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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).15605-15606 OF 2017 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition

(Civil) No.9631-9632 of 2017] COMMISSIONER OF TRADE AND  TAXES AND ORS.          ...APPELLANTS

VERSUS M/S AHLUWALIA CONTRACTS  (INDIA) LTD.        ...RESPONDENT

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 15608  OF 2017

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10485 of 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 15607 OF 2017 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition

(Civil) No.9633 of 2017] JUDGMENT

RANJAN GOGOI, J.  

1. Leave granted. 2. A  recital  of  the  facts  of  the Civil Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition  (Civil)  Nos.9631-9632  of  2017 alone are being made as the facts in the other  connected  proceedings  [i.e.  Civil Appeals  arising  out  of  Special  Leave

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Petition  (Civil)  Nos.10485/2017  and 9633/2017] are largely similar.  

3. The challenge by the Revenue is to an order of the High Court of Delhi by which the High Court has allowed the writ petitions  filed  by  the  respondents  – Assessees challenging the orders issued by the  Designated  Authority  i.e.  Additional Commissioner of Income Tax  rejecting the applications filed by the Respondent writ petitioners under the Delhi Tax Compliance Achievement  Scheme,  2013  (hereinafter referred  to  as  “the  Amnesty  Scheme”), details of which are noted below.

4. Under  Section  107  of  the  Delhi Value  Added  Tax  Act,  2004  (hereinafter referred  to  as  “the  DVAT  Act”),  the Government  of  National  Capital  Territory of Delhi (“GNCTD” for short) is empowered to  notify  amnesty  scheme(s)  covering payment of tax, interest, penalty or any

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other dues under the DVAT Act relating to any period ending before 1st April, 2013.

5. In  exercise  of  powers  under Section 107 of the DVAT Act, an Amnesty Scheme was notified by the GNCDT on 20th

September,  2013.   Clause  2(c)  of  the Amnesty  Scheme  which  defines  the 'designated  authority';  clause  4  which delineates  the  procedure  for  making declaration  and  payment  of  tax  dues; clause  5  which  deals  with  immunity  from interest,  penalty  and  other  proceedings; and the provisions of clause 8 which deals with the failure to make true declarations would  require  a  consideration  of  the Court. The same are, therefore, reproduced below for convenience:

“2(c)  “designated  authority” means  officer(s)  not  below  the rank  of  Joint  Commisioner  as notified  by  the  Commissioner, Value Added Tax for the purposes of this Scheme;

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*** *** *** 4. Procedure  for  making declaration  and  payment  of  tax dues – (1) Subject to the other provisions  of  this  Scheme,  a person may make a declaration of the  tax  dues  to  the  designated authority  on  or  before  the  31st day of January 2014 in Form DSC-1 appended to this notification. (2) The  designated  authority shall acknowledge the receipt of declaration  in  Form  DSC-2 appended  to  this  notification, within  a  period  of  fifteen working  days  from  the  date  of receipt of the declaration. (3) The  declarant  shall  pay  not less than fifty per cent of the tax  dues  declared  under sub-clause  (1)  along  with  the declaration and submit proof of such  payment  to  the  designated authority. (4) The  remaining  amount  of  tax dues or part thereof remaining to be  paid  after  adjusting  the payment made under sub-clause (3) shall be paid by the declarant on or before the 21st day of March, 2014. (5) Notwithstanding  anything contained in sub-clause (3) and sub-clause  (4),  any  tax  which becomes  due  or  payable  by  the declarant for the tax period(s) beginning  from  1  day  of  April, 2013 and thereafter shall be paid by  him  in  accordance  with  the provisions of the Act:

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Provided  that  where  an unregistered  dealer  has  made declaration  referred  to  in sub-clause  (1)  of  this  clause, such  dealer  shall  obtain registration and pay net tax for the period from 1 day of April, 2013 to the date of regisration and  furnish  return  in  Form DVAT-16  for  that  period  along with  proof  of  payment  in  Form DVAT-20  to  the  designated authority  at  the  time  of furnishing  of  declaration  under this Scheme.  Such a dealer shall be  eligible  for  immunity  under clause  5  ofteh  Scheme  for  late payment  of  such  tax  and non-filing  of  return  under  the Act. (6) The  declarant  shall  furnish to  the  designated  authority, details  of  payment  made   from time  to  time  under  this  Scheme along  with  a  copy  of acknowledgement  issued  to  him under sub-clause (2). (7) On furnishing the details of full payment of declared tax dues  payable  under  sub-clause (4),  the  designated  authority shall issue an acknowledgement of discharge  of  such  dues  within fifteen days to the declarant in Form  DSC-3  appended  to  this notification.

(8) A  dealer  who  has  not  taken registration  shall  obtain registration prior to filing of declaration  as  referred  in

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sub-clause  (1)  of  clause  4. Likewise,  a  person  who  is responsible for making deduction of tax under section 36A of the Act, shall obtain a Tax Deduction Account  Number  (TAN),  if  not already obtained.

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5.  Immunity  from  interest, penalty  and  other proceedings.-(1)  Notwithstanding anything  contained  in  any provision  of  the  Scheme,  the declarant,  upon  payment  of  the tax  dues  declared  by  him  under sub-clause (1) of clause 4, shall get  immunity  from  penalty  or penalties,  interest  other  than interest  payable  in  terms  of sub-clauses (2) and (4) of clause 3, prosecution  or  any  other proceedings under the Act or, as the  case  may  be,  under  the Central  Sales  Tax  Act,  1956  or the  erstwhile  Delhi  Sales  Tax Act,  1975  (43  of  1975)  or  the Delhi Sales Tax on Works Contract Act, 1999 (Delhi Act 9 of 1999) or the Delhi Sales Tax on Right to Use Goods Act, 2002 (Delhi Act 13 of 2002) or the Delhi Tax on Entry  of Motor  Vehicles  into Local areas Act, 1994 (Delhi Act 4 of  1995), in  relation to  the tax  dues declared  by  the declarant;  and  from  penalty  and prosecution  for  non-registration and non-furnishing of returns in time. Explanation.- For the purpose of this  sub-clause,  the  term

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“declarant” shall include-  (i) in relation to the declarant being  a  contractee,  who  has awarded the works contract under section  36A(1)  of  the  Act,  his immediate  contractor  to  whom  he has  awarded  the  works  contract, to the extent of amount declared by the contractee; and (ii) in relation to the declarant being a contractor, his immediate contractee who  has  awarded  the works  contract  under  section 36A(1) of the Act. Explanation  -For  removal  of doubts,  it  is  hereby  declared that,  to  avoid  double taxation, if  the  contractee  has  declared tax  dues,  his  immediate contractor will also get immunity to that extent, and vice-versa.

(2) Subject to the provisions of clause  8,  a  declaration  made under sub-clause (1) of clause 4 shall  become  conclusive  upon issuance  of  acknowledgement  of discharge under sub-clause (7) of clause 4 and no matter shall be reopened/  reassessed/  reviewed thereafter  in  any  proceedings under  this  Scheme  or  under  the Act before any authority or court relating to the period covered by such declaration to the extent of tax  dues  declared  by  the declarant.

(3)  All  statutory  appeals/ revisions  pending  before

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quasi-judcial  forums  upto  the stage of Tribunal shall be deemed to have been withdrawn once the Scheme is opted for. Further, all matters pending in the High Court and  Supreme  Court  shall  be withdrawn by the declarant and he will  need  to  submit  the application  filed  for  withdrawl with the  declaration.  for  the case to be withdrawn before the court. (4)  No  proceeding  shall  be instituted  within  48  hours  of securing  a  registration, provided, the registrant declares his  intent  of  opting  under  the Scheme  at  the  time  of  applying for TIN/ TAN. (5) The information gathered vide a  declaration  under  the  scheme shall  be  kept confidential  and shall  not  be  used  except  under the Scheme and the same shall not be shared with any other person/ government department/agency.

*** *** *** 8.  Failure  to  make  true declaration.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in  clause 5 of  the  Scheme,  where  the Commissioner  has,  for  a  period beginning  from 1st  April,  2009, reasons  to  believe  that  the declaration was false in material  particulars, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, serve notice  on  the declarant  in respect  of  such  declaration requiring him to show cause as to why he should not be required to

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pay  the  tax  dues  unpaid  or short-paid as per the provisions of the Scheme. (2) If  the  Commissioner  is satisfied,  for  reasons  to  be recorded  in  writing,  that  the declaration  made  by  the  dealer was substantially false,  (i) he  shall  within  three months of service of notice under sub-clause (1) make assessment of tax and penalty under section 32 and  33  of  the  Act,  as  if  that dealer had never made declaration under  this  Scheme.  However,  the dealer shall be entitled to the credit of tax paid by him under this Scheme; and (ii) such  dealer  may  be proceeded  under  sub-section  (2) of  section  89  of  the  Act  for furnishing of false declaration. (3) No  notice  shall  be  issued under  sub-clause  (1)  of  this clause  after  the  expiry  of  one year  from  the  date  of declaration.”

6. There  is  no  dispute  between  the parties  that  on  the  basis  of  the declaration  filed  by  the  respondent  – Assessee,  the  Designated  Authority  had issued the “acknowledgement of discharge” in  favour  of  the  respondent-  Assessee.

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However, on 16th January, 2015 a show cause notice in exercise of powers under clause 8 of the Amnesty Scheme was issued by the Additional  Commissioner  (Spl.  Zone), Department of Trade and Taxes, New Delhi to  which  the  respondent  –  Assessee submitted its reply on 27th January, 2015. In the reply so submitted, the respondent – Assessee did not raise any question with regard  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the Additional Commissioner to issue the show cause  notice  under  clause  8.   The adjudication was finalized by order dated 11th February, 2015 which was served to the Assessee.   The  Assessee  then  filed  the writ petitions in question before the High Court  contending,  inter  alia,  that  the show  cause  dated  16th January,  2015  was unauthorized  and  without  jurisdiction inasmuch as the power to issue such notice under  clause  8  is  vested  with  the Commissioner  and  the  same  had  not  been delegated to the Designated Authority i.e.

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the  concerned  Additional  Commissioner. The said contention found favour with the High  Court.   Accordingly,  the  writ petitions  filed  by  the  respondents  – Assessees  were  allowed  and  the  impugned consequential proceedings were interfered with.  The High Court also took the view that as under clause 8(3) of the Amnesty Scheme show cause notice has to be issued within one year of the date of declaration which in the present case was made on 18th

February,  2014  and  28th February,  2014, respectively,  issuance  of  any further/fresh show cause notice was time barred.   Aggrieved  the  Revenue  is  in appeal before this Court.  

7. Shri  Maninder  Singh,  learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Revenue has vehemently contended that the Government Order dated 30th April, 2014 contains a clear delegation of the power under clause 8 of the Amnesty Scheme by

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the  Commissioner  to  the  Designated Authority.  The power of disposal of the application  received  under  the  Scheme, according  to  the  learned  ASG,  must necessarily include the power to finalize the  matter  after  issuing  the  show  cause notice  under  clause  8  in  an  appropriate case.  Learned ASG has further urged that under  clause  4  the  declarations  are required  to  be  considered  by  the Designated  Authority  i.e.  the  Additional Commissioner.   It  is  natural  that  the power  to  reopen  the  cases  concluded  on mistaken/suppressed  facts  must  be understood to have been available to the Designated Authority at all times.

8. The  above  contentions  are contested  by  Shri  S.  Ganesh,  learned Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the respondents – Assessees who has urged that keeping in mind the necessity of finality of decisions under the Amnesty Scheme, the

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power of reopening the concluded cases by issuing  show  cause  notices  has  been conferred on a higher authority i.e. the Commissioner.  The  said  power  has  to  be distinguished from the power to decide an application filed, which is vested in the designated authority under Clause 4. It is urged that in the present case the power vested in the Commissioner under clause 8 has  not  been  delegated  to  any  other authority, in the absence whereof, it was not open for the Additional Commissioner to  issue  the  impugned  show  cause  notice dated 16th January, 2015. The fact that the Assessee  did  not  raise  the  issue  of jurisdiction  before  the  Adjudicating Authority would not clothe the Additional Commissioner  with  the  jurisdiction  to issue the show cause notice.  As the said issue is primarily a question of law which goes  to  the  root  of  the  matter  the question  could  always  have  been  raised before  the  High  Court.  The  same  having

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been so raised and answered by the High Court,  the  answer  provided  needs  to  be dealt  with  by  this  Court  on  merits  and ought not to be foreclosed merely on the ground  that  the  respondents  –  Assessees had not raised the same in the course of the adjudication of the show cause notice. Learned Senior Counsel has referred to the provisions of clause 8(3) of the Amnesty Scheme  to  contend  that  the  show  cause notice  under  clause  8  has  to  be  issued within  one  year  of  the  date  of declaration/declarations  and  there  is  no enabling  provision  to  condone  any  delay that  has  occurred  or  extend  the  time stipulated by clause 8(3). As the period of one year from the date of declaration is long over, in the event this Court is to  hold  that  the  impugned  show  cause notice was issued by the Authority which did not have the power and jurisdiction to so  act  the  question  of  issuance  of  any fresh/revised notice does not arise.

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9. On the rival contentions, two issues arise  for  consideration  in  the  present appeal.

10. The  first  relates  to  the  power  and jurisdiction  of  the  Designated  Authority to issue the notice under clause 8 of the Amnesty  Scheme.  Related,  is  whether,  in the  present  case,  there  has  been  any delegation  of  the  said  power  which  is vested  in  the  Commissioner  under  the aforesaid clause 8.   

11. The second issue arising would depend on an answer to the first, namely, if it is  to  be  held  that  the  Designated Authority  is  not  empowered  to  act  under clause 8, whether a fresh notice under the aforesaid clause of the scheme can still be issued by the competent authority i.e. the Commissioner or the delegatee of the Commissioner.

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12. What category of officers would come within  the  expression  “designated authority”  is  contemplated  by  the definition  contained  in  clause  2  (c)  of the Amnesty Scheme.  An Officer not below the rank of Joint Commissioner as may be notified  by  the  Commissioner  would  be  a designated authority under the Scheme.

13. Clause  4  of  the  Scheme  requires  a declaration of the tax due to be made to the designated authority and, thereafter, following the procedure prescribed by the various  sub-clauses  of  clause  4,  the Designated Authority is empowered to issue the acknowledgment of  discharge of dues under clause 4 (7) of the Scheme.  

14. Under  clause  8  of  the  aforesaid scheme,  the  Commissioner  is  vested  with the  power,  to  be  exercised  for  reasons recorded  in  writing,  to  issue  notice  to

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the assessee requiring him to show cause as to why he should not pay the tax/ dues unpaid or short paid as per the provisions of  the  scheme.  The  power  to  issue  the notice  under  clause  8  is  undoubtedly vested  with  the  Commissioner  and  not  in the Designated Authority.  What is vested in the Designated Authority is the power under clause 4 of the Scheme which is the power to hear and decide applications and issue acknowledgments of discharge on due satisfaction. The said power to hear and decide  applications,  by  no  means,  would include  the  power  to  reopen  a  decided matter which is what clause 8 specifically contemplates.  The  Government  order  dated 30th April, 2014 relied upon by the Revenue as a delegation of the power under clause 8, on a plain reading thereof, is only an empowerment  of  a  particular  Additional Commissioner of a particular Zone (a Zone may have several Additional Commissioners) to  hear  and  decide  applications  filed

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under the Scheme.  The said G.O dated 30th

April, 2014 cannot be construed to be an exercise of delegation of powers vested in the  Commissioner  under  Clause  8  to Designated Authority.  The plain language contained in the said G.O is capable of sustaining the above conclusion. We will, therefore,  have  to  hold  that  the Additional Commissioner who had issued the show cause notice under clause 8 in the present case was not competent to do so and on that basis we affirm the conclusion of the High Court on the said question.   15. This will bring us to a consideration of the second issue arising in the case details  of  which  have  already  been mentioned in preceding paragraphs of the present order.

16. The declarations in the present case were  issued  to  the  assessee  on  18th

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February,  2014  and  28th  February,  2014 respectively. The show cause notice under Clause 8 was issued on 16th January, 2015. The  reply  was  submitted  by  the respondent-assessee on 27th January, 2015. The  adjudication  was  completed  by  the Order  dated  11th February,  2015  against which the respondent-Assessee filed a writ petition  before  the  High  Court  on  4th

March,  2015.  In  the  reply  filed  by  the respondent-Assessee  to  the  show  cause notice  or  in  the  proceedings  pursuant thereto,  as  already  mentioned,  no objection was taken by the assessee to the power and jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner  to  issue  the  notice  in question.  The  adjudication  order, therefore,  did  not  deal  with  the  said issue. It is only after the period of one year from the date of declaration was over that the writ petition was filed wherein the  question  of  jurisdiction  of  the Additional Commissioner was raised for the

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first time. It is in these facts that the High  Court  took  the  view  that  as  the period of limitation prescribed by Clause 8(3)  was  over,  fresh  proceedings  stood barred by time.

17. While it is correct that the failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction by the assessee will not necessarily clothe the Additional  Commissioner  with  the jurisdiction  if  the  same  is  not contemplated  by  law,  there  are  certain aspects  of  the  case  which  need  to  be considered.  Had  the  assessee  raised  the question of jurisdiction in its reply or in  the  course  of  the  adjudication proceedings  there  would  have  been  still time  for  the  Commissioner  to  cure  the defect  and  issue  a  valid  notice.  Cases under  Amnesty  Scheme  would  fall  outside the arena of ordinary and routine matters and,  therefore,  it  is  possible  to attribute a genuine mistake on the part of

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the  Additional  Commissioner  in  invoking jurisdiction under Clause 8 of the Amnesty Scheme.  The  question  that  looms  large before the Court is that whether in such a situation the assessee should be allowed to  raise  the  question  of  limitation  and defeat the claim of the revenue to proceed afresh in the matter on that basis.

18. Dealing  with  a  somewhat  similar situation that arose before this Court in Grindlays  Bank  Ltd.   vs.   Income  Tax Officer, Calcutta and Ors.1 it was observed as follows in Para 7 of the report in the following manner.

“7. The next point is whether the High Court possessed any power to make the order directing a fresh assessment.  The  principal  relief sought  in  the  writ  petition  was the quashing of the notice under Section 142(1) of the Income Tax Act, and inasmuch as the assess- ment  order  dated  March  31,  1977 was  made  during  the  pendency  of the proceeding consequent upon a purported non-compliance with that notice, it became necessary to ob-

1  (1980) 2 SCC 191

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tain the quashing of the assess- ment order also. The character of an assessment proceeding, of which the  impugned  notice  and  the  as- sessment order formed part, being quasi-judicial,  the  “certiorari” jurisdiction of the High Court un- der Article 226 was attracted. Or- dinarily, where the High Court ex- ercises  such  jurisdiction  it merely quashes the offending order and the consequential legal effect is that but for the offending or- der the remaining part of the pro- ceeding  stands  automatically  re- vived before the inferior court or tribunal with the need for fresh consideration  and  disposal  by  a fresh order. Ordinarily, the High Court does not substitute its own order for the order quashed by it. It is, of course, a different case where the adjudication by the High Court establishes a complete want of  jurisdiction  in  the  inferior court or tribunal to entertain or to take the proceeding at all. In that event on the quashing of the proceeding by the High Court there is no revival at all. But although in  the  former  kind  of  case  the High Court, after quashing the of- fending order, does not substitute its own order it has power none- theless to pass such further or- ders as the justice of the case requires. When passing such orders the High Court draws on its inher- ent power to make all such orders as  are  necessary  for  doing  com- plete justice between the parties. The interests of justice require that any undeserved or unfair ad- vantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court, by

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the mere circumstance that it has initiated  a  proceeding  in  the court,  must  be  neutralised.  The simple fact of the institution of litigation by itself should not be permitted to confer an advantage on the party responsible for it. The present case goes further. The appellant would not have enjoyed the advantage of the bar of limi- tation if. notwithstanding his im- mediate grievance against the no- tice under Section 142(1) of the Income Tax Act, he had permitted the assessment proceeding to go on after registering his protest be- fore the Income Tax Officer, and allowed an assessment order to be made in the normal course. In an application  under  Section  146 against the assessment order, it would  have  been  open  to  him  to urge that the notice was unreason- able and invalid and he was pre- vented  by  sufficient  cause  from complying  with  it  and  therefore the  assessment  order  should  be cancelled.  In  that  event,  the fresh assessment made under Sec- tion 146 would not be fettered by the  bar  of  limitation.  Section 153(3)(i) removes the bar. But the appellant preferred the constitu- tional  jurisdiction  of  the  High Court under Article 226. If no or- der was made by the High Court di- recting  a  fresh  assessment,  he could contend as is the contention now before us, that a fresh as- sessment proceeding is barred by limitation. That is an advantage which the appellant seeks to de- rive by the mere circumstance of his  filing  a  writ  petition.  It will be noted that the defect com-

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plained of by the appellant in the notice was a procedural lapse at best and one that could be readily corrected by serving an appropri- ate notice. It was not a defect affecting  the  fundamental  juris- diction of the Income Tax Officer to  make  the  assessment.  In  our opinion,  the  High  Court  was plainly right in making the direc- tion  which  it  did.  The  observa- tions of this Court in Director of Inspection of Income Tax (Investi- gation) New Delhi v. Pooran Mall & Sons2 are relevant. It said:  

The  Court  in  exercising its  powers  under  Article 226 has to mould the remedy to  suit  the  facts  of  a case.  If  in  a  particular case a court takes the view that the Income Tax Officer while passing an order un- der Section 132(5) did not give  an  adequate  opportu- nity to the party concerned it should not be left with the only option of quashing it and putting the party at an advantage even though it may  be  satisfied  that  on the material before him the conclusion  arrived  at  by the Income Tax Officer was correct  or  dismissing  the petition  because  otherwise the party would get an un- fair  advantage.  The  power to quash an order under Ar- ticle 226 can be exercised not  merely  when  the  order sought to be quashed is one made  without  jurisdiction

2  (1975) 4 SCC 568

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in which case there can be no  room  for  the  same  au- thority  to  be  directed  to deal  with  it.  But  in  the circumstances of a case the court  might  take  the  view that  another  authority  has the  jurisdiction  to  deal with the matter and may di- rect that authority to deal with it or where the order of the authority which has the  jurisdiction  is  viti- ated  by  circumstances  like failure  to  observe  the principles  of  natural  jus- tice  the  court  may  quash the  order  and  direct  the authority to dispose of the matter  afresh  after  giving the aggrieved party a rea- sonable  opportunity  of putting  forward  its  case. Otherwise,  it  would  mean that where a court quashes an order because the prin- ciples  of  natural  justice have  not  been  complied with,  it  should  not  while passing  that  order  permit the tribunal or the author- ity to deal with it again irrespective  of  the  merits of the case.

The  point  was  considered  by  the Calcutta High Court in Cachar Ply- wood  Ltd. v.  ITO3 and  the  High Court, after considering the pro- visions of Section 153 of the In- come Tax Act, considered it appro- priate. while deposing of the writ petition, to issue a direction to

3  (1978) 114 ITR 379 (Cal)

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the Income Tax Officer to complete the assessment which, but for the direction of the High Court, would have been barred by limitation.”

19. Having considered the matter and the manner in which this Court has approached the issue arising in Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra)  we  are  of  the  view  that  Clause 8(3) of the Amnesty Scheme will have no application to the present case where the initial  show  cause  notice  was  issued within  time  and  its  legitimacy  was  not contested by the respondent-Assessee. Had such  legitimacy  been  questioned  at  the stage of reply or even in the course of the adjudication proceedings, there would still have been room/ time for the revenue to correct the error that had occurred. A rectified  Notice  could  even  have  been issued after the order of adjudication was passed on 11th February, 2015. The close proximity  of  time  between  the  reply submitted  by  the  assessee  to  the  Show

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Cause  Notice  (27.01.2015)  and  the proceedings in adjudication Revenue on the one hand and the date of filing of the Writ Petition (4.3.2015) would permit us to infer that the conduct of the assessee in raising the issue in the writ petitions and not earlier was not entirely bonafide. The respondent-Assessee, therefore, cannot

be allowed to take advantage of its own

wrong. The courts exercising extraordinary jurisdiction  cannot  be  understood  to  be helpless  but  concede  to  the  assessee  an undeserved victory over the Revenue. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, wide and pervasive as it is, should have enabled the High Court to appropriately deal with the situation and  issue  consequential  directions permitting  initiation  of  fresh proceedings,  if  the  Revenue  was  so inclined. The High Court having failed to so act, we now correct the error and issue directions to enable the Revenue to issue

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a  fresh  notice  to  the  assessee  under clause 8 of the Amnesty Scheme, if it so desires and is so advised.  

20. In  the  light  of  the  foregoing,  we allow  these  appeals  in  terms  of  the directions  as  above  and  set  aside  the order of the High Court impugned in the appeals.  

....................,J.            (RANJAN GOGOI)

....................,J.     (NAVIN SINHA)

NEW DELHI OCTOBER 4, 2017