REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.10787-10788 OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P(C) No.32768-32769/2010)

Chief Information Commr. and Another       ...Appellant(s)

- Versus -

State of Manipur and Another  ...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These  appeals  have  been  filed  by  the  Chief  

Information  Commissioner,  Manipur  and  one  Mr.  

Wahangbam  Joykumar  impugning  the  judgment  dated  

29th July 2010 passed by the High Court in Writ  

Appeal Nos. 11 and 12 of 2008 in connection with  

two Writ Petition No.733 of 2007 and Writ Petition  1

No. 478 of 2007. The material facts giving rise to  

the controversy in this case can be summarized as  

follows:

3. Appellant  No.2  filed  an  application  dated  9th  

February, 2007 under Section 6 of the Right to  

Information Act (“Act”) for obtaining information  

from  the  State  Information  Officer  relating  to  

magisterial  enquiries  initiated  by  the  Govt.  of  

Manipur from 1980-2006. As the application under  

Section 6 received no response, appellant No. 2  

filed  a  complaint  under  Section  18  of  the  Act  

before the State Chief Information Commissioner,  

who  by  an  order  dated  30th May,  2007  directed  

respondent No. 2 to furnish the information within  

15 days. The said direction was challenged by the  

State by filing a Writ Petition.

4. The second complaint dated 19th May, 2007 was filed  

by  the  appellant  No.  2  on  19th May,  2007  for  

obtaining  similar  information  for  the  period  

between  1980  -  March  2007.  As  no  response  was  

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received  this  time  also,  appellant  No.  2  again  

filed a complaint under Section 18 and the same  

was disposed of by an order dated 14th August, 2007  

directing disclosure of the information sought for  

within 15 days. That order was also challenged by  

way of a Writ Petition by the respondents.

5. Both the Writ Petitions were heard together and  

were  dismissed  by  a  common  order  dated  16th  

November, 2007 by learned Single Judge of the High  

Court by  inter alia upholding the order of the  

Commissioner.  The  Writ  Appeal  came  to  be  filed  

against both the judgments and were disposed of by  

the impugned order dated 29th July 2010. By the  

impugned  order,  the  High  Court  held  that  under  

Section  18  of  the  Act  the  Commissioner  has  no  

power  to  direct  the  respondent  to  furnish  the  

information and further held that such a power has  

already been conferred under Section 19(8) of the  

Act on the basis of an exercise under Section 19  

only. The Division Bench further came to hold that  

the  direction  to  furnish  information  is  without  

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jurisdiction  and  directed  the  Commissioner  to  

dispose of the complaints in accordance with law.  

6. Before dealing with controversy in this case, let  

us consider the object and purpose of the Act and  

the  evolving  mosaic  of  jurisprudential  thinking  

which virtually led to its enactment in 2005.   

7. As  its  preamble  shows  the  Act  was  enacted  to  

promote  transparency  and  accountability  in  the  

working  of  every  public  authority  in  order  to  

strengthen  the  core  constitutional  values  of  a  

democratic  republic.  It  is  clear  that  the  

Parliament enacted the said Act keeping in mind  

the  rights  of  an  informed  citizenry  in  which  

transparency  of  information  is  vital  in  curbing  

corruption  and  making  the  Government  and  its  

instrumentalities accountable. The Act is meant to  

harmonise the conflicting interests of Government  

to  preserve  the  confidentiality  of  sensitive  

information with the right of citizens to know the  

functioning of the governmental process in such a  

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way  as  to  preserve  the  paramountcy  of  the  

democratic ideal.

8. The preamble would obviously show that the Act is  

based on the concept of an open society.

9. On the emerging concept of an ‘open Government’,  

about  more  than  three  decades  ago,  the  

Constitution Bench of this Court in  The State of  Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain & others – AIR 1975 SC  865 speaking through Justice Mathew held:

“…The people of this country have a right to  know every public act, everything, that is  done  in  a  public  way,  by  their  public  functionaries. They are entitled to know the  particulars of every public transaction in  all its bearing. The right to know, which is  derived  from  the  concept  of  freedom  of  speech,  though  not  absolute,  is  a  factor  which should make one wary, when secrecy is  claimed for transactions which can, at any  rate,  have  no  repercussion  on  public  security. … To cover with veil of secrecy,  the common routine business, is not in the  interest  of  the  public.  Such  secrecy  can  seldom be legitimately desired.”

(para 74, page 884)

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10. Another Constitution Bench in S.P.Gupta  & Ors. v.  President  of  India  and  Ors. (AIR  1982  SC  149)  relying on the ratio in Raj Narain (supra) held:

“…The concept of an open government is the  direct  emanation  from  the  right  to  know  which seems to be implicit in the right of  free speech and expression guaranteed under  Article 19(1)(a). Therefore,  disclosure  of  information in regard to the functioning of  Government must be the rule and secrecy an  exception justified only where the strictest  requirement of public interest so demands.  The  approach  of  the  court  must  be  to  attenuate the area of secrecy as much as  possible consistently with the requirement  of public interest, bearing in mind all the  time  that  disclosure  also  serves  an  important aspect of public interest…”

(para 66, page 234)

11. It  is,  therefore,  clear  from  the  ratio  in  the  

above decisions of the Constitution Bench of this  

Court  that  the  right  to  information,  which  is  

basically  founded  on  the  right  to  know,  is  an  

intrinsic part of the fundamental right to free  

speech  and  expression  guaranteed  under  Article  

19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The said Act was,  

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thus, enacted to consolidate the fundamental right  

of free speech.

12. In  Secretary,  Ministry  of  Information  &  Broadcasting, Govt. of India and Ors.  v. Cricket  Association of Bengal and Ors. – (1995) 2 SCC 161,  this  Court  also  held  that  right  to  acquire  

information and to disseminate it is an intrinsic  

component  of  freedom  of  speech  and  expression.  

(See para 43 page 213 of the report).

13. Again  in  Reliance  Petrochemicals  Ltd. v.  Proprietors  of  Indian  Express  Newspapers  Bombay  Pvt. Ltd. & others – (1988) 4 SCC 592 this Court  recognised  that  the  Right  to  Information  is  a  

fundamental  right  under  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution.

14. This  Court  speaking  through  Justice  Sabyasachi  

Mukharji, as His Lordship then was, held:

“…We must remember that the people at large  have a right to know in order to be able to  take part in a participatory development in  

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the industrial life and democracy. Right to  know is a basic right which citizens of a  free country aspire in the broader horizon  of the right to live in this age in our land  under Article 21 of our Constitution. That  right  has  reached  new  dimensions  and  urgency.  That  right  puts  greater  responsibility  upon  those  who  take  upon  themselves the responsibility to inform.”

  (para 34, page 613 of the report)

15. In People’s Union for Civil Liberties and Anr. v.  Union of India and Ors. – (2004) 2 SCC 476  this  Court  reiterated,  relying  on  the  aforesaid  

judgments, that right to information is a facet of  

the right to freedom of “speech and expression” as  

contained in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution  

of India and also held that right to information  

is definitely a fundamental right. In coming to  

this conclusion, this Court traced the origin of  

the said right from the Universal Declaration of  

Human  Rights,  1948  and  also  Article  19  of  the  

International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  

Rights, which was ratified by India in 1978. This  

Court  also  found  a  similar  enunciation  of  

principle  in  the  Declaration  of  European  

Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  

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(1950) and found that the spirit of the Universal  

Declaration of 1948 is echoed in Article 19(1)(a)  

of the Constitution. (See paras 45, 46 & 47 at  

page 495 of the report)

16. The exercise of judicial discretion in favour of  

free  speech  is  not  only  peculiar  to  our  

jurisprudence,  the  same  is  a  part  of  the  

jurisprudence  in  all  the  countries  which  are  

governed  by  rule  of  law  with  an  independent  

judiciary.  In  this  connection,  if  we  may  quote  

what Lord Acton said in one of his speeches:

“Everything  secret  degenerates,  even  the  administration of justice; nothing is safe  that  does  not  show  how  it  can  bear  discussion and publicity”

17. It  is,  therefore,  clear  that  a  society  which  

adopts  openness  as  a  value  of  overarching  

significance not only permits its citizens a wide  

range  of  freedom  of  expression,  it  also  goes  

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further  in  actually  opening  up  the  deliberative  

process of the Government itself to the sunlight  

of public scrutiny.

18. Justice Frankfurter also opined:

“The ultimate foundation of a free society  is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment.  Such a sentiment is fostered by all those  agencies of the mind and spirit which may  serve  to  gather  up  the  traditions  of  a  people,  transmit  them  from  generation  to  generation,  and  thereby  create  that  continuity of a treasured common life which  constitutes  a  civilization.   “We  live  by  symbols.”  The flag is the symbol of our  national  unity,  transcending  all  internal  differences,  however  large,  within  the  framework of the Constitution.”

19. Actually the concept of active liberty, which is  

structured  on  free  speech,  means  sharing  of  a  

nation’s  sovereign  authority  among  its  people.  

Sovereignty  involves  the  legitimacy  of  a  

governmental  action.  And  a  sharing  of  sovereign  

authority  suggests  intimate  correlation  between  

the functioning of the Government and common man’s  

knowledge of such functioning.

(Active Liberty by Stephen Breyer – page 15)

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20. However, while considering the width and sweep of  

this right as well as its fundamental importance  

in  a  democratic  republic,  this  Court  is  also  

conscious  that  such  a  right  is  subject  to  

reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) of the  

Constitution.

21. Thus  note  of  caution  has  been  sounded  by  this  

Court in Dinesh Trivedi, M.P. & Others v. Union of  India & others – (1997) 4 SCC 306 where it has  been held as follows:

“…Sunlight is the best disinfectant. But it is  equally important to be alive to the dangers  that lie ahead. It is important to realize that  undue  popular  pressure  brought  to  bear  on  decision  makers  in  Government  can  have  frightening side-effects. If every action taken  by the political or executive functionary is  transformed into a public controversy and made  subject  to  an  enquiry  to  soothe  popular  sentiments, it will undoubtedly have a chilling  effect  on  the  independence  of  the  decision  maker who may find it safer not to take any  decision.  It will paralyse the entire system  and bring it to a grinding halt. So we have two  conflicting situations almost enigmatic and we  think the answer is to maintain a fine balance  which would serve public interest.”

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(para 19, page 314)

22. The Act has six Chapters and two Schedules. Right  

to Information has been defined under Section 2(j)  

of the Act to mean as follows:

“(j) “right to information” means the right to  information accessible under this Act which is  held  by  or  under  the  control  of  any  public  authority and includes the right to-

(i) inspection of work, documents, records;

(ii)  taking  notes,  extracts,  or  certified  copies of documents or records;

(iii) taking certified samples of material;

(iv)  obtaining  information  in  the  form  of  diskettes, floppies, tapes, video cassettes or  in  any  other  electronic  mode  or  through  printouts where such information is stored in a  computer or in any other device;”

23. Right  to  Information  has  also  been  statutorily  

recognised under Section 3 of the Act as follows:

“3.  Right  to  information.- Subject  to  the  provisions of this Act, all citizens shall have  the right to information.”

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24. Section  6  in  this  connection  is  very  crucial.  

Under Section 6 a person, who desires to obtain  

any  information  under  this  Act,  shall  make  a  

request in writing or through electronic means in  

English or Hindi or in the official language of  

the area in which the application is being made,  

accompanying such fee as may be prescribed. Such  

request  may  be  made  to  the  Central  Public  

Information  Officer  or  State  Public  Information  

Officer, as the case may be, or to the Central  

Assistant  Public  Information  Officer  or  State  

Assistant  Public  Information  Officer.  In  making  

the said request the applicant is not required to  

give any reason for obtaining the information or  

any other personal details excepting those which  

are necessary for contacting him.

25. It is quite interesting to note that even though  

under Section 3 of the Act right of all citizens,  

to receive information, is statutorily recognised  

but Section 6 gives the said right to any person.  

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Therefore, Section 6, in a sense, is wider in its  

ambit than Section 3.

26. After such a request for information is made, the  

primary obligation of consideration of the request  

is of the Public Information Officer as provided  

under Section 7. Such request has to be disposed  

of  as  expeditiously  as  possible.   In  any  case  

within 30 days from the date of receipt of the  

request either the information shall be provided  

or the same may be rejected for any of the reasons  

provided under Sections 8 and 9. The proviso to  

Section 7 makes it clear that when it concerns the  

life or liberty of a person, the information shall  

be  provided  within  forty-eight  hours  of  the  

receipt of the request. Sub-section (2) of Section  

7  makes  it  clear  that  if  the  Central  Public  

Information  Officer  or  the  State  Public  

Information Officer, as the case may be, fails to  

give  the  information,  specified  in  sub-section  

(1), within a period of 30 days it shall be deemed  

that such request has been rejected. Sub-section  

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(3) of Section 7 provides for payment of further  

fees representing the cost of information to be  

paid by the person concerned. There are various  

sub-sections in Section 7 with which we are not  

concerned. However, Sub-section (8) of Section 7  

is important in connection with the present case.  

Sub-section (8) of Section 7 provides:

“(8) Where a request has been rejected under  sub-section (1), the Central Public Information  Officer or State Public Information Officer, as  the case may be shall communicate to the person  making the request,-

(i) The reasons for such rejection;  (ii)the  period  within  which  an  appeal  against such rejection may be preferred;  and  (iii)the  particulars  of  the  appellate  authority.   

27. Sections  8  and  9  enumerate  the  grounds  of  

exemption from disclosure of information and also  

grounds  for  rejection  of  request  in  respect  of  

some items of information respectively. Section 11  

deals with third party information with which we  

are not concerned in this case.  

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28. The question which falls for decision in this case  

is the jurisdiction, if any, of the Information  

Commissioner  under  Section  18  in  directing  

disclosure  of  information.  In  the  impugned  

judgment  of  the  Division  Bench,  the  High  Court  

held that the Chief Information Commissioner acted  

beyond  his  jurisdiction  by  passing  the  impugned  

decision dated 30th May, 2007 and 14th August, 2007.  

The Division Bench also held that under Section 18  

of the Act the State Information Commissioner is  

not empowered to pass a direction to the State  

Information Officer for furnishing the information  

sought for by the complainant.

29. If we look at Section 18 of the Act it appears  

that  the  powers  under  Section  18  have  been  

categorized under clauses (a) to (f) of Section  

18(1).  Under clauses (a) to (f) of Section 18(1)  

of the Act the Central Information Commission or  

the State Information Commission, as the case may  

be, may receive and inquire into complaint of any  

person  who  has  been  refused  access  to  any  

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information  requested  under  this  Act  [Section  

18(1)(b)] or has been given incomplete, misleading  

or  false  information  under  the  Act  [Section  

18(1)(e)] or has not been given a response to a  

request for information or access to information  

within  time  limits  specified  under  the  Act  

[Section  18(1)(c).   We  are  not  concerned  with  

provision of Section 18(1)(a) or 18(1)(d) of the  

Act.  Here  we  are  concerned  with  the  residuary  

provision  under  Section  18(1)(f)  of  the  Act.  

Under  Section  18(3)  of  the  Act  the  Central  

Information  Commission  or  State  Information  

Commission, as the case may be, while inquiring  

into  any  matter  in  this  Section  has  the  same  

powers as are vested in a civil court while trying  

a suit in respect of certain matters specified in  

Section 18(3)(a) to (f). Under Section 18(4) which  

is a non-obstante clause, the Central Information  

Commission or the State Information Commission, as  

the case may be, may examine any record to which  

the Act applies and which is under the control of  

the public authority and such records cannot be  

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withheld from it on any ground.   

30. It has been contended before us by the respondent  

that  under  Section  18  of  the  Act  the  Central  

Information  Commission  or  the  State  Information  

Commission has no power to provide access to the  

information which has been requested for by any  

person but which has been denied to him.  The only  

order  which  can  be  passed  by  the  Central  

Information  Commission  or  the  State  Information  

Commission, as the case may be, under Section 18  

is an order of penalty provided under Section 20.  

However,  before  such  order  is  passed  the  

Commissioner must be satisfied that the conduct of  

the Information Officer was not bona fide.   

31. We uphold the said contention and do not find any  

error in the impugned judgment of the High court  

whereby  it  has  been  held  that  the  Commissioner  

while entertaining a complaint under Section 18 of  

the said Act has no jurisdiction to pass an order  

providing for access to the information.   

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32. In  the  facts  of  the  case,  the  appellant  after  

having applied for information under Section 6 and  

then  not  having  received  any  reply  thereto,  it  

must  be  deemed  that  he  has  been  refused  the  

information.   The  said  situation  is  covered  by  

Section  7  of  the  Act.   The  remedy  for  such  a  

person  who  has  been  refused  the  information  is  

provided under Section 19 of the Act. A reading of  

Section 19(1) of the Act makes it clear.  Section  

19(1) of the Act is set out below:-

“19.  Appeal. -  (1) Any person who, does  not  receive  a  decision  within  the  time  specified in sub-section (1) or clause (a)  of  sub-section  (3)  of  section  7,  or  is  aggrieved  by  a  decision  of  the  Central  Public  Information  Officer  or  the  State  Public Information Officer, as the case may  be, may within thirty days from the expiry  of such period or from the receipt of such a  decision prefer an appeal to such officer  who is senior in rank to the Central Public  Information  Officer  or  the  State  Public  Information Officer as the case may be, in  each public authority:

Provided  that  such  officer  may  admit  the  appeal after the expiry of the period of  thirty days if he or she is satisfied that  the  appellant  was  prevented  by  sufficient  cause from filing the appeal in time.”

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33. A second appeal is also provided under sub-section  

(3) of Section 19.  Section 19(3) is also set out  

below:-

“(3) A second appeal against the decision  under  sub-section  (1)  shall  lie  within  ninety  days  from  the  date  on  which  the  decision  should  have  been  made  or  was  actually  received,  with  the  Central  Information  Commission  or  the  State  Information Commission:

Provided  that  the  Central  Information  Commission  or  the  State  Information  Commission, as the case may be, may admit  the appeal after the expiry of the period of  ninety  days  if  it  is  satisfied  that  the  appellant was prevented by sufficient cause  from filing the appeal in time."

34. Section  19(4)  deals  with  procedure  relating  to  

information of a third party. Sections 19(5) and  

19(6)  are  procedural  in  nature.  Under  Section  

19(8) the power of the Information Commission has  

been specifically mentioned.  Those powers are as  

follows:-

“19(8).  In  its  decision,  the  Central  Information Commission or State Information  Commission,  as  the  case  may  be,  has  the  power to,--

(a)  require  the  public  authority  to  take  any  such  steps  as  may  be  necessary  to  secure  

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compliance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  including--

(i) by providing access to information, if so  requested, in a particular form; (ii)  by  appointing  a  Central  Public  Information  Officer  or  State  Public  Information Officer, as the case may be; (iii)  by  publishing  certain  information  or  categories of information; (iv)  by  making  necessary  changes  to  its  practices  in  relation  to  the  maintenance,  management and destruction of records; (v) by enhancing the provision of training on  the right to information for its officials; (vi) by providing it with an annual report in  compliance with clause (b) of sub-section (1)  of section 4;

(b) require the public authority to compensate  the complainant for any loss or other detriment  suffered; (c) impose any of the penalties provided under  this Act; (d) reject the application.”

35. The procedure for hearing the appeals have been  

framed in exercise of power under clauses (e) and  

(f) of sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the Act.  

They are called the Central Information Commission  

(Appeal Procedure) Rules, 2005.  The procedure of  

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deciding the appeals is laid down in Rule 5 of the  

said  Rules.   

Therefore,  the  procedure  contemplated  under  

Section  18  and  Section  19  of  the  said  Act  is  

substantially different.  The nature of the power  

under  Section  18  is  supervisory  in  character  

whereas  the  procedure  under  Section  19  is  an  

appellate procedure and a person who is aggrieved  

by refusal in receiving the information which he  

has sought for can only seek redress in the manner  

provided in the statute, namely, by following the  

procedure  under  Section  19.  This  Court  is,  

therefore, of the opinion that Section 7 read with  

Section 19 provides a complete statutory mechanism  

to a person who is aggrieved by refusal to receive  

information.  Such  person  has  to  get  the  

information by following the aforesaid statutory  

provisions. The contention of the appellant that  

information can be accessed through Section 18 is  

contrary to the express provision of Section 19 of  

the Act. It is well known when a procedure is laid  

down statutorily and there is no challenge to the  

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said statutory procedure the Court should not, in  

the name of interpretation, lay down a procedure  

which  is  contrary  to  the  express  statutory  

provision.  It  is  a  time  honoured  principle  as  

early as from the decision in  Taylor v.  Taylor  [(1876) 1 Ch. D. 426] that where statute provides  

for something to be done in a particular manner it  

can be done in that manner alone and all other  

modes  of  performance  are  necessarily  forbidden.  

This principle has been followed by the Judicial  

Committee of the Privy Council in  Nazir Ahmad v.  Emperor [AIR  1936  PC  253(1)]  and  also  by  this  Court in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan – [AIR  1961 SC 1527, (para 9)] and also in State of U.P.  v.  Singhara  Singh reported  in  AIR  1964  SC  358  (para 8).   

36. This Court accepts the argument of the appellant  

that  any  other  construction  would  render  the  

provision  of  Section  19(8)  of  the  Act  totally  

redundant. It is one of the well known canons of  

interpretation  that  no  statute  should  be  

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interpreted in such a manner as to render a part  

of it redundant or surplusage.

37. We are of the view that Sections 18 and 19 of the  

Act serve two different purposes and lay down two  

different  procedures  and  they  provide  two  

different remedies.  One cannot be a substitute  

for the other.  

38. It may be that sometime in statute words are used  

by way of abundant caution. The same is not the  

position  here.  Here  a  completely  different  

procedure has been enacted under Section 19. If  

the interpretation advanced by the learned counsel  

for  the  respondent  is  accepted  in  that  case  

Section 19 will become unworkable and especially  

Section 19(8) will be rendered a surplusage. Such  

an  interpretation  is  totally  opposed  to  the  

fundamental canons of construction. Reference in  

this connection may be made to the decision of  

this Court in  Aswini Kumar Ghose and another v.  Arabinda Bose and another – AIR 1952 SC 369. At  

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page  377  of  the  report  Chief  Justice  Patanjali  

Sastri had laid down:

“It is not a sound principle of construction to  brush  aside  words  in  a  statute  as  being  inapposite  surplusage,  if  they  can  have  appropriate  application  in  circumstances  conceivably  within  the  contemplation  of  the  statute”.    

39. Same was the opinion of Justice Jagannadhadas in  

Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v.  State of  U.P. – AIR 1953 SC 394 at page 397:

“It  is  incumbent  on  the  court  to  avoid  a  construction, if reasonably permissible on the  language,  which  would  render  a  part  of  the  statute devoid of any meaning or application”.

40. Justice  Das  Gupta  in  J.K.  Cotton  Spinning  &  Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v.  State of Uttar Pradesh  and  others –  AIR  1961  SC  1170  at  page  1174  virtually  reiterated  the  same  principles  in  the  

following words:

“the courts always presume that the Legislature  inserted every part thereof for a purpose and  the legislative intention is that every part of  the statute should have effect”.  

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41. It  is  well-known  that  the  legislature  does  not  

waste  words  or  say  anything  in  vain  or  for  no  

purpose.  Thus  a  construction  which  leads  to  

redundancy of a portion of the statute cannot be  

accepted in the absence of compelling reasons. In  

the instant case there is no compelling reason to  

accept  the  construction  put  forward  by  the  

respondents.

42. Apart from that the procedure under Section 19 of  

the Act, when compared to Section 18, has several  

safeguards  for  protecting  the  interest  of  the  

person who has been refused the information he has  

sought.  Section 19(5), in this connection, may be  

referred  to.   Section  19(5)  puts  the  onus  to  

justify the denial of request on the information  

officer.  Therefore,  it  is  for  the  officer  to  

justify the denial. There is no such safeguard in  

Section 18. Apart from that the procedure under  

Section 19 is a time bound one but no limit is  

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prescribed under Section 18. So out of the two  

procedures, between Section 18 and Section 19, the  

one  under  Section  19  is  more  beneficial  to  a  

person who has been denied access to information.  

43. There is another aspect also. The procedure under  

Section 19 is an appellate procedure. A right of  

appeal is always a creature of statute. A right of  

appeal is a right of entering a superior forum for  

invoking  its  aid  and  interposition  to  correct  

errors  of  the  inferior  forum.  It  is  a  very  

valuable  right.  Therefore,  when  the  statute  

confers  such  a  right  of  appeal  that  must  be  

exercised by a person who is aggrieved by reason  

of refusal to be furnished with the information.  

In that view of the matter this Court does not  

find any error in the impugned judgment of the  

Division Bench.  In the penultimate paragraph the  

Division  Bench  has  directed  the  Information  

Commissioner, Manipur to dispose of the complaints  

of the respondent no.2 in accordance with law as  

expeditiously as possible.  

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44. This Court, therefore, directs the appellants to  

file  appeals  under  Section  19  of  the  Act  in  

respect  of  two  requests  by  them  for  obtaining  

information vide applications dated 9.2.2007 and  

19.5.2007  within  a  period  of  four  weeks  from  

today. If such an appeal is filed following the  

statutory  procedure  by  the  appellants,  the  same  

should be considered on merits by the appellate  

authority  without  insisting  on  the  period  of  

limitation.   

45. However,  one  aspect  is  still  required  to  be  

clarified.  This  Court  makes  it  clear  that  the  

notification  dated  15.10.2005  which  has  been  

brought on record by the learned counsel for the  

respondent vide I.A. No.1 of 2011 has been perused  

by the Court. By virtue of the said notification  

issued under Section 24 of the Act, the Government  

of Manipur has notified the exemption of certain  

organizations  of  the  State  Government  from  the  

purview of the said Act. This Court makes it clear  

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that  those  notifications  cannot  apply  

retrospectively.  Apart  from  that  the  same  

exemption does not cover allegations of corruption  

and  human  right  violations.  The  right  of  the  

respondents  to  get  the  information  in  question  

must be decided on the basis of the law as it  

stood on the date when the request was made. Such  

right  cannot  be  defeated  on  the  basis  of  a  

notification if issued subsequently to time when  

the controversy about the right to get information  

is pending before the Court. Section 24 of the Act  

does  not  have  any  retrospective  operation.  

Therefore, no notification issued in exercise of  

the  power  under  Section  24  can  be  given  

retrospective effect and especially so in view of  

the object and purpose of the Act which has an  

inherent human right content.   

46. The appeals which the respondents have been given  

liberty  to  file,  if  filed  within  the  time  

specified,  will  be  decided  in  accordance  with  

Section 19 of the Act and as early as possible,  

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preferably  within  three  months  of  their  filing.  

With  these  directions  both  the  appeals  are  

disposed of.

47. There will be no order as to costs.

.......................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

.......................J. New Delhi (GYAN SUDHA MISRA) December 12, 2011

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