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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.249-250 OF 2011

DEEPAK RAI                         Appellant(s) VERSUS

STATE OF BIHAR                        Respondent(s) WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1747-1748 OF 2011

JAGAT RAI AND ANR.                     Appellant(s)

VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR                        Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T        H.L. Dattu, J:

1. These appeals are directed against the  judgment and order passed by the High  Court of Judicature at Patna in Death  Reference No. 6 of 2009 and Criminal

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Appeal(DB) Nos. 989 of 2009 and 158  of 2010, dated 19.08.2010.  By the  impugned judgment and order, the High  Court has confirmed the judgment of  conviction,  dated  17.09.2010  and  order  of  sentence,  dated  30.10.2009  passed  by  the  Additional  Sessions  Judge  cum  FTC  No.  2,  Vaishali  at  Hazipur in Sessions Trial No. 195 and  571  of  2006,  whereby  the  learned  Sessions  Judge  has  convicted  the  three accused-appellants for offence  under  Sections  120B,  148,  302  read  with  149,  307  read  with  149,  326,  429,  436  and  452  of  Indian  Penal  Code, 1860 (for short ‘the IPC’) and  sentenced them to death.

Facts:

2. The Prosecution case in a nutshell is:  On the fateful night of 01.01.2006,

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the  deceased  informant  (PW-7)  was  sleeping in the Varanda of his house  and his wife alongwith the children,  two daughters aged 12 and 10 years,  respectively and three sons aged 8, 6  and  3  years,  respectively  were  sleeping  in  the  room  inside  the  house. At around 01.00 A.M., he was  awakened by the sound of footsteps of  several people. In the dim light of a  night  bulb  and  further  from  their  voices, he identified the persons who  had come near his house armed with  lethal  weapons  as  appellant-accused  persons  and  nine  other  villagers  besides 10-11 unknown persons. Before  the  informant  could  escape,  appellant-accused-Jagat  Rai(A1)  and  Deepak Rai(A2) caught hold of him and  pushed him on the ground whereafter  3-4 unknown persons got over his body

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and  gagged  him.  Then  A1  instructed  few others to surround the house from  all sides and sprinkle kerosene over  it, while the other accused persons  locked the door of the room where the  informant’s  wife  was  sleeping  alongwith  the  children  and  set  the  house on fire trapping them inside.  Thereafter,  they  sprinkled  kerosene  over  the  informant’s  body  and  held  him to the ground while A1 set the  informant’s mouth on fire by lighting  a  matchstick.  Upon  rising  of  a  blazing  flash  of  fire,  the  accused  persons  fled  away  leaving  the  informant behind. While the informant  also attempted to escape, A2 fired at  him  but  the  informant  managed  an  escape and raised alarm. On hearing  such  noise,  the  informant’s  four  brothers and other family members who

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resided in the adjoining houses woke  up,  reached  the  spot  and  witnessed  the  accused  persons  running  away  while  the  informant  was  on  fire.  Until  then  the  fire  in  informant’s  house  had  reached  its  enormity,  swallowing the informant’s family and  injuring the buffalo and calf on the  property.  The  informant  (PW-7)  was  rushed to the Primary Health Centre,  Raghopur.  

3. The fardbayan was recorded at 7:30 AM,  on  the  basis  of  which  an  FIR  was  registered  against  the  three  appellant-accused and few others for  the offence under Sections 147, 148,  149, 452, 342, 324, 326, 427, 436,  307 and 302 of the IPC at 9:00 AM on  01.01.2006.  The  motive  of  the  occurrence  was  alleged  to  be  the  informant’s  refusal  even  after

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consistent threats by A1 to withdraw  the FIR lodged by him for the theft  of informant’s buffalo against A1 and  his family, in pursuance of which two  members of his family were arrested.  Upon  investigation,  the  chargesheet  was  drawn  against  the  aforesaid  accused  persons  on  21.03.2006.  The  learned  Judicial  Magistrate,  First  Class,  Hazipur,  Vaishali  bifurcated  the  case  of  the  absconded  accused  persons-A1,  A2  and  8  others  and  committed the case of Bacchababu Rai  (A3)  and  5  others  for  trial  as  Sessions Trial No. 195 of 2006, by  order  dated  06.05.2006.  Upon  arrest  of the accused persons-A1, A2 and one  other, their case was separated from  other  absconder-accused  persons  and  committed to trial as Sessions Trial  No.  571  of  2006,  by  order  dated

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15.12.2006. 4. While  in  Sessions  Trial  No.  195  of  

2006, 17 witnesses were examined and  14  exhibits  were  produced,  in  Sessions  Trial  No.571  of  2006,  14  witnesses  were  examined  and  11  exhibits  were  produced  by  the  prosecution.  Since  both  the  cases  arose out of the same FIR, they were  consolidated  by  order  dated  12.01.2008,  whereafter  their  trial  proceeded together. While A2 examined  8  witnesses,  other  two  accused  persons-  Binay  Rai  and  Ranjay  Rai  examined  five  and  three  witnesses,  respectively in their defence.  

5. Since  the  evidence  of  prosecution  witnesses recorded in the two trials  corroborates the prosecution case in  material  particulars,  brevitatis  causa and  to  avoid  repetition  we

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would  only  notice  them  once.  The  informant  (PW-7)  has  identified  the  appellant-accused  persons,  supported  the prosecution case in his evidence  and testified in respect of the time  and  manner  of  occurrence  of  the  fateful  incident  and  the  motive  of  the accused persons. PWs 1, 2, 3 and  4  are  the  brothers  of  PW-7  who  resided  adjacent  to  PW-7’s  house.  They  have  identified  the  accused  persons and further corroborated the  prosecution case in respect of time  of  occurrence  and  motive  of  the  appellant-accused  persons.  PW-1  has  stated that as soon as he heard PW- 7’s  shrieks  and  noise  from  the  blazing fire, he rushed outside his  house  and  witnessed  the  accused  persons fleeing away. He found PW-7  on fire and immediately covered him

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with  a  blanket  to  douse  it;  whereafter,  he  along  with  others  attempted to set the fire off at PW- 7’s  house  but  the  fire  having  transformed  into  a  conflagration  it  was too late to save the six deceased  persons.  PW-5  (wife  of  PW-2),  PW-6  (mother of PW-7), PW-14 (wife of PW- 1), PW-15 (sister of PW-7) and PW-16  (wife  of  PW-4)  have  also  supported  the  prosecution  case  in  respect  of  PW-1’s account of the incident, i.e.,  the  fleeing  away  of  the  three  appellant-accused persons along with  others and the motive of the accused  persons  behind  the  incident.  PW-8,  the Doctor who conducted post mortem  examination  of  the  six  deceased  persons,  has  corroborated  the  prosecution  case  that  the  death  occurred by 100% burn injuries. PW-

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10, the Doctor who treated PW-7, has  testified in respect of the injuries  suffered  by  PW-7.  His  evidence  alongwith  the  post-mortem  report  corroborate  the  time  and  manner  of  the fateful incident. Further, PW-11  (the Investigating Officer) supported  the prosecution case with regard to  the time and place of the occurrence  and  the  presence  of  charred  dead  bodies of the six deceased persons.  The  Trial  Court  discarded  the  testimonies of the defence witnesses  at the outset and proceeded with the  trial.

6. Upon meticulous consideration of the  evidence  on  record  and  the  submissions made by the parties, the  learned  Sessions  Judge  has  observed  that  even  though  the  witnesses  examined  by  the  prosecution  are

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related  to  the  victims,  their  testimonies when considered with due  care and caution are corroborated by  the evidence of informant (PW-7), the  post mortem reports, evidence of the  Doctors(PW-9 and 10) and the evidence  of  PW-11,  the  Investigating  Officer  and therefore, cannot be rejected on  the prima facie ground of them being  interested witnesses. The Trial Court  has  believed  the  aforesaid  evidence  corroborating the prosecution case in  respect of A1, A2 and A3; however,  doubted the presence of other accused  persons  since  their  names  have  neither  been  mentioned  in  the  fardbayan nor  has  the  evidence  produced  against  them  proved  their  offence  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  In  light of the aforesaid observations,  the  Trial  Court  has  reached  the

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conclusion that the three appellant- accused  persons  are  guilty  of  the  aforesaid  offence  and  has  convicted  them accordingly while acquitting the  others, by judgment dated 17.09.2009.  Further,  after  affording  an  opportunity  of  hearing  to  the  appellant-accused  persons  on  the  question of sentence, the Trial Court  has sentenced them to death, by order  dated 30.10.2009, relevant paragraphs  of which are reproduced as under:

“Heard  both  sides  on  the  question  of  sentence  on  behalf  of  the  held  guilty  accused  Bachcha  Babu  Rai,  Jagat  Rai,  Bipat Rai alias Deepak Rai, it has been  submitted  that  before  this,  they  have  not been punished in any case of them  Bipat Rai @ Deepak is a retired military  personnel.  Keeping in mind, their age  has  also  first  conviction,  minimum  of  sentence may be inflicted.  

On  behalf  of  the  prosecution  it  has  been  said  that  the  guilty  held  persons  Bachcha  Babu  Rai,  Jagat  Rai,  Bipat  Rai@  Deepak  Rai  have  committed  a  heinous  offence  and  their  offence falls under the category of RARE  OF  RAREST.   Their  heinous  crime  has

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ruined the informant of this case, his  wife and five children.  So far Bipat  Rai  is  concerned,  he  is  a  retired  military personnel his conduct should be  all the more decent.  They are not of  tender age nor old.  They do not deserve  any  mercy  and  they  deserve  death  sentence.  In the light of the reasoning  of  both  sides  as  also  on  an  appreciation, it is manifest, that the  occurrence  is  of  night  when  the  informant,  his  wife  and  five  minor  children and cattle all have been burnt  to  death.   The  informant  also  subsequently  died  in  this  way,  the  entire family is ruined.  In the light  of  the  guidelines  as  given  by  Hon’ble  Supreme Court, this case falls under the  heading  of  RARE  OF  RAREST  cases.  Because of this the guilty held accused  persons Bachcha Babu Rai, Jagat Rai and  Bipat  Rai  allias  Deepak  Rai  are  sentenced to death or offence u/s 302/  149 IPC. …”

7. Aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  judgment  and  order,  the  three  appellant- accused persons filed appeals before  the  High  Court  which  were  heard  alongwith the Death Reference No. 6  of 2009 and disposed of by a common  judgment and order, dated 19.08.2010.  The High Court has elaborately dealt

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with  the  evidence  on  record  and  extensively  discussed  the  judgment  and order of the Trial Court in order  to  ascertain  the  correctness  or  otherwise  of  the  conviction  and  sentence  awarded  to  the  appellant- accused persons. The High Court has  observed that since, the informant is  the only witness who was present at  the  scene  of  crime,  his  testimony  alone  could  substantiate  upon  the  specific role of accused persons in  the  commission  of  the  ghastly  offence.  In  so  far  as  the  identification  of  the  appellant- accused persons, the High Court has  observed  that  the  informant  in  the  fardbeyan specifically mentions their  names  and,  infact,  attributes  specific  roles  to  them  in  the  commission of the offence, i.e., A1

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commanding  the  house  to  be  set  on  fire and lighting the matchstick to  set the informant’s mouth on fire and  later,  when  the  informant  was  attempting  to  escape,  A2  firing  at  the  informant.  Further,  that  during  the  commission  of  the  offence  the  accused  persons  were  in  close  proximity  to  the  informant  and  the  presence of dim light of bulb in the  night and the illumination by flames  of  burning  house  coupled  with  them  being  known  to  the  informant  establishes  their  identity  in  the  evidence  of  informant,  which  is  supplemented and strengthened by the  evidence of PWs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.  The High Court has further observed  that the prosecution case in respect  of the time and place of occurrence  and  the  factum  of  accused  persons

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fleeing  the  spot  of  occurrence  immediately  after  setting  the  house  on fire causing death of six persons  by burning them alive and injury to  the  informant  has  been  well  established  by  cogent,  reliable  and  unimpeachable  eye-witnesses  and  further  corroborated  by  the  testimonies  of  the  Doctors,  post- mortem report, medical report and the  evidence of Investigating Officer. On  the basis of the aforesaid, the High  Court has concluded towards the guilt  of  the  accused  appellants  and  sentenced them as follows:

“…since the occurrence is ghastly murder  of  wife  and  five  children  of  the  informant  by  closing  in  room  for  not  withdrawing the case of theft of buffalo  shocked  the  entire  community  bringing  the  case  in  the  category  of  rare  of  rarest to attract the maximum punishment  and hence the reference is answered in  the affirmative and I do not find any  merit in the two appeals and hence the  appeals are dismissed……”

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8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction  and  sentence,  the  appellants  are  before  us  in  these  appeals.  The  appeals before us are limited to the  question of sentence.

Submissions:

9. We  have  heard  Dr.  Sumant  Bharadwaj  learned  counsel  appearing  for  A2,  Shri  Ramesh  Chandra  Mishra,  learned  counsel appearing for A1 and A3 and  Shri  Nagendra  Rai,  learned  senior  counsel appearing for the respondent- State.

10. Dr.  Bharadwaj  would  submit  that  the  Courts below have erred in sentencing  A2  as  the  reasons  recorded  by  the  Courts below do not conform to the  statutory  mandate  prescribed  under  Section  354(3)  of  the  Code  of

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Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (for  short  ‘the  Code’),  which  require  the  judgment to record “reasons” in case  of sentence of life imprisonment and  “special  reasons”  in  case  of  death  sentence.  He  would  submit  that  the  since  no  extraordinary  reasons  have  been assigned by the Courts below to  sentence  the  appellant  to  death  instead  of  a  less  harsher  sentence  and  that  this  Court  in  appellate  jurisdiction cannot go into the same  for the first time while confirming  the  death  sentence,  the  matter  requires to be remanded to the Trial  Court for fresh consideration on the  question of sentence as per Section  354(3) of the Code. Further, he would  place reliance upon the judgments of  this  Court  in  Ambaram  v.  State  of  M.P., (1976) 4 SCC 298, Balwant Singh

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v. State of Punjab, (1976) 1 SCC 425,  Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra, (1977)  3 SCC 68, Muniappan v. State of T.N.,  (1981) 3 SCC 11 and Rajesh Kumar v.  State,  (2011)  13  SCC  706;  wherein  this  Court  has  held  that  “special  reasons”  are  essential  for  awarding  death  sentence  under  Section  354(3)  of the Code and in absence of such  reasons  has  commuted  the  sentence  passed by the Courts below from death  to life imprisonment and submit that  since,  in  the  instant  case,  no  “special  reasons”  were  recorded  by  the Courts below while sentencing the  appellants,  the  sentence  of  the  appellants  ought  to  be  commuted  to  life imprisonment.

11. Shri Mishra would assail the sentence  awarded  by  the  Trial  Court  and

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confirmed  by  the  High  Court  and  submit  that  in  the  instant  case  mitigating  circumstances  overwhelmingly  outweigh  the  aggravating  circumstances  and  therefore, ends of justice would only  be achieved by commuting the sentence  of the two appellant-accused persons,  A1 and A3, from death to imprisonment  for  life.  He  would  put  forth  the  following factors in support of his  submission:

“Mitigating Circumstances: 1.Appellants are not hard core criminals, 2.They  are  not  threat/  menace  to  the  

Society, 3.They  have  no  criminal  antecedent/  

background,  4.They are not antisocial elements, 5.Their  conduct  in  Jail  has  been  

satisfactory, 6.The State has failed to prove that they  

are incapable of being reformed  7.They have been in Jail for about seven  

years, 8.Delay  of  seven  years  in  execution  of  

death  sentence  confirmed  in  death  anticipating imminent death any moment,

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9.Death sentence is exception and life- imprisonment is rule,

10. Global  move  to  abolish  death  sentence.  138 nations have abolished  death  sentence  while  59  countries  including  India  have  retained  death  sentence.  (2009) 6 SCC 498.  Relevant  page- 544, paras 111-112,

11. Jagat Rai at the time of commission  of offence was 48 years while Bachcha  Babu  Rai  was  43  years,  comparatively  young,

12. Offence  was  committed  when  the  appellant were under the influence of  extreme  of  mental  disturbance  due  to  pendency of criminal case,

13. There is every probability that the  appellants  can  be  reformed  and  rehabilitated,

14. All  the  four  main  objectives  which  state  intends  to  achieve  namely  deterrence, prevention, retribution and  reformation can be achieved by keeping  the appellants alive.

Aggravating Circumstances:  1.It was a planned, cold-blooded brutal  

murder, 2.Entire family was wiped out.…”

12. A contrario Shri Rai would support the  judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  Courts  below  convicting  the  appellants  of  the  aforesaid  offence  and  sentencing  them  to  death.  He  would  submit  that  the  reasons

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recorded  by  the  Courts  below  fall  within  the  statutory  requirements  under Section 354(3) of the Code as  well as the parameters laid down by  this  Court  for  recording  “special  reasons”  while  sentencing  a  convict  to  death.  He  would  distinguish  the  cases  cited  by  Shri  Bharadwaj  as  cases  wherein  the  sentence  of  the  accused persons was commuted due to  reasons  besides  absence  of  “special  reasons”  for  sentencing  the  accused  therein in the judgments and orders  of the Courts below and further place  reliance  upon  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Gurdev  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab,  (2003)  7  SCC  258 amongst  others,  wherein  this  Court  has  sentenced the accused persons therein  who were responsible for causing the  death  of  fifteen  persons,  besides

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causing  grievous  injuries  to  eight  others to death after balancing the  aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances.

13. We  have  given  our  anxious  consideration  to  the  materials  on  record  in  its  entirety,  the  submissions  made  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and  the  judgments  and  orders  of  the  Courts  below.  

Issues for consideration:

14. The  questions  which  fall  for  our  consideration and decision are first,  whether the reasons assigned by the  Courts  below  while  sentencing  the  appellants  are  “special  reasons”  under Section 354(3) of the Code and  second, whether the offence committed  by  the  appellants  fall  into  the

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category  of  “rarest  of  the  rare”  cases  so  as  to  warrant  death  sentence.  

Cases cited by Shri Bharadwaj:

15. At  the  outset  we  would  examine  the  decisions  relied  upon  by  Dr.  Bharadwaj and examine whether at all  should  the  sentence  in  the  present  case,  for  lack  of  special  reasons  being assigned by the Trial Courts as  well as the High Courts, ought to be  commuted to imprisonment for life.

16. In  Ambaram  case  (supra),  the  appellant-accused  was  tried  along  with four others for murder of two  persons. It was the appellant therein  who  shot  one  while  his  companions  assaulted  the  other  to  death  with  sharp-edged weapons and a lathi. He  was  convicted  under  Section  302  of

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the  IPC  by  the  Trial  Court  and  sentenced to death alone by the Trial  Court  as  well  as  the  High  Court  against which he had approached this  Court  by  filing  a  special  leave  petition.  It  is  pertinent  to  note  that his appeal was limited to the  question of sentence. This Court has  noticed  the  change  in  the  law  introduced  under  Section  354(3)  of  the  Code  in  1973  which  confers  discretion on the Courts to inflict  the death sentence or the sentence of  life  imprisonment  each  according  to  the  circumstances  and  exigencies  of  each case but enjoins duty upon them  to  justify  it  by  giving  special  reasons  and  reasons,  respectively.  This Court has observed as follows:

“1. …The  High  Court  has  not given any special reasons why Ambaram  has been singled out for the award of the

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extreme penalty. Nor do we find any such  reason to treat him differently in the  matter  of  sentence  from  his  companions  who have been awarded the lesser penalty.  On this short ground we allow this appeal  and commute Ambaram’s death sentence to  that of imprisonment for life.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. In  Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab,  (1976)  1  SCC  425 this  Court  has  observed as follows:  

“4. …On the facts of this case, it is  true that the appellant had a motive to  commit the murder and he did it with an  intention  to  kill  the  deceased.  His  conviction  under  Section  302  of  the  Penal Code was justified but the facts  found  were  not  such  as  to  enable  the  Court  to  say  that  there  were  special  reasons  for  passing  the  sentence  of  death in this case.”

(emphasis supplied)

Thereafter, this Court has observed the error  committed by the High Court in applying the  principle  of  extenuating  circumstances  under  the  older  Code  even  after  the  present  Code  coming into force in 1973 which requires the

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Court to assign special reasons while awarding  death penalty and observed the follows:

“5. The High Court has referred to the  two  decisions  of  this  Court  namely  in  Mangal Singh v. State of U.P., (1975) 3  SCC  290  and  in  Perumal  v.  State  of  Kerala, (1975) 4 SCC 109   and has then  said:

“There  are  no  extenuating  circumstances in this case and the  death  sentence  awarded  to  Balwant  Singh  appellant  by  the  Sessions  Judge is confirmed ....”

As  we  have  said  above,  even  after  noticing  the  provisions  of  Section  354(3)  of  the  new  Criminal  Procedure  Code the High Court committed an error  in  relying  upon  the  two  decisions  of  this Court in which the trials were held  under  the  old  Code.  It  wrongly  relied  upon  the  principle  of  absence  of  extenuating circumstances — a principle  which was applicable after the amendment  of  the  old  Code  from  January  1,  1956  until the coming into force of the new  Code from April 1, 1974. In our judgment  there is no special reason nor any has  been  recorded  by  the  High  Court  for  confirming  the  death  sentence  in  this  case. We accordingly allow the appeal on  the question of sentence and commute the  death  sentence  imposed  upon  the  appellant  to  one  for  imprisonment  for  life.”

(emphasis supplied)

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18. In Muniappan v. State of T.N., (1981)  3  SCC  11, this  Court  has  observed  that  not  only  has  the  Trial  Court  failed to provide adequate hearing to  the accused under Section 235(2), but  also  it  as  well  as  the  High  Court  have not assigned appropriate reasons  while  awarding  and  confirming  the  sentence of the accused, respectively  and thus, reached the conclusion that  the sentence of death could not be  imposed.  

19. Further,  in  Dagdu  case  (supra)  and  Rajesh Kumar case (supra) this Court  has  considered  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  in  its  entirety  while  balancing  the  aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances  to  decide  upon  the  adequacy of sentence awarded by the  Courts below and upon reaching such

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satisfaction  that  the  case  did  not  fall into the category of “rarest of  the  rare”  warranting  “special  reasons”  for  the  award  of  death  sentence has commuted the sentence of  the accused.

20. Thus in the aforementioned cases, this  Court has upon examination of both- the  evidence  on  record  and  the  reasoning of the Courts below while  sentencing  the  accused  reached  an  independent conclusion that the facts  and circumstances of the case do not  warrant  imposition  of  sentence  of  death.  Therefore,  it  is  not  the  absence  or  adequacy  of  “special  reasons”  alone  what  weighed  in  the  mind  of  this  Court  while  commuting  the sentence. The facts  in toto and  procedural impropriety, if any loomed  large in exercising such discretion.

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Hence,  the  reliance  placed  on  the  aforementioned decisions is rejected.

Scope  of  Article  136  vis-à-vis  examination  of  “special reasons”

21. Further, we are unable to accept the  submission  that  in  any  case  the  failure  on  the  part  of  the  Court,  which  has  convicted  an  accused  and  heard him on the question of sentence  but  failed  to  express  the  “special  reasons”  in  so  many  words,  must  necessarily entail a remand to that  Court  for  elaboration  upon  its  conclusion  in  awarding  the  death  sentence  for  the  reason  that  while  exercising  appellate  jurisdiction  this  Court  cannot  delve  into  such  reasons.

22. Since the appellants are before us by  way of an appeal by special leave, we

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would  first  examine  the  scope  of  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  of  India vis-à-vis criminal appeals.  

23. The appellate jurisdiction vested in  this Court by virtue of Article 136  is not plain statutory but expansive  and  extraordinary.  The  Court  exercises  its  discretion  and  grants  leave to appeal in cases where it is  satisfied  that  the  same  would  circumvent  a  grave  miscarriage  of  justice.  Such  jurisdiction  is  not  fettered  by  rules  of  criminal  procedure  but  guided  by  judicially  evolved principles.  

24. We are fortified by the decision of  this  Court  in  State  of  U.P.  v.  Dharmendra Singh, (1999) 8 SCC 325,

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where  while  examining the  applicability  of  Section  377(3)  of  the Code to an appeal under Article  136 has observed as follows:  

“10. …A perusal of this section shows that  this provision is applicable only when the  matter is before the High Court and the  same is not applicable to this Court when  an appeal for enhancement of sentence is  made  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution. It is to be noted that an  appeal to this Court in criminal matters  is not provided under the Code except in  cases covered by Section 379 of the Code.  An appeal to this Court under Article 136  of the Constitution is not the same as a  statutory  appeal  under  the  Code.  This  Court  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  is  not  a  regular  court  of  appeal which an accused can approach as of  right. It is an extraordinary jurisdiction  which is exercisable only in exceptional  cases when this Court is satisfied that it  should  interfere  to  prevent  a  grave  or  serious  miscarriage  of  justice,  as  distinguished  from  mere  error  in  appreciation of evidence. While exercising  this jurisdiction, this Court is not bound  by the rules of procedure as applicable to  the  courts  below.  This  Court’s  jurisdiction  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution is limited only by its own  discretion (see Nihal Singh v. State of  Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 26. In that view of  the  matter, we  are of  the opinion  that  Section 377(3) of the Code in terms does  not apply to an appeal under Article 136

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of the Constitution.  11.  This does  not mean  that this  Court  will  be  unmindful  of  the  principles  analogous  to  those  found  in  the  Code  including  those  under  Section  377(3)  of  the Code while moulding a procedure for  the disposal of an appeal under Article  136 of the Constitution. Apart from the  Supreme  Court  Rules  applicable  for  the  disposal of the criminal appeals in this  Court,  the  Court  also  adopts  such  analogous principles found in the Code so  as  to  make  the  procedure  a  “fair  procedure”  depending  on  the  facts  and  circumstances of the case.”

(emphasis supplied) 25. More so, it is settled law that an  

appeal by special leave under Article  136 is a continuation of the original  proceedings.  In  Moran  M.  Baselios  Marthoma  Mathews  II  v.  State  of  

Kerala, (2007) 6 SCC 517, this Court  categorically observed as follows:  

“13.  We,  therefore,  are  of  the  opinion  that despite the fact that the appellants  had insisted upon before the High Court  for issuance of a writ or in the nature of  mandamus upon the State or its officers  for  the  purpose  of  grant  of  police  protection as this Court has exercised its  appellate jurisdiction under Article 136  of the Constitution of India, it can and  should go into that question as well viz.

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as  to  whether  the  writ  petition  itself  could  have  been  entertained  or  not,  particularly,  when  the  appeal  is  a  continuation of the original proceedings.”  

26. Further, this Court in  Netai Bag v.  State of W.B., (2000) 8 SCC 262 while  observing that the scope of an appeal  under Articles 136 and 226 cannot be  wider  than  the  earlier  proceedings,  has  noticed  that  the  appeals  under  said  provisions  are  continuation  of  the original proceedings.

27. Thus,  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  in  appeal  under  Article 136  though  circumscribed to the scope of earlier  proceedings  is  neither  fettered  by  the rules of criminal procedure nor  limited  to  mere  confirmation  or  rejection of the appeal. This Court  while  considering  the  question  of  correctness  or  otherwise  of  the  sentence awarded by the Courts below

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has  exercised  discretionary  jurisdiction  under  Article  136  and  hence  can  not  only  examine  the  reasons  so  assigned  under  Section  354(3) but also substantiate upon the  same, if need so be.

28. With the aforesaid in view, let us now  examine the issues before us.

Issue one: “Special reasons” under Section 354(3)  of the Code

29. Under Section 367(5) of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1898  (for  short  “old Code”), the normal sentence to  be awarded to a person found guilty  of murder was death and imprisonment  for  life  was  an  exception.  The  Amending  Act  26  of  1955  amended  Section  367(5)  of  the  old  Code  resulting  in  vesting  of  discretion  with  the  Court  to  inflict  the  sentence  of  life  imprisonment  or

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death  each  according  to  the  circumstances  and  exigencies  of  the  case. The amended Section 367(5) of  the old Code reads as follows:

“367. (5) If the accused is convicted of  an offence punishable with death, and the  court  sentences  him  to  any  punishment  other than death, the court shall in its  judgment state the reason why sentence of  death was not passed.”

30. The present Code which was legislated  in 1973 brought a shift in the then  existing penological trend by making  imprisonment  for  life  a  rule  and  death sentence an exception. It makes  it mandatory for the Court in cases  of  conviction  for  an  offence  punishable with imprisonment for life  to assign reasons in support of the  sentence awarded to the convict and  further  ordains  that  in  case  the  Court  awards  the  death  penalty,  “special  reasons”  for  such  sentence

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shall be stated in the judgment. It  reads as follows :

"When  the  conviction  is  for  an  offence  punishable  with  death  or,  in  the  alternative,  with  imprisonment  for  life  or imprisonment for a term of years, the  judgment shall state the reasons for the  sentence  awarded,  and,  in  the  case  of  sentence  of  death,  the  special  reasons  for such sentence."

31. For  the  first  time,  this  shift  in  sentencing  policy  has  been  observed  by  Krishna Iyer J. (as he then was)  in  Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra  Pradesh,  (1974)  4  SCC  443, as  follows:

“18.  It  cannot  be  emphasised  too  often  that  crime  and  punishment  are  functionally  related  to  the  society  in  which they occur, and Indian conditions  and stages of progress must dominate the  exercise of judicial discretion in this  case.

… 21.  It  is  obvious  that  the  disturbed  conscience  of  the  State  on  the  vexed  question of legal threat to life by way  of death sentence has sought to express  itself  legislatively,  the  stream  of  tendency being towards cautious, partial  abolition  and  a  retreat  from  total

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retention.” (Also  Ambaram  case  (supra),  Joseph  v.  State  of  Goa,  (1977)  3  SCC  280,  Triveniben v. State of Gujarat)  

32. Further,  this  Court  in  Harnam  v.  State  of  U.P.,  (1976)  1  SCC  163  supplemented  the  aforesaid  observations and noted as follows:

“4.  …The  seminal  trends  in  current  sociological thinking and penal strategy,  tampered  as  they  are  by  humanistic  attitude and deep concern for the worth  of  the  human  person,  frown  upon  death  penalty and regard it as cruel & savage  punishment  to  be  inflicted  only  in  exceptional  cases.  It  is  against  this  background of legislative thinking which  reflects  the  social  mood  and  realities  and  the  direction  of  the  penal  and  procedural laws that we have to consider  whether the tender age of an accused is a  fetor  contra-indicative  of  death  penalty.”

33. In  Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar,  (1989)  3  SCC  5 this  Court  has  examined the purpose of inclusion of  “special reasons” clause as follows:

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“9. … When the law casts a duty on the  judge to state reasons it follows that he  is  under  a  legal  obligation  to  explain  his choice of the sentence. It may seem  trite to say so, but the existence of the  “special  reasons  clause”  in  the  above  provision implies that the court can in  fit cases impose the extreme penalty of  death which negatives the contention that  there  never  can  be  a  valid  reason  to  visit an offender with the death penalty,  no matter how cruel, gruesome or shocking  the  crime  may  be…  While  rejecting  the  demand  of  the  protagonist  of  the  reformatory theory for the abolition of  the death penalty the legislature in its  wisdom thought that  the “special reasons  clause” should be a sufficient safeguard  against  arbitrary  imposition  of  the  extreme  penalty.  Where  a  sentence  of  severity  is  imposed,  it  is  imperative  that the judge should indicate the basis  upon  which  he  considers  a  sentence  of  that  magnitude  justified.  Unless  there  are special reasons, special to the facts  of  the  particular  case,  which  can  be  catalogued  as  justifying  a  severe  punishment the judge would not award the  death sentence. It may be stated that if  a  judge  finds  that  he  is  unable  to  explain  with  reasonable  accuracy  the  basis for selecting the higher of the two  sentences his choice should fall on the  lower sentence. In all such cases the law  casts an obligation on the judge to make  his choice after carefully examining the  pros and cons of each case. It must at  once be conceded that offenders of some  particularly grossly brutal crimes which  send tremors in the community have to be  firmly  dealt  with  to  protect  the  community from the perpetrators of such

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crimes. Where the incidence of a certain  crime is rapidly growing and is assuming  menacing  proportions,  for  example,  acid  pouring  or  bride  burning,  it  may  be  necessary  for  the  courts  to  award  exemplary  punishments  to  protect  the  community  and  to  deter  others  from  committing  such  crimes.  Since  the  legislature in its wisdom thought that in  some rare cases it may still be necessary  to impose the extreme punishment of death  to  deter  others  and  to  protect  the  society and in a given case the country,  it  left  the  choice  of  sentence  to  the  judiciary with the rider that the judge  may visit the convict with the extreme  punishment  provided  there  exist  special  reasons for so doing. …”

34. In  Bachan  Singh case  (supra),  while  determining  the  constitutional  validity  of  the death penalty,  this  Court  has  examined  the  sentencing  procedure embodied in Section 354(3)  of  the  Code.  Following  issue  was  framed by this Court in the aforesaid  context:

“15.  (i)…  (ii)…whether  the  sentencing  procedure provided in Section 354(3) of  the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2  of  1974)  is  unconstitutional  on  the  ground  that  it  invests  the  court  with  unguided and untrammelled discretion and

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allows death sentence to be arbitrarily  or freakishly imposed on a person found  guilty  of  murder  or  any  other  capital  offence punishable under the Penal Code  with death or, in the alternative, with  imprisonment for life.”

35. To answer the said issue, this Court  referred to and considered  Jagmohan  Singh  v.  State  of  U.P. (which  was  decided  under  the  old  Code)  and  culled out several propositions from  that decision. Keeping in view of the  changed  legislative  policy,  this  Court  agreed  with  all  the  observations  in  Jagmohan  Singh  case  (supra) but for two- first, that the  discretion  in  the  matter  of  sentencing is to be exercised by the  Judge  after  balancing  all  the  aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances  of  the  crime and  second,  that  while  choosing  between  the  two  alternative  sentences

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provided in Section 302 of the IPC,  i.e.,  sentence  of  death  and  life  imprisonment,  the  court  is  principally  concerned  with  the  aggravating  or  mitigating  circumstances  connected  with  the  particular crime under inquiry.  This  Court observed that whilst under the  old Code, both the sentence of death  was  the  rule  and  life  imprisonment  was an exception, Section 354(3) of  the Code has reversed the sentencing  policy  with  the  legislative  mandate  that if a sentence of death is to be  awarded, special reasons need to be  recorded by the Courts. That is to  say,  the  legislative  policy  now  virtually  obviated  the  necessity  of  balancing  the  aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances  for  the  award of punishment in respect of an

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offence of murder. The Court observed  as follows in context of departures  from Jagmohan Singh case (supra):

“164.  (a)  The  normal  rule  is  that  the  offence of murder shall be punished with  the  sentence  of  life  imprisonment.  The  court  can  depart  from  that  rule  and  impose  the  sentence  of  death  only  if  there are special reasons for doing so.  Such reasons must be recorded in writing  before imposing the death sentence. (b)  While  considering  the  question  of  sentence to be imposed for the offence of  murder  under  Section  302  of  the  Penal  Code, the court must have regard to every  relevant  circumstance  relating  to  the  crime  as  well  as  the  criminal.  If  the  court finds, but not otherwise, that the  offence is of an exceptionally depraved  and heinous character and constitutes, on  account of its design and the manner of  its execution, a source of grave danger  to the society at large, the court may  impose the death sentence.”

36. In the aforesaid background this Court  observed that special reasons, in the  context  of  the  said  provision,  obviously mean “exceptional reasons”  founded  on  the  exceptionally  grave  circumstances  relating  to  the  crime

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as  well  as  the  criminal.  It  being  extremely difficult to catalogue such  special  reasons,  they  have  to  be  construed in the facts of the case  and relative weight has to be given  to  mitigating  and  aggravating  factors.  This  Court  observed  that  these two aspects are so intertwined  that isolation of one from the other  would defeat the mandate of law and  held with hope that in view of the  “broad illustrative guidelines” laid  down therein, the Courts:

“209.  …  will  discharge  the  onerous  function  with  evermore  scrupulous  care  and  humane  concern,  directed  along  the  highroad  of  legislative  policy  outlined  in Section 354(3) viz. that for persons  convicted of murder, life imprisonment is  the  rule  and  death  sentence  an  exception.”

(Also: State of Maharashtra v. Goraksha Ambaji  Adsul,  (2011) 7 SCC 437; Sangeet v. State of  Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452; Sandesh v. State of  Maharashtra, (2013) 2 SCC 479)

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37. In Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of  Karnataka,  (2008)  13  SCC  767 this  Court opined  that the  term “special  reasons” as explained in the  Bachan  Singh  case  (supra) indicates a  relative category based on comparison  with other cases under Section 302 as  under:

“44.  The  matter  can  be  looked  at  from  another  angle.  In  Bachan  Singh it  was  held  that  the  expression  “special  reasons” in the context of the provision  of  Section  354(3)  obviously  means  “exceptional  reasons”  founded  on  the  exceptionally grave circumstances of the  particular case relating to the crime as  well as the criminal. It was further said  that on conviction for murder and other  capital  offences  punishable  in  the  alternative  with  death  under  the  Penal  Code,  the  extreme  penalty  should  be  imposed  only  in  extreme  cases.  In  conclusion  it  was  said  that  the  death  penalty ought not to be imposed save in  the  rarest  of  rare  cases  when  the  alternative  option  is  unquestionably  foreclosed.  Now,  all  these  expressions  “special reasons”, “exceptional reasons”,  “founded  on  the  exceptional  grave  circumstances”, “extreme cases” and “the  rarest  of  rare  cases”  unquestionably  indicate  a  relative  category  based  on

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comparison  with  other  cases  of  murder.  Machhi  Singh,  for  the  purpose  of  practical application sought to translate  this  relative  category  into  absolute  terms by framing the five categories. (In  doing  so,  it  is  held  by  some,  Machhi  Singh considerably enlarged the scope for  imposing death penalty that was greatly  restricted by Bachan Singh).”

38. The said five categories of rarest of  the rare crimes delineated in Macchi  Singh case (supra) are as follows:

“I. Manner of commission of murder 33.  When the murder is committed in an  extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical,  revolting or dastardly manner so as to  arouse intense and extreme indignation of  the community. For instance, (i)  when the house of the victim is set  aflame with the end in view to roast him  alive in the house. (ii)  when  the  victim  is  subjected  to  inhuman  acts  of  torture  or  cruelty  in  order to bring about his or her death. (iii) when the body of the victim is cut  into pieces or his body is dismembered in  a fiendish manner. II. Motive for commission of murder 34.  When the murder is committed for a  motive which evinces total depravity and  meanness. For instance when (a) a hired  assassin commits murder for the sake of  money or reward (b) a cold-blooded murder  is committed with a deliberate design in  order  to  inherit  property  or  to  gain  control  over  property  of  a  ward  or  a  person under the control of the murderer

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or vis-à-vis whom the murderer is in a  dominating position or in a position of  trust, or (c) a murder is committed in  the course of betrayal of the motherland. III.  Anti-social  or  socially  abhorrent  nature of the crime 35.  (a)  When  murder  of  a  member  of  a  Scheduled  Caste  or  minority  community,  etc.  is  committed  not  for  personal  reasons but in circumstances which arouse  social wrath.  For instance when such a  crime is committed in order to terrorise  such  persons  and  frighten  them  into  fleeing  from  a  place  or  in  order  to  deprive them of, or make them surrender,  lands or benefits conferred on them with  a view to reverse past injustices and in  order to restore the social balance. (b) In cases of ‘bride burning’ and what  are  known  as  ‘dowry  deaths’  or  when  murder is committed in order to remarry  for  the  sake  of  extracting  dowry  once  again  or  to  marry  another  woman  on  account of infatuation. IV. Magnitude of crime 36.  When  the  crime  is  enormous  in  proportion.  For  instance  when  multiple  murders  say  of  all  or  almost  all  the  members of a family or a large number of  persons of a particular caste, community,  or locality, are committed. V. Personality of victim of murder 37.  When the victim of murder is (a) an  innocent child who could not have or has  not provided even an excuse, much less a  provocation,  for  murder  (b)  a  helpless  woman or a person rendered helpless by  old age or infirmity (c) when the victim  is a person vis-à-vis whom the murderer  is in a position of domination or trust

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(d) when the victim is a public figure  generally  loved  and  respected  by  the  community  for  the  services  rendered  by  him  and  the  murder  is  committed  for  political or similar reasons other than  personal reasons.”

(emphasis supplied)

39. This Court has cautioned that though  the aforesaid are extremely important  factors  could  not  be  taken  as  inflexible,  absolute  or  immutable,  they  must  be  perceived  only  as  indicators which the Courts must bear  in  mind  while  deciding  upon  the  sentence  and  assigning  special  reasons, if required.

40. The Constitutional Bench of this Court  in  Shashi Nayar v. Union,  (1992) 1  SCC 96 has observed that the “special  reasons  clause”  means  reasons,  specific to the fact of a particular  case,  which  can  be  catalogued  as  justifying  a  severe  punishment  and

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unless, such reasons are not recorded  death sentence must not be awarded.  Under  this  provision,  if  the  basis  for awarding the higher sentence can  be  explained  with  reasonable  accuracy,  after  examining  the  pros  and  cons  of  sentencing  options  achieving  proportional  balance  with  the severity of the crime committed  only  then  should  the  higher  punishment be awarded. This Court has  noted that thus, Section 345(3) is a  sufficient  safeguard  against  the  arbitrary  imposition  of  the  extreme  penalty  and  unless  the  nature  of  crime  and  the  circumstances  of  the  offender reveal that the sentence to  life  imprisonment  would  be  wholly  inadequate,  the  Courts  should  ordinarily  impose  a  lesser  punishment.

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41. This  Court  in  Sandesh  v.  State  of  Maharashtra,  (2013)  2  SCC  479 has  discussed  the  aforesaid  principles  and observed as follows:

“21……it  is  not  only  the  crime  and  its  various facets which are the foundation  for  formation  of  special  reasons  as  contemplated  under  Section  354(3)  CrPC  for imposing death penalty but it is also  the criminal, his background, the manner  in which the crime was committed and his  mental  condition  at  the  relevant  time,  the motive of the offence and brutality  with  which  the  crime  was  committed  are  also  to  be  examined.  The  doctrine  of  rehabilitation  and  doctrine  of  prudence  are the other two guiding principles for  proper exercise of judicial discretion.”

42. The aforesaid would reflect that under  this provision the legislature casts  a  statutory  duty  on  the  Court  to  state  reasons  for  choice  of  the  sterner  sentence  to  be  awarded  in  exceptional cases as against the rule  of life imprisonment and by necessary

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implication,  a  legal  obligation  to  explain  them  as  distinguished  from  the expression “reasons” follows. The  legislative  mandate  of  assigning  “special  reasons”  assures  that  the  imposition of the capital punishment  is well considered by the Court and  that only upon categorization of the  case  as  “rarest  of  rare”,  thus  leaving no room for imposition of a  less harsh sentence, should the Court  sentence the accused person to death.  

43. Incontrovertibly,  the  judicial  approach towards sentencing has to be  cautious,  circumspect  and  careful.  The Courts at all stages- trial and  appellate  must  therefore  peruse  and  analyze the facts of the case in hand  and  reach  an  independent  conclusion  which  must  be  appropriately  and

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cogently  justified  in  the  “reasons”  or “special reasons” recorded by them  for  imposition  of  life  imprisonment  or death penalty. The length of the  discussion would not be a touchstone  for  determining  correctness  of  a  decision.  The  test  would  be  that  reasons must be lucid and satisfy the  appellate Court that the Court below  has considered the case  in toto and  thereafter,  upon  balancing  all  the  mitigating  and  aggravating  factors,  recorded the sentence.  

44. We  must  now  briefly  advert  to  the  sentencing  procedure  prescribed  by  law.  Under  Section  235(2)  of  the  Code,  the  Court  on  convicting  an  accused must unquestionably afford an  opportunity to the accused to present  his case on the question of sentence  and under Section 354(3) record the

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extraordinary  circumstances  which  warrant imposition of death sentence  keeping in view the entire facts of  the case and the submissions of the  accused.  In  doing  so  if,  for  any  reason, it omits to do so or does not  assign  elaborate  reasons  and  the  accused  makes  a  grievance  of  it  before the higher court, it would be  open to that Court to remedy the same  by elaborating upon the said reasons.  Even when the reasons recorded by the  Courts below do not conform to the  statutory  mandate  or  the  judicially  evolved  principles,  this  Court,  should  reach  the  conclusion  that  harsher sentence of death requires to  be imposed, could supplement them so  as to justify the imposition of such  sentence  instead  of  remanding  the  matter  to  Courts  below  for  re-

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consideration  on  the  question  of  sentence. Further, should this Court  opine to the contrary that the facts  and circumstances of the case do not  require  imposition  of  capital  punishment  and  the  ends  of  justice  would  be  achieved  by  a  less  harsh  sentence,  it  could  accordingly  commute the sentence awarded by the  Courts  below.  This  Court  in  Dagdu  case (supra) has observed that remand  is an exception, not the rule, and  therefore ought to be avoided as far  as  possible  in  the  interests  of  expeditious, though fair, disposal of  cases.  

45. Herein,  it  is  not  the  case  of  the  appellants that the opportunity to be  heard  on  the  question  of  sentence  separately  as  provisioned  for  under  Section 235(2) of the Code was not

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provided  by  the  Courts  below.  Further, the Trial Court has recorded  and discussed the submissions made by  the appellants and the prosecution on  the  said  question  and  thereafter,  rejected the possibility of awarding  a  punishment  less  harsh  than  the  death  penalty.  However,  the  High  Court  while  confirming  the  sentence  has  recorded  reasons  though  encapsulated.  The  High  Court  has  noticed the motive of the appellants  being non withdrawal of the case by  the informant and the ghastly manner  of  commission  of  crime  whereby  six  innocent persons as young as 3 year  old  were  charred  to  death  and  concluded  that  the  incident  shocks  the conscience of the entire society  and thus deserves nothing lesser but  death penalty.

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46. There  being  no  impropriety  by  the  Courts below in compliance with the  procedure  prescribed  under  law  for  sentencing  the  appellants,  only  the  question of adequacy and correctness  of the special reasons assigned for  awarding  sentence  of  death  requires  to  be  considered  by  us.   In  our  considered opinion, as noticed above,  it is only upon examination of the  facts and circumstances of the case  could  the  adequacy  of  the  special  reasons recorded by the Courts below  be  determined  by  us.  Therefore,  we  would now consider the second issue  to determine whether at all the case  falls in the category of rarest of  the rare offences.  

Issue two: Does this case fall into the category  of rarest of the rare cases?

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47.  We are mindful of the principles laid  down by this Court in Bachan Singh v.  State, (1980) 2 SCC 684 and affirmed  in  Macchi Singh v. State of Punjab,  (1983) 3 SCC 470 to be observed on  the sentencing policy in determining  the  rarest  of  the  rare  crimes.  In  Bachan Singh case (supra) this Court  has held as follows:

"While  considering  the  question  of  sentence to be imposed for the offence  of murder u/s 302 of the Penal Code, the  court must have regard to every relevant  circumstance  relating  to  the  crime  as  well  as  the  criminal.  If  the  court  finds,  but  not  otherwise,  that  the  offence is of an exceptionally depraved  and  heinous  character  and  constitutes,  on account of its design and the manner  of  its  execution,  a  source  of  grave  danger  to  the  society  at  large,  the  court may impose the death sentence."   

48. In  Machhi  Singh  case  (supra),  this  Court has awarded death sentence to  the accused who had methodically in a  preplanned manner murdered seventeen  persons of a village including men,

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women  and  children.  Therein,  this  Court has besides outlining the five  broad  categories  of  rarest  of  rare  cases held that in order to apply the  guidelines  of  Bachan  Singh  case  (supra) the following questions ought  to be answered:  

“39.  “(a)  Is  there  something  uncommon  about the crime which renders sentence  of imprisonment for life inadequate and  calls for a death sentence? (b) Are the circumstances of the crime  such that there is no alternative but to  impose  death  sentence  even  after  according  maximum  weightage  to  the  mitigating circumstances which speak in  favour of the offender?”

This Court has held that if the answer to the  above is in affirmative, then death sentence is  warranted. This Court has further observed that  the  motivation  of  the  perpetrator,  the  vulnerability of the victim, the enormity of  the crime, the execution thereof are few of the  many factors which normally weigh in the mind

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of the Court while awarding death sentence in a  case terming it as the “rarest of the rare”  cases. While applying the test of rarest of the  rare case, the Court has to look into variety  of factors like society's abhorrence, extreme  indignation and antipathy to certain types of  crimes which shake the collective conscience of  the society.  

49. This  Court in  Rajesh Kumar v. State,  (2011)  13  SCC  706 has  noticed  the  observations and  principles  evolved  in  Bachan  Singh  case  (supra)  resonating through  the international  sentiments  on  death  penalty,  as  follows:

“83.  The  ratio  in  Bachan  Singh has  received  approval  by  the  international  legal  community  and  has  been  very  favourably referred to by David Pannick  in Judicial Review of the Death Penalty:  Duckworth (see pp. 104-05). Roger Hood  and Carolyn Hoyle in their treatise on  The  Death  Penalty,  4th  Edn.  (Oxford)  have  also  very  much  appreciated  the  Bachan  Singh  ratio  (see  p.  285).  The  concept  of  “rarest  of  rare”  which  has

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been  evolved  in  Bachan  Singh  by  this  Court  is  also  the  internationally  accepted  standard  in  cases  of  death  penalty. 84.  Reference  in  this  connection  may  also be made to the right based approach  in  exercising  discretion  in  death  penalty  as  suggested  by  Edward  Fitzgerald,  the  British  Barrister.  [Edward  Fitzgerald:  The  Mitigating  Exercise  in  Capital  Cases  in  Death  Penalty Conference (3-5 June), Barbados:  Conference Papers and Recommendations.]  It has been suggested therein that right  approach  towards  exercising  discretion  in  capital  cases  is  to  start  from  a  strong  presumption  against  the  death  penalty. It is argued that “the presence  of  any  significant  mitigating  factor  justifies  exemption  from  the  death  penalty even in the most gruesome cases”  and Fitzgerald argues: “Such a restrictive approach can be  summarised  as  follows:  The  normal  sentence  should  be  life  imprisonment.  The  death  sentence  should  only  be  imposed  instead  of  the life sentence in the ‘rarest of  rare’  cases  where  the  crime  or  crimes  are  of  exceptional  heinousness  and  the  individual  has  no  significant  mitigation  and  is  considered beyond reformation.”

(Quoted in The Death Penalty, Roger Hood  and Hoyle, 4th Edn., Oxford, p. 285.) 85.  Opposing  mandatory  death  sentence,  the United Nations in its interim report  to the General Assembly in 2000 advanced  the following opinion: “The  proper  application  of  human  rights  law—especially  of  its

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provision  that  ‘no  one  shall  be  arbitrarily  deprived  of  his  life’  and that ‘no one shall be subjected  to … cruel, inhuman or degrading …  punishment’—requires  weighing  factors that will not be taken into  account  in  the  process  of  determining  whether  a  defendant  is  guilty of committing a ‘most serious  crime’. As a result, these factors  can  only  be  taken  into  account  in  the  context  of  individualised  sentencing by the judiciary in death  penalty cases …. The conclusion, in  theory as well as in practice, was  that respect for human rights can be  reliably  ensured  in  death  penalty  cases only if the judiciary engages  in  case-specific,  individualised  sentencing that accounts for all of  the relevant factors…. It is clear,  therefore,  that  in  death  penalty  cases,  individualised  sentencing  by  the judiciary is required to prevent  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  punishment  and  the  arbitrary  deprivation of life.”

(The  Death  Penalty,  Roger  Hood  and  Hoyle, 4th Edn., Oxford, p. 281.)

50. In   Ramnaresh  v.  State  of  Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257,  this  Court  has  reflected  upon  the  aforesaid decisions  and  culled  out  the principles as follows:  

“76.  The  aforesaid  judgments,  primarily  dissect  these  principles  into  two  different  compartments—one  being  the

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“aggravating  circumstances”  while  the  other  being  the  “mitigating  circumstances”. The court would consider  the  cumulative  effect  of  both  these  aspects and normally, it may not be very  appropriate for the court to decide the  most  significant  aspect  of  sentencing  policy  with  reference  to  one  of  the  classes under any of the following heads  while  completely  ignoring  other  classes  under other heads. To balance the two is  the primary duty of the court. It will be  appropriate  for the  court to  come to  a  final  conclusion  upon  balancing  the  exercise that would help to administer the  criminal justice system better and provide  an effective and meaningful reasoning by  the  court  as  contemplated  under  Section  354(3) CrPC. Aggravating circumstances (1)  The  offences  relating  to  the  commission of heinous crimes like murder,  rape, armed dacoity, kidnapping, etc. by  the  accused  with  a  prior  record  of  conviction for capital felony or offences  committed  by  the  person  having  a  substantial  history  of  serious  assaults  and criminal convictions. (2) The offence was committed while the  offender was engaged in the commission of  another serious offence. (3)  The  offence  was  committed  with  the  intention to create a fear psychosis in  the public at large and was committed in a  public place by a weapon or device which  clearly could be hazardous to the life of  more than one person. (4) The offence of murder was committed  for  ransom  or  like  offences  to  receive  money or monetary benefits.

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(5) Hired killings. (6) The offence was committed outrageously  for  want  only  while  involving  inhumane  treatment and torture to the victim. (7) The offence was committed by a person  while in lawful custody. (8)  The  murder  or  the  offence  was  committed  to  prevent  a  person  lawfully  carrying  out  his  duty  like  arrest  or  custody in a place of lawful confinement  of  himself  or  another.  For  instance,  murder is of a person who had acted in  lawful discharge of his duty under Section  43 CrPC. (9)  When  the  crime  is  enormous  in  proportion  like  making  an  attempt  of  murder of the entire family or members of  a particular community. (10) When the victim is innocent, helpless  or  a  person  relies  upon  the  trust  of  relationship  and  social  norms,  like  a  child,  helpless  woman,  a  daughter  or  a  niece staying with a father/uncle and is  inflicted with the crime by such a trusted  person. (11) When murder is committed for a motive  which  evidences  total  depravity  and  meanness. (12) When there is a cold-blooded murder  without provocation. (13) The crime is committed so brutally  that  it  pricks  or  shocks  not  only  the  judicial  conscience  but  even  the  conscience of the society. Mitigating circumstances (1) The manner and circumstances in and  under which the offence was committed, for  example,  extreme  mental  or  emotional  disturbance  or  extreme  provocation  in

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contradistinction to all these situations  in normal course. (2) The age of the accused is a relevant  consideration  but  not  a  determinative  factor by itself. (3)  The  chances  of  the  accused  of  not  indulging in commission of the crime again  and the probability of the accused being  reformed and rehabilitated. (4)  The  condition  of  the  accused  shows  that  he  was  mentally  defective  and  the  defect impaired his capacity to appreciate  the circumstances of his criminal conduct. (5)  The  circumstances  which,  in  normal  course  of  life,  would  render  such  a  behaviour  possible  and  could  have  the  effect of giving rise to mental imbalance  in  that  given  situation  like  persistent  harassment or, in fact, leading to such a  peak of human behaviour that, in the facts  and circumstances of the case, the accused  believed that he was morally justified in  committing the offence. (6)  Where  the  court  upon  proper  appreciation of evidence is of the view  that  the  crime  was  not  committed  in  a  preordained  manner  and  that  the  death  resulted in the course of commission of  another  crime  and  that  there  was  a  possibility  of  it  being  construed  as  consequences  to  the  commission  of  the  primary crime. (7) Where it is absolutely unsafe to rely  upon the testimony of a sole eyewitness  though  the  prosecution  has  brought  home  the guilt of the accused. 77.  While  determining  the  questions  relatable to sentencing policy, the court  has to follow certain principles and those  principles  are  the  loadstar  besides  the  above  considerations  in  imposition  or  otherwise of the death sentence.

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Principles (1) The court has to apply the test to  determine, if it was the “rarest of rare”  case for imposition of a death sentence. (2)  In  the  opinion  of  the  court,  imposition  of  any  other  punishment  i.e.  life  imprisonment  would  be  completely  inadequate and would not meet the ends of  justice. (3)  Life  imprisonment  is  the  rule  and  death sentence is an exception. (4)  The  option  to  impose  sentence  of  imprisonment for life cannot be cautiously  exercised having regard to the nature and  circumstances  of  the  crime  and  all  relevant considerations. (5) The method (planned or otherwise) and  the  manner  (extent  of  brutality  and  inhumanity, etc.) in which the crime was  committed and the circumstances leading to  commission of such heinous crime.”

51. This Court has consistently held that  only in those exceptional cases where  the  crime  is  so  brutal,  diabolical  and  revolting  so  as  to  shock  the  collective  conscience  of  the  community, would it be appropriate to  award  death  sentence.  Since  such  circumstances cannot be laid down as  a straight jacket formula but must be

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ascertained  from  case  to  case,  the  legislature has left it open for the  Courts to examine the facts of the  case  and  appropriately  decide  upon  the  sentence  proportional  to  the  gravity of the offence.

52. We would now notice the decisions of  this  Court  to  reflect  upon  the  various  circumstances  which  have  acted  as  mitigating  and  aggravating  factors in given facts to result in  commutation  of  sentence  or  confirmation of death penalty; so as  to examine the sentencing policy in  the backdrop of balance-sheet of such  factors in the case at hand.

Cases where death sentence is confirmed:  53. In  Dagdu  v.  State  of  Maharashtra,  

(1977)  3  SCC  68, this  Court  has

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observed as follows:  “83. Having considered the matter in all  its  aspects  —  penal,  juristic  and  sociogical — and having given our most  anxious consideration to the problem, we  are of the opinion that Accused 3, 9, 10  and  11  deserve  the  extreme  penalty  of  law and that there is no justification  for  interfering  with  the  sentence  of  death imposed upon them. 84.  Accused  3  put  an  end  to  four  innocent  lives,  three  small  girls  ten  years  of  age  and  a  woman  in  her  thirties. Accused 9, 10 and 11 committed  the  murders  of  Haribai,  her  nine-year  old daughter and her infant child. The  victims  had  given  no  cause  for  the  atrocities  perpetrated  on  them. They  were killed as a child kills flies. And  the brutality accompanying the manner of  killing defies an adequate description.  The luring of small girls, the gagging,  the cutting of their private parts, the  ruthless  defiling  in  order  to  prevent  identification  of  the  victims  and  the  mysterious motive for the murders call  for but one sentence. Nothing short of  the  death  sentence  can  atone  for  such  callous and calculated transgression of  law. Morbid pity can have no place in  the assessment of murders which, in many  respects, will remain unparalled in the  annals of crime. Accordingly, we confirm  the death sentence imposed on Accused 3,  9, 10 and 11.”

54. In  Sunder  Singh v.  State  of  Uttaranchal, (2010)  10  SCC  611 the

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accused  had  gone  to  the  place  of  occurrence  well  prepared  carrying  jerry cans containing petrol, sword,  pistol with two bullets, which showed  his  premeditation  and  cold-blooded  mind.  In  the  incident  five  persons  lost  their  lives  while  the  sole  surviving lady survived with 70% burn  injuries. The murder was committed in  a  cruel,  grotesque  and  diabolical  manner, and closing of the door of  the house was the most foul act by  which  the  accused  actually  intended  to burn all the persons inside the  room  and  precisely  that  happened.  Hence  the  Court  did  not  find  any  sentence  less  harsh  than  the  death  sentence.  

55. In  M.A.  Antony v.  State  of  Kerala,  (2009) 6 SCC 220 all six members of a  family  were  murdered  at  their

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residence  at  night.  The  motive  was  money, and the absence of the accused  from  his  own  residence  during  the  corresponding period and recovery of  clothes  under  Section  27  of  the  Evidence  Act,  1872,  fingerprints  on  the doorsteps of the house matching  with  those  of  the  accused,  and  recovery of scalp hair of the accused  from place of occurrence were damning  circumstantial  evidence.  Having  regard to the chain of circumstances  and  the  diabolical  manner  of  commission  of  crime  the  death  sentence was upheld.

56. In Jagdish v. State of M.P., (2009) 9  SCC  495 the  assailant  murdered  his  wife and five children (aged 1 to 16  years) in his own house. The murders  were  particularly  horrifying  as  the  assailant was in a dominant position

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and a position of trust as the head  of  the  family.  The  assailant  betraying the trust and abusing his  position murdered his wife and minor  children (youngest being the only son  just  1  year  old).  This  Court  held  that  the  balance  sheet  of  the  aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances  was  heavily  weighed  against the assailant making it the  rarest  of  rare  cases.  Consequently  the award of death sentence was just.

57. In  Prajeet  Kumar  Singh v.  State  of  Bihar,  (2008) 4 SCC 434 the accused  was a paying guest for a continuous  period of four years in lieu of a sum  of  Rs.500  for  food  and  meals.  He  brutally  executed  three  innocent  defenceless children aged 8, 15 and  16,  attempted  to  murder  the  father  (informant)  and  mother  who  survived

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the  attack  with  multiple  injuries.  There  was  no  provocation  or  reason  for committing this ghastly act at a  time when the children were sleeping.  There  were  several  incised  wounds  (muscle-deep or bone-deep) caused to  the  deceased.  Considering  the  brutality,  diabolic,  inhuman  nature  and enormity of the crime (multiple  murders and attacks), this Court held  that the mindset of the accused could  not  be  said  to  be  amenable  to  any  reformation. Therefore, it came under  the rarest of the rare category where  not awarding a death sentence would  have resulted in failure of justice.

58. In Ram Singh v. Sonia, (2007) 3 SCC 1  the  wife  in  collusion  with  her  husband  murdered  not  only  her  stepbrother  and  his  whole  family  including three tiny tots of 45 days,

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2½ years and 4 years, but also her  own father, mother and sister so as  to  deprive  her  father  from  giving  property to her stepbrother and his  family. The murders were committed in  a  cruel,  pre-planned  and  diabolic  manner  while  the  victims  were  sleeping,  without  any  provocation  from the victim’s side. It was held  that  the  accused  persons  did  not  possess  any  basic  humanity  and  completely  lacked  the  psyche  or  mindset amenable to any reformation.  It was a revolting and dastardly act,  and hence the case fell within the  category of the rarest of rare cases  and  thus  death  sentence  was  justified.

59. In  Holiram  Bordoloi v.  State  of  Assam,  (2005) 3 SCC 793 the accused  persons were armed with lathis, and

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various other weapons. They came to  the house of the victim and started  pelting stones on the bamboo wall of  the  said  house.  Thereafter,  they  closed the house from the outside and  set the house on fire. When the son,  daughter and the wife of the victim  somehow managed to come out of the  house,  the  accused  persons  caught  hold of them and threw them into the  fire  again.  Thereafter  the  elder  brother  who  was  staying  in  another  house at some distance from the house  of the victim was caught and dragged  to the courtyard of the accused where  the accused cut him into pieces. It  was held that there was absence of  any strong motive and the victims did  not  provoke  or  contribute  to  the  incident. The accused was the leader  of  the  gang,  and  the  offence  was

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committed in the most barbaric manner  to deter others from challenging the  supremacy  of  the  accused  in  the  village.  It  was  held  that  no  mitigating  circumstances  to  refrain  from  imposing  death  penalty  were  found.

60. In  Karan  Singh v.  State  of  U.P.,  (2005) 6 SCC 342 the two appellants  chased  the  deceased  persons  and  butchered  them  with  axes  and  other  weapons in a very dastardly manner.  After  killing  three  adults,  the  appellants  entered  their  house  and  killed  two  children  who  in  no  way  were  involved  with  the  alleged  property dispute with the appellants.  It was held that the sole intention  here  was  to  exterminate  the  entire  family. Thus, it was the rarest of  the rare case.

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61. In  Gurmeet  Singh v.  State  of  U.P.,  (2005) 12 SCC 107 appellant G, along  with  his  friend  L killed  thirteen  members of his family including small  kids for a flimsy reason (objection  of family of G to the visits and stay  of L at their house) while they were  asleep. The award of death sentence  was held proper.

62. In  State of Rajasthan v.  Kheraj Ram,  (2003)  8  SCC  224 the  accused  deliberately planned and executed his  two  innocent  children,  wife  and  brother-in-law  when  they  were  sleeping  at  night.  There  was  no  remorse for such a gruesome act which  was  indicated  by  the  calmness  with  which he was smoking “chilam” after  the commission of the act. As it was  preplanned and after the entire chain  of  events  and  circumstances  were

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comprehended,  the  inevitable  conclusion,  was  that  the  accused  acted in the most cruel and inhuman  manner and the murder was committed  in  an  extremely  brutal,  grotesque,  diabolical,  revolting  and  dastardly  manner.

63. In  Om  Prakash v.  State  of  Uttaranchal,  (2003)  1  SCC  648 the  accused,  a  domestic  servant  killed  three innocent members and attempted  to  kill  the  fourth  member  of  the  family of his employer in order to  take  revenge  for  the  decision  to  dispense  with  his  service  and  to  commit  robbery.  The  death  sentence  was upheld.

64. In  Gurdev Singh v.  State of Punjab,  (2003)  7  SCC  258 the  appellants,  having known that on the next day a

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marriage  was  to  take  place  in  the  house  of  the  complainant  and  there  would be lots of relatives present in  her house, came there on the evening  when a feast was going on and started  firing  on  the  innocent  persons.  Thirteen persons were killed on the  spot and eight others were seriously  injured.  The  appellants  thereafter  went to another place and killed the  father and brother of PW 15. Out of  the thirteen persons, one of them was  a seven-year-old child, three others  had ages ranging between 15 and 17  years.  The  death  sentence  was  held  justified.

65. In  Praveen  Kumar v.  State  of  Karnataka,  (2003)  12  SCC  199 the  accused  was  accommodated  by  one  of  the  victims  (who  was  his  aunt)  despite  her  large  family,  and  she

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gave him an opportunity to make an  honest  living  as  a  tailor.  The  accused  committed  the  preplanned,  cold-blooded murders of the relatives  and well-wishers (including one young  child)  while  they  were  sleeping.  After the commission of the crime the  accused  absconded  from  judicial  custody for nearly four years, which  eliminated  the  possibility  of  any  remorse or rehabilitation. Held, the  extreme  penalty  of  death  was  justified.

66. In  Suresh v.  State of U.P., (2005) 6  SCC 130 the brutal murder of one of  the accused’s brother and his family  members  including  minor  children  at  night when they were fast asleep with  axe  and  chopper  by  cutting  their  skulls and necks for a piece of land  was considered to be a grotesque and

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diabolical  act,  where  any  other  punishment than the death penalty was  unjustified.

67. In  Ranjeet  Singh v.  State  of  Rajasthan,  (1988)  1  SCC  633 the  entire family was murdered when they  were  fast  asleep  and  this  Court  observed as under:  

“13.  With  regard  to  the  sentence  of  death, there cannot be two opinions. The  manner  in  which  the  entire  family  was  eliminated indicates that the offence was  deliberate  and  diabolical.  It  was  predetermined  and  cold-blooded.  It  was  absolutely devilish and dastardly.”

68. In  Ramdeo Chauhan v.  State of Assam,  (2000)  7  SCC  455 the  accused  committed a preplanned, cold-blooded  brutal murder of four inmates of a  house  including  two  helpless  women  and  a  child  aged  2½  years  during  their sleep with a motive to commit  theft. The accused also attacked with

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a spade another inmate of the house,  an old woman, and a neighbour when  they  entered  the  house.  The  Court  held that the young age (22 years) of  the accused at the time of committing  the  crime  was  not  a  mitigating  circumstance, and death penalty was a  just and proper punishment.

69. In  Narayan  Chetanram  Chaudhary v.  State  of  Maharashtra,  (2000)  8  SCC  457 there  was  a  preplanned,  calculated,  cold-blooded  murder  of  five  women,  including  one  pregnant  woman and two children aged 1½ years  and 2½ years, all inmates of a house,  in order to wipe out all evidence of  robbery  and  theft  committed  by  two  accused in the house at a time when  male members of the house were out.  It was held that the young age (20-22  years) of the accused persons cannot

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serve as a mitigating circumstance.

70. In  Surja Ram v.  State of Rajasthan,  (1996)  6  SCC  271 the  appellant  murdered his brother, his two minor  sons  and  an  aged  aunt  by  cutting  their neck with a kassi while they  were all sleeping. He also attempted  to  murder  his  brother’s  wife  and  daughter  but  they  survived  with  serious injuries. The dispute between  them only related to putting a barbed  fence  on  a  portion  of  their  residential  complex.  The  death  sentence was held to be justified.

71. In Ravji v. State of Rajasthan, (1996)  2 SCC 175 the accused in a cool and  calculated manner wanted to kill his  wife and three minor children while  they  were  asleep.  When  his  mother  intervened he injured her with an axe

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with  an  intention  to  kill  her.  He  then silently went to the neighbour’s  house  and  attempted  to  kill  his  neighbour’s wife who was also asleep.  When  his  neighbour  intervened  he  killed  him  too  and  fled  from  the  place of occurrence and tried to hide  himself.  The  accused  had  a  solemn  duty  to  protect  his  family  members  and maintain them but he betrayed the  trust reposed in him in a very cruel  and  calculated  manner  without  any  provocation  whatsoever.  Hence  the  death penalty had to be upheld.

72. In  Sudam v.  State  of  Maharashtra,  (2011) 7 SCC 125 this Court held that  where an accused was found guilty of  committing  murder  of  four  children  and a woman with whom he was living  with as husband and wife, the death  penalty was justified and observed:

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“22. The manner in which the crime has  been  committed  clearly  shows  it  to  be  premeditated and well planned. It seems  that all the four children and the woman  were brought near the pond in a planned  manner,  strangulated  to  death  and  the  dead bodies of the children thrown in the  pond to conceal the crime. He not only  killed  Anita  but  crushed  her  head  to  avoid  identification.  Killing  four  children,  tying  the  dead  bodies  in  bundles of two each and throwing them in  the  pond  would  not  have  been  possible,  had  the  appellant  not  meticulously  planned  the  murders.  It  shows  that  the  crime  has  been  committed  in  a  beastly,  extremely brutal, barbaric and grotesque  manner.  It  has  resulted  in  intense  and  extreme indignation of the community and  shocked the collective conscience of the  society. 23. We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  appellant is a menace to the society who  cannot be reformed. Lesser punishment, in  our opinion, shall be fraught with danger  as  it  may  expose  the  society  to  peril  once again at the hands of the appellant.  We are of the opinion that the case in  hand falls in the category of the rarest  of rare cases and the trial court did not  err  in  awarding  the  death  sentence  and  the High Court confirming the same.”

73. In  Atbir v.  Govt.  (NCT  of  Delhi),  (2010) 9 SCC 1, this Court confirmed  the  death  sentence  given  to  the  appellant who had committed multiple

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murders of members of his family, who  were  none  other  than  stepmother,  brother  and  sister  in  order  to  inherit  the  entire  property  of  his  father.  The  appellant,  in  consultation with his mother planned  to eliminate the entire family of his  stepmother,  and  with  this  intention  went to her house, closed the doors  and  mercilessly  inflicted  37  knife  injuries on the vital parts of the  victims’ bodies.

74. In  Ajitsingh  Harnamsingh  Gujral  v.  State of Maharashtra,  (2011) 14 SCC  401 the appellant was convicted for  burning  wife  and  three  grown  up  children. While awarding the sentence  of  death  this  Court  considered  the  following circumstances which weighed  in favor of the capital punishment:

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“91. In our opinion, a person like the  appellant who instead of doing his duty  of  protecting  his  family  kills  them  in  such a cruel and barbaric manner cannot  be reformed or rehabilitated. The balance  sheet  is  heavily  against  him  and  accordingly we uphold the death sentence  awarded to him. 92. In the present case the accused did  not  act  on  any  spur  of  the  moment  provocation.  It  is  no  doubt  that  a  quarrel occurred between him and his wife  at  midnight,  but  the  fact  that  he  had  brought a large quantity of petrol to his  residential apartment shows that he had  pre-planned  the  diabolical  and  gruesome  murder in a dastardly manner.”

Cases where death sentence is commuted:

75. Mohd. Chaman v. State (NCT of Delhi),  (2001) 2 SCC 28 was a case where the  convict  had  raped  a  one-and-a-half  year old child who died as a result  of  the  unfortunate  incident.  This  Court found that the crime committed  was  serious  and  heinous  and  the  criminal  had  a  dirty  and  perverted  mind  and  had  no  control  over  his  carnal  desires.  Nevertheless,  this

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Court found it difficult to hold that  the  criminal  was  such  a  dangerous  person that to spare his life would  endanger  the  community.  This  Court  reduced the sentence to imprisonment  for life since the case was one in  which a “humanist approach” should be  taken  in  the  matter  of  awarding  punishment.

76. Dilip Premnarayan Tiwari v. State of  Maharashtra,  (2010) 1 SCC 775 was a  case  in  which  three  convicts  had  killed  two  persons  and  grievously  injured two others, leaving them for  dead. A third victim later succumbed  to his injuries. While noticing that  the crime was in the nature of, what  is  nowadays  referred  to  as  “honour  killing”,  this  Court  reduced  the  death sentence awarded to two of the  criminals  to  imprisonment  for  life

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with a direction that they should not  be  released  until  they  complete  25  years  of  actual  imprisonment.  The  third  criminal  was  sentenced  to  undergo  20  years  of  actual  imprisonment.  That  these  criminals  were young persons who did not have  criminal  antecedents  weighed  in  reducing their death sentence.

77. Sebastian v. State of Kerala, (2010) 1  SCC  58 was  a  case  in  which  the  criminal  had  raped  and  murdered  a  two-year-old child. He was found to  be  a  paedophile  with  “extremely  violent  propensities”.  Earlier,  in  1998, he was convicted of an offence  under  Section  354  IPC,  that  is,  assault or use of criminal force on a  woman  with  intent  to  outrage  her  modesty,  an  offence  carrying  a  maximum  sentence  of  two  years’

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imprisonment with fine. Subsequently,  he was convicted for a more serious  offence under Sections 302, 363 and  376  IPC  but  an  appeal  was  pending  against  his  conviction.  The  convict  also appears to have been tried for  the murder of several other children  but was acquitted in 2005 with the  benefit  of  doubt,  the  last  event  having taken place three days after  he had committed the rape and murder  of  the  two-year-old  child.  Notwithstanding  the  nature  of  the  offence  as  well  as  his  “extremely  violent  propensities”,  the  sentence  of death awarded to him was reduced  to imprisonment for the rest of his  life.

78. In  Rajesh  Kumar  case  (supra) the  appellant had murdered two children.  One of them was four-and-a-half year

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old  and  the  criminal  had  slit  his  throat with a piece of glass which he  obtained  from  breaking  the  dressing  table. The other child was an infant  of  eight  months  who  was  killed  by  holding his legs and hitting him on  the floor. Despite the brutality of  the crime, the death sentence awarded  to this convict was reduced to that  of  life  imprisonment.  It  was  held  that he was not a continuing threat  to the society and that the State had  not  produced  any  evidence  to  show  that he was incapable of reform and  rehabilitation.

79. Amit v. State of U.P.,  (2012) 4 SCC  107 was a case in which a three-year- old child was subjected to rape, an  unnatural  offence  and  murder.  The  convict  was  also  found  guilty  of  causing  the  disappearance  of

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evidence.  The  sentence  of  death  awarded  to  him  was  reduced  to  imprisonment  for  life  subject  to  remissions.  It  was  held  that  there  was nothing to suggest that he would  repeat  the  offence  and  that  the  possibilities  of  his  reform  over  a  period of years could not be ruled  out since there was no evidence of  any earlier offence committed by him.

80. In the present circumstances, we would  place reliance upon the observations  of  this  Court  in State  of  U.P.  v.  Dharmendra Singh,  (1999) 8 SCC 325.  In this case, 6 accused persons were  charged  with  offence  under  Section  302  read  with  149  of  the  IPC  for  murdering 5 persons: an old man of 75  years,  a  woman  aged  32  years,  two  boys aged 12 years and a girl aged 15  years, at night when they were asleep

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by  inflicting  multiple  injuries  to  wreak  vengeance.  The  Trial  Court  while  convicting  them  had  awarded  life sentence in regard to 4 accused  persons  and  after  assigning  reasons  awarded  death  sentence  to  the  2  others.  In  appeal  the  High  Court  upheld the conviction of all accused  persons  and  while  confirming  life  sentence  on  the  4  accused  persons  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  sentence of death was not called for  in respect to 2 accused persons who  were  languishing  in  the  death  cell  for 3 years and consequently reduced  the sentence to that of imprisonment  of life.  In appeal, this Court in  context  of  the  argument  that  since  individual overt acts that have not  been  established,  even  if  the  conviction is to be upheld, capital

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punishment should not be granted, has  observed as follows:

“15.  We  have  carefully  perused  the  evidence  adduced  in  this  case,  to  the  limited extent of examining whether the  case in hand is a case which could be  termed as rarest of the rare cases so as  to invoke the extreme penalty of death.  The  learned  Sessions  Judge  while  assigning  special  reasons  for  awarding  the  capital  punishment  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  crime  in  question  was  a  dastardly  crime  involving  the  death of 5 innocent human beings for the  purpose of achieving the sadistic goals  of  Dharmendra  and  Narendra,  the  respondents  herein,  to  avenge  their  respective  grouse  against  the  complainant  and  his  niece  Reeta  by  eliminating  5  members  of  the  family.  Learned Sessions Judge distinguished the  case of the 4 other accused with that of  these  respondents  based  on  the  motive  and on the ground that these respondents  were the principal perpetrators of the  crime. It is seen that the High Court  has concurred with this reasoning of the  Sessions Judge. However, the High Court  on  the  ground  that  the  accused  have  languished  in  the  death  cell  for  3  years,  altered  the  sentence  to  life  imprisonment.  

… 23. It is possible in a given set of  facts that the court might think even in  a  case  where  death  sentence  can  be  awarded,  the  same  need  not  be  awarded  because  of  the  peculiar  facts  of  that  case like the possibility of one or more  of  the  accused  being  responsible  for

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offences  less  culpable  than  the  other  accused. In such circumstances, in the  absence  of  their  being  no  material  available, to bifurcate the case of each  accused person, the court might think it  prudent not to award the extreme penalty  of death. But then such a decision would  rest on the availability of evidence in  a particular case. We do not think that  a  straitjacket  formula  for  awarding  death sentence can be evolved which is  applicable  to  all  cases.  The  facts  of  each  case  will  have  their  own  implication on the question of awarding  sentence.  In  Ronny  case  (1998)  3  SCC  625,  this  Court  on  facts  found  extenuating factors to curb the sentence  which  is  clear  from  the  following  extract from the said judgment: (SCC p.  654, para 47)

“From  the  facts  and  circumstances,  it is not possible to predict as to  who  among  the  three  played  which  part. It may be that the role of one  has  been  more  culpable  in  degree  than  that  of  the  others  and  vice  versa. Where in a case like this it  is not possible to say as to whose  case falls within the ‘rarest of the  rare’ cases, it would serve the ends  of justice if the capital punishment  is commuted into life imprisonment.”

81. Further  in  Dharmendra  Singh  case  (supra) this  Court  while  rejecting  the  mitigating  circumstance  of  expectation  of  survival  due  to

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reversal  of  sentence  by  the  High  Court, observed:

“25…In a judicial system like ours  where  there  is  a  hierarchy  of  courts, the possibility of reversal  of  judgments  is  inevitable,  therefore,  expectations  of  an  accused  cannot  be  a  mitigating  factor to interfere in an appeal for  enhancement of sentence if the same  is otherwise called for in law. 26.  Taking  into  consideration  the  brutality of the attack, the number  of  persons  murdered,  the  age  and  infirmity  of  the  victims,  their  vulnerability  and  the  diabolic  motive,  acts  of  perversion  on  the  person  of  Reeta,  cumulatively  we  find  the  sentence  awarded  by  the  trial court was just and proper. “

Mitigating  and  Aggravating  Circumstances  in  the present case:

82. Having noticed the decisions of this  Court on the said aspect, we would  revert  to  the  factual  position  in  this case. Herein, the time, place,  manner  of  and  the  motive  behind  commission of the crime speak volumes  of  the  pre-mediated  and  callous  nature  of  the  offence.  The

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ruthlessness  of  the  appellants  is  reflected  through  brutal  murders  of  the young, innocent children and wife  of  the  informant  by  burning  them  alive to avenge their cause in the  dark of the night; the cause being  non-withdrawal of an FIR filed by the  informant  for  theft  of  his  buffalo  against  the  appellant-A1.  Further,  from the record we gather that only  family members of the informant have  come forward to depose as the entire  village must have been shocked with  the ghastly murders of the deceased  persons  and  in  such  circumstances  would  not  have  come  forward  to  testify  against  the  appellants  who  already  had  translated  the  threats  given  to  the  informant  in  village  panchayat  into  a  shocking  reality.  While our experience reminds us that

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civilized  people  generally  unsuccinctly  when  the  crime  is  committed  infact  in  their  presence,  withdraw  themselves  both  from  the  victim  and  the  vigilante  unless  inevitable  and  consider  that  crime  like  civil  disputes  must  restrict  itself to the two parties, it also  evidences for the threat the incident  had  instilled  amongst  the  villagers  that  none  in  such  close  knit  unit  besides  the  sanguine  relatives  had  come  forth  to  testify  against  the  accused.   

83. The  mitigating  circumstances  elaborated  upon  by  Shri  Mishra  in  respect of comparatively young age of  the appellants holds no ground, their  army  background  and  their  custodial  behavior  fail  to  outweigh  the  aggravating  factors  in  the  present

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case.  The  argument  that  the  appellants  are  not  “antisocial  elements” fails into inception in the  light of the effect of the occurrence  reflected  through  the  abstinence  of  the  villagers  from  deposing  against  them at the trial.   

84. However,  in  the  present  case,  while  taking an overall view, no overt act  in the commission of crime could be  attributed to A3. The role played by  A3 during commission of the crime as  established was to hold the barrels  of  kerosene  along  with  one  other.  While determining the gravity of the  offence  committed  by  the  appellants  it must be noticed that it is only A1  who had threatened the informant of  burning  his  house  in  case  the  FIR  against his family and him were not  withdrawn.  Further,  A1  during  the

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occurrence  not  only  scripted  and  instructed the rest of the unlawful  assembly  but  also  lighted  the  matchstick to burn the house as well  informant’s  body.  A2,  pushed  the  informant  to  the  ground  and  later  fired at him.  

85. Further, in respect of the mitigating  factors  of  lack  of  criminal  antecedents  or  probabilities  of  the  appellants  to  be  menace  to  the  society,  we  would  re-iterate  the  observations of this Court in Gurdev  Singh v. State of Punjab,  (2003) 7  SCC 258 that it is indeed true that  the  underlying  principle  of  our  sentencing  jurisprudence  is  reformation and there is nothing in  evidence to show that the appellants  have been a threat or menace to the  society  at  large  besides  the  FIR

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regarding the theft of buffalo. It is  also  true  that  we  cannot  say  that  they would be a further menace to the  society  or  not  as  we  live  as  creatures  saddled  with  an  imperfect  ability  to  predict  the  future.  Nevertheless, the law prescribes for  future, based upon its knowledge of  the past and is being forced to deal  with  tomorrow’s  problems  with  yesterday’s tools.  

86. However, in the peculiar facts of this  case,  the  possibility  of  A3  being  less culpable than the other accused  cannot  be  answered  in  affirmative.  Therefore, in our considered view, we  do not deem it proper to sentence A3  to death in light of there being no  overt  act  attributable  to  him  and  sentence to imprisonment till the end  of his life would appropriately serve

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as  punishment  proportional  to  the  degree of offence committed by him.

87. In respect of A1 and A2, we are of the  considered view that the instant case  falls into such category of rarest of  the rare cases where culpability has  assumed  the  proportion  of  extreme  depravity  and  the  appellant-accused  are  perfect  example  of  a  blood  thirsty,  scheming  and  hardened  criminals  who  slayed  seven  innocent  lives  to  quench  their  thirst  for  revenge and such revenge evolving out  of  a  fellow  citizens  refusal  to  abstain  from  resorting  to  machinery  of  law  to  protect  his  rights.  The  entire  incident  is  extremely  revolting  and  shocks  the  collective  conscience of the community. The acts  of murder committed by the appellants  are so gruesome, merciless and brutal

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that  the  aggravating  circumstances  far  outweigh  the  mitigating  circumstances.

88. We now proceed to examine such special  reasons which negate the possibility  of  any  sentence  but  for  death  penalty.  Herein,  A1  and  A2  have  committed a cold blooded murder in a  pre-ordained  fashion  without  any  provocation  whatsoever.  The  motive  behind the gruesome act was to avenge  the act of informant in approaching  the  machinery  of  law  enforcement  inspite of threats by the appellants.  The  victims  were  five  innocent  children  and  wife  of  the  informant  who were sleeping unalarmed when the  appellants  came  and  locked  them  inside their house while it was set  ablaze. Further, wrath of A1 and A2  is reflected in their act of first

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gagging  the  informant,  thereafter  attempting  to  burn  him  alive  and  later,  when  he  tried  to  escape,  firing  at  him  thereby  leaving  no  stone  unturned  in  translating  their  threats into reality. As a result of  the  aforesaid  incident,  having  witnessed  the  threats  of  burning  given  by  the  A1  to  the  informant  tuned  into  reality,  none  but  the  family of the deceased-informant came  forth  to  depose  against  the  appellant-accused persons during the  trial.  The  crime,  enormous  in  proportion having wiped off the whole  family, is committed so brutally that  it  pricks  and  shocks  not  only  the  judicial  conscience  but  even  the  collective conscience of the society.  It demands just punishment from the  Court  and  the  Court  is  bound  to

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respond within legal parameters. The  demand for justice and the award of  punishment have to be in consonance  with the legislative command and the  discretion vested in the Courts.

89. On the question of striking a delicate  balance  between  the  proportionality  of  crime  to  the  sentencing  policy,  Lord Denning has observed as follows  on the very purpose of imposition of  a punishment:

“…the  punishment  is  the  way  in  which  society  expresses  its  denunciation  of  wrong  doing;  and,  in  order  to  maintain  respect for the law, it is essential that  the punishment inflicted for grave crimes  should  adequately  reflect  the  revulsion  felt by the great majority of citizens for  them.  It  is  a  mistake  to  consider  the  objects  of  punishments  as  being  a  deterrent or reformative or preventive and  nothing  else...  The  truth  is  that  some  crimes  are  so  outrageous  that  society  insists  on  adequate  punishment,  because  the wrong doer deserves it, irrespective  of whether it is a deterrent or not.”  

90. In  light  of  the  aforesaid,  having

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regard to the gravity of the offence  committed, we are of the considered  opinion that with regard to A1 and A2  this case falls into the category of  rarest of the rare cases and is not a  case where imprisonment for life is  an  adequate  sentence  and  thus,  constrained to reach the inescapable  conclusion  that  death  sentence  imposed on A1 and A2 be confirmed.

 91. Therefore,  the  sentence  of  death  

imposed on A1 and A2 is confirmed and  the  sentence  awarded  to  A3  is  commuted  to  life  imprisonment  till  the rest of his life.  

92. The order of stay on the execution of  the capital punishment of A1 and A2  is vacated.

93. The  appeals  are  disposed  of  in  the  aforesaid terms.

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.............................J. (H. L. DATTU)

.............................J. (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

.............................J. (M. Y. EQBAL)

NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 19, 2013.