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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4926 OF 2017 (@ S.L.P. (Civil) No. 26887 OF 2016)

Dental Council of India   ... Appellant(s)

                               Versus

Dr. Hedgewar Smruti Rugna Seva Mandal, Hingoli & Ors.  ... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Though this  Court  ordinarily  is  loath  to  interfere  with

interim orders or directions issued by the High Court, yet the

impugned order dated 27.05.2016 passed in Writ Petition No.

4529 of 2016 by the learned Vacation Judge of the High Court

of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad, constrains, in

a  way,  obliges  us  to  pen  a  verdict  with  some  concern,  for

abandonment  to  write  a  decision  in  the  obtaining

circumstances would tantamount to playing possum with the

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precedents,  which  need  to  be  recapitulated  by  the  High

Courts.

2. The facts are simple.  The respondent, a dental college,

vide  letter  dated  26.05.2015,  submitted  its  scheme  on

29.07.2015  for  grant  of  permission  to  start  post-graduate

course  of  Orthodontics  and  Dentofacial  Orthopaedics  along

with four other specialties.  A team of Dental Council of India

(for  short,  ‘the  Council’),  the  appellant  herein,  conducted  a

pre-PG assessment of the respondent-college on 17th and 18th

November, 2015 and submitted its report to the Council.  The

assessment  report  submitted  by  the  said  team was  placed

before the Executive Committee of the Council in its meeting

held on 03.12.2015 whereupon the Committee found many a

deficiency relating to infrastructure, teaching faculty and other

physical facilities in the respondent-college.  The Committee

decided  to  call  upon  the  respondent-college  to  rectify  the

deficiencies and submit its compliance within seven days.  The

said decision was communicated vide letter dated 08.12.2015.

The  respondent-college  vide  its  letter  dated  17.12.2015

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submitted its  compliance report whereafter  the assessors of

the Council carried out a compliance verification assessment

of  the  respondent-college  on  21.12.2015.   The  case  of  the

respondent-college was placed before the Executive Committee

for  consideration,  which  found  that  the  respondent-college

fulfilled the eligibility criteria at the undergraduate level.  On

29.01.2016,  the  Council  decided  to  carry  out  the  physical

assessment  of  the  dental  college  in  order  to  ascertain  the

infrastructure,  clinical  material,  teaching  faculty  and  other

physical  facilities in respect of  four  postgraduate specialties

and  in  accordance  with  the  decision,  inspection  was

conducted on 28th and 29th January, 2016.  The assessment

report  was  considered  by  the  Executive  Committee  in  its

meeting held on 12.02.2016 and it observed that there were

deficiencies  and  the  college  was  required  to  submit

compliance.

3. As is evident from the materials brought on record the

decision of the Committee was communicated to the college on

18.02.2016 whereupon the respondent-college communicated

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that the defects had been removed.  The Council proceeded to

verify the compliance made by the college and keeping in view

the various facilities and regard being had to the decision of

this Court in Royal Medical Trust (Registered) and another

v. Union of India and another1,  decided to recommend to

the  Government  of  India  not  to  grant  permission  to  the

respondent-college for starting the post-graduate courses.  The

Government of India, after affording an opportunity of hearing

to  the  respondent-college,  vide  letter  dated  21.03.2016,

required the Council to verify/review the schemes and further

desired to furnish its revised recommendation.   

4. The  communication  received  from  the  Government  of

India  was  placed  before  the  Committee  and  the  Committee

keeping in view the cut-off date, postulated in Royal Medical

Trust (supra) and  Ashish Ranjan and others v. Union of

India and others2, decided to reiterate its earlier stand and

accordingly it was communicated to the Government of India

1

 (2015) 10 SCC 19 2

 (2016) 11 SCC 225

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on 28.03.2016.  The Government of India after considering the

recommendation of the Council, vide letter dated 31.03.2016,

disapproved the scheme of the respondent-college for starting

MDS course in the specialty of Orthodontics and Dentofacial

Orthopaedics for the academic session 2016-2017.  

5. Being dissatisfied with the decision of the Government of

India which is based on the recommendation of the Council,

the respondent-college knocked at the doors of the High Court

by filing a writ petition and the learned Vacation Judge upon

hearing  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties,  passed  the

following order:-

“The controversy or the issue involved in the matter requires consideration and due to paucity of time, this Court is unable to decide this matter finally.  In such circumstances the impugned communication dated 31st March, 2016 is hereby stayed until next date  i.e.  06.06.2016.  The  admission  process undertaken by the petitioner is  at  the risk of  the petitioner.  The petitioner shall intimate the order passed  by  this  Court  to  the  students  who  are intending  to  take  admission  for  M.D.S.  course  in Orthodontics and Denotfacial Orthopaedics.”

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After passing the said direction, the Court adjourned the

matter to 06.06.2016.

6. Assailing the said order, it is submitted by Mr. Gaurav

Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court

could  not  have,  in  the  absence  of  approval  of  the  scheme

submitted  by  the  college,  passed  an  order  of  the  present

nature by staying the order and observing that the admission

process  undertaken  by  the  institution  would  be  at  its  own

risk.  Learned counsel would submit that though the learned

Single  Judge has opined that  the college shall  intimate  the

students who are intending to take admission to MDS course

in the Orthodontics and Dentofacial Orthopaedics about the

order passed by the Court, yet such an order is impermissible

as it brings in anarchy and chaos in the process of admission

to medical  courses.   He has referred to  certain authorities,

which we shall refer to in the course of the judgment.  

7. Mr.  S.M.  Jadhav,  learned  counsel  for  the

respondent-college would contend, in his turn, that decision of

the Council was prima facie erroneous and, therefore, the High

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Court  was justified in  staying  the  said  order.   It  is  further

canvassed by him that the High Court, while staying the order,

had  imposed  the  conditions  and  hence,  there  is  no

justification or warrant on the part of the Council to invoke

the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  under  Article  136  of  the

Constitution and it would have been advisable for it to wait for

the final decision of the High Court.  Additionally, it is urged

by  him  that  the  respondent-college  has  been  granted  due

approval for the academic session 2017-2018 and that would

make the non-denial of the approval for the earlier order illegal

and, in any case, the three students who have been admitted

by virtue of the order passed by the High Court should not put

in a state of suffering and predicament.  

8. The  narration  of  facts  is  absolutely  telling  that  the

scheme submitted by the respondent-college for starting the

MDS course in the two specialties had been disapproved by

the  Government  of  India.  The  justifiability  of  the  said

non-approval was the subject matter of the lis before the High

Court.  The  High  Court  was  expected  to  adjudicate  under

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Article  226  of  the  Constitution  within  its  parameters  as

regards the nature of deficiencies pointed out by the Council,

steps  taken  by  the  college  with  regard  to  removal  of  such

deficiencies and whether there had been any perversity in the

decision  making  process  of  the  Council  while  not

recommending for  approval  to the Government of  India and

further declining to  review the decision after the Government

of India required it  to verify/review the scheme and furnish

the  revised  recommendation.  As  is  evident,  the  Council

keeping in view the cut-off date prescribed by this Court in

Royal  Medical  Trust  (supra)  and Ashish  Ranjan (supra)

reiterated  its  earlier  recommendation.  Thus,  the  ultimate

result was disapproval of  the scheme by the Government of

India.   Hence,  the  writ  court  observed,  as  is  demonstrable

from the order which we have reproduced hereinbefore, that

the  controversy  required  consideration  and  as  the  matter

could not be finally adjudicated, the circumstances required

interim direction and stay of  the impugned communication.

True it is, the High Court has qualified its order by stating that

the admission process shall be at the risk of the college and

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the students shall be intimated, but the heart of the matter is,

whether  the  High Court  should  have  stayed the  order  with

such  conditions.  Basically,  the  order  amounts  to  granting

permission for the admission of students in certain courses in

a college which had not  received approval.  There may be a

case where the court may ultimately come to the conclusion

that the recommendation is unacceptable and eventually the

decision  of  disapproval  by  the  Government  of  India  is

unsustainable.  But  the  issue  is  whether  before  arriving  at

such conclusions, should the High Court, by way of interim

measure, pass such an order.  

9.   Such a controversy has not  arisen for  the first  time.  A

two-Judge  Bench  in  Union  of  India  v.  Era  Educational

Trust and another3 stated  that  normally  this  Court  would

hesitate  to  interfere  with  an  interlocutory  order,  but  was

compelled to do so where prima facie it appeared that the said

order could not be justified by any judicial standard, the ends

of justice and the need to maintain judicial discipline required

3

(2000) 5 SCC 57

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the  Court  to  do  so  and  to  indicate  the  reasons  for  such

interference. The Court, adverting to the aspects of passing of

orders  relating  to  provisional  admission,  quoted  a  passage

from  Krishna Priya Ganguly  v. University of  Lucknow4

which reads thus:-

“[T]hat whenever a writ petition is filed provisional admission should not be given as a matter of course on the petition being admitted unless the court is fully  satisfied  that  the  petitioner  has  a  cast-iron case which is bound to succeed or the error is so gross  or  apparent  that  no  other  conclusion  is possible.”

The  Court  also  thought  it  appropriate  to  reproduce

further observations from Krishna Priya Ganguly (supra):-

“Unless the institutions can provide complete and full facilities for the training of each candidate who is admitted in the various disciplines, the medical education  will  be  incomplete  and  the  universities would  be  turning  out  doctors  not  fully  qualified which  would  adversely  affect  the  health  of  the people in general.”

 10. Adverting  to  the  facts  in  the  case  before  it,  the  Court

held:-  

4

(1984) 1 SCC 307

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“9. In the present case, this type of  situation has arisen because of the interim order passed by the High  Court  without  taking  into  consideration various  judgments  rendered  by  this  Court  for exercise  of  jurisdiction  under  Article  226.  It  is apparent that even at the final stage the High Court normally could not have granted such a mandatory order.  Unfortunately,  mystery  has  no  place  in judicial process. Hence, the impugned order cannot be justified by any judicial standards and requires to be quashed and set aside.”

The  aforesaid  passage  is  quite  vivid  and  reflects  the

surprise expressed by the learned Judges.   

11. In  Medical  Council  of  India  v.  Rajiv  Gandhi

University of Health Sciences and others5 the three-Judge

Bench referred to  the  authority  in  Era Educational  Trust

(supra) and emphatically reiterated the law declared therein.

The reiteration is as follows:-  

“4. We once again emphasise that the law declared by this Court in  Union of India v.  Era Educational Trust  (supra)  that  interim  order  should  not  be granted  as  a  matter  of  course,  particularly  in relation to  matter  where  standards of  institutions are  involved and the  permission to  be  granted  to such institutions is subject to certain provisions of law and regulations applicable to the same, unless the same are complied with. Even if the High Court gives certain directions in relation to consideration

5

(2004) 6 SCC 76

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of the applications filed by educational institutions concerned  for  grant  of  permission  or  manner  in which  the  same  should  be  processed  should  not form a basis to direct the admission of students in these institutions which are yet to get approval from the  authorities  concerned  or  permission  has  not been granted by the Council.”

The aforesaid pronouncement, as is manifest,  rules that

issue of an interim order in respect of an institution which has

not received the approval is not countenanced in law.  

12. In  Medical Council of India v. JSS Medical College

and another6 the issue had arisen with regard to passing of

interim orders by the High Court  relating to permission for

increase  of  seats.  The  anguish  expressed  by  the  Court  is

reflectible from the following passage:-  

“12. Without adverting to the aforesaid issues and many  other  issues  which  may  arise  for determination, the High Court, in our opinion, erred in permitting increase in seats by an interim order. In normal circumstances the High Court should not issue interim order granting permission for increase of the seats. The High Court ought to realise that granting such permission by an interim order has a cascading effect.  By virtue of  such order students are  admitted  as  in  the  present  case  and  though many of them had taken the risk knowingly but few may be ignorant. In most of such cases when finally

6

(2012) 5 SCC 628

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the issue is decided against the College the welfare and plight of the students are ultimately projected to arouse sympathy of the Court. It results in a very awkward  and  difficult  situation.  If  on  ultimate analysis  it  is  found  that  the  College’s  claim  for increase of seats is untenable, in such an event the admission  of  students  with  reference  to  the increased seats shall be illegal. We cannot imagine anything more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the Court to allow continuance of such students, whose admissions is found illegal in the ultimate analysis.”   

13. In Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh and others7

dealing  with  various  aspects,  the  Court  was  in  pain  and

thought  it  appropriate  to  request  the  High  Courts  with

humility.  The lucid statement  is extracted below:-  

“78.4.  With all  the  humility  at  our  command,  we request the High Courts to ensure strict adherence to the prescribed time schedule, process of selection and to the rule of merit. We reiterate what has been stated  by  this  Court  earlier,  that  except  in  very exceptional cases, the High Court may consider it appropriate to decline interim orders and hear the main petitions finally, subject to the convenience of the Court. …”   

14. In  Medical Council of India v. M.G.R. Educational &

Research  Institute  University  &  another8 treating  the

admission as unauthorized as there had been no approval by

7 (2012) 7 SCC 433 8 (2015) 4 SCC 580

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the  MCI,  the  Court  imposed  costs  of  Rs.  5  crores  on  the

respondent institution therein, for it had created a complete

mess  insofar  as  the  students  were  admitted  to  the  second

batch of MBBS course in the college. There has been a further

direction that  the  amount  of  costs  that  was  directed  to  be

deposited  before  the  Registry  of  this  Court  was  not  to  be

recovered in any manner from any student or adjusted against

the fees or provision for facilities for students of subsequent

batches.

15. The three-Judge Bench in Royal Medical Trust (supra),

while dealing with time schedule, stated thus:-  

“33.  The  cases  in  hand  show  that  the  Central Government  did  not  choose  to  extend  the time-limits  in  the  Schedule  despite  being empowered by Note below the Schedule. Though the Central Government apparently felt constrained by the directions in Priya Gupta (supra) it did exercise that  power  in  favour  of  government  medical colleges. The decision of this Court in  Priya Gupta (supra) undoubtedly directed that the Schedule to the Regulations must be strictly and scrupulously observed. However, subsequent to that decision, the Regulations  stood  amended,  incorporating  a  Note empowering the Central Government to modify the stages  and  time-limits  in  the  Schedule  to  the Regulations.  The  effect  of  similar  such empowerment and consequential exercise of power as expected from the Central Government has been

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considered  by  this  Court  in  Priyadarshini9.  The Central Government is thus statutorily empowered to  modify  the  Schedule  in  respect  of  class  or category of applicants, for reasons to be recorded in writing.  Because  of  subsequent  amendment  and incorporation of the Note as aforesaid, the matter is now required to be seen in the light of and in accord with Priyadarshini (supra) where similar Note in pari materia Regulations was considered by this Court. We therefore hold that the directions in Priya Gupta (supra) must now be understood in the light of such statutory  empowerment  and we  declare  that  it  is open to  the  Central  Government,  in  terms of  the Note,  to  extend  or  modify  the  time-limits  in  the Schedule to the Regulations. However the deadline, namely, 30th of September for making admissions to the first MBBS course as laid down by this Court in Madhu Singh10 and Mridul Dhar (5)11 must always be observed.”

16. The question of tenability of an interim order passed by

the High Court in matters of admission came for consideration

in a recent decision in Medical Council of India v. Kalinga

Institute  of  Medical  Sciences  (KIMS)  and  others12.  The

Court found that after the MCI and the Central Government

having  twice  considered  the  inspection  report,  the  matter

ought to have been given a quietus by the High Court for the

academic year 2015-2016.  It has been further observed that

9 (2011) 4 SCC 623 10 (2002 ) 7 SCC 258 11 (2005) 2 SCC 65 12 (2016) 11 SCC 530

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the  High  Court  ought  to  have  been  more  circumspect  in

directing the admission of students and there was no need for

the High Court to rush into an area that MCI feared to tread.

It was further observed that:-  

“27. …  Granting  admission  to  students  in  an educational  institution  when  there  is  a  serious doubt whether admission should at all be granted is not  a  matter  to  be  taken  lightly.  First  of  all  the career  of  a  student  is  involved  —  what  would  a student do if his admission is found to be illegal or is quashed? Is it not a huge waste of time for him or her? Is it enough to say that the student will  not claim any equity in his or her favour? Is it enough for student to be told that his or her admission is subject  to  the  outcome  of  a  pending  litigation? These  are  all  questions  that  arise  and  for  which there is no easy answer.  Generally  speaking,  it  is better  to  err  on  the  side  of  caution  and  deny admission to a student rather than have the sword of Damocles hanging over him or her. There would at least be some certainty.”

We respectfully concur with the said observations.

17. It is worthy to note that the Court thought it appropriate

to observe that for the fault of  the institution, the students

should not suffer nor should the institution get away scot-free.

It issued certain directions to the institution that it should not

have  entered  into  adventurist  litigation  and  costs  of  Rs.  5

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crores were imposed for playing with the future of the students

and  the  mess  that  the  institution  had  created  for  them.

Certain  other  directions were  issued  in  this  case  which we

need not advert to.  

18. In  Ashish Ranjan  (supra),  the Court after hearing the

Union  of  India,  MCI  and  all  the  States,  had  fixed  a  time

schedule and directed as follows:-  

“3.  Regard  being  had  to  the  prayer  in  the  writ petition,  nothing  remains  to  be  adjudicated.  The order passed today be sent to the Chief Secretaries of all the States so that they shall see to it that all the stakeholders follow the schedule in letter  and spirit  and  not  make  any  deviation  whatsoever. Needless to say AIIMS and PGI (for the examination held in July) shall also follow the schedule in letter and spirit.”

 19. From the aforesaid authorities, it is perspicuous that the

court should not pass such interim orders in the matters of

admission,  more  so,  when  the  institution  had  not  been

accorded approval. Such kind of interim orders are likely to

cause chaos, anarchy and uncertainty. And, there is no reason

for  creating  such  situations.  There  is  no  justification  or

requirement.  The High Court  may feel  that  while  exercising

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power under Article 226 of the Constitution, it can pass such

orders  with  certain  qualifiers  as  has  been  done  by  the

impugned order, but it really does not save the situation.  It is

because an institution which has not been given approval for

the course, gets a premium. That apart, by virtue of interim

order, the court grants approval in a way which is the subject

matter  of  final  adjudication  before  it.   The  anxiety  of  the

students to get admission reigns supreme as they feel that the

institution  is  granting  admission  on  the  basis  of  an  order

passed by the High Court.  The institution might be directed to

inform the  students  that  the  matter  is  sub  judice,  but  the

career oriented students get into the college with the hope and

aspiration that in the ultimate eventuate everything shall be

correct for them and they will be saved.  It can be thought of

from  another  perspective,  that  is,  the  students  had

deliberately got into such a situation.  But it is seemly to note

that it is the institution that had approached the High Court

and sought a relief of the present nature.  By saying that the

institution may give admission at its own risk invites further

chaotic and unfortunate situations.

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20.  The High Court has to realize the nature of the lis or the

controversy. It is quite different. It is not a construction which

is built at the risk of a plaintiff or the defendant which can be

demolished or  redeemed by grant  of  compensation.   It  is  a

situation where the order has the potentiality to play with the

career  and life  of  young.  One may say,  “… life  is  a foreign

language; all mis-pronounce it”, but it has to be borne in mind

that artificial or contrived accident is not the goal of life.

21. There  is  no  reason  to  invite  a  disaster  by  way  of  an

interim order. A Judge has to constantly remind himself about

the precedents in the field and not to be swayed away by his

own convictions. In this context, the oft-quoted passage from

Felix Frankfurter13 would be apt to remember:-

“For  the  highest  exercise  of  judicial  duty  is  to subordinate one’s personal pulls and one’s private views to the law of  which we are all  guardians ― those impersonal convictions that make a society a civilized community, and not the victims of personal rule.”   

22. That  leads  us  to  say  something  about  following  the

precedents. The purpose is to have consistency. A three-Judge

13 FRANKFURTER, Felix, in Clark, Tom C., “Mr. Justice Frankfurter: ‘A Heritage for all  Who Love the Law’,” 51 A.B.A.J. 330, 332 (1965)

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Bench in  Government  of  Andhra Pradesh and others  v.

A.P. Jaiswal and others14 observed:-  

“24.  Consistency  is  the  cornerstone  of  the administration  of  justice.  It  is  consistency  which creates  confidence  in  the  system  and  this consistency can never be achieved without respect to the rule of finality. It is with a view to achieve consistency in judicial pronouncements, the courts have  evolved  the  rule  of  precedents,  principle  of stare  decisis,  etc.  These  rules  and  principle  are based on public policy….”

23. In Arasmeta Captive Power Company Private Limited

and another  v.  Lafarge  India  Private  Limited15,  dealing

with  the  matter  that  related  to  the  field  of  arbitration,  the

Court emphatically observed that it is an “endeavour to clear

the maze, so that certainty remains “A Definite” and finality is

“Final””.  In this regard, we may travel a decade and a half

back. In Chandra Prakash and others v. State of U.P. and

another16, it has been held:-  

“22.   …  The doctrine  of  binding  precedent  is  of utmost  importance  in  the  administration  of  our judicial  system.  It  promotes  certainty  and consistency  in  judicial  decisions.  Judicial consistency  promotes  confidence  in  the  system, therefore, there is this need for consistency in the

14 (2001) 1 SCC 748 15 (2013) 15 SCC 414 16 (2002) 4 SCC 234

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enunciation of  legal  principles  in  the  decisions  of this Court.”   

 24. In  the  instant  case,  the  precedents  are  clear  and

luculent.  It  does  not  allow  any  space  for  any  kind  of

equivocation. In Priya Gupta (supra), the Court had requested

the High Courts to ensure strict adherence to the prescribed

time  schedule,  process  of  selection  and  role  of  merit  and

except  in  very  exceptional  cases,  to  decline  interim orders.

The Court had added the words “humility at our command”.

The “grammar of humility in law” in the hierarchical system

basically  means  to  abide  by  the  precedents  unless

distinguishable  but  not  to  ignore  them  and  pass  orders

because of an individual notion or perception.   Adjudication

in accordance with precedents is cultivation of humility.  As

long  as  a  precedent  is  binding  under  the  constitutional

scheme, it  has to be respected by all.   It  has been said by

Simone Weil17:-

“In the intellectual order, the virtue of  humility is nothing more nor less than the power of attention”

17 Simone Weil, 1909-1943 Gravity and Grace, 1947

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25. We reiterate the concept of humility as stated in  Priya

Gupta (supra). However, we intend to add that the meaning

behind the words, namely, “humility”, and “request” as used

by this Court,  has to be appositely understood by the High

Courts.  It requires attention. And attention in the context is

disciplined and concerned awareness.  Nothing more need be

said.

26. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we cannot but hold that

the impugned order passed by the   learned Single Judge of

the  High  Court  is  absolutely  unsustainable.   But  the

controversy does not end there. It is the admitted position that

the  respondent-college  has  been  granted  approval  for  the

academic session 2017-2018. By virtue of  the interim order

passed by the High Court, three students had been admitted

and they are prosecuting their studies.  We intend to strike a

balance.  The  students  who  have  been  admitted  shall  be

allowed  to  continue  their  courses,  but  their  seats  shall  be

adjusted  from  the  academic  session  2017-2018.  The

respondent-college cannot be allowed to get a premium.  The

grant of bounty is likely to allow such institutions to develop

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an attitude  of  serendipity.  Such a  culture  is  inconceivable.

Therefore,  apart  from the  adjustment  of  seats  for  the  next

academic  session,  we  also  direct  the  respondent-college  to

deposit a sum of Rs. 30 Lakhs before the Registry of this Court

within eight weeks hence and to ensure such compliance, the

matter  shall  be  listed  in  the  third  week  of  July,  2017  for

further directions. After the amount is deposited, it shall be

determined how to deal with the sum.  The costs that has been

directed to be deposited before the Registry of this Court shall

in no manner be recovered from the students who had been

admitted nor shall it be collected from the students who will

be admitted to the course in the next year.  That apart,  the

respondent-college shall not think of any kind of adjustment.

27. The appeal stands disposed of in above terms.   

……………………………….…J. (Dipak Misra)

………………………………..…J. (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)

NEW DELHI; APRIL 11, 2017