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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1941    OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 15530 of 2013)

Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply  and Sewerage Board and others …  Appellants

Versus

T.T. Murali Babu        … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present appeal, by special leave, is directed  

against  the  judgment  and  order  dated  

22.11.2012  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  

Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 2531 of  

2012 whereby the Division Bench has affirmed

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the judgment and order dated 21.7.2011 in W.P.  

No.  25673  of  2007  whereunder  the  learned  

single Judge had allowed the writ petition, and  

after setting aside the punishment of dismissal,  

directed reinstatement  of  the respondent  with  

continuity of service but without back wages.    

3. Bereft  of  unnecessary  details,  the  expose’  of  

facts  that  have  been  undraped  are  that  the  

respondent  was  appointed  as  a  Surveyor  in  

Chennai  Metropolitan  Water  Supply  and  

Sewerage  Board  (for  short,  “CMWSSB”)  and  

subsequently  promoted  as  Junior  Engineer  in  

1989.   From  28.8.1995  he  remained  

continuously  absent  from  duty  without  any  

intimation to the employer and did not respond  

to the repeated memoranda/reminders requiring  

him to  explain  his  unauthorized absence from  

duty  and  to  rejoin  duty.   On  1.4.1997  he  

reported to duty with the medical certificate for  

his  absence  from  duty  for  the  period  

commencing 28.8.1995 to 31.3.1997.  As he had  

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already remained unauthorisedly absent and did  

not  respond  to  the  memos  by  offering  an  

explanation,  a  charge-sheet  had already  been  

issued  on  11.9.1996  under  the  Chennai  

Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board  

Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations,  

1978  (for  brevity  “the  Regulations”).   The  

charge memo contained two charges,  namely,  

that the respondent-herein had failed to submit  

an explanation to the first charge memo dated  

11.10.1995 inspite of reminders and second, he  

deserted his post by remaining unauthorisedly  

absent from duty from 28.8.1995, and thereby  

committed  misconduct  under  Regulations  6(1)  

and 6(2) respectively of the Regulations.   Be it  

noted,  though  the  charge  memo  was  duly  

acknowledged  by  the  respondent  on  

19.11.1996,  yet  he  chose  not  to  submit  his  

explanation till 6.1.1997, much after the charge-

sheet was issued.  

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4. As the factual  matrix  would  further  uncurtain,  

an  enquiry  was  conducted  against  the  

respondent and his explanation in the enquiry  

was that he could not attend to the duties and  

could  not  give  explanation to  the  first  charge  

memo because of ill health.  The enquiry officer  

found  charges  were  proved  and,  accordingly,  

submitted  the  enquiry  report  which  was  

accepted by the disciplinary authority and after  

following  the  due  procedure  punishment  of  

dismissal  was  passed  on  16.4.1998.   In  the  

order  of  dismissal  disciplinary  authority  

observed  that  belated  submission  of  medical  

certificate  on  1.4.1997  irresistibly  led  to  the  

conclusion  that  the  respondent  employee  was  

unauthorisedly  absent  from  28.8.1995.   A  

conclusion  was  also  arrived  at  that  the  first  

charge, namely, that he had not responded to  

the  letters  and  reminders,  also  stood  proved.  

Being  of  this  view,  the  disciplinary  authority  

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thought  it  apt  to  impose  the  punishment  of  

dismissal from service and he did so.   

5. On an appeal being preferred by the respondent  

the Board rejected the appeal dated 30.6.1998.  

Being dissatisfied by the order of dismissal and  

the  affirmation  thereof  in  appeal,  the  

respondent preferred W.P. No. 15272 of 1998.  

The  learned  Single  Judge,  by  order  dated  

12.3.2003,  directed  re-consideration  of  the  

appeal solely on the ground that the Managing  

Director who was the disciplinary authority had  

taken  part  in  the  proceedings  of  the  Board  

which decided the appeal.  After the said order  

came to be passed, the matter was again placed  

before  the  Board  and  the  appellate  authority,  

considering  the  enquiry  report,  the  evidence  

brought  on  record  and  after  due  discussion,  

affirmed the order of disciplinary authority and  

consequently dismissed the appeal on 1.7.2003.  

6. The grievance of re-affirmation of the order of  

dismissal  was  agitated  by  the  respondent  in  

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W.P. No. 25673 of 2007 which was preferred on  

7.7.2007.   The appellant-Board in the counter  

affidavit,  defending  the  order  of  dismissal,  

stated  that  the  only  reason  given  by  the  

employee  was  that  he  could  not  attend  the  

duties as he was availing continuous treatment  

for tuberculosis and, further,  he also met with  

an  accident  in  September  1995  which  was  

unacceptable.  In addition, it was stated in the  

counter  affidavit  that  bunch  of  medical  

certificates  was produced by him on 1.4.1997  

which  mentioned  that  he  was  suffering  from  

depressive psychosis  and bronchitis  and there  

was no mention about any accident and injury  

sustained  by  him  in  September  1995  and  

treatment availed by him.  

7. The  learned  Single  Judge,  by  the  impugned  

judgment,  after  narrating the facts,  noted the  

statement  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondent  that  even  if  the  employee  had  

absented  from  duty,  there  was  no  past  

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misconduct of desertion/absence and, therefore,  

the punishment of dismissal from service for the  

first  time  desertion/absenteeism  is  too  harsh  

and  disproportionate  and  deserved  to  be  

interfered with.   The learned Single  Judge did  

not advert to any other facet and referred to the  

decisions  in  Shri Bhagwan  Lal  Arya  v.  

Commissioner  of  Police,  Delhi1,  B.  C.  

Chaturvedi v. Union of India2, V. Ramana v.  

A.P.  SRTC3,  Jagdish  Singh  v.  Punjab  

Engineering  College4 and  Division  Bench  

judgment in  V. Senthurvelan v. High Court  

of Judicature at Madras5 and opined thus:-

“10. Applying the said judgment to the fact  of  this  case  and  considering  the  counter  filed by the respondents wherein it  is  not  stated  as  to  whether  the  petitioner  has  deserted  /  absented  on  any  previous  occasion, this Court is of the view that this  writ petition deserves to be allowed.  

11. This  writ  petition  is  allowed  with  a  direction  to  the  respondent  to  reinstate  petitioner  with  continuity  of  service  but  without backwage, within a period of  four  

1 (2004) 4 SCC 560  2 (1995) 6 SCC 749  3 (2005) 7 SCC 338  4 (2009) 7 SCC 301 5 (2009) 7 MLJ 1231

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weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of  this order.”  

8. Grieved  by  the  aforesaid  order  the  CMWSSB  

preferred Writ Appeal No. 2531 of 2012 and the  

Division Bench accepted the conclusion of the  

learned single Judge by stating thus: -

“It  is  not in dispute that the respondent/  writ petitioner was unwell during the said  period,  though  there  might  have  been  some  discrepancies  in  the  date  of  the  certificate  issued,  it  has  not  been  controverted  by  the  appellant  that  the  respondent/writ  petitioner  was  suffering  from depressive psychosis and bronchitis.  That  apart  it  has  also not  been disputed  that  the  respondent/  writ  petitioner  had  not suffered any earlier punishment while  in the services of the appellant Board from  the date of his appointment.  Therefore, in  such circumstances, it would be very harsh  and  unreasonable  to  impose  the  punishment  of  removal  from  service  for  the  charge  of  unauthorized  absence,  as  such  punishment  is  awarded  for  acts  of  grave  nature  or  as  cumulative  effect  of  continued  misconduct  or  for  such  other  reasons,  where  the  charges  are  very  serious  and  in  case  where  charge  of  corruption had been proved.  Admittedly,  there has been no such allegation against  the  respondent/writ  petitioner.   Further,  the  learned  single  Judge  while  setting  aside the order of dismissal from service,  rightly  denied  back  wages  to  the  respondent/writ  petitioner  as  the  respondent/writ  petitioner  failed  to  discharge duty during the relevant period.”

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[Underlining is ours]

9. We  have  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

parties  and  perused  the  material  brought  on  

record.

10. On a keen scrutiny of the decision rendered by  

the learned single Judge as well as that of the  

Division  Bench  it  is  clearly  demonstrable  that  

there has been no advertence with regard to the  

issue whether the charges levelled against the  

respondent  had  been  proved  or  not.   It  is  

manifest that there had been no argument on  

the said score before the writ court or in intra-

court appeal and hence, we are obliged to state  

that the only aspect which was really proponed  

before the High Court pertains to the nature of  

charges  and  proportionality  of  punishment.  

Therefore,  we  shall  confine  our  analysis  with  

regard  to  said  limited  sphere  and  an  added  

facet  which  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant has emphatically urged before us, that  

is,  the belated approach by the respondent in  

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invoking  the  extraordinary  jurisdiction  of  the  

High Court.  

11. The  charges  that  were  levelled  against  the  

respondent-employee read as follows: -

“CHARGE NO. 1:

That  he  has  failed  to  offer  his  explanation  to  this  office  Memo  dated  11.10.95  in  spite  of  reminders  thereon  dated 20.01.96 and 23.04.96 which clearly  shows  his  disobedience  to  the  order  of  superior  and  it  amounts  to  misconduct  under Regulation 6(1) of the MMWSS Board  Employees  (Discipline  and  Appeal)  Regulations 1978.

CHARGE NO. 2:

That  he has deserted the post  from  28.08.95  onwards  and  remains  unauthorisedly  absent  from  duty  which  amounts  to  misconduct  under  Regulation  6(2)  of  the  MMWSS  Board  Employees  (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations 1978.”

12. It is not in dispute that the Inquiry Officer found  

that  both the charges had been proved.   The  

disciplinary authority had ascribed reasons and  

passed an order of dismissal from service.  On a  

perusal of the order of dismissal it is vivid that  

the medical certificate was belatedly submitted  

and  he  had  remained  unauthorisedly  absent  

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from 28.08.1995.   The question  that  arises  is  

when the charges of unauthorized absence for a  

long period had been proven, was it justified on  

the part of the High Court to take resort to the  

doctrine  of  proportionality  and  direct  

reinstatement  in  service.   That  apart,  one  

aspect which has not at all been addressed to  

by  the  High  Court  is  that  the  respondent  

invoked  the  extraordinary  jurisdiction  of  the  

High Court after four years.

13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay.  In  

Maharashtra  State  Road  Transport  

Corporation  v.  Balwant  Regular  Motor  

Service,  Amravati  and  others6 the  Court  

referred to the principle that has been stated by  

Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co.  

v.  Prosper  Armstrong  Hurd,  Abram  

Farewall,  and  John  Kemp7,  which  is  as  

follows: -

6 AIR 1969 SC 329 7 (1874) 5 PC 221

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“Now the doctrine of  laches in  Courts  of  Equity  is  not  an  arbitrary  or  a  technical  doctrine.   Where  it  would  be  practically  unjust  to  give  a  remedy,  either  because  the party has,  by his  conduct,  done that  which  might  fairly  be  regarded  as  equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his  conduct  and  neglect  he  has,  though  perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put  the other  party in  a situation in  which it  would not be reasonable to place him if the  remedy were afterwards to be asserted in  either  of  these  cases,  lapse  of  time  and  delay  are  most  material.   But  in  every  case, if an argument against relief, which  otherwise would be just,  is founded upon  mere  delay,  that  delay  of  course  not  amounting  to  a  bar  by  any  statute  of  limitations,  the  validity  of  that  defence  must be tried upon principles substantially  equitable.   Two  circumstances,  always  important in such cases, are, the length of  the delay and the nature of the acts done  during  the  interval,  which  might  affect  either party and cause a balance of justice  or injustice in taking the one course or the  other, so far as relates to the remedy.”

14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar8, while  

dealing with exercise of power of the High Court  

under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court  

observed  that  power  of  the  High  Court  to  be  

exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution,  

if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious  

and reasonable, admits of no controversy.  It is  

8 (1995) 4 SCC 683

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for that reason, a person’s entitlement for relief  

from  a  High  Court  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution, be it against the State or anybody  

else,  even  if  is  founded  on  the  allegation  of  

infringement  of  his  legal  right,  has  to  

necessarily  depend  upon  unblameworthy  

conduct  of  the  person  seeking  relief,  and the  

court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to  

such person in exercise of such power, when he  

approaches  it  with  unclean  hands  or  

blameworthy conduct.

15. In  State  of  M.P.  and  others  etc.  etc.  v.  

Nandlal  Jaiswal  and  others  etc.  etc.9 the  

Court observed that it is well settled that power  

of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ  

under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  is  

discretionary and the High Court in exercise of  

its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy  

and  the  indolent  or  the  acquiescent  and  the  

lethargic.  It has been further stated therein that  

9 AIR 1987 SC 251

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if  there is  inordinate delay on the part  of  the  

petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is  

not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may  

decline  to  intervene  and  grant  relief  in  the  

exercise of its writ  jurisdiction.  Emphasis was  

laid on the principle of delay and laches stating  

that resort  to the extraordinary remedy under  

the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to  

cause confusion and public inconvenience and  

bring in injustice.   

16. Thus,  the doctrine of  delay and laches should  

not  be  lightly  brushed  aside.   A  writ  court  is  

required to weigh the explanation offered and  

the acceptability of the same.  The court should  

bear  in  mind  that  it  is  exercising  an  

extraordinary  and equitable  jurisdiction.   As  a  

constitutional court it has a duty to protect the  

rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to  

keep  itself  alive  to  the  primary  principle  that  

when  an  aggrieved  person,  without  adequate  

reason, approaches the court at his own leisure  

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or  pleasure,  the  Court  would  be  under  legal  

obligation  to  scrutinize  whether  the  lis  at  a  

belated stage should be entertained or not.  Be  

it noted, delay comes in the way of equity.  In  

certain circumstances delay and laches may not  

be  fatal  but  in  most  circumstances  inordinate  

delay would only invite disaster for the litigant  

who knocks at  the doors of  the Court.   Delay  

reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a  

litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic  

norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest  

thief of time” and second, law does not permit  

one to sleep and rise like a phoenix.  Delay does  

bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.  In  

the case at hand, though there has been four  

years’  delay in approaching the court,  yet the  

writ court chose not to address the same.  It is  

the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such  

enormous  delay  is  to  be  ignored  without  any  

justification.   That  apart,  in  the  present  case,  

such belated approach gains more significance  

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as  the  respondent-employee  being  absolutely  

careless  to  his  duty  and  nurturing  a  

lackadaisical  attitude to  the  responsibility  had  

remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext  

of some kind of ill health.  We repeat at the cost  

of  repetition  that  remaining  innocuously  

oblivious  to  such  delay  does  not  foster  the  

cause of justice.  On the contrary, it brings in  

injustice, for it  is likely to affect others.   Such  

delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights  

and  may  unnecessarily  drag  others  into  

litigation  which  in  acceptable  realm  of  

probability,  may  have  been  treated  to  have  

attained finality.  A court is not expected to give  

indulgence  to  such  indolent  persons  -  who  

compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter  

‘Rip  Van  Winkle’.   In  our  considered  opinion,  

such  delay  does  not  deserve  any  indulgence  

and  on  the  said  ground  alone  the  writ  court  

should  have  thrown the  petition  overboard  at  

the very threshold.

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17. Having  dealt  with  the  doctrine  of  delay  and  

laches, we shall presently proceed to deal with  

the doctrine of proportionality which has been  

taken  recourse  to  by  the  High  Court  regard  

being had to the obtaining factual matrix.  We  

think  it  appropriate  to  refer  to  some  of  the  

authorities  which  have  been  placed  reliance  

upon by the High Court.

18. In  Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya (supra) this Court  

opined that the unauthorized absence was not a  

grave  misconduct  inasmuch  as  the  employee  

had  proceeded  on  leave  under  compulsion  

because of his grave condition of health.  Be it  

noted,  in  the  said  case,  it  has  also  been  

observed  that  no  reasonable  disciplinary  

authority  would  term  absence  on  medical  

grounds  with  proper  medical  certificate  from  

Government doctors as a grave misconduct.   

19. In Jagdish Singh (supra) the Court took note of  

the  fact  that  the  appellant  therein  was  a  

sweeper and had remained absent on four spells  

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totalling to fifteen days in all in two months.  In  

that context, the Court observed thus: -

“The instant case is not a case of habitual  absenteeism.   The  appellant  seems  to  have a good track record from the date he  joined service as a sweeper.   In his long  career of service, he remained absent for  fifteen  days  on  four  occasions  in  the  months of February and March 2004.  This  was primarily to sort out the problem of his  daughter  with  her  in-laws.   The  filial  bondage  and  the  emotional  attachment  might have come in his way to apply and  obtain  leave  from  the  employer.   The  misconduct  that  is  alleged,  in  our  view,  would  definitely  amount  to  violation  of  discipline that is expected of an employee  to maintain in the establishment, but may  not fit into the category of gross violation  of discipline.  We hasten to add, if it were  to be habitual absenteeism, we would not  have ventured to entertain this appeal.”

20. If both the decisions are appositely understood,  

two aspects clearly emerge.  In Shri Bhagwan  

Lal  Arya  (supra),  the  Court  took  note  of  the  

fact,  that  is,  production  of  proper  medical  

certificate  from a  Government  medical  doctor  

and opined about the nature of misconduct and  

in Jagdish Singh (supra) the period of absence,  

status of the employee and his track record and  

the explanation offered by him.  In the case at  

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hand, the factual score being different, to which  

we  shall  later  on  advert,  the  aforesaid  

authorities do not really assist the respondent.

21. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  has  

commended us to the decision in Krushnakant  

B. Parmar  v.  Union of India and another10  

to  highlight  that  in  the  absence  of  a  finding  

returned by the Inquiry Officer or determination  

by  the  disciplinary  authority  that  the  

unauthorized  absence  was  willful,  the  charge  

could not be treated to have been proved.  To  

appreciate  the  said  submission  we  have  

carefully perused the said authority.  In the said  

case, the question arose whether “unauthorized  

absence from duty” did tantamount to “failure  

of devotion to duty” or “behavior unbecoming of  

a  Government  servant”  inasmuch  as  the  

appellant therein was charge-sheeted for failure  

to maintain devotion to duty and his behavior  

was  unbecoming  of  a  Government  servant.  

10 (2012) 3 SCC 178

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After  adverting  to  the  rule  position  the  two-

Judge Bench expressed thus: -

“16. In the case of the appellant referring  to  unauthorized  absence  the  disciplinary  authority alleged that he failed to maintain  devotion  to  duty  and  his  behavior  was  unbecoming of a government servant.  The  question  whether  “unauthorized  absence  from duty” amounts to failure of devotion  to  duty  or  behavior  unbecoming  of  a  government  servant  cannot  be  decided  without  deciding  the  question  whether  absence is willful or because of compelling  circumstances.

17. If  the  absence  is  the  result  of  compelling  circumstances  under  which  it  was not possible to report or perform duty,  such absence cannot be held to be willful.  Absence from duty without any application  or  prior  permission  may  amount  to  unauthorized  absence,  but  it  does  not  always  mean  willful.   There  may  be  different  eventualities  due  to  which  an  employee  may  abstain  from  duty,  including  compelling  circumstances  beyond  his  control  like  illness,  accident,  hospitalization, etc.,  but in such case the  employee cannot be held guilty of failure  of  devotion  to  duty  or  behavior  unbecoming of a government servant.

18. In  a  departmental  proceeding,  if  allegation  of  unauthorized  absence  from  duty is made, the disciplinary authority is  required  to  prove  that  the  absence  is  willful, in the absence of such finding, the  absence will not amount to misconduct.”  

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22. We have quoted in extenso as we are disposed  

to think that the Court has, while dealing with  

the  charge  of  failure  of  devotion  to  duty  or  

behavior unbecoming of a Government servant,  

expressed the aforestated view and further the  

learned Judges have also opined that there may  

be compelling circumstances which are beyond  

the  control  of  an  employee.   That  apart,  the  

facts  in  the  said  case  were  different  as  the  

appellant on certain occasions was prevented to  

sign  the  attendance register  and the  absence  

was intermittent.  Quite apart from that, it has  

been stated therein that it is obligatory on the  

part of the disciplinary authority to come to a  

conclusion that  the absence is  willful.   On  an  

apposite understanding of the judgment we are  

of  the opinion that  the view expressed in  the  

said case has to be restricted to the facts of the  

said case regard being had to the rule position,  

the  nature  of  the  charge  levelled  against  the  

employee and the material  that  had come on  

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record during the enquiry.  It cannot be stated  

as an absolute proposition in law that whenever  

there  is  a  long  unauthorized  absence,  it  is  

obligatory  on  the  part  of  the  disciplinary  

authority  to  record  a  finding  that  the  said  

absence is willful even if the employee fails to  

show the  compelling  circumstances  to  remain  

absent.

23. In this context, it is seemly to refer to certain  

other  authorities  relating  to  unauthorized  

absence and the view expressed by this Court.  

In  State of Punjab  v.  Dr. P.L.  Singla11 the  

Court,  dealing with unauthorized absence,  has  

stated thus: -

“Unauthorised  absence  (or  overstaying  leave), is an act of indiscipline.  Whenever  there  is  an  unauthorized  absence  by  an  employee,  two  courses  are  open  to  the  employer.   The  first  is  to  condone  the  unauthorized  absence  by  accepting  the  explanation and sanctioning leave for the  period  of  the  unauthorized  absence  in  which  event  the  misconduct  stood  condoned.   The  second  is  to  treat  the  unauthorized  absence  as  a  misconduct,  

11 (2008) 8 SCC 469

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hold an enquiry and impose a punishment  for the misconduct.”

24. Again,  while  dealing  with  the  concept  of  

punishment the Court ruled as follows: -

“Where  the  employee  who  is  unauthorisedly  absent  does  not  report  back  to  duty  and  offer  any  satisfactory  explanation,  or  where  the  explanation  offered  by  the  employee  is  not  satisfactory,  the  employer  will  take  recourse to disciplinary action in regard to  the  unauthorized  absence.   Such  disciplinary  proceedings  may  lead  to  imposition  of  punishment  ranging  from a  major  penalty  like  dismissal  or  removal  from  service  to  a  minor  penalty  like  withholding  of  increments  without  cumulative effect.   The extent of penalty  will depend upon the nature of service, the  position held by the employee, the period  of absence and the cause/explanation for  the absence.”

25. In  Tushar D. Bhatt  v.  State of Gujarat and  

another12, the appellant therein had remained  

unauthorisedly absent for a period of six months  

and further had also written threatening letters  

and conducted some other acts of misconduct.  

Eventually, the employee was visited with order  

of dismissal and the High Court had given the  

stamp of approval to the same.  Commenting on  12 (2009) 11 SCC 678

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the conduct  of  the appellant  the Court  stated  

that  he  was  not  justified  in  remaining  

unauthorisedly  absent  from  official  duty  for  

more than six months because in the interest of  

discipline of any institution or organization such  

an  approach  and  attitude  of  the  employee  

cannot be countenanced.

26. Thus,  the  unauthorized  absence  by  an  

employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a  

straight-jacket  formula  for  imposition  of  

punishment.  It will depend upon many a factor  

as  has  been  laid  down  in  Dr.  P.L.  Singla  

(supra).

27. Presently,  we  shall  proceed  to  scrutinize  

whether the High Court is justified in applying  

the  doctrine  of  proportionality.   Doctrine  of  

proportionality  in  the  context  of  imposition  of  

punishment in service law gets attracted when  

the court on the analysis of material brought on  

record  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the  

punishment  imposed  by  the  Disciplinary  

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Authority or the appellate authority shocks the  

conscience  of  the  court.   In  this  regard  a  

passage  from  Indian  Oil  Corporation  Ltd.  

and  another  v.  Ashok  Kumar  Arora13  is  

worth reproducing: -

“At the outset,  it  needs to be mentioned  that  the  High  Court  in  such  cases  of  departmental  enquiries  and  the  findings  recorded  therein  does  not  exercise  the  powers  of  appellate  court/authority.   The  jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases  is  very  limited  for  instance  where  it  is  found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated  because of non-observance of principles of  natural  justice,  denial  of  reasonable  opportunity;  findings  are  based  on  no  evidence, and/or the punishment is totally  disproportionate to the proved misconduct  of an employee.”

28. In  Union  of  India  and  another  v.  G.  

Ganayutham14,  the  Court  analysed  the  

conception  of  proportionality  in  administrative  

law  in  England  and  India  and  thereafter  

addressed itself with regard to the punishment  

in  disciplinary  matters  and opined that  unless  

the  court/tribunal  opines  in  its  secondary  role  

that  the  administrator  was,  on  the  material  13 (1997) 3 SCC 72 14 (1997) 7 SCC 463

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before him, irrational according to  Associated  

Provincial  Picture  Houses  Ltd.  v.  

Wednesbury  Corpn.15 and  Council  of  Civil   

Service  Unions  v.  Minister  for  Civil  

Service16 norms,  the  punishment  cannot  be  

quashed.

29. In  Chairman-cum-Managing  Director,  Coal  

India Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar  

Choudhuri  and  others17,  the  Court,  after  

analyzing  the  doctrine  of  proportionality  at  

length, ruled thus: -

“19. The  doctrine  of  proportionality  is,  thus,  well-recognised  concept  of  judicial  review  in  our  jurisprudence.   What  is  otherwise within the discretionary domain  and sole  power  of  the  decision-maker  to  quantify  punishment  once  the  charge  of  misconduct  stands  proved,  such  discretionary power is exposed to judicial  intervention if exercised in a manner which  is out of proportion to the fault.  Award of  punishment which is  grossly in excess to  the allegations cannot claim immunity and  remains  open  for  interference  under  limited scope of judicial review.

15 (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 16 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 17 (2009) 15 SCC 620

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20. One of the tests to be applied while  dealing  with  the  question  of  quantum of  punishment  would  be:  would  any  reasonable  employer  have  imposed  such  punishment  in  like  circumstances?  Obviously,  a  reasonable  employer  is  expected  to  take  into  consideration  measure,  magnitude  and  degree  of  misconduct  and  all  other  relevant  circumstances  and  exclude  irrelevant  matters before imposing punishment.

21. In a case like the present one where  the  misconduct  of  the  delinquent  was  unauthorized  absence  from  duty  for  six  months  but  upon  being  charged  of  such  misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and  explained  the  reason  for  his  absence  by  stating that he did not have intention nor  desired  to  disobey  the  order  of  higher  authority or violate any of the Company’s  rules and regulations but the reason was  purely  personal  and  beyond  his  control  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  sent  his  resignation  which  was  not  accepted,  the  order  of  removal  cannot  be  held  to  be  justified,  since  in  our  judgment,  no  reasonable employer would have imposed  extreme  punishment  of  removal  in  like  circumstances.  The punishment is not only  unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the  allegations.”

30. After so stating the two-Judge Bench proceeded  

to say that one of the tests to be applied while  

dealing  with  the  question  of  quantum  of  

punishment  is  whether  any  reasonable  

employer would have imposed such punishment  

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in  like circumstances taking into consideration  

the major, magnitude and degree of misconduct  

and  all  other  relevant  circumstances  after  

excluding  irrelevant  matters  before  imposing  

punishment.  It is apt to note here that in the  

said  case  the  respondent  had  remained  

unauthorisedly absent from duty for six months  

and  admitted  his  guilt  and  explained  the  

reasons  for  his  absence  by  stating  that  he  

neither had any intention nor desire to disobey  

the order of superior authority or violated any of  

the  rules  or  regulations  but  the  reason  was  

purely personal and beyond his control.  Regard  

being had to the obtaining factual  matrix,  the  

Court  interfered  with  the  punishment  on  the  

ground  of  proportionality.   The  facts  in  the  

present case are quite different.  As has been  

seen from the analysis made by the High Court,  

it  has  given  emphasis  on  past  misconduct  of  

absence and first time desertion and thereafter  

proceeded  to  apply  the  doctrine  of  

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proportionality.   The  aforesaid  approach  is  

obviously  incorrect.   It  is  telltale  that  the  

respondent  had  remained  absent  for  a  

considerable length of time.  He had exhibited  

adamantine  attitude  in  not  responding  to  the  

communications  from  the  employer  while  he  

was unauthorisedly absent.   As it  appears,  he  

has chosen his way, possibly nurturing the idea  

that  he  can  remain  absent  for  any  length  of  

time, apply for grant of leave at any time and  

also knock at the doors of the court at his own  

will.   Learned counsel  for  the  respondent  has  

endeavoured hard to impress upon us that he  

had not been a habitual absentee.  We really fail  

to  fathom  the  said  submission  when  the  

respondent had remained absent for almost one  

year and seven months.  The plea of absence of  

“habitual  absenteeism”  is  absolutely  

unacceptable  and,  under  the  obtaining  

circumstances, does not commend acceptation.  

We are disposed to think that the respondent by  

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remaining unauthorisedly absent for such a long  

period  with  inadequate  reason  had  not  only  

shown indiscipline but also made an attempt to  

get  away  with  it.   Such  a  conduct  is  not  

permissible and we are inclined to think that the  

High Court has erroneously placed reliance on  

the authorities where this Court had interfered  

with the punishment.   We have no shadow of  

doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does  

not get remotely attracted to such a case.  The  

punishment  is  definitely  not  shockingly  

disproportionate.

31. Another  aspect  needs  to  be  noted.   The  

respondent  was  a  Junior  Engineer.   Regard  

being had to his official position, it was expected  

of  him  to  maintain  discipline,  act  with  

responsibility,  perform  his  duty  with  sincerity  

and serve the institution with honesty.  This kind  

of conduct cannot be countenanced as it creates  

a concavity in the work culture and ushers in  

indiscipline in an organization.  In this context,  

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we  may  fruitfully  quote  a  passage  from  

Government  of  India  and  another  v.  

George Philip18: -

“In a case involving overstay of leave and  absence  from duty,  granting  six  months’  time  to  join  duty  amounts  to  not  only  giving premium to indiscipline but is wholly  subversive  of  the  work  culture  in  the  organization.   Article  51-A(j)  of  the  Constitution lays down that it shall be the  duty  of  every  citizen  to  strive  towards  excellence in all spheres of individual and  collective  activity  so  that  the  nation  constantly  rises  to  higher  levels  of  endeavour and achievement.  This cannot  be  achieved  unless  the  employees  maintain  discipline and devotion to  duty.  Courts should not pass such orders which  instead of  achieving the underlying spirit  and objects of Part IV-A of the Constitution  have  the  tendency  to  negate  or  destroy  the same.”

32. We respectfully reiterate the said feeling and re-

state  with  the  hope  that  employees  in  any  

organization should adhere to discipline for not  

only  achieving  personal  excellence  but  for  

collective  good of  an  organization.   When  we  

say  this,  we  may  not  be  understood  to  have  

stated that  the employers  should  be harsh to  

impose grave punishment  on any misconduct.  18 (2006) 13 SCC 1

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An  amiable  atmosphere  in  an  organization  

develops the work culture and the employer and  

the employees are expected to remember the  

same  as  a  precious  value  for  systemic  

development.

33. Judged on the anvil  of the aforesaid premises,  

the  irresistible  conclusion  is  that  the  

interference  by  the  High  Court  with  the  

punishment  is  totally  unwarranted  and  

unsustainable,  and further the High Court was  

wholly  unjustified  in  entertaining  the  writ  

petition after a lapse of four years.  The result of  

aforesaid analysis would entail overturning the  

judgments  and  orders  passed  by  the  learned  

single Judge and the Division Bench of the High  

Court and, accordingly, we so do.

34. Consequently,  the  appeal  is  allowed  and  the  

judgments and orders passed by the High Court  

are set aside leaving the parties to bear their  

respective costs.

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…………….……..…..J. [H.L. Gokhale]

…………………….….J. [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;  February 10, 2014.

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