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REPORTABLE        

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1051  OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 25851 2005)

The Commissioner, Bangalore  Development Authority & Anr.               .... Appellant (s)

Versus

Brijesh Reddy & Anr.                                             ....  Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This appeal is directed against the judgment and final  

order  dated  27.07.2005  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  

Karnataka at Bangalore in R.F.A. No. 947 of 2003 whereby  

the  High  Court  allowed  the  first  appeal  filed  by  the  

respondents  herein  and  remitted  the  matter  to  the  trial  

Court for fresh disposal.

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3) Brief facts:

(a) On 28.09.1965, a notification was issued by the State  

Government proposing to acquire several lands including the  

suit  land being Survey No.  23/10 of Ejipura measuring 22  

guntas for formation of Koramangala Layout.  The original  

khatedars, who were notified were one Papaiah, Thimaiah,  

Patel  Narayan Reddy,  Smt.  Rathnamma,   Smt.  Perumakka  

(Defendant  No.3  in  the  suit),  Munivenkatappa  and  

Chickaabbaiah, the husband of 3rd defendant.  After holding  

an enquiry, the Land Acquisition Officer passed the award on  

07.09.1969.  Thereafter,  10  guntas  of  land  held  by  Smt.  

Rathnamma was taken possession on 28.11.1969 and the  

remaining  12  guntas  held  by  defendant  No.3  was  taken  

possession on 22.07.1978 and then handed over the entire  

land to  the Engineering Section.   The layout  was formed,  

sites were allotted to the intending purchasers.  

(b) According to  the respondents herein,  they purchased  

12  guntas  of  land  under  a  registered  sale  deed  dated  

15.11.1995  from  Perumakka-3rd defendant  in  the  suit.  

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Originally  the  said  land  belonged  to  Chikkaabbaiah  –  

husband  of  3rd defendant.   Chikkaabbaiah  mortgaged  the  

said  property  to  Patel  Narayan  Reddy  on  26.02.1985.  

Thereafter, the said property was re-conveyed in favour of  

Chikkaabbiah.   After  the  death  of  Chikkaabbiah,  his  wife  

Perumakka,  (3rd defendant  in  the  suit)  was  the  absolute  

owner and in possession of the property.    

(c) When the Bangalore Development  Authority  (in  short  

“the BDA”) tried to interfere with the possession of the suit  

property,  3rd defendant in the suit filed O.S. No. 10445 of  

1985  for  injunction  and  obtained  an  order  of  temporary  

injunction on 15.06.1985 which was in force till 22.05.1994.  

Ultimately the said suit was dismissed on the ground that  

before filing of the suit, statutory notice had not been given  

to the BDA.  Thereafter, another suit being O.S. No. 2069 of  

1994 was filed by the third defendant on the file of the Civil  

Judge, Bangalore and the same was dismissed as withdrawn  

on 14.06.1995 with liberty to file a fresh suit.

(d) In the meantime, the respondents herein purchased the  

suit land from the third defendant under a registered sale  

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deed on 15.11.1995.   After  the purchase of  the land,  the  

respondents were put in possession.  When the BDA tried to  

interfere with the possession of the respondents herein, they  

filed a petition being W.P. No. 41497 of 1995 before the High  

Court,  ultimately  the  said  petition  was  dismissed  as  

withdrawn by the respondents herein with a liberty to file a  

fresh suit.  

(e)  Thereafter, the respondents herein filed a suit being  

O.S. No. 4267 of 1996 on the file of the Court of the XVI Addl.  

City  Civil  &  Sessions  Judge  at  Bangalore  for  permanent  

injunction.   By  order  dated  18.06.2003,  the  trial  Court  

dismissed the said suit as not maintainable.   

(f) Challenging the said order, the respondents herein filed  

first  appeal  being  R.F.A.  No.947  of  2003  before  the  High  

Court.  By impugned order dated 27.07.2005, the High Court  

allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the trial Court  

with a direction to dispose of the same after permitting the  

plaintiffs to adduce evidence on merits.

(g) Aggrieved  by  the  said  order,  the  appellants  have  

preferred this appeal by way of special leave.

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4) Heard Mr. Altaf Ahmed, learned senior counsel for the  

appellants and Mr. G.V. Chandrashekar, learned counsel for  

the respondents.

Discussion:

5) The  only  point  for  consideration  in  this  appeal  is  

whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit when  

the schedule lands were acquired under the land acquisition  

proceedings  and  whether  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  

remanding the matter to the trial Court without examining  

the question with regard to the maintainability of the suit?  

6) It is seen from the plaint averments in O.S. No. 4267 of  

1996 that the plaintiffs purchased the suit schedule property  

from the third defendant under a registered sale deed dated  

15.11.1995 and since then they are in exclusive possession  

and enjoyment  of  the  same.   Since  other  details  are  not  

necessary for our purpose, there is no need to traverse the  

entire plaint allegations.   

7) The  third  defendant,  who  filed  a  separate  written  

statement supporting the case of the plaintiffs, had asserted  

that she did had the right, interest and title in the schedule  

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property  and  she  possessed  every  right  to  transfer  and  

alienate it in favour of the plaintiffs.  On the other hand, the  

BDA and its officers/defendant Nos. 1 and 2, in their written  

statements, specifically denied all  the allegations made by  

the  plaintiff.   According  to  the  BDA,  the  suit  schedule  

property which forms part and parcel of Survey No. 23 of  

2010 of Ejipura, totally measuring 22 guntas was notified for  

acquisition for the formation of Koramangala Layout.  In their  

statements,  they  specifically  pleaded  that  the  notification  

came to be issued on 28.09.1965.  The original khatedars  

who  were  notified  were  one  Papaiah,  Thimaiah,  Patel  

Narayan Reddy,  Smt.  Rathnamma,  Smt.  Perumakka (D-3),  

Muni Venkatappa and Chickaabbaiah,  the husband of D-3.  

The  Land  Acquisition  Officer,  after  complying  with  the  

provisions  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  and  after  holding  

enquiry passed an award.  It is further stated that 10 guntas  

of land held by Smt. Rathnamma was taken possession on  

28.11.1969,  remaining  12 guntas  held  by  defendant  No.3  

was taken possession on 22.07.1978 and thereafter, handed  

over the entire land to the Engineering Section.  It is also  

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stated that as a follow-up action, the lay out was formed,  

sites were allotted to the intending purchasers.  According to  

defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the entire land vested with them  

and the so-called purchase now alleged by the plaintiff from  

Defendant No. 3 on 15.11.1995 is bad and in any event, not  

binding on the defendants.  It is also stated that the persons  

who purchased the sites were issued possession certificates,  

khata was changed, khata certificates were issued, building  

licences  were  issued  and  there  were  constructions  in  the  

said site.  Pursuant to the same, they had paid tax to the  

authority  concerned.   Accordingly,  it  is  asserted  that  the  

plaintiff  was not in possession on the date of filing of the  

suit.   Before  the  trial  Court,  in  order  to  substantiate  the  

defence, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have produced copies  

of the Gazette Notification with respect to the acquisition of  

the said land.   The award passed by the Land Acquisition  

Officer has also been produced and taken on record.  The  

perusal of the discussion by the trial Court shows that the  

plaintiffs  have  not  disputed  the  contents  of  those  

documents, even otherwise it cannot be disputed.  

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8) Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides  

jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting those that  

are expressly or impliedly barred which reads as under:   

“9. Courts  to try  all  civil  suits  unless barred.- The  Courts  shall  (subject  to  the  provisions  herein  contained)  have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting  suits  of  which  their  cognizance  is  either  expressly  or  impliedly barred.”

From  the  above  provision,  it  is  clear  that  Courts  have  

jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of  

which  their  cognizance  is  either  expressly  or  impliedly  

barred.   The  jurisdiction  of  Civil  Court  with  regard  to  a  

particular matter can be said to be excluded if there is an  

express provision or by implication it can be inferred that the  

jurisdiction is taken away.  An objection as to the exclusion  

of  Civil  Court’s  jurisdiction  for  availability  of  alternative  

forum should  be  taken  before  the  trial  Court  and  at  the  

earliest  failing  which  the  higher  court  may  refuse  to  

entertain the plea in the absence of proof of prejudice.   

9) In State of Bihar vs. Dhirendra Kumar and Others,  

(1995) 4 SCC 229, the core question was whether a civil suit  

is  maintainable  and ad  interim injunction  could  be  issued  

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where proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act,1894 was  

taken pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of the  

Act and possession delivered to the beneficiary.  On going  

through  the  entire  proceedings  initiated  under  the  Land  

Acquisition Act, this Court held as under:

“3. … … We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently  advised,  that  by  necessary implication  the power  of  the  civil Court to take cognizance of the case under Section 9  of  CPC  stands  excluded,  and  a  civil  Court  has  no  jurisdiction to go into the question of validity or legality of  the  notification  under  Section  4  and  declaration  under  Section 6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under  Article 226 of the Constitution.  So, the civil suit itself was  not maintainable…”  

After holding so, this Court set aside the finding of the trial  

Court that there is a  prima facie triable issue.  It also held  

that the order of injunction was without jurisdiction.     

10) In  Laxmi Chand and Others vs.  Gram Panchayat,  

Kararia and Others,  (1996) 7 SCC 218 while considering  

Section  9  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code,  1908  vis-à-vis  the  

Land Acquisition Act, 1894, this Court  held as under:

“2. … It is seen that Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code,  1908 gives jurisdiction to the civil court to try all civil suits,  unless barred. The cognizance of a suit of civil nature may  either  expressly  or  impliedly  be  barred.  The  procedure  contemplated  under  the  Act  is  a  special  procedure  envisaged  to  effectuate  public  purpose,  compulsorily  acquiring  the  land  for  use  of  public  purpose.  The  notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section  

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6 of the Act are required to be published in the manner  contemplated  thereunder.  The  inference gives  conclusiveness to the public purpose and the extent of the  land mentioned therein. The award should be made under  Section  11  as  envisaged  thereunder.  The  dissatisfied  claimant is provided with the remedy of reference under  Section 18 and a further appeal under Section 54 of the  Act.  If  the  Government  intends  to  withdraw  from  the  acquisition before taking possession of the land, procedure  contemplated under Section 48 requires to be adhered to.  If possession is taken, it stands vested under Section 16 in  the State with absolute title  free from all  encumbrances  and  the  Government  has  no  power  to  withdraw  from  acquisition.

3.  It  would  thus be clear  that  the scheme of  the Act  is  complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the Civil  Court  to take cognizance of  the cases arising under the  Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. The Civil Court  thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the  invalidity  of  the  procedure  contemplated  under  the  Act.  The only right an aggrieved person has is to approach the  constitutional Courts, viz., the High Court and the Supreme  Court  under  their  plenary  power  under  Articles  226 and  136  respectively  with  self-imposed  restrictions  on  their  exercise of extraordinary power.  Barring thereof, there is  no power to the Civil Court.”

11) In  Commissioner,  Bangalore  Development  

Authority vs. K.S. Narayan, (2006) 8 SCC 336, which arose  

under the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, was  

similar to the case on hand, this Court held that a civil suit is  

not maintainable to challenge the acquisition proceedings.  

In that case one K.S. Narayan filed Original Suit No. 5371 of  

1989 in the Court of the City Civil Judge, Bangalore, praying  

that a decree for  permanent injunction be passed against  

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the  defendant  -  Bangalore  Development  Authority,  their  

agents and servants restraining them from interfering with  

the  plaintiff's  possession  and  enjoyment  of  the  plaint  

scheduled  property  and  from  demolishing  any  structure  

situate thereon.  The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff  

purchased the property in dispute bearing No. 46, situated in  

Banasawadi village, K.R. Pura Hobli, Bangalore, South Taluk  

from S. Narayana Gowda by means of a registered sale deed  

dated 17.06.1985.  The erstwhile owners of the property had  

obtained conversion certificate from the Tahsildar and the  

property is situated in a layout which is properly approved  

by  obtaining  conversion  for  non-agricultural  use  from the  

competent  authority.  The  plaintiff  applied  for  mutation  

entries and the same was granted in his favour. The property  

in dispute was not covered by any acquisition proceedings  

as neither notice of acquisition had been received nor any  

award  regarding  the  said  property  had  been  passed.  The  

defendant had no right, title or interest over the property but  

it was trying to dispossess the plaintiff from the same on the  

ground of alleged acquisition. The plaintiff issued a notice to  

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the defendant on 11.07.1989 calling upon it not to interfere  

with  his  possession  and  enjoyment  of  the  property  in  

dispute.   The  suit  was  contested  by  the  defendant  -  

Bangalore Development Authority on the ground  inter alia  

that  the  plaintiff  was  not  the  owner  of  the  property  in  

dispute.   S.  Narayana  Gowda,  who  is  alleged  to  have  

executed  the  sale  deed  in  favour  of  the  plaintiff  on  

17.06.1985, had no right, title or interest over the property  

in dispute and he could not have conveyed any title to the  

plaintiff. It was further pleaded that the disputed land had  

been acquired by the Bangalore Development Authority after  

issuing preliminary and final notifications in accordance with  

the  Bangalore  Development  Authority  Act  and  the  

possession had also been taken over and thereafter it was  

handed over to the engineering section on 22.06.1988 after  

completion of all formalities. The award for the land acquired  

had already been made and the compensation amount had  

been deposited in the civil court under Sections 30 and 31(2)  

of the Land Acquisition Act. It was specifically pleaded that it  

was the defendant - Bangalore Development Authority which  

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was in possession of the plaint scheduled property on the  

date of filing of the suit and, therefore, the suit for injunction  

filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable and was liable to  

be dismissed.

12) It  is  relevant to  note that  in  the above decision,  the  

acquisition proceedings in  question had been taken under  

the  Bangalore  Development  Authority  Act,  1976  and  the  

provisions of Sections 17 and 19 are somewhat similar to the  

provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,  

1894.  After noting out all the details, this Court allowed the  

appeals  and set  aside  the  decision  rendered by  the  High  

Court.   

13) It is clear that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete  

Code in  itself  and is  meant  to  serve  public  purpose.   By  

necessary  implication,  the  power  of  civil  Court  to  take  

cognizance  of  the  case  under  Section  9  of  CPC  stands  

excluded and a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the  

question of the validity or legality of the notification under  

Section  4,  declaration  under  Section  6  and  subsequent  

proceedings except by the High court in a proceeding under  

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Article 226 of the Constitution.  It is thus clear that the civil  

Court  is  devoid  of  jurisdiction  to  give  declaration  or  even  

bare  injunction  being  granted  on  the  invalidity  of  the  

procedure  contemplated  under  the  Act.   The  only  right  

available for the aggrieved person is to approach the High  

Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 136 with  

self imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary  

power.   

14) No  doubt,  in  the  case  on  hand,  the  plaintiffs  

approached the civil Court with a prayer only for permanent  

injunction restraining the defendant Nos. 1 and 2,i.e., BDA,  

their agents, servants and any one claiming through them  

from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment  

of the schedule property.  It is true that there is no challenge  

to  the  acquisition  proceedings.   However,  in  view  of  the  

assertion of the BDA, in their written statements, about the  

initiation of acquisition proceedings ending with the passing  

of  award,  handing over  possession and subsequent action  

etc.,  the  said  suit  is  not  maintainable.  This  was  rightly  

concluded by the trial Court.  For proper compensation, the  

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aggrieved parties are free to avail the statutory provisions  

and approach the court concerned.  All these aspects have  

been clearly noted by the trial Court and ultimately rightly  

dismissed the suit as not maintainable.  On the other hand,  

the learned Single Judge of the High Court though adverted  

to the principles laid down by this Court with reference to  

acquisition  of  land  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  and  

Section  9  of  CPC  committed  an  error  in  remanding  the  

matter  to  the trial  Court  on the ground that  the plaintiffs  

were not given opportunity to adduce evidence to show that  

their vendor was in possession which entitles them for grant  

of  permanent  injunction  from  evicting  them  from  the  

scheduled  property  without  due  process  of  law  by  the  

defendants.   In  the light  of  the specific  assertion coupled  

with materials in the written statement about the acquisition  

of land long ago and subsequent events, suit of any nature  

including bare injunction is not maintainable, hence, we are  

of the view that the High Court is not right in remitting the  

matter to the trial Court for fresh disposal.

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15) Having  regard  to  the  fact  that  the  acquisition  

proceedings had been completed way back in 1960-70, the  

plaintiffs who purchased the suit land in 1995 cannot have  

any  right  to  maintain  the  suit  of  this  nature  particularly,  

against defendant Nos. 1 and 2, namely, the BDA.  The High  

Court clearly erred in remanding the matter when the suit  

was not maintainable on the face of it.  The High Court failed  

to take note of the fact that even in the plaint itself,  the  

respondents herein/plaintiffs have stated that the suit land  

was acquired and yet they purchased the suit land in 1995  

and  undoubtedly  have  to  face  the  consequence.   The  

possession vests with the BDA way back in 1969 and 1978  

and  all  the  details  have  been  asserted  in  the  written  

statements, hence the remittal order cannot be sustained.  

16) In  the  light  of  the  above  discussion,  the  impugned  

judgment  dated  27.07.2005  passed  by  the  High  Court  in  

R.F.A. No. 947 of 2003 remitting the matter to the trial Court  

is set aside and the judgment dated 18.06.2003 of the trial  

Court in O.S. No. 4267 of 1996 is restored.  

17) The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.     

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...…………….…………………………J.              (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

 .….....…………………………………J.      (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)         

NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 08, 2013.  

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