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REPORTABL E             

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA             CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION         CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.2032-2033  of 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) Nos.  8076-8077 of 2010

Deoki Panjhiyara   ...Appellant   Versus Shashi Bhushan  Narayan  Azad &  Anr.             … Respondents     

J  U  D  G  M  E  N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The  appellant,  who was  married  to  the  respondent   

in  the  year 2006,  had  filed a  petition  under  Section  12   

of the Protection  of Women from  Domestic Violence  Act,   

2005  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  DV Act’)  seeking   

certain  reliefs  including  damages  and  maintenance.   

During  the  pendency  of  the  aforesaid  application  the   

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appellant   filed  an  application  for  interim maintenance   

which  was  granted  by  the  learned  trial  court  on   

13.02.2008  at  the  rate  of  Rs.2000/-  per  month.   The  

order  of  the  learned  trial  court  was  affirmed  by  the   

learned  Sessions  Judge  on  09.07.2008.  As  against  the   

aforesaid  order,  the  respondent  (husband)  filed  a  Writ  

Petition before the High Court of Jharkhand.   

3. While the Writ Petition was pending,  the respondent   

sought  a  recall  of  the  order  dated  13.02.2008  on  the   

ground  that  he  could  subsequently  come  to  know that   

his  marriage  with the  appellant  was  void on  the  ground   

that  at  the  time of the  said  marriage  the  appellant  was   

already married  to  one  Rohit  Kumar Mishra.   In support,   

the  respondent  –  husband  had  placed  before  the   

learned  trial  court  the  certificate  of  marriage  dated   

18.04.2003  between  the  appellant  and  the  said  Rohit   

Kumar  Mishra  issued  by the  competent  authority under   

Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (hereinafter   

referred to as ‘the Act of 1954’).

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4.   The  learned  trial  court  by  order  dated  7.8.2009   

rejected  the  aforesaid  application  on  the  ground  that   

notwithstanding  the  certificate  issued  under  Section  13  

of  the  Act  of  1954,  proof  of  existence  of  the  conditions   

enumerated  in Section  15 of the  Act would still required   

to be adduced  and  only thereafter  the  certificate  issued   

under Section 13 of the Act can be held to be valid.  

5.  The  aforesaid  order  dated  07.08.2009  was  

challenged  by  the  respondent-husband  in  a  revision  

application  before  the  High  Court  which  was  heard   

alongwith  the  writ  petition  filed  earlier.  Both  the  cases   

were disposed  of by the  impugned  common order  dated   

09.04.2010  holding  that  the  marriage  certificate  dated   

18.04.2003  issued  under  Section  13 of the  Act  of 1954   

was  conclusive  proof  of  the  first  marriage  of  the   

appellant  with  one  Rohit  Kumar  Mishra  which  had  the   

effect  of  rendering  the  marriage  between  the  appellant   

and  the  respondent  null  and  void.   Accordingly,  it  was  

held  that  as  the  appellant  was  not  the  legally wedded   

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wife  of  the  respondent  she  was  not  entitled  to   

maintenance  granted  by the  learned  courts  below.  It is  

against  the  aforesaid  order  of  the  High  Court  that  the   

present  appeals  have been filed by the appellant – wife.

6. We  have  heard  Shri  Gaurav  Agarwal,  learned   

counsel  for  the  appellant  and  Shri  Mahesh  Tiwari,  

learned counsel for the respondent.

7. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has  strenuously  

urged  that  the  allegation  of  the  earlier  marriage   

between  the appellant  and Rohit Kumar Mishra had been   

denied by the appellant  at all stages  and the said fact is   

not  substantiated  only by the  Marriage  Certificate  dated   

18.04.2003.   Even  assuming  the  marriage  between  the   

appellant  and  the  respondent  to  be  void,  the  parties   

having  lived  together,  a  relationship  in  the  nature  of  

marriage  had  existed  which  will entitle  the  appellant  to   

claim and  receive maintenance  under  the  DV Act,  2005.   

Placing  the  legislative  history  leading  to  the  aforesaid   

enactment,  it is urged  that  in the  Bill placed  before  the   

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Parliament  i.e.  Protection  from  Domestic  Violence  Bill,  

2002  an  “aggrieved  person”  and  “relative” was,  initially,  

defined in the following terms :

“Section 2………

(a)  “aggrieved  person” means any woman who is or has  been relative of  the respondent and who alleges to have  been  subjected  to  act  of  domestic  violence  by  the  respondent;

(b)…

( c )…

(d)….

(e)….

(f)…

(g)…

(h)….

(i)”relative” includes any person related by blood, marriage  or adoption and living with the respondent.”

Thereafter,  the  different  clauses  of  the  Bill  were  

considered  by a  Parliamentary Standing  Committee  and   

recommendations  were  made  that  having regard  to  the   

object  sought  to  be  achieved  by  the  proposed   

legislation,  namely,  to  protect  women  from  domestic   

violence  and exploitation,  clause  (2)(i) defining “relative”  

may be  suitably amended  to  include  women  who  have  

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been  living in relationship  akin to marriages  as  well as  in  

marriages  considered  invalid  by  law.  Pursuant  to  the   

aforesaid  recommendation  made  by  the  Standing   

Committee,  in  place  of  the  expression  “relative”  

appearing  in  clause  2(i)  of  the  Bill,  the  expression   

“domestic relationship” came be included  in clause  (f) of  

Section 2 of the Act.  Learned counsel  by referring to the   

definition  of  “aggrieved  person”  and  “domestic   

relationship” as appearing in the DV Act, 2005 has urged   

that  the  legislative  intent  to  include  women,  living  in  

marriages  subsequently  found  to  be  illegal  or  even  in  

relationships  resembling  a  marriage,  within  the   

protective umbrella of the  DV Act is absolutely clear  and   

the  same  must  be  given  its  full  effect.   It is  submitted   

that  having regard  to  the  above even if the  marriage  of   

the  appellant  and  the  respondent  was  void on  account   

of the  previous  marriage  of the  appellant,  the  said  fact,   

by  itself,  will  not  disentitle  the  appellant  to  seek   

maintenance  and other reliefs under the DV Act, 2005.

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8. Before  proceeding  further  it  will be  appropriate  to   

notice,  at  this  stage,  the  definition  of  the  expressions   

“aggrieved  person”  and  “domestic  relationship”   

appearing in Section 2(a) and (f) of the DV Act, 2005.

“Section 2…..

(a) “aggrieved person” means any women who is, or has  been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who  alleges  to  have  been  subjected  to  any  act  of  domestic  violence by the respondent;  (b) …… (c) …… (d)    …… (e) …… (f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship between  two persons who live or have, at  any point of  time, lived  together in a shared household, when they are related by  consanguinity,  marriage,  or  through  a  relationship in  the  nature of  marriage, adoption or are family members living  together as a joint family.”

9. Learned  counsel,  in all fairness,  has  also  drawn the   

attention  of  the  court  to  a  decision  rendered  by  a   

coordinate  Bench  in  D. Velusamy vs. D.Patchaimmal1  

wherein  this  court  had  occasion  to  consider   the   

provisions  of  Section  2(f)  of  the  DV Act  to  come  to  the   

1 (2010) 10 SCC 469

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conclusion  that  a  “relationship  in  the  nature  of  

marriage”  is  akin  to  a  common  law  marriage  which  

requires,   in addition to proof of the fact that parties  had   

lived  together  in  a  shared  household  as  defined  in  

Section  2(s)  of the DV Act, the following conditions  to be   

satisfied:  

(a) The  couple  must  hold  themselves  out  to  society  as  being akin to spouses.

(b) They must be of legal age to marry.

(c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal  marriage, including being unmarried.

(d) They  must  have  voluntarily  cohabited  and  held  themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for   a significant period of time…….”   

[Para 33]

10. Learned  counsel  has,  however,  pointed  out  that  in  

Velusamy (supra) the  issue  was  with  regard  to  the  

meaning  of  expression  “wife”  as  appearing  in  Section   

125  Cr.P.C. and  therefore  reference  to  the  provisions  of  

Section  2(f)  of  the  DV Act,  2005  and  the  conclusions   

recorded  were  not  required  for  a  decision  of the  issues   

arising  in the  case.  Additionally, it has  been  pointed  out   

that while rendering its opinion in the aforesaid  case  this   

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Court  had  no  occasion  to  take  into  account  the   

deliberations  of  the  Parliamentary  Standing  Committee   

on  the  different  clauses  of  Protection  of  Women  from  

Domestic  Violence  Bill,  2002.  It  is  also  urged  that  the   

equation  of the expression  “relationship  in the nature  of  

marriage”  with  a  common  law  marriage  and  the   

stipulation  of the four requirements  noticed  above is not   

based  on any known or acceptable  authority or source  of  

law.  Accordingly,  it  is  submitted  that  the  scope  and   

expanse  of the  expression  “relationship  in the  nature  of  

marriage”  is  open  for  consideration  by us  and,  at  any  

rate,  a reference  of the  said  question  to a larger  bench   

would be justified.   

11. Opposing  the  contentions  advanced  on  behalf  of  

the  appellant  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  –  

husband  has  submitted  that  the  object  behind  insertion   

of  the  expression  “relationship  in  the  nature  of  

marriage”  in  Section  2(f)  of  the   DV Act   is  to  protect   

women   who  have  been  misled  into  marriages  by the   

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male spouse  by concealment  of the factum of the earlier   

marriage of the husband.   The Act is a beneficial piece of  

legislation  which confers  protection  of different  kinds  to   

women  who  have  been  exploited  or  misled  into  a  

marriage.   Learned  counsel  has  pointed  out  that  in the   

present  case  the  situation  is,  however,  otherwise.  From  

the marriage certificate  dated  18.04.2003  it is clear that   

the  appellant  was  already  married  to  one  Rohit  Kumar  

Mishra  which  fact  was  known  to  her  but  not  to  the   

respondent.   The second  marriage which is void and also   

gives  rise  to  a  bigamous  relationship  was  voluntarily  

entered  into  by the  appellant  without  the  knowledge  of  

the  husband.  Therefore,  the  appellant  is not  entitled  to   

any of  the  benefits  under  the  DV Act.  In fact,  grant  of   

maintenance  in  the  present  case  would  amount  to   

conferment  of benefit  and  protection  to  the  wrong  doer   

which  would  go  against  the  avowed  object  of  the  Act.   

Learned  counsel  has  also  submitted  that  the  conduct  of  

the  appellant  makes  it  clear  that  she  had  approached   

the court by suppressing  material facts  and with unclean   

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hands  which disentitles  her  to  any relief either  in law or   

in equity.  In this regard the decision of this court in S.P.   

Changalvaraya  Naidu vs.  Jagannath and others2 has  

been placed before us.   

12. Having considered  the submissions  advanced by the   

learned  counsels  for  the  contesting  parties,  we are  of  

the  view that  the  questions  raised,  namely, whether  the   

appellant  and the respondent  have/had  lived together  in  

a shared  household  after their marriage on 4.12.2006;  if  

the  parties  have/had  lived  together  whether  the  same   

gives rise to relationship  in the nature  of marriage within  

the meaning of Section 2(f) of the DV Act, 2005; whether   

the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Velusamy  (supra) is  an  

authoritative  pronouncement  on  the  expression   

“relationship  in  the  nature  of  marriage”  and  if  so   

whether  the  same  would  require  reference  to  a  larger   

Bench,  may all be premature  and the  same need  not  be   

answered  for the  present.  Instead,  in the  first  instance,   

2 AIR 1994 SC 853

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the matter may be viewed from the perspective indicated   

below.

13. The Respondent  before  us  had  claimed (before  the   

trial  court  as  well as  the  High  Court)  that  the  marriage   

between  him  and  the  appellant  solemnised  on   

4.12.2006,  by performance  of rituals  in accordance  with  

Hindu Law, was void on account  of the previous marriage   

between  the  appellant  with  one  Rohit  Kumar  Mishra.  In  

support  thereof,  the  respondent  relied  on  a  marriage   

certificate  dated  18.4.2003  issued  under  Section  13  of  

the  Special  Marriage  Act,  1954.  Acting  solely  on  the   

basis  of  the  aforesaid  marriage  certificate  the  learned   

trial  court  as  well as  the  High  Court  had  proceeded  to   

determine  the  validity  of  the  marriage  between  the   

parties  though  both  the  courts  were  exercising   

jurisdiction in a proceeding for maintenance.  However, till  

date,  the  marriage  between  the  parties  is  yet  to  be   

annulled by a competent  court. What would be the effect   

of the  above  has  to  be  determined  first  inasmuch  as  if,  

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under  the  law,  the  marriage  between  the  parties  still  

subsists  the  appellant  would  continue  to  be  the  legally  

married  wife of  the  respondent  so  as  to  be  entitled  to   

claim maintenance  and  other  benefits  under  the  DV Act,   

2005. Infact, in such a situation there will be no occasion   

for  the  Court  to  consider  whether  the  relationship   

between the parties  is in the nature of a marriage.

14. Admittedly, both  the  appellant  and  the  respondent   

are  governed  by the  provisions  of  the  Hindu  Marriage   

Act, 1955.  Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage  Act makes  it  

clear  that  a  marriage  solemnised  after  the   

commencement  of  the  Act  “shall  be  null  and  void  and   

may,  on  a  petition  presented  by  either  party  thereto   

against  the  other  party, be  so  declared  by a  decree  of   

nullity  if  it  contravenes  any  one  of  the  conditions  so   

specified in clauses  (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5.”

15. While considering the provisions  of Section 11 of the   

Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  this  Court  in  Yamunabai  v.   

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Anantrao3 has  taken  the  view that  a  marriage  covered  

by Section  11 is void-ipso-jure, that  is, void from the very  

inception.  Such  a  marriage   has  to  be  ignored  as  not   

existing in law at all. It was further held by this Court that   

a  formal declaration  of  the  nullity of  such  a  marriage  is   

not  a  mandatory requirement  though  such  an  option  is  

available to either of the parties  to a marriage.

It  must,  however,   be  noticed  that  in  Yamunabai  

(supra) there  was no dispute  between  the parties  either   

as  regards  the  existence  or  the  validity  of  the  first   

marriage on the basis  of which the second  marriage was   

held to be ipso jure void.

16. A similar view has  been  expressed  by this Court in a   

later  decision  in  M.M.  Malhotra  v.  Union  of  India4  

wherein  the  view expressed  in  Yamunabai (supra)  was  

also noticed and reiterated.   

3     AIR 1988 SC  645 4     2005 (8) SCC  351

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17. However,  the  facts  in  which  the  decision  in  M.M.   

Malhotra  (supra)  was  rendered  would  require  to  be  

noticed in some detail:

The appellant M.M. Malhotra  was, inter alia, charged   

in  a  departmental  proceeding  for  contracting  a  plural   

marriage.  In  reply  to  the  charge  sheet  issued  it  was  

pointed  out  that  the  allegation  of  plural  marriage  was  

not  at  all  tenable  inasmuch  as  in  a  suit  filed  by  the   

appellant  (M.M.  Malhotra)  for  a  declaration  that  the   

respondent  (wife)  was  not  his  wife  on  account  of  her   

previous  marriage  to  one  D.J.  Basu  the  said  fact  i.e.   

previous  marriage  was admitted  by the  wife leading  to a  

declaration  of the  invalidity of the  marriage  between  the   

parties.  The  opinion  of  this  court  in  M.M.  Malhotra   

(supra) was,  therefore,  once  again  rendered  in  the   

situation  where  there  was no  dispute  with regard  to the   

factum of the earlier marriage of one of the spouses.   

18. In the  present  case,  however,  the  appellant  in her   

pleadings  had  clearly,  categorically  and  consistently  

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denied  that  she  was  married  to  any person  known  as   

Rohit  Kumar  Mishra.  The  legitimacy,  authenticity  and   

genuineness  of the marriage certificate  dated  18.4.2003   

has  also  been  questioned  by  the  appellant.  Though   

Section  11 of the aforesaid  Act gives an option  to either   

of the parties  to a void marriage to seek a declaration  of   

invalidity/nullity of  such  marriage,  the  exercise  of  such   

option  cannot  be  understood  to  be  in  all  situations   

voluntarily.  Situations  may  arise  when  recourse  to  a   

court for a declaration regarding the nullity of a marriage   

claimed by one of the spouses  to be a void marriage,  will  

have to be insisted  upon in departure  to the normal rule.   

This,  in our  view, is  the  correct  ratio  of  the  decision  of  

this  Court  in  Yamunabai (supra) and  M.M.  Malhotra   

(supra).   In this  regard,  we may take  note  of  a  recent   

decision  rendered  by this  Court  in  A. Subash Babu v.   

State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.5 while dealing with the  

question  whether  the  wife  of  a  second  marriage   

contracted  during the validity of the first marriage  of the   

5       2011 (7) SCC  616

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husband  would  be  a  “person  aggrieved”  under  Section   

198 (1)(c)  of the  Code  of Criminal Procedure  to maintain   

a  complaint  alleging  commission  of  offences  under   

section  494  and  495  IPC by the  husband.  The  passage   

extracted  below effectively illuminates  the issue:  

“Though the law specifically does not cast obligation on either  party to seek declaration of nullity of marriage and it may be  open to the parties even without recourse to the Court  to  treat  the  marriage as  a  nullity,  such a  course  is neither  prudent  nor  intended  and  a  declaration  in  terms  of  Section 11 of  the Hindu Marriage Act will have to be asked  for, for the purpose of  precaution and/or record. Therefore,  until the declaration contemplated by Section 11 of the Hindu  Marriage Act is made by a competent Court, the woman with  whom second marriage is solemnized continues to be the wife  within the meaning of Section 494 IPC  and would be entitled  to maintain a complaint against her husband.”

19.  In  the  present  case,  if  according  to  the   

respondent,  the  marriage  between  him  and  the   

appellant  was  void on  account  of the  previous  marriage   

between  the  appellant  and  Rohit  Kumar  Mishra  the   

respondent  ought  to  have  obtained  the  necessary  

declaration  from  the  competent  court  in  view  of  the   

highly contentious  questions  raised  by the  appellant  on   

the  aforesaid  score.   It  is  only  upon  a  declaration  of  

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nullity or annulment of the marriage between  the parties   

by  a  competent  court  that  any  consideration  of  the   

question  whether  the  parties  had  lived in a “relationship   

in  the  nature  of  marriage”  would  be  justified.  In  the   

absence  of  any valid decree  of  nullity or  the  necessary  

declaration  the court will have to proceed  on the footing   

that  the  relationship  between  the  parties  is  one  of  

marriage  and  not  in  the  nature  of  marriage.  We would  

also  like  to  emphasise  that  any  determination  of  the   

validity of  the  marriage  between  the  parties  could  have  

been  made only by a competent  court  in an appropriate   

proceeding  by  and  between  the  parties  and  in  

compliance  with  all  other  requirements  of  law.  Mere   

production of a marriage certificate issued under Section   

13  of  the  Special  Marriage  Act,  1954  in support  of  the   

claimed  first  marriage  of the  appellant  with Rohit  Kumar  

Mishra  was not  sufficient  for any of the  courts,  including   

the  High  Court,  to  render  a  complete  and  effective  

decision  with regard  to  the  marital status  of the  parties   

and  that  too  in a collateral  proceeding  for maintenance.   

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Consequently, we hold that  in the present  case  until the   

invalidation  of  the  marriage  between  the  appellant  and   

the  respondent  is  made  by a  competent  court  it would  

only  be  correct  to  proceed  on  the  basis  that  the   

appellant  continues  to be the  wife of the  respondent  so   

as  to  entitle  her  to  claim  all  benefits  and  protection   

available under the DV Act, 2005.

20. Our above conclusion  would render  consideration  of  

any of  the  other  issues  raised  wholly unnecessary  and   

academic.  Such an exercise must surely be avoided.

21.  We, accordingly, hold that the interference  made by  

the High Court with the grant of maintenance  in favour of   

the  appellant  was  not  at  all  justified.  Accordingly,  the   

order  dated  09.04.2010  passed  by the  High Court is set   

aside and the present  appeals,  are allowed.

…………… ……………………….J.

[ P. SATHASIVAM ]

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……………………………………J. [RANJAN  GOGOI]

New Delhi, December  12, 2012

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