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NON REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

I.A. NO. 7 OF 2014 IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1810 OF 2009

COLLECTOR OF LAND ACQUISITION & ORS. ……APPELLANTS

Vs.

M/S. ANDAMAN TIMBER INDUSTRIES      ……RESPONDENTS

WITH

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NOS.263 & 264 OF 2014

O R D E R

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.

     This I.A. No. 7 is filed by the appellants  

in  Civil  Appeal  No.  1810  of  2009,  which  was  

disposed  of  on  28.11.2013  by  this  Court.  The  

appellants have filed this application to modify  

the said order in the appeal and pass such other  

order or orders as this Court may deem fit and  

proper in the facts and circumstances of the case  

and urged certain relevant facts.        

2. The  learned Attorney  General of  India, Mr.

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Mukul  Rohatgi,  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

appellants  has  contended  that  the  land  bearing  

Survey  No.  22/3-23  measuring  8.86  hectares  in  

Shorepoint Village, Bambooflat, South Andaman, was  

recorded  as  Grant  in  favour  of  Krishi  Gopalan  

Shilpa Shikshalaya, Calcutta. Thereafter, it was  

allotted in favour of the respondent herein by way  

of  a  licence  deed  in  Form  -  AG-3,  which  was  

executed on 2.1.1990 by the Deputy Commissioner,  

Port Blair in exercise of his power under Clause  

(ii) of Section 146 of the Andaman and Nicobar  

Islands, Land Revenue and Land Reforms Regulation,  

1966  (for  short  “The  Regulation,  1966”)  for  

commercial  purpose,  subject  to  the  general  

provisions  of  the  said  Regulation  made  therein  

with certain conditions for a period of 30 years,  

which was effective from 1.1.1968. The relevant  

conditions in Clauses 6 and 7 of the Form AG-3,  

upon which strong reliance has been placed by the  

appellants which terms of the licence state that  

the  granting  authority  has  the  power  of  

cancellation or modification of the licence and it  

can resume forthwith the whole or part of the land

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under licence and in the event of cancellation or  

resumption  of  the  licence  as  aforesaid,  no  

compensation  shall  be  paid  to  the  licensee.  

Further, the licence is subject to the payment of  

premium  of  Rs.1,06,320/-.  Further,  reliance  was  

placed  upon  the  notifications  issued  under  

Sections 4(1) (2), 6(1), 7 and 17 (1) & (4) of The  

Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  (for  short  “the  

L.A.Act”), to show that, what was proposed to be  

acquired by the respondent were pieces and parcels  

of the land along with the trees and structure if  

any, standing thereon which are needed for public  

purpose  namely,  for  the  development  of  Port  

related facilities. The learned Attorney General  

further submits that the land was granted by way  

of licence to the respondent for the purpose of  

running the respondent’s timber industry, hence,  

he cannot be called as an interested person in  

terms of Section 3 (b) of the L.A. Act, as the  

land was granted in his favour as a licensee. It  

is further contended that under the provision of  

Section 146 clause (i) of the Regulation, 1966, a  

licence can be granted in favour of the licensee

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in respect of the government land for a maximum  

period not exceeding 30 years with an option for  

renewal for a like period i.e. upto 60 years, for  

the  purpose  of  cultivation  of  rubber  crop,  a  

longer  period  may  be  specified  by  the  Chief  

Commissioner with the approval of the Government.  

Reliance was also placed by him upon the provision  

of  Section  38(1)  of  the  Regulation,  1966  to  

substantiate the plea of the appellants that all  

the land in the Union Territory of Andaman and  

Nicobar  Islands  is  vested  absolutely  with  the  

Government,  save  as  provided  by  or  under  this  

Regulation,  no  person  shall  be  deemed  to  have  

acquired any property therein or any right to or  

over  the  same  by  occupation,  prescription  or  

conveyance  or  in  any  other  manner  whatsoever,  

except by a conveyance executed by or under the  

authority of the Government.  

3. Further, reliance was placed upon Section 141  

of the Regulation, 1966 which states that there  

shall be 4 types of classes of tenants namely,(i)  

Occupancy  tenants;  (ii)  Non-occupancy  tenants;  

(iii)  Grantees;  and  (iv)  Licensees  and  also

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Section  142  (a)  and  (b)  and  Section  143  which  

defines  different  kinds  of  occupancy  and  non-

occupancy tenants. Section 144(1) provides for the  

class  of  grantees.  Section  144(2)  is  a  non-

obstante clause, which provides that a person who,  

not being an occupancy or non-occupancy tenant, is  

in possession of any coconut or arecanut in the  

Nicobars, shall be deemed to be a grantee for the  

purpose of the Regulation, for such period as the  

Chief  Commissioner  may  by  notification  specify  

from time to time. Section 144 clauses (1) and (2)  

of  the  Regulation,  1966  clearly  state  that  the  

respondent  is  neither  a  tenure  holder  nor  a  

grantee but a licensee governed by the provision  

of Section 146 clauses (i) and (ii). Therefore,  

the respondent is not an “interested person” in  

terms of the definition of Section 3(b) of the  

L.A. Act to prefer a claim for compensation upon  

the land in question before the Land Acquisition  

Collector.  

4. Further, reliance was placed on behalf of the  

appellant  upon  the  award  No.5-39/LA/ADM/2002  

passed  on  26.9.2002  by  the  Land  Acquisition

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Collector, wherein a mistake had crept in, with  

relation  to  the  property  acquired  namely,  the  

building  and  the  trees  by  the  Union  Territory  

under the notification read with the provisions of  

Sections 17(4), 4 and 6 of the L.A Act. The Land  

Acquisition Collector wrongly referred to the land  

in respect of the licensee, as it was contrary to  

the acquisition notifications, particularly in the  

final notification, it is specifically mentioned  

in  express  terms  that  the  respondent  is  a  

licensee/tenant and not the owner of the land. The  

notification dated 23.07.2002, published under the  

provisions  of  Section  4(1)  of  the  L.A.  Act,  

expressly stated that the building structures, the  

trees and crops standing on the land mentioned in  

the  Schedule  including  Survey  Nos.  22/3  (6.91  

hectares) and 23 (1.95 hectares) which comes to a  

total  of  8.86  hectares,  are  classified  as  

commercial.  Therefore,  the  Land  Acquisition  

Collector erred in determining the market value of  

the  land  to  the  extent  of  a  portion  of  the  

property at Rs.3,03,03,567/-, the amount which is  

already paid to the respondent. Further, on the

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basis of the notifications referred to supra, a  

writ  of  mandamus  was  filed  by  the  respondent  

before the Circuit Bench of Calcutta High Court,  

at Port Blair, which was allowed by issuing a writ  

of mandamus as prayed by him. The writ appeal was  

preferred by the appellants against the judgment  

and order of the learned single Judge, which was  

dismissed on merits and the cross-objections filed  

by  the  respondent  in  the  said  writ  appeal  was  

allowed and the said judgment and order of the  

Division Bench of the High Court was affirmed by  

this  Court  in  the  aforesaid  civil  appeal  vide  

order dated 28.11.2013 by recording its reasons.  

This application is filed by the appellant with a  

view to modify the order for the reasons stated in  

the application. The legal contentions urged by  

the  learned  Attorney  General  on  behalf  of  the  

appellants, contending that the mistake committed  

by the Land Acquisition Collector in passing the  

award  which  is  contrary  to  the  acquisition  

notification, was neither brought to the notice of  

the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of  

High Court nor this Court, which is a mistake on

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the  part  of  the  appellants.  In  support  of  the  

above legal submissions, he has placed reliance  

upon the judgment of this Court in A.R. Antulay v.  

R.S.  Nayak  &  Anr.1,  wherein  this  Court  has  

succinctly laid down the law in support of the  

proposition that “an elementary rule of justice is  

that  no  party  should  suffer  by  mistake  of  the  

Court”.  Therefore,  the  present  application  has  

been  filed  by  the  appellants  to  see  that  the  

public  interest  shall  not  suffer  on  account  of  

mistake  committed  by  the  Land  Acquisition  

Collector, which relevant fact has been neither  

brought to the notice of the High Court nor this  

Court.  Therefore,  he  has  contended  that  

miscarriage  of  justice  has  taken  place  and  the  

same can be corrected by this Court by modifying  

the order as prayed in the application. He has  

also placed strong reliance upon the C.B.I. final  

report  no.1  dated  2.5.2008,  produced  with  the  

rejoinder  affidavit  filed  by  the  appellants  at  

paragraphs 27 and 28 wherein, the lack of original  

land records was stated as the reason due to which  

1  (1988) 2 SCC 602

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a decision for resumption of land could not be  

taken.  

5. It is stated in the report that it was not  

possible for the C.B.I to fix the responsibility  

and  establish  mala  fides/criminality  on  the  

officers, who have not pressed for resumption of  

the  land  for  cancellation  of  licence  of  the  

respondent in respect of the land involved in the  

proceedings. It is further stated in the report  

that during the course of investigation conducted  

by  the  CBI,  no  evidence  came  up  showing  the  

dishonesty on the part of the officials who dealt  

with the matter. Further, instead of resumption of  

land, during the period 1990 to 2002, the same  

method of awarding compensation had been followed  

in all the cases of acquisition, which indicated  

that the acquisition of the land in question by  

giving  substantial  compensation  was  more  of  a  

result of a systemic failure than any criminality  

or mala fides on the part of the concerned public  

servants,  who  have  processed  the  matter.  

Therefore,  the  learned  Attorney  General  submits  

that the prayer made in the application requires

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to be granted, otherwise a great miscarriage of  

justice  will  be  allowed  to  sustain  and  thereby  

public interest will be affected, if the judgment  

and order of issuing a writ of mandamus given to  

the appellants by the High Court in favour of the  

respondent is required to be complied with, which  

is in violation of the provisions of Section 38  

read  with  Section  146  (ii)  of  the  Regulation,  

1966, in respect of  the Government land, which is  

neither acquired nor could be acquired in law.  

6. The learned senior counsel, Dr. A.M. Singhvi,  

on behalf of the respondent has placed reliance  

upon the lease deed of land which was executed on  

1.9.1960,  stating  that  the  said  lease  is  a  

permanent  lease.  The  said  lease  deed  was  

registered  prior  to  the  Regulation,  1966  which  

came into force and therefore, the said Regulation  

is not applicable to the land involved in this  

case. Therefore, the respondent is an interested  

person upon the land in question in terms of the  

definition under Section 3(b) of the L.A. Act and  

reliance has been placed by him upon the judgment  

of this Court in the case of  Saraswati Devi  v.

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Delhi Development Authority & Ors.2,  and in the  

case   of  The  Special  Land  Acquisition  &  

Rehabilitation Officer  v. M.S. Sheshagiri Rao &  

Anr.3 In the case of Saraswati Devi (supra), this  

Court took notice of the facts with respect to the  

evacuee  property,  acquired  by  the  Central  

Government  under  Section  12  of  the  Displaced  

Persons  (Compensation  and  Rehabilitation)  Act,  

1954 (for short, “the Act, 1954”). On acquisition  

of  such  property  under  Section  12  of  the  Act,  

1954,  it  became  part  of  the  compensation  pool  

under Section 14 of the said Act in exercise of  

the power conferred under Section 20 of the Act,  

1954, upon the  managing officer or the managing  

corporation to  transfer  the  property  out  of  

the  compensation  pool.  The  above  property  was  

notified to be sold by way of public auction on  

21.6.1958. The husband of the appellant who bid  

Rs.24,500/- for the above said property, was the  

highest  bidder,  which  was  accepted  by  the  

Auctioning  Authority.  Sale  certificate  as  

contemplated under the provisions of the Displaced  

2   (2013) 3 SCC 571 3   (1968) 2 SCR 892

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Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules,  

1955 was issued and the same was registered with  

the  Sub-Registrar  on  15.7.1981.  Dr.  Singhvi,  

learned senior counsel placed strong reliance on  

paragraphs 44 & 45 of the above decision, wherein  

it is stated that on creation of an encumbrance,  

the subject property could be acquired under the  

Act, even though the ownership of the land vested  

with the Central Government. He has further relied  

upon the decision of this Court in the case of  

Delhi Administration v. Madan Lal Nangia & Ors.4,  

wherein  it  has  been  held  that  at  the  time  of  

acquisition of evacuee property under Section 12  

of the Act, 1954, the interest on such property  

vests  on  a  private  person,  under  the  Land  

Acquisition Act, even though the land is owned by  

the Government. He submits that the said case is  

aptly  applicable  to  the  fact  situation  of  the  

present  case  in  support  of  the  respondent.  

Therefore, the judgment and order is sought to be  

modified  by  the  appellants,  as  this  Court  has  

affirmed the orders of the learned single Judge  

4   (2003) 10 SCC 321

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and the Division Bench of the High Court in the  

writ appeal filed by the respondent by issuing a  

writ  of  mandamus  to  the  appellants  to  pay  

compensation  to  the  remaining  extent  of  5.22  

hectares of land acquired by the government under  

the notifications referred to supra, upon which  

reliance  was  placed  by  the  learned  Attorney  

General.  It was contended that the judgment and  

order sought to be modified are impermissible in  

law as there is no miscarriage of justice as urged  

by  the  learned  Attorney  General.  For  the  same  

proposition,  he  has  placed  reliance  upon  the  

judgment of this Court in  M.S. Sheshagiri Rao &  

Anr. (supra) wherein this Court has followed the  

case  of  Attorney  General  v. De  Keyser’s  Royal  

Hotel, Ltd.5 by the House of Lords wherein it is  

held that the Land Acquisition Act is the source  

of  power  for  divesting  the  claimants  of  their  

possession from their property and further the law  

enjoins the payment of compensation to them for  

the acquisition of their land under the provisions  

of  the  L.A.  Act.  The  process  by  which  the  

5  [1920] AC 508

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respondent  is  divested  of  the  land  involved  in  

this case is not permitted by the conditions of  

grant, but as provided by the provisions of the  

L.A. Act.

7. Further,  the  learned  senior  counsel  has  

placed reliance upon Order XL of the Supreme Court  

Rules, 1966, (for short, “The Rules, 1966”) which  

states that if any error is committed in the order  

by  this  Court,  the  procedure  required  to  be  

followed by the concerned party is that a review  

application is required to be filed and if the  

review  petition  is  not  allowed  on  the  grounds  

urged, then curative petition can be filed by the  

aggrieved party. It is further contended by him  

that as observed many a times by this Court, the  

applications  are  filed  by  the  parties  seeking  

clarification/ modification/ recall or rehearing,  

not  because  any  clarification/  modification  is  

found  necessary  but  because  the  applicant  in  

reality wants a review of the judgment and also  

wants  hearing,  by  avoiding  circulation  of  the  

review petition in the Chambers as provided under  

the Rules, 1966. Therefore, he has urged that the

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appellants  cannot  be  permitted  either  to  

circumvent or bypass the circulation procedure and  

indirectly obtain a hearing in open Court and get  

the judgment and order reviewed. This Court has  

held  time  and  again  that  what  cannot  be  done  

directly  should  not  be  allowed  to  be  done  

indirectly.  The  practice  of  the  litigants  to  

overcome the provisions by filing review petitions  

under  Order  XL  of  the  Rules,  1966  by  filing  

application  for  modification  and  clarification  

after hearing has to be deprecated. In support of  

this submission, the learned senior counsel has  

placed  reliance  upon  the  cases  Cine  Exhibition  

Pvt. Ltd.  v. Collector, District Gwalior & Ors.6  

(para  6) A.R.  Antulay (supra),  Delhi  

Administration  v. Gurdip  Singh Uban & Ors. Etc.7  

(para 17) and Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi &  

Ors.8 (paras 8,12-17), Sone Lal v. State of U.P.,9

(para 4). Therefore, the learned senior counsel on  

behalf  of  the  respondent  submits  that  the  

application  filed  by  the  appellants  is  not  

6   (2013) 2 SCC 698 7  (2000) 7 SCC 296 8  (2004) 12 SCC 713 9  (1982) 2 SCC 398

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maintainable,  hence  the  same  is  liable  to  be  

rejected.

8. With reference to the above said rival legal  

contentions, we have carefully perused each one of  

the rival legal submissions made by the learned  

Attorney  General,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  

General and the senior counsel on behalf of the  

parties  and  we  proceed  to  pass  the  following  

order.

9. The  submission  made  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent that if there is any error in law which  

is apparent on the face of the record, either on  

the facts or in law, the same can be corrected by  

following  the  procedure  as  contemplated  under  

Order  XL  of  the  Rules,  1966,  as  has  been  

considered by this Court in  Cine Exhibition Pvt.  

Ltd. (supra)  (para  6).  The  observations  made  

therein are required to be accepted and the legal  

principle laid down in that case with reference to  

Order XL of the Rules, 1966 shall be followed and  

the procedure laid down under the Rules cannot be  

dispensed with in this case.

10. Having said so, in view of the relevant legal

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aspects involved in this case, we have perused the  

licence deed of 2.1.1990, giving the right to the  

licensee  that  he  shall  utilize  the  land  under  

licence for the purpose for which it is granted  

with effect from 1.1.1968, particularly condition  

No. 6, which reads thus:

“6. If the licensee fails to observe  any condition specially mentioned in  the licence, or any provisions of the  Andaman  and  Nicobar  Islands  Land  Revenue  and  Land  Reforms  Regulation  or the rules made thereunder and in  force of the time being, the granting  authority, may cancel or modify the  licence  and  resume  forthwith  the  whole  or  part  of  the  land  under  licence. In the event of cancellation  or  resumption  of  the  licence  as  aforesaid,  no  compensation  shall  be  paid to the licensee.”

       (emphasis supplied)

11. The learned Attorney General on behalf of the  

appellants  has  rightly  placed  reliance  upon  

Section 38 of the Regulation, 1966, in support of  

the plea that the ownership of the land upon which  

the  building  and  any  other  structure  were  

existing, ownership of such land always, will be  

with the Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar  

Islands  and  is  absolutely  vested  with  the  

Government.

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12. Further, the licence right granted in favour  

of  the  respondent  under  Section  146  of  the  

Regulation,  1966,  is  valid  for  a  period  not  

exceeding 30 years with an option for a further  

extension  for  a  like  period  subject  to  the  

approval  of  the  Government.  Further,  the  

respondent  is  not  a  classified  licensee  either  

under  Section  141  or  Section  143  of  the  

Regulation, 1966.

13. But on the other hand, Section 143(a)and (b)  

of  the  said  Regulation,  clearly  state  that  a  

person  granted  licence  under  clause  (ii)  of  

Section 146 of the Regulation, with respect to any  

agricultural land is a licensee or a non occupancy  

tenant.  Therefore,  the  Condition  No.6  clearly  

states that the licence granted on the land by the  

Government can be cancelled and resumed by it. On  

careful perusal of the acquisition notifications,  

it is made very clear that acquisition is only in  

respect of buildings and structure existing on the  

land in respect of which licence right has been  

granted  in  favour  of  the  respondent  for  a  

specified period. These facts were not noticed by

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the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  at  the  time  of  

passing  of  the  award.  The  award  was  passed  in  

respect of the land, the buildings and structures  

which is not permissible in law and compensation  

of  Rs.3,03,03,567/-  awarded  in  favour  of  the  

respondent, for which he is not entitled to in  

law, is the legal ground urged on behalf of the  

appellants by highlighting  various provisions of  

the  Regulation,  1966,  along  with  the  licence  

granted in favour of the respondent. However, the  

said part of the award has been complied with by  

paying  the  compensation  amount  to  the  workmen  

working  in  the  factory  of  the  respondent  in  

pursuance  of  the  award  passed  by  the  Land  

Acquisition Collector though he is not entitled to  

the same as per law. The said fact was not brought  

to the notice of the Division Bench of the High  

Court  and  this  Court  at  the  time  of  hearing.  

Therefore,  the  learned  Attorney  General  has  

rightly contended that it is a mistake of fact. A  

factual mistake has been committed by this Court  

in  affirming  the  order  of  the  High  Court  in  

issuing a writ of mandamus to the appellants for

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its compliance by holding that the extent of land  

notified in the acquisition notifications are not  

passed because neither the acquisition proceedings  

of the land have lapsed nor the possession of the  

land  was  taken  by  the  Government  from  the  

respondent.  Therefore,  the  order  passed  by  the  

High  Court  for  issuing  a  writ  of  mandamus  for  

payment of the compensation to the respondent in  

respect of the land has also been affirmed by the  

Division Bench of the High Court and this Court in  

the civil appeal by passing the judgment and the  

same is sought to be modified by the appellants by  

filing the application.

14. The  procedure  prescribed  under  the  Rules,  

1966, for the purpose of review of the judgment  

and order of this Court on either facts or error  

in  law,  which  is  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  

record, has to be followed. Therefore, reliance  

placed  upon  the  judgment  of  this  Court  by  the  

learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent, in the case of  Cine Exhibition Pvt.  

Ltd.(supra) and  other  cases  in  support  of  his  

submissions  that  the  procedure  provided  under

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Order XL of The Rules,1966, shall be followed, the  

said cases referred to supra, viz.  Sone Lal(para  

4), Gurdip  Singh  Uban  &  Ors.  (para  17) and  

Savitri  Devi  (para  Nos.  12-17)  are  aptly  

applicable to the fact situation in support of the  

respondent.   

15. Having regard to the facts and circumstances  

of  the  case,  particularly  the  legal  statutory  

provisions of the Regulation and public interest  

involved in this case, the appellants are given  

liberty to file review petition within six weeks.  

If  such  review  petition  is  filed,  the  same  is  

required to be heard in open Court. When such a  

review petition is filed, the same may be placed  

before  the  Court  to  hear  the  parties  after  

obtaining necessary orders from the Hon’ble Chief  

Justice. The review petition may be disposed of on  

the merits of the case.

16.  With  the  above  observations  and  liberty  

given to the appellants for filing review petition  

along with condonation of delay application within  

six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this  

order, the application, along with the contempt

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petitions are disposed of in the above terms, but  

without costs.

     ……………………………………………………………J.                  [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

  ……………………………………………………………J.      [C. NAGAPPAN]

New Delhi, December 11, 2014

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ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment      COURT NO.11               SECTION XVI

              S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

I.A. No. 7 of 2014 in Civil Appeal  No(s).  1810/2009

COLLECTOR OF LAND ACQUISITION & ORS.               Appellant(s)

                               VERSUS

M/S. ANDAMAN TIMBER  INDUSTRIES                    Respondent(s)

WITH CONMT.PET.(C) No. 263/2014 In C.A. No. 1810/2009

CONMT.PET.(C) No. 264/2014 In C.A. No. 1810/2009   Date : 11/12/2014 These matters were called on for pronouncement of  JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s)    Ms. G. Indira,Adv.  Mr. K.V. Jagdishvadan, Adv.  Mr. Balasubramaniam, Adv.

                    Mr. D. S. Mahra,Adv.                                            M/s. O. P. Khaitan & Co.

                    Mr. Praveen Kumar,Adv.

For Respondent(s)    M/s. O. P. Khaitan & Co.

                    Mr. Praveen Kumar,Adv.                       

Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  V.Gopala  Gowda  pronounced  the  

judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr.  

Justice C. Nagappan.

The  appeal  along  with  the  application  and  contempt  

petitions  are  disposed  of  in  terms  of  the  signed  Non-

Reportable Judgment.  

   (VINOD KUMAR)    (MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

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(Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)