REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7818­7819 OF 2009

Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy  .....Appellant

Versus

Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead)  Thr Lrs. & Anr.                 .....Respondents

J U D G M E N T

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.

These appeals are directed against the impugned judgment

dated 12.06.2008 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at

Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No. 1404 of 2004 and Cross­Objection

(SR) No. 50168 of 2004.

2. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has reversed

the judgment of the Trial Court dated 05.12.2003 passed by the

IIIrd  Additional District  Judge at Karimnagar  in O.S.  No. 91 of

1996, in which the Trial Court had decreed the suit.

3. A  suit for  specific  performance was  filed  by the  plaintiff,

Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy (the appellant herein) in respect of the

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agreement of sale dated 20.04.1993 pertaining to  House  No.

1­5­266 (new) situated at Kaman Road, Karimnagar. It is his case

that the first defendant in the suit, Baddam Pratapa Reddy (the

first respondent  herein,  now deceased)  agreed to  sell the suit

schedule  house in  his favour; that  he  was  always ready  and

willing to perform his part of the contract; and though he had

sufficient money to get the sale deed registered and had brought

the availability of money to the notice of the first defendant, the

latter did not execute the sale deed in his favour. The first

defendant and his brother, Baddam Ram Reddy, sold their

respective shares in the suit house in favour of the second

defendant, Neethi Satyanarayana (the second respondent herein)

after execution of the agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff.

The suit was initially filed against the first defendant. The second

defendant was impleaded subsequently. It is relevant to note here

that the plaintiff  purchased half  of the suit  property from the

second defendant after the impugned judgment was passed by

the High Court.

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The defendants in their written statement denied the case of

the  plaintiff,  specifically  alleging that the  agreement  of  sale is

forged.

On evaluation  of the  material  on record, the  Trial  Court

decreed the suit. Vide the impugned judgment, the High Court

dismissed the suit and disposed of the appeal and cross­

objections arising out of the judgment of the Trial Court. Hence,

the instant appeals have been preferred before this Court.  

4. During the trial, the agreement of sale Ext. A­1 was sent for

obtaining expert opinion on the genuineness of the signature of

the first defendant thereon. DW­2 is the expert who examined it

and his report is at Ext. B­2. He opined that the admitted

signatures of the first defendant and the disputed signature do

not tally, thereby  meaning that it is forged. The Trial Court

considered this expert opinion, but preferred not to rely on  it,

inasmuch as it ruled that the expert opinion was not

corroborated by any reliable evidence. It also held that the

evidence of the attesting witnesses (PWs 2 and 3) is cogent and

reliable,  and there  is  no reason why their  evidence should be

disbelieved to give way to the expert opinion.

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Per  contra, the  High  Court  solely relied  upon  the expert

opinion and dismissed the suit by concluding that the signature

of the first defendant on the agreement of sale Ext. A­1 is forged.

5. From the discussion of the High Court in arriving at this

conclusion, we find that it has not assigned any valid reason for

disbelieving the attesting witnesses PWs 2 and 3. In fact, with

respect to their evidence, the High Court made certain

observations which are against the evidence on record. Similarly,

with respect to PW­1, the High Court observed that he had not

deposed as to the presence of the third attestor, Krishna Murthy,

at the time of execution of the agreement of sale. However, it is

clear from the evidence of PW­1 that he has specifically deposed

about the presence of Krishna Murthy at that time. It was also

wrongly observed by the High Court that PWs 1 and 2 are silent

as to the time and place of the execution of the agreement.

However, in his examination­in­chief, PW­2 has clarified that the

first defendant executed this agreement at the suit schedule

house, at a time when he was residing there and the plaintiff was

residing in the western side of the house, etc. From the

aforementioned facts, it is clear that the High Court disbelieved

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the evidence of the plaintiff (PW1) and the attestors (PWs 2 and 3)

on mere assumptions and wrong reasons.

6. In any case, to satisfy our conscience, we have gone through

the evidence of PWs 1, 2, and 3. As rightly observed by the Trial

Court,  there  is  no reason to disbelieve these witnesses, whose

evidence  is  consistent,  cogent,  and reliable.  Though they were

subjected to lengthy cross­examination, nothing noteworthy has

been brought out from their deposition to discard their evidence.

Thus, the evidence of PWs 1, 2, and 3 fully supports the case of

the plaintiff and in our considered opinion, the High Court was

not justified in rejecting their evidence.  

7. As mentioned supra, the High Court mainly relied upon the

opinion evidence of DW­2, the handwriting expert,  who opined

that the signature of the first defendant on the agreement of sale

Ext. A­1 did not tally with his admitted signatures.   

8.  By now, it is well­settled that the Court must be cautious

while evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of

evidence and not substantive in nature. It is also settled that it

may not be safe to solely rely upon such evidence, and the Court

may seek independent and reliable corroboration in the facts of a

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given case. Generally, mere expert evidence as to a fact  is not

regarded as conclusive proof of it. In this respect, reference may

be made to a long line of precedents that includes Ram Chandra

and Ram Bharosey  v.  State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC

381, Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR

1964 SC 529,  Magan Bihari Lal  v. State of Punjab, (1977) 2

SCC 210, and  S. Gopal Reddy  v.  State of Andhra Pradesh,

(1996) 4 SCC 596.

We may particularly refer to the decision of the Constitution

Bench of this Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra), where it

was observed that the evidence of a handwriting expert can rarely

be given precedence over substantive evidence. In the said case,

the Court chose to disregard the testimony of the handwriting

expert as to the  disputed signature of the testator of a  Will,

finding such evidence to be inconclusive. The Court instead relied

on the clear testimony of the two attesting witnesses as well as

the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will.

9. On  the  other  hand, in  Murari  Lal  v.  State of  Madhya

Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 704, this Court emphasised that reliance

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on expert testimony cannot be precluded merely because it is not

corroborated by  independent evidence, though the Court  must

still approach such evidence with caution and determine its

creditworthiness after considering all other relevant evidence.

After examining the decisions referred to supra, the Court was of

the opinion that these decisions  merely laid down a rule of

caution, and there is no legal rule that mandates corroboration of

the opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. At the same time,

the Court noted that Section 46 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

(hereinafter “the Evidence Act”) expressly makes opinion evidence

open to challenge on facts.

In Alamgir v. State (NCT, Delhi), (2003) 1 SCC 21, without

referring to Section 46 of the Evidence Act, this Court reiterated

the  observations in  Murari  Lal  (supra)  and stressed  that the

Court must exercise due care and caution while determining the

creditworthiness of expert evidence.  

10. In our considered opinion, the decisions in  Murari Lal

(supra) and Alamgir (supra) strengthen the proposition that it is

the duty of the Court to approach opinion evidence cautiously

while  determining its reliability  and that the  Court  may seek

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independent corroboration of such evidence as a general rule of

prudence. Clearly, these observations in Murari Lal (supra) and

Alamgir  (supra) do not go against the proposition stated in

Shashi Kumar  Banerjee  (supra) that the evidence of a

handwriting expert should rarely be given precedence over

substantive evidence.

11. In light of these principles, it is necessary to evaluate the

correctness of the findings of the High Court as to the

genuineness of the signature of the first defendant on Ext. A­1.

12. As  mentioned earlier, Ext. A­1 is the agreement of sale

entered into by the plaintiff and the first defendant. Ext. A­2 is

the receipt evidencing the payment of earnest  money of Rs.

61,200/­ in  pursuance of this agreement of sale. The receipt

bears the signature of the first defendant on the revenue stamps

affixed thereon. Curiously, Ext. A­2 was not sent for obtaining

expert opinion. At the same time, no reliable material was

brought on record that the first defendant has not received the

amount under Ext. A­2. In the absence of any challenge to the

first defendant’s signature on Ext. A­2, and in the absence of any

reliable  material produced  by the first defendant to  deny the

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receipt of such earnest money, the High Court, in our considered

opinion, should have relied upon this receipt. In fact, we find that

the High Court has not considered Ext. A­2 in its entire

judgment. As a matter of fact, Ext. A­1 and Ext. A­2 go hand in

hand, and Ext. A­2 should not have been ignored by the High

Court.  

Moreover, merely because the plaintiff’s signature was not

present on the agreement of sale, this would not ipso facto nullify

the  agreement  altogether. This is because the  agreement  was

signed  by the first  defendant  and clearly reveals that  he  had

agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff for a due consideration

of  Rs. 1,20,000/­. This agreement  was followed by  Ext. A­2,

which shows the payment and receipt of the earnest money. In

addition to the signature of the first defendant, this receipt bears

the signature of the plaintiff on revenue stamps. As mentioned

earlier, Ext. A­1 and Ext. A­2 are part of the same transaction.

Thus, the contention that absence of the plaintiff’s signature on

Ext. A­1 nullifies the agreement altogether, cannot be accepted.   

In addition to this, the evidence of DW­3 (the brother of the

first defendant) belies the allegation of the first defendant that

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the signature found on  Ext. A­1 is forged. DW­3 specifically

admitted during his cross­examination that he could identify the

signature of the first defendant, who is his elder brother. He has

further admitted that Ext. A­1 and Ext. B­1 bears the signature

of the first defendant. It may be noted here that a partition had

taken place between the first defendant and DW­3 in the year

1980, and such partition  was effected through Ext. B­1, an

unregistered  partition  deed.  Crucially, the first defendant  has

also admitted his signature on Ext. B­1 in his cross­examination.

Thus, it is clear that such admitted signature and the disputed

signature of the first defendant have been identified by his

brother as those of the first defendant himself.   

13. Undoubtedly, the opinion of a handwriting expert is a

relevant fact under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. Under Section

47 of the Evidence Act, the opinion of any person acquainted with

the  handwriting  of the  person  by  whom  it is supposed to  be

written or signed is also a relevant fact.  

Per the  explanation to  Section 47 of the  Evidence Act,  a

person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another

person when he  has  seen  that  person write,  or  when he  has

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received documents purported to be written by that  person  in

answer to documents written by himself or under his authority

and addressed to that person, or when, in the ordinary course of

business, documents  purporting to  be  written  by that  person

have been habitually submitted to him.

14.  A reading of Section 47 of the Evidence Act makes it clear

that this provision is concerned with the relevance of the opinion

of a person who is acquainted with the handwriting of another

person. The Explanation to this Section goes on to enumerate the

circumstances in  which a person  may be said to have such

acquaintance.  

In the matter at hand, DW­3, in his cross­examination, has

identified the disputed signature of the first defendant (his elder

brother) on Ext. A­1. He also stated that the suit schedule house

was constructed  when  he  was 25 years old; a partition  was

effected in 1980, after which he and the first defendant occupied

their respective shares in the house; and that he finally sold his

share in 1996 (when he was aged about 58 years). This goes on

to show that DW­3 lived and resided with the first defendant in

the same house for over three decades. Moreover, as mentioned

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earlier, DW­3 identified the first defendant’s signature on Ext. B­

1 (the partition deed), which has been admitted by the first

defendant himself. In light of this, and given that DW­3 came in

to support the case of his brother, the first defendant before the

Court, it  can be inferred that their relations were cordial even

after partition and that DW­3 would have seen the latter write on

multiple occasions in normal course of family affair. Thus, it is

clear that, he was acquainted with the handwriting of the first

defendant in terms of the Explanation to Section 47 of the

Evidence Act. This makes his opinion as to the disputed

handwriting a relevant fact under Section 47.  

At this juncture, it would be apposite to observe that the

weight to be accorded to such an opinion depends on the extent

of familiarity shown by the witness with the disputed

handwriting. This, in turn, depends on the frequency with which

the witness has had occasion to notice and observe the

handwriting, his own power of observation, and how recent such

observations were. In light of the facts discussed above, which go

on to show the familiarity of DW­3 with the handwriting of the

first  defendant,  we conclude that the testimony  of  DW­3 may

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safely be relied upon, and  must be accorded similar, if not

greater, weight than the expert evidence adduced by the

defendants to advance their case. This conclusion is further

strengthened by the fact that the first defendant neither

challenged DW­3’s admission nor his acquaintance with the

disputed handwriting, although it was open for him to do so by

way of re­examination.  

15.  The admission by DW­3 is further supported by the cogent

and consistent testimony of the  plaintiff (PW­1) and attesting

witnesses (PWs 2 and 3), and the fact that the first defendant has

not denied his signature on Ext. A­2 (the receipt of payment of

earnest  money).  Having regard  to  the  totality  of the  facts  and

circumstances, we conclude that the disputed signature of the

first defendant on Ext. A­1 is genuine. Moreover, keeping in mind

the principle that expert evidence should not be given precedence

over substantive evidence, in our considered opinion, the High

Court was not justified in giving precedence to the opinion of the

expert (DW­2) and solely relying upon his testimony to set aside

the judgment and decree of the Trial Court.  

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In any case, to satisfy our conscience, we have examined

the admitted and disputed signatures ourselves,  and find that

the signatures are virtually the same. However, in this case, it is

unnecessary for us to rely on our own comparison in light of the

material on record, as discussed above. We hasten to emphasize

that  we  have  not  been  prejudiced  by  our  own comparison in

appreciating the evidence and reaching our conclusion.

16. There is another reason why we are not inclined to place

reliance on the opinion of the expert DW­2. From a perusal of his

report  Ext.  B­2, it is evident that  barring the signature  on  a

written statement in a prior suit, all other admitted signatures of

the first defendant are of a period subsequent to the filing of the

plaint (i.e. on the vakalatnama and the written statement filed in

this suit itself). These admitted signatures taken subsequent to

the filing of the suit could not have been used as a valid basis of

comparison, and their use for this purpose casts serious doubt

on the reliability of the entire report Ext. B­2. Thus, the report

was liable to be discarded on this ground alone, and was wrongly

relied upon by the High Court.

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17. Moreover, the  High  Court  has  wrongly  observed that the

plaintiff has not produced any evidence to prove that he

demanded the performance of sale after the execution of the

agreement of sale. The filing of a suit for specific performance of

an agreement of sale is governed by Section 16(c) of the Specific

Relief  Act, 1963, read  with  Article  54  of the  Schedule of the

Limitation Act,  1963.  In addition to  this,  Forms 47 and 48 of

Appendix A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 prescribe the

format of the plaint for such a suit. Thus, a plaint which seeks

the relief of specific performance of an agreement/contract must

comply with all these requirements. In the matter at hand, the

plaintiff has specifically averred in his plaint that he was ready

and willing to perform his part of the contract under the

agreement of sale dated 20.04.1993. It was also specifically

stated that the plaintiff had been demanding that the first

defendant receive the balance consideration of Rs. 58,800/­ and

execute a regular registered sale deed at his cost, but the first

defendant had been avoiding the specific performance of the

agreement of sale. In light of this, in our considered opinion, all

the formalities which are to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff

for getting a decree of specific performance have been fulfilled.

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Moreover, there cannot be any proof of oral demand.  Be that as

it may, we are satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff had

sufficient  money to  pay the  balance  consideration to the first

defendant and was ready and willing to perform his part of the

contract.  

18. In view of the aforementioned reasons, the impugned

judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside. Accordingly,

the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court stands

restored. The appeals are allowed accordingly.

..........................................J. (N.V. Ramana)

...........................................J. (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)

...........................................J. (Ajay Rastogi)

New Delhi;  August 27, 2019.

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