REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6293 OF 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15151 of 2011)

Devendra Singh & Ors.                   ………….. Appellants

versus

State of U.P. & Ors.                                                  ………..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

H.L. Dattu, J.

Leave granted.

2). This  appeal,  by  special  leave,  is  directed  against  the  

Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2010 passed by the High Court of  

Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 61903 of  

2010 whereby, the writ petition filed by the appellants challenging  

the  acquisition  of  their  land  for  construction  of  District  Jail  by  

invoking Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act,  

1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) was dismissed.

3). The facts of the present appeal are as follows:-

The  District  Magistrate,  Jyotiba  Phule  Nagar,  had  sent  a  

proposal  to  the  Principal  Secretary,  Home/Prisons  Section  4,  

Government of  U.P.  for acquisition of  land situated at  Amroha-

Naugawan Sadat  Road  for  the  construction  of  District  Jail  vide  

letter  dated  24.01.2003.  After  the  gap  of  5  years,  the  Special  

Secretary,  Prisons  Administration  and  Reforms,  Government  of  

U.P.,  had requested  the  District  Magistrate  to  find the  available  

lands for acquisition, for the said purpose, in the proximity of the  

District Head Quarters vide letter dated 16.01.2008. Subsequently,  

the District Magistrate traced and informed the availability of such  

lands  in  village  Dasipur  and  other  nearby  villages  for  possible  

acquisition  to  the  Special  Secretary vide letter  dated  25.2.2008.  

Thereafter, the Special Secretary directed the Selection Committee  

to  inspect  the  available  lands  regarding  the  feasibility  of  their  

acquisition for the construction of Jail vide letter dated 22.04.2008.  

Accordingly,  the  Selection  Committee,  after  conducting detailed  

spot inspection of the available lands, found and recommended that  

the  lands  at  village  Dulhar  Sant  Prasad  were  suitable  for  

construction  of  Jail  on  05.05.2008.   In  this  backdrop,  the  

respondent  had  issued  a  notification  dated  05.03.2010  under  

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Section  4  read  with  Section  17(4)  of  the  Act  for  acquisition  of  

20.870 hectares  of  land at  village  Dulhapur  Sant  Prasad,  Tehsil  

Amroha, Jyotiba Phule Nagar for public purpose of construction of  

District Jail. The same was published in the local newspapers on  

26.03.2010.   The  relevant  part  of  the  notification  is  extracted  

below:

“UTTAR PRADEHS SHASAN KARAGAR  PRASHASAN EVEM SUDHAR ANUBHAG – 4

The Governor is pleased to order the publication   of the following English translation of Notification   No. 443/22-4-2010-101 (b) 2000 dated 05 March,   2010 for general information:

NOTIFICATION No. 443/22-4-2010-101 (b) 2000 Lucknow: Dated 05 March 2010

Under  subsection  (1)  of  section  4  of  the  Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1984 (sic.)), the   Governor  is  pleased  to  notify  for  general   information  that  the  land  mentioned  in  the  schedule  below is  needed for  the  public  purpose  namely,  for  construction  of  the  District  Jail  in   District Jyotiba Phule Nagar.

Being of opinion that provisions of subsection (1)   of section 17 of the said Act are applicable to the   said land in as much as the said land is urgently   required  for  construction  of  the  District  Jail  in   District  Jyotiba Phule Nagar and that in view of   the  pressing  urgency  it  is  as  well  necessary  to   eliminate to delay likely to be caused by an enquiry   under section 5-A of the said Act the Governor is   further pleased to direct,  under subsection (4)  of   section  17  of  said  Act,  that  the  provisions  of   section 5-A shall not apply.”

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4). Since  the  appellants’  land  was  also  included  in  the  

notification,  they  made  representations  dated  07.04.2010  and  

20.08.2010  to  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer,  the  District  

Magistrate, Jyotiba Phule Nagar, the Chief Minister and the Home  

Secretary, Government of U.P. with the request that their land may  

not  be acquired as  they  had raised  construction of  houses,  tube  

wells  and  lands  are  under  cultivation.  They  also  suggested  the  

availability of large tracts of alternative lands with no construction  

and irrigation facility situated within one Kilometer towards North.  

However,  the  concerned  authorities  did  not  reply  to  these  

representations  of  the  appellants.  Subsequently,  the  appellants,  

aggrieved by the said notification, filed Writ Petition No. 22252 of  

2010 before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, which was  

dismissed vide its  Order  dated 22.04.2010 without  deciding any  

issue on merits on the ground that the writ petition is premature as  

the  declaration  under  Section  6  has  not  been  issued.  The  High  

Court  further  granted  liberty  to  the  appellants  to  raise  all  the  

available grounds, including the applicability of Sections 17(1) and  

17(4) of the Act, in order to challenge the acquisition of their land  

once the State  Government  proceeds  to  issue Notification under  

Section 6(1) of the Act. Thereafter, the State Government issued a  

Notification dated 06.08.2010 under Section 6 read with Section  

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17(1) of the Act whereby, it directed the Collector of Jyotiba Phule  

Nagar to take possession of the said land on the expiry of 15 days  

from the date of publication of the Notice under Section 9(1) even  

in  the  absence  of  any  award  being  made  under  Section  11.  

Eventually, the Public Notice dated 03.09.2010 was issued, which  

expressed the intention of the Government to take possession of the  

said  land,  in  which  it  was  directed  to  the  appellants  to  appear  

before the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Jyotiba Phule Nagar.  

The appellants,  being aggrieved,  filed a Writ  Petition before the  

High Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad  interalia questioning  the  

correctness of the Notification dated 5.3.2010 issued under Section  

4 read with Section 17(4) and Notification dated 6.8.2010 issued  

under Section 6 read with Section 17(1) thereby dispensing with  

the opportunity of hearing and enquiry under Section 5-A of the  

Act. The High Court, vide its impugned Judgment and Order dated  

8.10.2010, dismissed the Wirt Petition and allowed the respondents  

to proceed further with acquisition of the said land in terms of the  

Act on the ground that the construction of the District Jail is an  

urgent matter which has been mentioned in the Notification under  

Section 4 as the very purpose of acquisition of the land. Aggrieved  

by this Judgment and Order of the High Court, the appellants are  

before us in this appeal.

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5). The  issue  involved  in  the  present  appeal  for  our  

consideration is:  Whether the respondent is  justified in invoking  

the  urgency  provision  under  Section  17(1)  and  excluding  the  

application of Section 5-A in terms of Section 17(4) of the Act for  

acquisition of the land for construction of District Jail.  

6). The learned counsel Shri. Prashant Kumar submits that the  

district of Jyotiba Phule Nagar came into existence on 24.04.1997.  

Since  then,  the  State  Government  had  not  shown  any  kind  of  

urgency and was only considering the proposal  of acquiring the  

land for the public purpose of construction of the District Jail. It  

was only in the year 2010 that the State Government had issued  

Notifications under Sections 4 and 6, invoking urgency provision  

as contemplated by the Sections 17(1) and 17 (4). In other words,  

the  lackadaisical  attitude  of  the  State  Government  since  the  

creation of the new district nearly 13 years ago does not exhibit or  

depict  any  kind  of  urgency  but  only  lethargy  on  their  part  in  

acquiring the land. Therefore, the urgency contemplated in the Act  

cannot be equated with dereliction of responsibility on the part of  

the  State  Government.  The  learned  counsel  contends  that  the  

respondents  had  unnecessarily  invoked  the  urgency  provisions  

under Section 17 (1) read with Section 17 (4) for acquisition of the  

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land for construction of the District Jail in view of the delay of 13  

years in the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act  

and still,  the said land is under the possession of the appellants.  

The learned counsel argues that invoking of the urgency provisions  

under  Section  17(4),  which  excludes  the  application  of  Section  

5-A,  by  the  respondents  in  the  absence  of  any  real  urgency  as  

contemplated by Section 17, amounts to illegal deprivation of the  

right to file objection and hearing of the appellants under Section  

5-A of the Act. He submits, relying on various decisions of this  

Court, that the expropriatory legislation like Land Acquisition Act  

must be given strict construction. He further submits that Section  

5-A is  a  substantial  right  and akin to Fundamental  Right  which  

embodies  a  principle  of  giving  of  proper  and  reasonable  

opportunity to the land owner to persuade the authorities against  

the acquisition of his land which can be dispensed with only in  

exceptional cases of real urgency.  The learned counsel relies on  

the decision of this Court in Dev Sharan & Others v. State of U.P.  

(2011) 4 SCC 769 in support of his contention that dispensing with  

the opportunity of hearing and enquiry under Section 5-A of the  

Act in view of prolonged lethargy of almost 13 years on the part of  

respondents by invoking emergency provisions under Section 17 is  

illegal and unjustified.  The learned counsel has further cited catena  

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of Judgments of this Court in support of his arguments which has  

already been dealt with by this Court in Radhy Shyam v.  State of   

U.P. (2011) 5 SCC 553.

7). Per Contra, the learned senior counsel Shri. K.K. Venugopal  

submits that the newly created district of Jyotiba Phule Nagar does  

not have a District Jail to lodge the prisoners of the district who are  

presently accommodated in the Moradabad District  Jail,  wherein  

the total population of inmates exceeds by more than three times  

the capacity of the Jail, causing great hardships to inmates. Further,  

producing of the prisoners from Moradabad Jail to various Courts  

in Jyotiba Phule Nagar raises financial and security concerns. He  

submits  that  since  the  creation  of  the  new  district,  the  State  

Government has been making continuous efforts for acquisition of  

land  to  construct  the  District  Jail.   However,  the  process  of  

construction of Jail could not be carried forward due to subsequent  

dissolution  of  the  district  vide  Notification  dated  13.04.2004,  

which was challenged before the High Court and later,  the High  

Court quashed the said Notification of Dissolution. Pursuant to this  

Order of the High Court,  the district  was recreated in 2004. He  

further submits that the State Government had issued a Notification  

dated 5.3.2010 under Section 4 read with Section 17 (4) of the Act  

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for  acquisition  of  the  said  land  for  public  purpose  of  urgent  

construction  of  Jail  in  the  newly  created  district  by  invoking  

Section 17(4) of the Act in order to eliminate delay likely to be  

caused by enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Subsequently, in  

view  of  the  said  urgency,  the  State  Government  had  issued  

Notification  dated  6.8.2010  under  Section  6  read  with  Section  

17(1) of the Act and published it in the Newspaper along with a  

Public  Notice  under  Section  9  of  the  Act  dated  20.08.2010,  all  

within  a  period  of  5  months.   Further,  the  respondents,  after  

hearing  the  objections  and  claims  of  the  appellants  dated  

03.09.2010 regarding the  compensation  and measurement  of  the  

land under Section 9 of the Act, handed over the possession of the  

said  land  to  the  Senior  Superintendent  of  Jails,  Mordabad,  on  

07.01.2011.  The learned senior counsel submits that there is no  

lethargy  or  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  State  Government  to  

acquire the said land. He further supports the observation of the  

High Court in the impugned Judgment that construction of Jail is  

an  urgent  matter  requiring  acquisition  of  the  land  by  invoking  

urgency provisions under Section 17 (1) and Section 17(4) thereby  

dispensing  with  the   enquiry  under  Section 5-A  of  the  Act.  He  

further contends that the right of the citizens of filing of objections  

and opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A are subject to the  

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provisions of Section 17 of the Act and the same can be legally  

curtailed  in  the  event  of  any  pressing  need  and  urgency  for  

acquisition of land in order to eliminate delay likely to be caused  

by an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act.  The learned senior  

counsel  further  submits  that  Dev  Sharan’s  Case  (Supra) upon  

which, the appellant had placed strong reliance is not relevant and  

applicable  to  the  present  case  because  in  that  case,  this  Court  

invalidated the acquisition of land by invoking urgency provisions  

for construction of a new Jail when old Jail was already existed in  

District Shahjahanpur but was located in a densely populated area  

which  needs  to  be  shifted.  Learned  Senior  Counsel  has  placed  

reliance  on the  decisions  of  this  Court  in Deepak Pahwa v.  Lt.   

Governor of Delhi, (1984) 4 SCC 308 and Chameli Singh v. State  

of U.P., (1996) 2 SCC 549 in  support of his arguments that even  

the  delay  and  lethargy  on  the  part  of  the  respondents  will  not  

disentitle them to invoke urgency provisions under Sections 17 of  

the Act.   

8). The issue before us is no more res integra as it has already  

been  decided  by  this  Court  in  Radhy  Shyam’s  Case (Supra)  in  

which one of us was the party (G.S. Singhvi, J.) wherein this Court  

has considered the development of the jurisprudence and law, with  

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respect to invoking of the urgency provisions under Section 17 vis-

à-vis right of the landowner to file objections and opportunity of  

hearing and enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, by referring to  

plethora of earlier decisions of this Court.  This Court had culled  

out  various  principles  governing  the  acquisition  of  the  land  for  

public purpose by invoking urgency thus:

“From  the  analysis  of  the  relevant  statutory  provisions and interpretation thereof by this Court   in different cases, the following principles can be  culled out:

(i)  Eminent  domain  is  a  right  inherent  in  every   sovereign  to  take  and  appropriate  property   belonging  to  citizens  for  public  use.  To  put  it   differently, the sovereign is entitled to reassert its   dominion over any portion of the soil of the State   including  private  property  without  its  owner’s   consent provided that such assertion is on account   of  public  exigency  and  for  public  good  —  Dwarkadas Shrinivas v.  Sholapur Spg.  and Wvg.   Co. Ltd.46,  Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v.  Union of   India47 and Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of   Gujarat48.

(ii) The legislations which provide for compulsory   acquisition of private property by the State fall in   the category of expropriatory legislation and such  legislation  must  be  construed  strictly  —  DLF  Qutab  Enclave  Complex  Educational  Charitable   Trust v. State of Haryana49; State of Maharashtra  v.  B.E.  Billimoria50 and  Dev Sharan v.  State  of   U.P.242

(iii) Though, in exercise of the power of eminent   domain,  the Government  can acquire the private   property  for  public  purpose,  it  must  be  remembered  that  compulsory  taking  of  one’s   property  is  a  serious  matter.  If  the  property   belongs to economically disadvantaged segment of   

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the  society  or  people  suffering  from  other  handicaps, then the court is not only entitled but is   duty-bound to scrutinise the action/decision of the  State  with  greater  vigilance,  care  and  circumspection  keeping  in  view the  fact  that  the  landowner  is  likely  to  become  landless  and  deprived of the only source of his livelihood and/or   shelter.

(iv) The property of a citizen cannot be acquired by   the  State  and/or  its  agencies/instrumentalities   without complying with the mandate of Sections 4,   5-A and 6 of the Act. A public purpose, however,   laudable  it  may  be  does  not  entitle  the  State  to   invoke  the  urgency  provisions  because  the  same  have the effect of depriving the owner of his right   to property without being heard. Only in a case of   real  urgency,  the  State  can  invoke  the  urgency  provisions  and  dispense  with  the  requirement  of   hearing the landowner or other interested persons.

(  v  ) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers    extraordinary  power  upon  the  State  to  acquire   private  property  without  complying  with  the   mandate of Section 5-A. These provisions can be  invoked  only  when  the  purpose  of  acquisition  cannot  brook  the  delay  of  even  a  few  weeks  or  months.  Therefore,  before  excluding  the   application of Section 5-A, the authority concerned  must  be fully  satisfied that  time of  few weeks  or  months  likely  to  be  taken  in  conducting  inquiry   under Section 5-A will, in all probability, frustrate   the public purpose for which land is proposed to be   acquired.

(vi)  The  satisfaction  of  the  Government  on  the   issue  of  urgency  is  subjective  but  is  a  condition  precedent to the exercise of power under Section  17(1)  and  the  same  can  be  challenged  on  the  ground  that  the  purpose  for  which  the  private   property is sought to be acquired is not a public   purpose  at  all  or  that  the  exercise  of  power  is   vitiated  due to  mala fides  or that  the  authorities   concerned did not apply their mind to the relevant   factors and the records.

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    vii) The exercise of power by the Government   under Section 17(1) does not necessarily result in  exclusion  of  Section  5-A  of  the  Act  in  terms  of   which  any  person  interested  in  land  can  file   objection and is entitled to be heard in support of   his  objection.  The  use  of  word  “may”  in  sub- section  (4)  of  Section  17  makes  it  clear  that  it   merely enables the Government to direct that the  provisions of Section 5-A would not apply to the   cases  covered  under  sub-section  (1)  or  (2)  of   Section  17.  In  other  words,  invoking  of  Section  17(4)  is  not  a  necessary  concomitant  of  the   exercise of power under Section 17(1).

(  viii  )  The  acquisition  of  land  for  residential,    commercial,  industrial  or  institutional  purposes   can  be  treated  as  an  acquisition  for  public   purposes within the meaning of Section 4 but that,   by itself, does not justify the exercise of power by   the Government under Sections 17(1) and/or 17(4).   The court can take judicial notice of the fact that   planning,  execution  and  implementation  of  the   schemes  relating  to  development  of  residential,   commercial,  industrial  or  institutional  areas   usually  take  few  years. Therefore,  the  private   property cannot be acquired for such purpose by  invoking  the  urgency  provision  contained  in   Section 17(1). In any case, exclusion of the rule of   audi alteram partem embodied in Sections 5-A(1)   and (2) is not at all warranted in such matters.”

9). In view of the above it is well settled that acquisition of the  

land for public purpose by itself shall not justify the exercise of  

power  of  eliminating  enquiry  under  Section  5-A  in  terms  of  

Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act.  The Court should  

take judicial notice of the fact that  certain  public  purpose such as  

development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional  

areas by their intrinsic nature and character contemplates planning,  

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execution  and  implementation  of  the  schemes  which  generally  

takes time of few years.  Therefore, the land acquisition for said  

public purpose does not justify the invoking of urgency provisions  

under  the  Act.  In  Radhy  Shyam  (Supra),  this  Court,  whilst  

considering the conduct or attitude of the State Government  vis-à-

vis urgency for acquisition of the land for the public purpose of  

planned industrial  development  in  District  Gautam Budh Nagar,  

has observed:

“In this case, the Development Authority sent the   proposal sometime in 2006. The authorities up to   the  level  of  the  Commissioner  completed  the  exercise  of  survey and preparation of  documents   by the end of December 2006 but it took one year   and almost three months for the State Government   to  issue  notification  under  Section  4  read  with   Sections  17(1)  and 17(4).  If  this  much time  was  consumed between the receipt of proposal for the   acquisition of land and issue of notification, it  is   not  possible  to  accept  the  argument  that  four  to  five  weeks  within  which  the  objections  could  be  filed under sub-section (1) of Section 5-A and the   time  spent  by  the  Collector  in  making  enquiry  under sub-section (2) of  Section 5-A would have  defeated the object of the acquisition.”

10). Moreover,  in  Dev Sharan  Case  (Supra) the acquisition  of  

land for construction of new District Jail, since the old Jail  

was  overcrowded  and  causing  hardships  including  health  

and hygiene concerns to the inmates, by invoking urgency  

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provision under Section 17 was quashed on the ground that  

the government machinery had functioned at very slow pace  

in processing the acquisition which clearly evinces that there  

was no urgency to exclude the application of Section 5-A of  

the Act. The Court further observed:

“35. From the various facts disclosed in the said   affidavit it appears that the matter was initiated by  the  Government’s  Letter  dated  4-6-2008  for   issuance  of  Section  4(1)  and  Section  17  notifications. A meeting for selection of a suitable   site for construction was held on 27-6-2008, and  the proposal for such acquisition and construction  was sent to the Director, Land Acquisition on 2-7- 2008.  This  was  in  turn  forwarded  to  the  State  Government  by the Director  on 22-7-2008.  After   due consideration of the forwarded proposal and  documents, the State Government issued Section 4  notification, along with Section 17 notification on  21-8-2008.  These  notifications  were  published  in   local newspapers on 24-9-2008.

36. Thereafter, over a period of 9 months, the State  Government  deposited  10%  of  compensation  payable  to  the  landowners,  along  with  10%  of   acquisition  expenses  and  70%  of  cost  of   acquisition  was  deposited,  and  the  proposal  for   issuance of Section 6 declaration was sent to the   Director,  Land  Acquisition  on  19-6-2009.  The   Director  in turn forwarded all  these to the State   Government  on  17-7-2009,  and  the  State   Government  finally  issued  the  Section  6   declaration  on  10-8-2009.  This  declaration  was   published in the local dailies on 17-8-2009.

37. Thus  the  time  which  elapsed  between  publication  of  Section  4(1)  and  Section  17  notifications, and Section 6 declaration in the local   newspapers is 11 months and 23 days i.e. almost   

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one year. This slow pace at which the government   machinery  had  functioned  in  processing  the   acquisition,  clearly  evinces  that  there  was  no  urgency for  acquiring the  land so  as to  warrant  invoking Section 17(4) of the Act.

38. In  Para  15  of  the  writ  petition,  it  has  been  clearly stated that there was a time gap of more  than 11 months between Section 4 and Section 6   notifications, which demonstrates that there was no   urgency in the State action which could deny the   petitioners  their  right  under  Section  5-A.  In  the   counter which was filed in this case by the State   before the High Court, it was not disputed that the   time gap between Section 4 notification read with  Section 17, and Section 6 notification was about 11   months.

39. The construction of jail is certainly in public   interest  and  for  such  construction  land  may  be   acquired.  But such acquisition can be made only   by strictly following the mandate of the said Act. In  the facts of this case, such acquisition cannot be  made by invoking emergency provisions of Section  17.  If  so  advised,  the  Government  can  initiate   acquisition proceeding by following the provision   of Section 5-A of the Act and in accordance with   law.”

11). In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is clear  

that  the District  of Jyotiba  Phule Nagar was created in the year  

1997 which was, however, dissolved and recreated in 2004. The  

District Magistrate, Jyotiba Phule Nagar, had sent a proposal to the  

Principal  Secretary,  Home/Prisons,  Government  of  U.P.  for  

acquisition  of  land  for  the  construction  of  District  Jail  on  

24.01.2003 which is undoubtedly a public purpose. After the lapse  

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of 5 years in the year 2008, the State Government asked District  

Magistrate  to  trace  availability  of  lands  for  acquisition  for  

construction  of  the  District  Jail  in  the  proximity  to  District  

Headquarters  and  further  requested  the  Selection  Committee  to  

recommend the land suitable for the said purpose. Thereafter, the  

Selection Committee recommended the acquisition of the said land  

as suitable for the construction of the Jail but it took two years for  

the State Government to issue the said Notifications under Section  

4  and  Section  6  respectively,  thereby  invoking  the  urgency  

provisions under Section 17 of the Act.  The series of events shows  

lethargy and lackadaisical attitude of the State Government. In the  

light of the above circumstances, the respondents are not justified  

in invoking the urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act,  

thereby  depriving  the  appellants  of  their  valuable  right  to  raise  

objections  and  opportunity  of  hearing  before  the  authorities  in  

order to persuade them that their property may not be acquired.  

12). The decision of this Court in Chameli Singh (Supra), upon  

which  Shri.  K.K.  Venugopal,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

respondents has placed reliance, has already been considered and  

distinguished by this Court in  Radhy Shyam Case (Supra) in the  

following terms:

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“74. In  State  of  U.P. v.  Pista  Devi,  Rajasthan  Housing Board v.  Shri Kishan and Chameli Singh  v.  State of U.P. the invoking of urgency provision  contained in Section 17(1) and exclusion of Section  5-A was approved by the Court keeping in view the   acute problem of housing, which was perceived as   a national problem and for the solution of which   national  housing  policy  was  framed  and  the   imperative of providing cheaper shelter to Dalits,   tribals  and  other  disadvantaged  sections  of  the   society.”

13). Learned senior counsel for the respondents also relied on the  

decision of this Court in Deepak Pahwa Case (Supra). In that case,  

the  land  was  acquired by  invoking  urgency  provisions  under  

Section 17 for the purpose of construction of a New Transmitting  

Station  for the  Delhi  Airport  after  the correspondence of  nearly  

eight  years  among  the  various  Departments  of  the  Government  

before the Notification and the declaration was published in the  

Gazette.   This  Court  has  held  that  mere  pre-notification  delay  

would not render the invocation of the urgency provisions void as  

very  often,  the  delay  increases  the  urgency  of  the  necessity  for  

acquisition. We are afraid that the decision will not come to the  

rescue  of  the  respondents  because  this  Court  has  observed  that  

delay  only  accelerates  or  increases  the  urgency  of  need  of  

acquisition, which contemplates that delay does not create a ground  

or cause for urgency but increases the already existing urgency for  

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acquisition of land for any public purpose.  Therefore, the delay, by  

itself,  does  not  create  urgency  for  acquisition  but  accelerates  

urgency only in case it already exists in the nature of the public  

purpose.

14). For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the State Government  

was not justified, in the facts of this case, to invoke the emergency  

provision of  Section 17(4)  of  the  Act.  Therefore,  the  appellants  

cannot be denied of their valuable right under Section 5-A of the  

Act.

15). In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment  

and Order of the High Court dated 08.10.2010 is set aside.  No  

order as to costs.

…………………………J.                                                                                       [ G.S. SINGHVI ]

        ……………………… …J.  

             [ H. L. DATTU ] New Delhi, August  03,  2011.

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