taken  place,  can  be  more      definitely stated than those of events which are yet in      the offing.  In the  very nature  of things,  the  main      object of  the Act  is to  prevent persons  from  doing      something which  comes within the purview of any one of      the sub-clauses of cl. (a) of s. 3 (1) of the Act."      Next reliance  was placed  on Masood Alam etc. v. Union of India  & Ors.  (1).  In  this  case  also  the  order  of detention was  challenged on the ground of vagueness of some of the grounds. Reference was specially made to the last two lines of  ground No. 1 relating to the collection of Rs. 700 for Youth  Majlis and  to grounds Nos. 2 and 3. In the facts and circumstances of the case this Court held :           "If the  last two  lines are  read, as they should      be, along  with the  remaining contents of ground No. 1      it cannot  be said  that the  petitioner was  unable to      tender his  explanation with  respect to the allegation      contained therein.  Quite clearly,  the exact  point of      time and  the  people  from  whom  small  amounts  were      collected could  not possibly be stated with precision.      Grounds Nos.  2 and  3, as  is clear,  contain  precise      details in  the  various  clauses  enumerated  therein.      According to  ground No.  2 the  petitioner has  extra-      territorial loyalties and, therefore, he is a threat to      security of  India and this conclusion is arrived at on      the basis  of the  instances stated  in cls. (a) to (d)      which are precise and definite. Similarly, ground No. 3      says that  the petitioner  has been  exciting  communal      feelings among the Muslims in India and contributing to      communal  disturbances   in  Aligarh   city  and   this      conclusion is  based on instances stated in cls. (a) to      (d) which are precise and definite. The instances under      both these  grounds are  relevant and  germane  to  the      object which  is sought  to be  achieved by s. 3 of the      Act for the purpose of detaining persons who are likely      to act  in a  manner prejudicial to the security of the      State or maintenance of public order." 141      State of  Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (supra) was sought to  be distinguished  by  the  Advocate  General  and referred to the following observations made by the Court:           "This however does not mean that all facts leading      to the  conclusion mentioned  in the  grounds  must  be      conveyed to  the detained  person at  the same time the

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    grounds are  conveyed to  him. The  facts on  which the      conclusion mentioned  in the  grounds are based must be      available to  the Government,  but there  may be  cases      where there  is delay  or difficulty  in collecting the      exact date  or it  may not be convenient to set out all      the facts  in the  first communication.  If the  second      communication contains  no further  conclusion of  fact      from facts, but only furnishes all or some of the facts      on which  the first mentioned conclusion was founded it      is obvious  that no fresh ground for which the order of      detention was  made is  being furnished to the detained      person  by   the  second  communication  which  follows      sometime after the first communication."      Next reliance was placed on Bidya Deb Barma v. District Magistratc, Tripura,  Agartala.(1) In  that  case  also  the impugned order  was challenged  on the  ground of  vagueness inasmuch as  the ground  did not  give any  details since no particulars  of  time,  place  and  circumstances  had  been mentioned and  relevant and irrelevant matters had also been included. In  the  circumstances  of  the  case  this  Court negatived the contention and observed:           "The grounds  begin by  stating generally what the      activities  were.  They  consisted  of  instigation  of      tribal people  to practise  jhuming and  preventing the      authorities from  delivering paddy  to Government under      the procurement  schemes. This  instigation it  is said      was through  mass and  secret meetings  and resulted in      violent resistance  to Government. Having said this the      grounds then  specify the places where and the dates on      which the  meetings were held and the date on which and      place at  which  the  resistance  took  place.  In  our      judgment more detailed information was not necessary to      give  the   detenus  an   opportunity  to   make  their      representations." 142      In Vakil  Singh v.  State of  Jammu &  Kashmir(1)  this Court observed:           "’Grounds’ within the contemplation of s. 8 (1) of      the  Act  means  ’materials’  on  which  the  order  of      detention is primarily based. Apart from conclusions of      facts ’grounds’  have a factual constituent, also. They      must contain  the pith  and substance  of primary facts      but not  subsidiary facts  or evidential  details. This      requirement, as  to the  communication of all essential      constituents  of  grounds  was  complied  with  in  the      present case.  The basic  facts, as  distinguished from      factual details,  were in  corporated in  the  material      communicated to the detenu. He was told the name of the      notorious PAK  agent and  courier...through whom he was      supplying the information about the Indian Army. He was      informed about  the places  in Pakistan  which  he  was      visiting. He  was further  told that  in  lieu  of  the      supply of  this information he had been receiving money      from  Pakistan.   Nothing  more   was  required  to  be      intimated  to   enable  him   to  make   an   effective      representation. The facts which were not disclosed were      not basic facts and their non-disclosure did not affect      the petitioner’s right of making a representation."      After analysing  the various cases cited on either side we are  of the  view that  the question whether a particular ground is  vague will  depend on the facts and circumstances of each  case because vagueness is a relative term. What may be vague  in one case may not be so in similar circumstances of the  other case.  If the basic facts have been given in a particular case  constituting the grounds of detention which

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enable the  detenu  to  make  an  effective  representation, merely because  meticulous details  of facts  are not  given will  not   vitiate  the   order  of   detention.  We   have meticulously examined  paragraphs 2  and 3 of the grounds of detention and  we are satisfied, that basic facts have given to enable the appellant to make an effective representation. Of course, it would have been better if other minute details had also been given. 143      Lastly we  take up  the plea  raised on  behalf of  the appellant that the facts alleged in the grounds of detention only make  out a  case for  maintenance of law and order and not of  public order. The difference between the expressions ’law and  order’ and  ’public order’  has been  the  subject matter of  consideration by this Court on various occasions. In Dr.  Ram Manohar  Lohia v.  State of  Bihar (supra)  this Court observed:           "What was  meant by  the  ’maintenance  of  public      order’ was  the  prevention  of  disorder  of  a  grave      nature, a  disorder which  the  authority  thought  was      necessary to  prevent in view of the emergent situation      created by  external aggression; whereas the expression      ’maintenance of  law and  order’ may mean prevention of      disorder of  comparatively lesser  gravity and of local      significance only." Again, the  distinction was  brought out  in Ashok  Kumar v. Delhi Administration  & Ors.,  (1) to  which one of us was a party. This Court observed:           "The true distinction between the areas of "public      order" and  "law and  order" lies  not in the nature or      quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its      reach upon  society. The  distinction between  the  two      concepts of  "law and  order" and  "public order"  is a      fine one  but this  does not  mean that there can be no      overlapping. Acts  similar in  nature but  committed in      different  contexts   and  circumstances   might  cause      different  reactions.  In  one  case  it  might  affect      specific  individuals  only  and  therefore  touch  the      problem of  law and  order while  in another  it  might      affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not      determinant of  its own gravity. It is the potentiality      of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the      community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance      of public order."      The situation in Assam is a grave one and the agitation on the  issue of  foreigners has been going on for years and it has  taken an ugly and serious turn,and the statements of facts made in paragraphs 144 2 and  3 of  the  grounds  of  detention  in  the  prevalent circumstances in  Assam relate  to the maintenance of public order in view of the law laid down in the above case.      For the  foregoing discussion  the appeal must fail. It is accordingly dismissed. H.L.C.                                     Appeal dismissed. 145