REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1276  OF 2010

Dashrath Singh Chauhan               ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Central Bureau of Investigation    ….Respondent(s)

                 J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) This appeal is directed against the final

judgment and  order  dated  20.07.2009  passed  by

the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  in Criminal

Appeal No.447 of 2001  whereby the High Court

dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein

and upheld his conviction and sentence awarded by

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order dated 31.05.2001 passed by the Special

Judge, Delhi in C.C. No.53 of 1995 acquitting him

of the charge  under  Section  120­B  of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”)

and convicting him for the charges under Sections

7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the

PC  Act”) and sentenced  him to  undergo rigorous

imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a

fine of Rs.40,000/­ under Sections 7 and 13(2) read

with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act cumulatively, in

default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo

simple imprisonment for six months.   

2) In order to  appreciate the  issues  involved  in

this appeal, few facts need mention hereinbelow.

3) In short, the case of the prosecution is that the

appellant was an employee of Delhi Electric Supply

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Undertaking (DESU). At the relevant time, he was

working on the post of Inspector.  

4) On 28.03.1995, the complainant­Arun Kumar

(PW­1) lodged an  FIR  under  Section  7 read  with

Section 13(2)  of the  PC Act  against the  appellant

and  another employee  of  DESU namely,  Rajinder

Kumar complaining inter alia that in January 1995,

he applied for installation of an electric connection

for his factory and for that purpose  he  met the

appellant in his office where he demanded from him

Rs.4000/­ for  doing the  abovesaid  work  and  told

him  that  unless  he  pays  a sum of  Rs.4000/­  as

bribe to him, it is not possible to install the electric

connection.  

5) On the basis of the said FIR, the CBI through

its Inspector­  Mr. Kaul (PW­6) formed a raiding

party on 29.03.1995 to implicate the appellant and

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then reached to his office with one shadow witness

Mahinder (PW­2).  

6) On reaching the office, the Complainant told

the appellant that he has brought Rs.4000/­ as

demanded by him. The appellant, however, told the

Complainant to give the said  money to Rajinder

Kumar, who accepted the money from him. No

sooner Rajinder Kumar accepted the money, than

PW­2 and  PW­6 entered in the room and caught

Rajinder Kumar with the bribe money.

7) This led to initiation of the prosecution of the

appellant and co­accused Rajinder Kumar for

commission of the offences punishable under

Sections 7,  13(2)  and 13(1)(d)  of the  PC Act  read

with Section 120­B of  IPC in the Court of Special

Judge Delhi. The prosecution examined their

witnesses to prove the three charges framed against

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both the accused. The appellant also adduced

defense evidence.  

8) By judgment dated 31.05.2001, the Trial Court

(Special Judge) held that the prosecution failed to

prove the case of any conspiracy between the

appellant (A­1) and co­accused Rajinder Kumar (A­

2) in relation to the offences in question and,

therefore, the charge of conspiracy against them

under Section 120­B  IPC was held as not made out.

Both the accused were, therefore, acquitted of the

charge of conspiracy under Section 120­B  IPC.  

9) The finding on this issue recorded by the Trial

Court in Paras 14 and 16 reads as under:­  

“14. In the case before us, there is not even slightest evidence about the existence of a criminal conspiracy between A­1 and A­2. Once this had been established, only then we could  have read  the  statement of  both  the accused, not only against each one of them, but  against  the other  of them and also  for proving the existence of criminal conspiracy as such.  

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16.There is no such situation before us. There are certain statements only. In any case, once conspiracy is not established, even the statement, made by A­1 against A­2 are vice­versa, cannot be read in evidence.”   

10) The Trial Court then disbelieved the evidence

of the Investigating Officer­Mr. Kaul (PW­6) on the

ground that he himself was of a doubtful integrity

because the High Court, in one case, had directed

registration of a bribe case against him and,

therefore, his evidence in this case cannot be relied

on (See Para 17 of the judgment of the Trial Court)

but the Trial Court believed the evidence of shadow

witness (PW­2 ­ Mahinder Lal) for holding the

appellant guilty of the  offences  punishable  under

the PC Act.

11)  The Trial Court accordingly acquitted Rajinder

Kumar (A­2) from all the charges but convicted the

appellant(A­1) for the offences punishable under

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Sections 7 and 13 (2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC

Act.  

12) The State, however, accepted the judgment of

the Trial Court and did not file any appeal against

the acquittal  of  Rajinder Kumar nor even file  any

appeal against the acquittal  of the appellant  from

the offence under Section 120­B IPC.

13) The appellant (A­1), felt aggrieved by his

conviction and sentence under the PC Act, filed

criminal appeal in the High Court at Delhi. By

impugned order, the High Court dismissed the

appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court

which has given rise to filing of the present appeal

by way of special leave by the appellant(A­1) in this

Court.

14) Heard learned counsel for the parties.

15) Mr. Rishi Malhotra, learned counsel appearing

for the  appellant (A­1)  while  assailing the legality

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and correctness of the impugned order mainly

argued two points.  

16) In the first  place, learned counsel  contended

that the Trial Court as well as the High Court

having rightly acquitted both the accused (A­1 and

A­2) insofar as the offence of conspiracy under

Section 120­B is concerned and further having

rightly acquitted Rajinder Kumar (A­2) from all the

charges under the PC Act but erred in not

acquitting the appellant(A­1) from the offences

under Sections 7, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)

of  the PC Act.

17) It was his submission that once the charge of

conspiracy  under  Section  120­B  IPC was  held  as

"not proved" against the appellant(A­1) and the co­

accused Rajinder Kumar(A­2) and further its benefit

was rightly extended to Rajinder Kumar (A­2) for his

clean acquittal from the charges under the PC Act,

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the same benefit should have been extended to the

appellant(A­1) as well.  

18) In the second place, the learned counsel

contended that the appellant’s conviction is based

only  on  the  evidence  of  a  shadow witness (PW­2)

whereas the evidence of the Investigation  Officer,

Mr. Kaul (PW­6) was not believed due to his

doubtful integrity.  

19) It was his submission that the basic

requirements in such  a case, namely, proving of

"demand of bribe and its acceptance by the

appellant" was not proved much less beyond

reasonable doubt. It  was urged that  at  best what

the prosecution was able to prove was the “demand"

of bribe made by the appellant to the Complainant

but  not “its  acceptance”  because  the evidence, in

clear terms, established coupled with the findings of

the Courts below that the appellant did not accept

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the money but it was accepted and recovered from

the possession of Rajinder Kumar(A­1).  

20) It was, therefore, urged that since the

acceptance of bribe money was not proved qua  the

appellant and nor it was proved that Rajinder

Kumar accepted it for and on behalf of the

appellant, the appellant’s  conviction under any of

the provisions of the PC Act much less under

Sections 7, 13(2) read with   Section 13(1)(d)   was

not legally sustainable and hence it deserves to be

set aside.   

21) In reply, learned  counsel for the respondent

(CBI)  supported the reasoning and the conclusion

arrived at by the two Courts below and contended

that no case for any interference in the impugned

judgment is  made out and  hence the appeal be

dismissed.  

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22) Having heard the learned counsel for the

parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we

find force in the submissions of the learned counsel

for the appellant.

23) It  is not in dispute that the prosecution had

framed three charges against the appellant and co­

accused­Rajinder Kumar and two out of the three

charges, namely, Charge Nos. 1 and 2 were based

on the conspiracy. It is also not in dispute that the

Trial  Court,  on  appreciation of the  evidence,  held

that  the prosecution  failed to prove the charge of

conspiracy under Section 120­B IPC against the

appellant and Rajinder Kumar (A­1) and accordingly

acquitted both of them from the said charge.   It is

also not in dispute that so far as co­accused­

Rajinder Kumar (A­1) is concerned, he was

acquitted from all the charges framed under the PC

Act. It is also not in dispute that the State neither

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challenged the clean  acquittal of  Rajinder  Kumar

and nor challenged the part acquittal of the

appellant in the  High Court  by filing  any appeal.

This, therefore, attained finality.     

24) In  substance, the  charges  against  both the

accused were that the appellant entered into a

criminal conspiracy with Rajinder Kumar to

demand and accept illegal bribe money of Rs.

4000/­ from the Complainant­Arun Kumar as a

motive or reward for showing him official favour in

the matter of installation of electricity power

connection and, in furtherance thereof, the

appellant on 28.03.1995 as also on 29.03.1995

around 11.30 AM to 11.55 AM in the DESU office

demanded Rs.4000/­ from the complainant and

directed him to pay the said  money to Rajinder

Kumar­co accused, who accepted the said money on

his behalf.

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25) In our considered  opinion,  when the charge

against both the accused in relation to conspiracy

was  not  held proved  and  both the  accused  were

acquitted from the said charge which, in turn,

resulted in clean acquittal of Rajinder Kumar from

all the charges  under the PC  Act, a  fortiori, the

appellant too  was entitled for his clean acquittal

from the charges under the PC Act.  

26) It is not the case of the prosecution that the

appellant  had conspired with another  person and

even though the identity of the other person was not

established, yet the appellant held guilty for the

offence under Section 120­B IPC. On the contrary,

we find that the case of the prosecution was that

the appellant conspired with one Rajinder Kumar to

accept the sum of Rs.4000/­ as illegal gratification

from Arun Kumar­the complainant.  

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27) Once  Rajinder Kumar so also the appellant

stood acquitted in respect of the charge of

conspiracy and further Rajinder Kumar­ co­accused

was also acquitted from the charges under the PC

Act, the charges  against the  appellant  must also

necessarily fall on the ground. (See Para 15 Bhagat

Ram vs. State of Rajasthan, (1972) 2 SCC 466).  

28) Even assuming that despite the appellant

being acquitted of the charge relating to conspiracy

and notwithstanding the clean acquittal of Rajinder

Kumar from all the charges, the prosecuton failed ot

prove the charge against the appellant under

Sections 7, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of  the

PC Act.  

29) It is for the reason that in order to prove a case

against the appellant, it was necessary for the

prosecution to prove the twin requirement of

“demand and the acceptance of the bribe amount by

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the appellant”.  As mentioned above, it was the case

of the prosecution in the charge that the appellant

did not accept the bribe money but the money was

accepted and recovered from the possession of

Rajinder Kumar–co­accused (A­1).  

30) In such circumstances, there is no evidence to

prove that the appellant directly accepted the money

from the Complainant. Since the plea of conspiracy

against the appellant and Rajinder Kumar failed, it

cannot  be  held that  money (Rs.4000/­) recovered

from the  possession of  Rajinder  Kumar was as  a

fact the  bribe  money  meant for the  appellant for

holding him guilty for the offences punishable

under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC

Act. It is more so when the benefit of such acquittal

from the charge of conspiracy was given to Rajinder

Kumar but was not given to the appellant.   

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31) In our view, the prosecution, therefore, failed

to prove the factum of acceptance of bribe money of

Rs.4000/­ by the appellant  from the Complainant

on 29.03.1995 as per  the charges  framed against

him.

32)  Since in order to attract the rigors of Sections

7, 13(2) read 13(1)(d) of PC Act, the prosecution was

under a legal obligation to prove the twin

requirements of “demand and acceptance of  bribe

money by the  accused”, the  proving  of  one  alone

but not the other was not sufficient.  The appellant

is, therefore, entitled for acquittal from the charges

framed against him under the PC Act too. (See para

8 of M.K. Harshan vs. State of Kerala,  (1996) 11

SCC 720)

33)   In view of the foregoing discussion, the

appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The

impugned judgment is set aside. The conviction and

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the sentence awarded to the appellant under

Sections 7, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of  the

PC Act by the Courts below are set aside and the

appellant is set free from the said charges.  

34) If the appellant is already on  bail, it is  not

necessary for him to surrender.

    ………...................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

                                          ...……..................................J.

                   [INDU MALHOTRA] New Delhi; October 09, 2018  

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