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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL/CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.__4540________OF 2013 [Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.13120 OF 2013]

CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI APPELLANT

VERSUS

K.C. PALANISAMY AND OTHERS RESPONDENTS

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.    736-737   __________OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) Nos.3273-3274 OF 2013)

CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE & ANOTHER RESPONDENTS

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.    731-733   __________OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) Nos.1924-1926 OF 2013)

K.C. PALANISAMY APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE & ANOTHER ETC. ETC. RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.    4537-4538    __________OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.11342-11343 OF 2013)

K.C. PALANISAMY APPELLANT

VERSUS

RAMASWAMY ATHAPPAN & OTHERS  ETC. ETC. RESPONDENTS

AND

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.   734-735  __________OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) Nos.1947-1948 OF 2013)

PAUL RIVETT  APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE & ANOTHER RESPONDENTS

AND

CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 166 OF 2013 IN  

S.L.P.(CRL.) NO. 9853 OF 2010

CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI  PETITIONER  

VERSUS

V. BALAKRISHNAN & ANR. RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

M.Y. EQBAL, J.:

Leave granted.

2. Since common questions of law are involved, these appeals  

have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common  

judgment.  However, for the sake of convenience, the factual matrix  

giving rise to these cases as alleged in the civil appeal arising  

out of SLP(C) No. 13120 of 2013 is set out hereinafter.

3. The  appellant  –  Chandran  Ratnaswami,  alleged  to  have  

settled  in  Canada  since  1974,  is  an  officer  of  Hamblin  Watsa  

Investment Counsel, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fairfax Financial  

Holdings Limited (in short, “Fairfax”) which is based in Canada and  

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has also made investments  in India worth more than USD 1 billion.  

The  said  appellant  is  also  a  Director  on  the  Boards  of  various  

renowned companies including ORE Holdings Limited (in short, “ORE”),  

a Fairfax Group company, based in Mauritius, and has to travel to  

India on business commitments. The said holding company, ORE on 30th  

January, 2004 entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with CG  

Holdings  Private  Limited  (respondent  No.  1  –  K.C.  Palanisamy’s  

company) and N.  Athappan (a Singapore citizen) for constructing and  

developing a hotel property, a shopping complex and an IT Park of the  

properties owned by Cherraan Properties Limited (CPL) and Vasantha  

Mills  Limited  (VML)  (respondent  No.1’s companies).   ORE  invested  

Rs.75  crores  and  got  45%  in  Cheran  Enterprises  Private  Limited  

(CEPL).   N. Athappan invested Rs. 4 crores and got 10% in CEPL.   It  

is alleged that as CPL and VML have immovable assets, respondent No.  

1 transferred shares of CPL and VML to CEPL instead of bringing  

money  and  got  45%  share  holding  in  CEPL.   Respondent  No.  1  is  

alleged to have swindled the said Rs. 75 crores that was deposited  

in  the  bank  account  contrary  to  the  JVA  and  transferred  the  

immovable assets of CPL and VML, subsidiaries of CEPL.  Thereupon,  

ORE filed Company Petition No. 76 of 2005 before the Company Law  

Board, Additional Principal Bench, Chennai (in short, “the CLB”)  on  

account of the alleged acts of oppression and mismanagement indulged  

in by respondent No. 1.    The Company Law Board by order dated 13th  

August, 2008 directed respondent No. 1, CG Holdings Private Limited  

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and CEPL to return the investment of ORE and N. Athappan amounting to  

Rs. 79 crores with 8% interest  within one year, failing which the  

land of VML was to be transferred to ORE and N. Athappan.  It was  

directed that once the aforementioned amount is paid, respondent No.  

1 would take control of CEPL and its subsidiaries.  The Company Law  

Board held as under:

“17. In view of the foregoing conclusions and in exercise  of the powers under Sections 397 & 398 read with Section  402 and  with a view to bringing to an end the grievances  of CG Holdings, KCP, ORE and Athappan, the following order  is passed:

CEPL shall return a sum of Rs. 75 crores and Rs. 4  crores  invested  by  ORE  and  Athappan  respectively,  together with simple  interest at the rate of 8% per  annum from the date of investment till the date of  repayment  within a period of 12 months in one or  more instalments, commencing from 01.11.2008.  While  making the payment CEPL, CG Holdings and KCP shall  ensure that at least 25% of the amount due is paid in  every  quarter.   CEPL  CG  Holdings  and  KCP  are  at  liberty to make use of the fixed deposit held by CEPL  with the SBI, Erode Main Branch, free of any liens or  encumbrances towards refund of the investments of ORE  and Athappan.  VML shall not alienate or sell any of  its immoveable properties till full payment is made  to ORE, in terms  of this order.  In the event of any  failure to make the repayment within the specified  time, CEPL CG Holdings, KCP and VML will duly convey  the immovable properties of VML, namely, 17.15 acres  of land in favour of ORE and 7.80 acres of land in  favour  of  Athappan  by  executing  and  registering  necessary  deeds  of  conveyance  in  strict  compliance  with  all  applicable  laws,  as  consideration  for  reduction of capital and surrender of the shares of  ORE and Athappan, upon which ORE as well as Athappan  will  deliver  the  share  certificates  and  blank  transfer forms in respect of their holdings in CEPL  and the subsidiaries, if any, in favour of CG Holdings  and KCP. CEPL is consequently authorized to reduce its  share capital and in the meantime, operation of the  

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impugned  agreements  is  suspended,  to  expedite  and  ensure due completion of the modalities of exit by  ORE and Athappan, thereby, bringing to an end the acts  complained of in the present proceedings.  CEPL shall  ensure necessary statutory compliances till the whole  process, in accordance with the aforesaid directions,  is properly completed.  The parties are at liberty to  apply  in  the  event  of  any  difficulty  in  implementation  of  the  smooth  exist  of  ORE  and  Athappan from CEPL.”  

4. Cross appeals were filed by the parties before the High Court  

of  Judicature at Madras and the  High  Court  vide order dated 5th  

August, 2011 confirmed the order dated 13th August, 2008 passed by  

the CLB,  in the following terms:

“54. On  analysis  of  various  aspects,  Company  Law  Board  concluded that it was no longer possible for the parties  to carry out joint venture business of CEPL as per the  terms  of  JVA.   Only  to  have  smooth  exit  of  ORE  and  Athappan, the Company Law Board passed the order directing  CEPL to repay Rs. 75 Crores and Rs. 4 Crores invested by  ORE Holdings and Athappan respectively.  By perusal of the  order  of  Company  Law  Board,  in  our  considered  view,  Company  Law  Board  has  elaborately gone  into  the  issues  arisen between the parties even though those objections  were filed under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies  Act.   As  demonstrated  infra,  there  are  commonality  of  issues raised in both the Company Petitions, O.S. No.90 of  2007  and  the  petition  filed  before  I.C.C.  seeking  for  arbitration.   

55. Criminal Cases:- The learned counsel for appellants  Mr. Karthik  Seshadri contended  that  the  purport  of  the  criminal  proceedings  are  different  and  initiating  of  criminal  complaints  does  not  amount  to  waiver  of  arbitration.  Of course, a party does not waive his right  to invoke arbitration by filing criminal complaints.  But  what is relevant is the allegations in the plethora of  criminal  complaints  filed  at  the  instance  of  the  appellants/father of KCP/respondents.  Both parties have  made  serious  allegations  of  cheating,  forgery,  falsification of records, etc., against one another.  Even  before  the  arbitral  Tribunal,  the  same  allegations  are  

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made.  The Honourable Supreme Court and the Madras High  Court  have  held  that  the  arbitration  is  not  the  appropriate  forum  if  allegations  of  fraud,  misappropriation and complicated facts are involved.   

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84.    By a careful reading of the order of Company Law  Board in C.P. Nos.65 and 76 of 2005, it is clear that the  alleged breach of Clause 9.2 has been elaborately dealt  with.  Company Law Board dealt with not only the issues  pertaining to the oppression and mismanagement of CEPL and  also the larger issues arising between the parties.  Only  to ensure smooth exit of ORE and Athappan, the order dated  13.8.2008 came to be passed by the  Company Law Board.  It  is pertinent to note that KCP had not challenged the said  order of Company Law Board.  

xxx xxx xxx

112. As pointed out earlier, several criminal cases have  been filed and number of quash petitions also came to be  filed.  Of course a party does not waive his right to  invoke  the  arbitration  of  the  dispute  by  filing  of  criminal complaints.  When a party deliberately chooses  not  to  adopt   a  particular  course  of  action,  the  arbitration  agreement  becomes  inoperative  and  as  the  parties have waived or abandoned the arbitration clause,  by invoking the  jurisdiction of Civil Court, the doctrine  of wavier applies.   The appellants had the option to go  before ICC even in 2005 but the appellants chose to file  C.P. No.65 of 2005 and also stoutly defended C.P. No.76 of  2005  filed by ORE Holdings.  Even in C.P. No.76 of 2005,  the  appellants  have  not  sought  for  reference  to  arbitration.  By agitating the matter before the Company  law Board  for nearly two years, and filing the Civil Suit  in  O.S.  No.90  of  2007  before  District  Munsif’s  Court,  Kangeyam, by their conduct the appellants must be deemed  to have given a go bye to the arbitration clause.  

113. The  parties  have  been  engaged  in  pitched  battle  before the Company Law Board and orders were passed by the  Company  Law  Board  on  13.8.2008.   When  the  matter  was  pending  before  the  Company  Law  Board,  the  Company  Law  Board has passed interim orders at various stages.  The  learned  counsel  for  plaintiffs  would  submit  that  even  settlements/proposals  have  been  made  disclosing  parties  

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intentions  and  discovery  process  has  been  utilized.  We  find much force in the contention of the respondents that  Athappans and Ore have spent consideration time and money  before the Company Law Board.  In so far as O.S. No.90 of  2007 pending before District Munsif’s Court, Kangeyam, the  suit  is  ready  ripe  for  trial  and  the  respondents  are  diligently  defending  the  same.   Having   initiated  proceedings   before  various  forums,  cannot  now  seek  to  invoke arbitration as an additional remedy.  

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120.  Company Appeal Nos. 21,25 to 27 and 29 of 2009:- The  gist of order in C.P. Nos.65 and 76 of 2005 dated 13.8.2008  is that:-

CEPL,  KCP  and  C.G.Holdings  were  to  return  Rs.  75  Crores to ORE and Rs. 4 Crores to Athappan.  The  money was to be paid within a period of one year  starting 1.11.2008 with 25 percent of the same, being  paid every year.

CEPL,  KCP and  C.G.Holdings  were to utilize  Rs.  20  Crores maintained in the fixed deposit at State Bank  of India, Erode to pay ORE and Athappan.  In the  event of failure to pay the money the property of VMC  situated in Coimbatore is to be transferred to ORE and  Athappan  in  the proportion  of  17.15 acres  and  7.80  acres respectively.  Until then VML was refrained from  dealing with the property.

On  receipt  of  money,  ORE  and  Athappan  were  to  surrender  their  shares  in  CEPL  and  CEPL  shall  accordingly be permitted to reduce its share capital.

The parties were given liberty to approach  Company  Law  Board  for  limited  purpose  of  overcoming  difficulties in implementation of the said order.    

xxx xxx xxx

145. As per Order of Company Law Board amount invested by  ORE  has  to  be  refunded  which  of  course,  must  be  in  accordance  with  applicable  laws:  be  it  compliance  with  FEMA or other Regulations, ORE, being a foreign investor-  an entity of foreign origin , as per FEMA, cannot own  

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immovable property in India.  Compliance  of FEMA or other  applicable regulations cannot be bypassed.  By the order  dated  3.8.2009,  Company  Law  Board  modified  its  earlier  order  directing  VML to execute the sale  deed conveying  immovable properties of 17.15 acres to the nominee of ORE  and thereby modified its earlier order.  The Order of the  Company Law Board modifying its earlier order directing  VML to convey the properties to ‘nominee of ORE’ is to be  modified to the effect that any such conveyance  should be  subject  to  applicable  laws  and  regulations  and  with  required approval/permission to be obtained by ORE from  the competent authorities.  The Order of the Company Law  Board in C.A. No.155 of 2008 is to be modified to that  extent.  

146. …. Company  Appeal Nos. 21 and 29 of 2009 preferred  by  ORE  and  Company  Appeals  Nos.  25  and  26  of  2009  preferred  by  N. Athappan  and  R.  Athappan  are  allowed.  Company appeal No.27 of 2009 is disposed of modifying the  order of  Company Law Board dated  3.8.2009 in C.A. No.155  of 2008 to the effect that the conveyance of immovable  properties to nominee of ORE is subject to all applicable  laws  and  regulations  and  if  need  be,  with  necessary  approval/permission  to  be  obtained  by  ORE  from  the  competent authorities.”

5. ORE and N. Athappan filed execution petitions before the CLB in  

December 2011 and the same are stated to be pending as on date.

6. While the proceedings before the CLB were pending, respondent  

No. 1 started filing multiple criminal complaints.  On 27th February,  

2006,  respondent  No.  1  filed  a  complaint  before  the  Economic  

Offences  Wing,  Chennai  (EOW)  against  ORE,  Fairfax,  Prem  Watsa,  

Ramaswamy  Athappan,  Chandran  Ratnaswami  (appellant  herein),  Paul  

Rivett, M/s. Odyssey America Reinsurance Corporation and N. Athappan  

making  them  accused  Nos.  1  to  8  inter  alia  on  the  following  

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allegations:

“Through  this  strategic  acquisition  accused  No.  1,  through Accused No. 7 and Accused No. 4 through Accused  No. 8 acquired substantial ownership and management rights  in VML and CPL also.  The complainant states that the sole  objective of the sacrifice made by the complainant of his  highly  valuable  prime  immovable  properties  is  the  assurance of the Accused No. 3, 4, 5 & 6 that about Rs.  375  crores  would  be  brought  into  the  JV  Company  as  investment  and  loans  and  projects  worth  thousands  of  crores would be commenced.

The complainant states that, as per the joint venture  agreement dated 30.1.2004, M/s. Odyssey America Reinsurance  Corporation, the 7th accused herein which is a subsidiary  company of the Fair Fax Group and the Accused No. 2 had  agreed to extend a Corporate Guarantee in favour of the  lender for arranging the syndicated credit facility of US$  65  Million  (approximately  Rs.  300  crores)  to  the  JV  company.  In confirmation of the said fact the Accused No.  2, 3 and 4 and 8 while signing the JV agreement, cleverly  included in the same, a model draft of the Irrevocable  Corporate Guarantee Agreement to be furnished by the 7th  

accused in favour of the lender and even signed the said  draft  so  as  to  make  believe  the  complainant  in  no  uncertain  terms  about  their  intention  to  honour  their  commitments.   Thus,  the  joint  venture  business  could  commence  only  upon  the  1st accused  arranging  for  the  syndicated  credit  facility  of  US$  65  million,  on  the  strength of the Corporate Guarantee to be given by the 7th  

accused.

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….. On the one hand the accused had miserably failed  to  organize  the  funds  even  after  the  complainant  had  parted with the ownership rights over valuable properties  held by him through VML and CPL and on the other hand they  defrauded and cheated the complainant by not organizing  the promised funds, upon the receipt of which alone, the  complainant would be able to commence the projects worth  thousand of crores.

….  From the above, it is therefore evident that the  consideration of entering into the JV agreement was the  promise and assurance that the accused 2 to 6 shall also  arrange for a loan of Rs. 300 crores in addition to the  

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share investment of Rs. 75 crores as stipulated under the  JV agreement.

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Thus  the  accused  have  induced  the  complainant  to  enter into an agreement under the guise of a joint venture  agreement which was conceived in pursuance of a criminal  conspiracy with an intention of cheating.  In addition to  the  above,  the  accused  4  and  8  have  also  obtained  a  gratification,  amounting  to  approximately  Rs.  37.40  cr.  from  the  complainant,  by  getting  the  shares  of  the  companies  allotted  to  them  to  a  discounted  rate,  as  consideration for facilitating the joint venture and for  arranging the term loan thereby making wrongful gains to  themselves while causing wrongful loss to the complainant.  Moreover  after  receiving  the  said  consideration  in  the  form of shares at a discounted value, the accused 4 and 8  have  now  joined  hands  with  M/s  ORE  Holdings  Ltd.  for  gaining an illegal majority in the JV company and have  thus  defrauded  the  complainant  of  several  crores  of  rupees.

Therefore,  the  accused  Nos.  1  to 7  have  committed  various offences under section 120-B, read with sections  409, 420, 405, 471 and 389 among other provisions of the  Indian  Penal  Code,  which  amount  to  the  offences  of  Criminal Conspiracy, Cheating, Criminal Breach of Trust,  making False Representation and Promises and Extortion by  putting  the  fear  of  accusation  of  offences  against  the  complainant among others, and have induced the complainant  to part with the shares of his company and the control  over  the  valuable  immovable  properties  owned  by  him  through VML and CPL on the strength of the false promises  and assurances made by the accused.”

7. Since the Economic Offences Wing refused to take any action, the  

Respondent No.1 filed Criminal O.P. No. 9791 of 2006 before the High  

Court seeking direction to EOW to take action, which petition was  

later withdrawn.  Thereafter, he filed a similar private complaint  

(Criminal M.P. No. 6096 of 2006) for offences under Sections 406, 406  

r/w  109,  420,  467  r/w  420  IPC  before  the  Judicial  Magistrate,  

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Perundurai which was dismissed on 13th March, 2007 holding the same  

to wreak vengeance and observing as under:

“7. On  a  careful  consideration  of  the  aforesaid  complaint, depositions, and Exhibits it is unbelievable to  state  that  the  respondents  have  cheated  and  committed  breach of trust, the complainant who is a former member of  the Legislative assembly, a former member of the parliament  and running business houses which have properties worth of  the more than 100 crores of Rupees.  Because, no documents  were filed to show that the shares of Rs. 10/- face value  of  the  Cheran  Properties  were  sold  in  the  market  for  Rs.60/-  and  the  shares  of  Rs.10/-  face  value  of  the  Vasanthi Mills were sold at Rs.105/-.  It is not believable  that the shares of Rs. 10/- face value was transferred to  the same value of Nandakumar and paid about Rs. 22 crores  as commission, as the  complainant himself has admitted in  the  complaint  that  some  of  the  respondents  and  the  complainant  have  started  a  Joint  Venture  Company.  The  memorandum of understanding/Joint venture agreement is not  submitted for the perusal of the court.  In the memorandum  of understanding the details to the investment of each of  the  parties,  the  shares  allotted  to each  of  them,  the  relief to the parties when the conditions are violated,  and the court  which has jurisdiction to entertain such  matter.   The  failure   to  file  the  memorandum  of  understanding in the court, and the failure to give the  reasons for not filing the same is not  acceptable.

8. It  is  clearly  seen  from  the  deposition  of  the  petitioner and  the complaint that the respondents have  arranged for about 17 million American Dollars through a  firm Odyssey.  It is also seen that the said sum is with  the Cheran Holdings Private Limited and the affidavit filed  in  the  Hon’ble  High  Court  at  Delhi  confirms  the  same,  while  examining  details,  it  is  seen  that  a  sum  of  17  million  American  Dollars  have  come  to  Cheran  Holdings  Limited   in  which  the  complainant  is  a  share  holder.  Hence the petitioner complainant might not have sustained  any loss.  There is no explanation in the  complaint as to  whether after the receipt of 17 million American Dollars,  it was invested in the business.  In the first meeting of  the petitioner with the respondents, it was agreed that  foreign investments are to be made accordingly the same has  been  done.   It  is  seen  from  the  deposition  of  the  petitioner  that  17 million  American  Dollars,  it  is  not  

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believable  that  the  respondents  have  cheated  the  petitioner/complainant.  

9. It  is  seen  that  on  orders  of  Hon’ble  High  Court,  Delhi in C.P. No.292/2004, a sum of Rs. 78 crores has to be  deposited  and  Cheran  Enterprises  and  Cheran  Holdings  Limited  have  not  deposited  in  the  Bank  Accounts.   The  reasons adduced by the complainant was hold an important  post in the Cheran Group of Companies for not depositing  the  sum  into  the  Bank,  do  not  seem  to  be  accepted.  Moreover, Chandran Ratnaswami has obtained powers from the  petitioner for the conduct of the case and as such, he has  to face the consequences of the orders of the court.  On  that aspect also, the petition would sustain.  

xxx xxx xxx

12. The petitioner on 23.9.2005 sent an e-mail to the  State Bank of India to give Bank guarantee to BSNL, that  when he approached the Bank, he came to know that Chandra  Ratnaswami  and  Athappan  Ramaswamy  have  sent  independent  letters  to  the  Bank  requiring  that  the  request  of  the  petitioner  should  not  be  accepted.   It  cannot  be  considered by the Court as a criminal act.  It can be  considered as an act of safe guard in the trade.  The  proceedings between the petitioner and respondents are of  civil nature relating to contract Act and Company Law.  If  the conditions therefore are violated, the petitioner has  to seek remedy under Contract Act  or Company Law.  Instead  the filing of this case terming the respondents as accused  the court considers that it cannot be accepted.

13. On world level, the foreign investments made in each  country  enhance  the  economy  and  it  is  a  day  to  day  commercial activities.  The petitioner and the respondents  and some others, with an intention to establish a joint  venture company having done so, have to take steps for the  developmental activities, and one party should not, with  intention to wreak vengeance against the other should not,  term them as accused and approach  the court, and this  court cannot accept it.  Because, the petitioner has not  handed over any property to the respondents under section  406  IPC.   Hence  there  is  no  ingredient  for  breach  of  trust.  In  the  circumstances  that  the  respondents  have  arranged for 17 million American Dollars, that Chandran  Ratnaswamy himself has agreed to the Rs.78 crores case in  the Hon’ble High Court, Delhi  that  the petitioner has  not mentioned in the complaint that date, time and place  

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where  he  was  cheated,  that  like  wise,  the  Respondent  cheated the petitioner and  thereby he sustained loss, and  that there are no ingredients for sections 420, 467 read  with  420  are  found  in  the  complaint   or  depositions.  Therefore,  no  prima  facie  case  to  show  that  the  respondents with criminal intention indulged  in criminal  activities is found in the complaint, or depositions or  documents.  

14. Hence, for the reasons as aforesaid, this petition is  dismissed under Section 203 of Cr. P.C.”

8. Respondent No. 1 then filed another similar complaint before  

Judicial Magistrate, Kangayam suppressing the fact of filing earlier  

complaints  and  the  order  dated  13th March,  2007  passed  by  the  

Magistrate  Perundurai,  whereupon  the  Crime  Branch,  Erode  was  

directed to register an FIR.  Accordingly, FIR No. 7 of 2007 was  

registered by Police Station DCB, Erode under Sections 120-B, 420,  

169, 408, 409 IPC, but the case was said to have been closed on 20th  

May, 2009  and  the  police  filed  the  Closure  Report.   Meanwhile,  

Criminal  O.P.  Nos.  12695  and  19384  of  2007  had  been  filed  for  

quashing the FIR by the persons shown as accused in the said FIR,  

in which the High Court vide  order dated 8th February, 2010 frowned  

upon the conduct of respondent No. 1 in the following terms:

“3. It is brought to the notice of this court  by the  learned Senior Counsel Mr. Habibullah Basha, appearing for  the accused/petitioners 1 to 3 in Crl.O.P. No.12695 that  the de facto complainant,  on the very  same allegations  preferred a complaint in C.C. No.1096 of 2006 on the file  of  the  learned  District  Munsif-cum-Judicial  Magistrate  Court at Perundurai and the said court was pleased to pass  an  order  of  dismissal  under  Section  203  Cr.P.C.  It  is  impressed upon this court that such dismissal came about  

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after consideration of the complaint and the statement of  the witnesses and on finding no ground to proceed thereon.  

4. Though in view of the submission made by the learned  Government  Advocate  (Crl.side)  nothing  survives  for  consideration in the matter,  this Court would frown upon  the conduct of the    defacto    complainant  in indulging in    repeated  harassment  of  the  petitioners.   The  criminal  original  petitions  shall  stand  closed.  Consequently,  connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.”  

9. The  respondent  then  preferred  Special  Leave  Petition  in  the  

Supreme Court being SLP (Crl.) No. 9853 of 2010 against the order  

dated 8th February, 2010, which was dismissed by this Court on 22nd  

November, 2010 with liberty to pursue protest petition, if any, said  

to be pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Kangayem.  It  

is alleged that no protest petition was pending on that day.   

10. Though in different context, respondent No.1, K.C. Palanisamy,  

filed  three  writ  petitions  against  the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu,  

Superintendent of Police, Economic Offences Wing, Chennai, Director  

General  of  Police,  State of Tamil Nadu, Union of India, Central  

Bureau  of  Investigation  and  Reserve  Bank  of  India,   in  which  

respondent No.1 prayed for issuance of writ of mandamus directing the  

respondents in writ petitions for investigation as also for transfer  

of investigation and FIR making allegations against another Company,  

DAIL.   In  the  said  writ  petitions,  the  contention  of  the  writ  

petitioner was that he was the resident of Coimbatore and former  

Member  of  Legislative  Assembly  of  the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu  and  

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Managing Director of the Company viz. CEPL.  The said Company was  

formed for the purpose of sharing a Joint Venture between the CG  

Holdings Private Limited, ORE Holdings Limited, Mauritius  and one N.  

Athappan.  As part of the Joint Venture business CEPL looked for  

acquiring a Telecom Company called DAIL which was a Delhi based  

Company  involved  in  the  business  of  International  Long  Distance  

Telephony Services and Internet Services.  In those writ petitions,  

a common counter affidavit was filed by the respondents refuting all  

the averments made in the three writ petitions and stated that more  

than  nine  cases  were  pending  against  the  respondent  No.1,  writ  

petitioner.  In the order dated 19th October, 2011 passed by the  

Madras High Court in those three writ petitions, the numbers  of  

cases pending against the writ petitioner were mentioned in para 19  

of the order, extracted hereunder:

“19.  The cases pending against the petitioner in various  

provisions of IPC including Section 420 IPC, there were as  

many  as  9  cases  in  Coimbatore  alone.   They  are  as  

follows:-

“a)  Coimbatore City Crime Branch

     Cr. No.37/99 u/s.  420 IPC.

b)    Coimbatore City Crime Branch

     Cr. No.17/2000 u/s. 420 IPC.

c) Coimbatore City Crime Branch

     Cr. No.62/2000 u/s. 420 IPC.

d) Coimbatore City Crime Branch

     Cr. No.18/2001 u/s. 420 IPC.

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e) Coimbatore City Crime Branch

     Cr. No.25/2001 u/s. 420 IPC.

f) Coimbatore City Crime Branch

     Cr. No.29/2001 u/s. 384 IPC.

g) Coimbatore City Crime Branch

     Cr. No.20/2002 u/s. 467, 468,471

     472 and 477(A), IPC.

h) Coimbatore Economic Offences Wing

Cr. No.03/2001 u/s. 408 IPC.

i) Coimbatore City Crime Branch

     Cr. No.26/2003 u/s.406 IPC.”

11. In para 20 of the order dated 19th October, 2011, the Court  

observed  that  the  modus  operandi of  the  writ  petitioner  was  to  

defraud a person or entity and thereafter approach the Courts with  

multiple  petitions  in  order  to  distract  attention  from  his  own  

misdeeds.  

12. The High Court dismissing all the afore-mentioned three writ  

petitions observed as under:-

“28. However, this  Court  is  not  inclined  to accept  the  request made by the petitioner.  The petitioner is not an  innocent party in filing such complaints and he himself  has not obeyed the order passed by the Delhi High Court in  the application for winding up and asking him to refund  the amount siphoned off by him which was obtained as a  loan by DAIL.  Parties who come to court must come with  clean hands.  Not only the petitioner has come to this  Court with unclean hands, but he himself being an accused  

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in  several  cases  had  also  suppressed  the  entire  proceedings of the Delhi High Court including the order  directing the company to retransfer the money siphoned off  from DAIL.   xxx xxx xxx

31. In the present case, the petitioner has filed series  of Crl.Ops including the prayer which has been made in the  writ petitions and they were negatived by this Court more  than  once.   All  that  this  Court  held  was  that  investigation should be conducted by the State Police and  a report should be filed expeditiously and that has been  done in this case as noted in the counter affidavit filed  by the  second respondent. xxx xxx xxx

34. Therefore, in the light of the above, there is no  case made out to grant any direction sought for by the  petitioner either in the first writ petition or to call for  a report from RBI as demanded in the second writ petition  or for any direction to the Central Government to take  steps  to  retransfer  the  funds  siphoned  off  from  this  country.  The petitioner has not made out any prima facie  case for grant of any such direction and he has suppressed  the information relating to winding up proceedings before  the Delhi High Court.  The petitioner himself is not a  person above board and faced with several criminal cases  under Section 420 IPC not only as revealed in the affidavit  filed in support of the petition for impleadment but also  as noted by this Court in the decision cited in Ramaswamy  Athappan’s case (cited supra).  The petitioner himself is  guilty of several commissions and omissions and at his  instance no direction can be granted by this Court.

35. In view of the above, all the three writ petitions  will stand dismissed.  However, there will be no order as  to costs.  Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions  are closed.”  

13. Curiously  enough,  on  2nd January,  2012,  respondent  No.  6  -  

Superintendent  of  Police,  Tiruppur  allegedly  in  collusion  with  

respondent No. 1 and relying upon the order dated 22nd November,  2010  

reopened FIR No. 7 of 2007 and ordered re-investigation.  Charge-

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sheet being CC 162 of 2012 ultimately came to be filed by respondent  

No. 5 - Dy. Superintendent of Police, District Crime Records Bureau,  

Erode before the Judicial Magistrate, Erode-III on 11th September,  

2012 inter alia against Paul Rivett, Chandran Rathnaswami, Ramasamy  

Athappan,  Nandakumar  Athappan,  M/s.  Fairfax  Financial  Holdings  

Limited,  M/s.  Hamin  Watsa  Investment  Council,  Odyssey  America  

Reinsurance  Corporation  and  ORE  Holdings  Limited  showing  them  

respectively  as  accused  Nos.  2,  3,  4,  6,  8,  9,  11 and  12  for  

committing offences under Sections 120-B, 420, 409 read with 109 IPC.

14. On the basis of aforesaid chargesheet, the Judicial Magistrate  

on 12th September, 2012 issued summons returnable on 12th October,  

2012.  On 26th September, 2012, the Dy. Superintendent of Police filed  

a report stating that he searched for the accused in Chennai and  

Mumbai  but  could  not  ascertain  their  whereabouts  and  accordingly  

prayed  for  issuance  of  Non-Bailable  Warrants  (NBWs)  which  were  

issued by the Judicial Magistrate, Erode on 27th September, 2012.  

Based upon the NBWs, the Superintendent of Police  issued  a  Look-

Out  Circular  on  9th January, 2013 against the appellant.  Unaware  

of all this, the appellant landed in India and was detained by the  

immigration authorities.  He filed a writ petition being W.P. No.  

1764 of  2013 and  on  22nd January, 2013 the  High  Court  passed  an  

interim order restraining appellant’s detention and directed to post  

the writ petition on 29th January, 2013.  SLP filed against this order  

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was disposed of on 24th January, 2013 observing that the High Court  

had itself posted the matter on 29th January, 2013.  On 29th January,  

2013, the High Court directed the appellant to surrender before the  

trial  court  and  pray  for  recall  of  NBWs  vide  order  passed   in  

Criminal  O.P.  No.  2283  of  2013  filed  by  him  for  quashing  the  

chargesheet i.e. CC 162 of 2012.  Crl.M.P. No. 3 of 2013 was also  

filed in Criminal O.P. No. 2283 of 2013 alleging fraud committed by  

the opposite party.  On the same day, Crl.M.Ps. No. 3 in Criminal  

O.P. No. 2166 of 2013 filed by Ramasamy Athappan & N. Athappan and  

Criminal O.P. No.2282 of 2013 filed by Paul Rivett also came up  

before the High Court and they were also directed to surrender before  

the Judicial Magistrate No. III, Erode.  Finally on 1st February, 2013  

the High Court directed in respect of the appellant (petitioner in  

Criminal O.P. No. 2283 of 2013), Ramasamy Athappan & N. Athappan  

(petitioners  in  Criminal  O.P. No.  2166  of  2013)  and  Paul  Rivett  

(petitioner in Criminal O.P. No. 2282 of 2013) as under:

“5. Considering the submissions made by all the parties  and also considering the facts and circumstances of the  case, the order dated 29.01.2013 is modified as follows:

“The  petitioners are directed to appear before the  trial  Court  on  or  before  08.03.2013  and  on  such  appearance, the warrant, if any, shall be recalled.  If  the  offences  are  non-bailable  in  nature,  the  petitioners  are  directed  to  file  bail  application  before the trial Court along with a bond for a sum of  Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten Thousand) with two sureties  each for like sum to the satisfaction of the trial  court  and on such sureties, the trial court shall  

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dispose the bail applications on the same day.  The  petitioners are at liberty to file to withdraw the  lookout application before this Court, if they are  advised to do so.

With the above directions, these petitions are disposed  of.”   

15. The appellant surrendered on 4th February, 2013 and NBWs were  

recalled  by  the  Judicial  Magistrate  III,  Erode.   However,  the  

immigration authorities did not allow the appellant to leave India  

on 5th February, 2013 stating that the court proceedings were pending.  

In the meanwhile, writ petition being W.P. No. 2739 of 2013 was filed  

by Ramaswamy Athappan  praying to issue a writ of mandamus or any  

other writ, order or direction in the nature of a writ of mandamus  

forebearing the Superintendent of Police, Tiruppur (Tamilnadu) and  

Ministry  of  Home  Affairs,  New  Delhi  including  its  constituent  

officers at all airports from acting upon the non-bailable arrest  

warrant  dated  27th September,  2012  issued  against  the  petitioner  

(Ramaswamy Athappan) in respect of chargesheet CC No. 162 of 2012  

pending  on  the  file  of  Judicial  Magistrate-III,  Erode  and  the  

alleged  Look  Out  Notice  dated  9th January,  2013  issued  by  the  

Superintendent  of  Police  and  consequently  from  in  any  manner  

restraining/restricting the petitioner’s entry into or exit out of  

India.  Similar writ petition being W.P. No. 2740 of 2013 was also  

filed by the appellant – Chandran Ratnaswami who additionally prayed  

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for directions to DSP, SP, MHA and respondent No. 1 herein K.C.  

Palanisamy  to jointly and  severally pay   compensation  of  Rs.  10  

crores to him for his illegal detention on 22nd January, 2013.   

16.  On  26th February,  2013,  the  High  Court  again  directed  the  

appellant to appear before the trial court by passing the following  

order in W.P. Nos. 2739 & 2740 of 2013 and Criminal O.P. Nos. 2166,  

2282 and 2283 of 2013:

“10. Accordingly,  Mr.  Chandran  Ratnaswami  the  accused  should  appear  before  the  learned  Judicial  Magistrate,  where CC No. 162/2012 is pending, within a period of two  weeks from today to comply with the following:

(i) he must file an affidavit of undertaking before the  court that he would not evade the due process of law and  ensure his appearance as and when required;

(ii)  he  should  execute  his  own  bond  for  a  sum  of  Rs.5,00,000/-  (Rupees  Five  Lakhs  only)  and  two  cash  sureties of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) each to  the satisfaction of the learned Judicial Magistrate-III,  Erode on the same day.

xxx xxx xxx

       13.  In this case, non-bailable warrant has been  recalled on 04.02.2013 on the accused surrendering before  the learned Magistrate.  For non-compliance of the orders  passed by this Court, I am inclined to pass the above  order directing them to appear before the Court for the  purpose of filing an affidavit and furnishing surety.”

17.    On 11th March, 2013, this Court granted stay of chargesheet  

i.e. CC 162 of 2012 by an order passed in SLP(Crl.) Nos. 1947-1948 of  

2013 which have been filed by Paul Rivett, an other accused in the  

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chargesheet CC 162 of 2012, challenging the orders dated 29th January  

and 1st February, 2013 respectively in Criminal O.P. No. 2282 of 2013  

and Crl.M.P. No.3 of 2013 in Criminal O.P. No. 2282 of 2013.   Paul  

Rivett is Law Officer in the Fairfax Group and is a Canadian citizen  

and he has also been made an accused in the chargesheet CC 162 of  

2012.  NBWs as well as the Look Out Notice were issued against Paul  

Rivett also.   

18.     On 12th March, 2013, the appellant prayed before the Single  

Judge of High Court that he may be permitted to file affidavit of  

undertaking there as proceedings in the trial court were stayed by  

this Court  which  prayer  was  opposed by respondent  No. 1  on 13th  

March, 2013 urging that this Court was seized of the matter and the  

Single Judge could not pass any order.  However, the Single Judge  

passed an order dated 14th March, 2013 in M.P. No. 2 of 2013 in W.P.  

No. 2740 of 2013 filed by the appellant seeking recall of the Look  

Out  Notice  and  directed  the  appellant  to  file  the  affidavit  of  

undertaking before the High Court and to furnish security deposit of  

Rs. 25 lakhs and permitted him to travel.   

19.   Challenging the above order of the Single Judge, respondent  

No. 1 filed a writ appeal being W.A. No. 517 of 2013 which was  

allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court vide order dated 22nd  

March, 2013 setting aside the order dated 14th March, 2013 passed by  

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the Single Judge and observing:

“12. From the above narrated facts it is evident that the  first  respondent  has  not  filed  bail  application  while  surrendering  himself  before  the  Judicial  Magistrate  No.III, Erode, for recalling the Non-bailable Warrant and  the fact remains, till date he has not obtained any order  of anticipatory bail/bail.  

13. The  appellant  challenged  the  interim  order  dated  26.2.2013 passed in Crl. O.P. No.2166, 2282 and 2283 of  2013 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (C ) Nos.  1924-1926 of 2013.  Accused No.2 in the said C.C. No.162 of  2012 viz. Paul Rivert filed SLP (Crl) No.1947-1948 of 2013  and  prayed to quash  the  proceedings pending  before the  Judicial Magistrate Court No.III, Erode and also prayed  for  an  interim  order  to  dispense  with  hi9s  personal  appearance  before the Judicial Magistrate Court No.III,  Erode in connection with C.C. No.162 of 2012.  The Hon’ble  Supreme Court refused to pass any interim order in the  applications filed by the appellant herein.

14. Insofar as the applications filed by Paul Rivert (A- 2), the Hon’ble Supreme Court refused to stay the order  passed by this Court  dated 29.01.2013 and 01.02.2013 in  Crl. O.P. 2282 of 2013 and granted stay of the proceedings  in  CC  162  of  2013  pending  on  the  file  of  Judicial  Magistrate  Court  No.III,  Erode,  pending  further  orders.  The  prayer  for  dispensing  with  his  appearance  was  not  granted.  The appellant thereafter filed Crl. M.P. Nos.5810  to 5812 of 2013 in  SLP  (Crl.) No.1924-1926 of  2013 and  prayed for restraining the first respondent from leaving  India,  pending   SLP  direct   the  first  respondent  to  surrender  his  passport  before  the  Judicial  Magistrate  Court  No.III,  Erode  No  order  was  passed  in  the  said  petition and the matter is adjourned to 3.4.2013 before the  Supreme Court for further hearing.  

15. The first respondent thereafter moved this High Court  to pass orders in M.P. No.2 of 2013 which was allowed by  the leaned single Judge holding that since CC No.162 of  2012 is stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the NBW  having been recalled, the basis of the Lookout Notice has  gone.”  

xxx xxx xxx

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18. On a perusal of the prayer made in the writ petition,  it is evident that the first respondent has challenged the  Look-out Notice issued on 9.1.2013 and consequently prayed  for payment of compensation.  The learned Single Judge in  the above miscellaneous petition has held that the Loo-out  Notice dated 9.1.2013 is cancelled and allowed the first  respondent  to  leave  India  after  filing  undertaking  affidavit and deposit a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs.  

19. It  is  not  in  dispute  that  the  very  same  issues  regarding the Look out Notice and the prayer to quash CC  No.162 of 2012 pending on the file of JM III Court, Erode,  which was filed at the instance of another accused (A-2  Paul  Rivert)  are  posted  for hearing  before  the  Hon’ble  Supreme Court on 3.4.2013.  Admittedly the matter is seized  of by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and only on interim stay of  the proceedings in CC No.162 of 2012 was ordered by the  Apex Court, that too at the instance of A-2 in the above  C.C. No. 162 of 2013, and the prayer to dispense with the  appearance of A-2 was not granted.  If the order of the  learned single Judge dated 14.3.2013 is to be implemented  immediately, it may be difficult to secure the presence of  the first respondent in the criminal case.

xxx xxx xxx

22. On the above said background and in the light of the  decision cited supra, we are of the considered view that  the order passed by the learned single Judge in M.P. No.2  of 2013 in W.P. No.2740 of 2013 dated 14.3.2013 is liable to  be set aside, and accordingly set aside.  The writ appeal  is allowed.  Consequently, the first respondent is entitled  to get refund of the amount deposited by him on 15.3.2013  pursuant to the interim order of the learned single Judge  No costs.  Connect M.P. No.1 of 2013 is closed.”  

20. Hence, this appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 13120 of 2013 by  

the appellant – Chandran Ratnaswami.   S.L.P.(Crl.) Nos. 3273-3274 of  

2013  have also been filed by the same appellant (an accused in  

Chargesheet CC 162 of 2013) against orders dated 29th January, 2013  

and 1st February, 2013 respectively in Criminal O.P. No. 2283 of 2013  

and Crl.M.P. No.3 of 2013 in Criminal O.P. No. 2283 of 2013.  In  

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these SLPs, notice has not been issued and they are fresh ones.

21. Criminal Appeals arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) Nos. 1924-1927 of  

2013 have been filed by K.C. Palanisamy [respondent No. 1 in civil  

appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 13120 of 2013] challenging the order  

dated 26th February, 2013 in Criminal O.P. Nos. 2283, 2282 and 2166 of  

2013 and Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 11342-11343 of  

2013 (D.No.7366/2013) have been filed challenging the order dated 26th  

February, 2013 in Writ Petition Nos. 2739 and 2740 of 2013.  In these  

matters, the appellant – K.C. Palanisamy has challenged the said  

High  Court’s order  by  which  the  accused  have  been  exempted  from  

filing proper bail application under the Criminal Procedure Code.  

22. Contempt Petition (C) No. 166 of 2013 in S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 9853  

of 2010  has been filed by the applicant – Chandran Ratnaswami for  

wilful and deliberate violation and disobedience of order dated 22nd  

November, 2010 by re-opening the closed FIR No. 7 of 2007.  In this  

contempt petition, notice has not been issued and it is a fresh one.

23. Mr. K.K.  Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing in SLP(C)  

No.13120 of 2013 assailed the impugned order passed by the Division  

Bench and also the orders passed in criminal proceedings as being  

illegal and wholly without jurisdiction.  Learned counsel drew our  

attention to the entire facts of the case discussed hereinabove and  

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submitted that respondent No.1 filed a series of complaints which  

have either been dismissed or quashed or stayed by the High Court or  

this  Court.   Learned  counsel  submitted  that  the  criminal  courts  

including the High Court have completely failed and erred in not  

condemning respondent No.1 for approaching the courts to obstruct  

the proceedings before the learned Single Judge of the Madras High  

Court. Learned counsel submitted that the disputes arose with regard  

to the Joint Venture Agreement between the parties have been finally  

adjudicated  by  the  Company  Law  Board  and  the  High  Court,  but  

respondent  No.1 instead  of  complying  with  the  directions  of  the  

Company Law Board and High Court started filing frivolous criminal  

cases against the appellant, which were either quashed or stayed by  

the High Court. Learned counsel seriously assailed the conduct of  

the  Superintendent  of  Police,  who  directed  reinvestigation  in  a  

matter which was finally closed. Learned counsel submitted that the  

Division  Bench  failed  to  note  that  the  entire  efforts  of  the  

respondent in prosecuting the appellant are serious abuse of the  

process of the Court. Learned counsel referred the allegations made  

in the complaint petition and submitted that the whole object of  

filing those complaints are nothing but to pressurize the appellant  

and to harass him.  Learned counsel then submitted that the whole  

procedure  in  the  proceedings  initiated  against  the  appellant  is  

violative  of  Article  21 of  the  Constitution  of  India.   It  was  

contended that the conduct of respondent No.1 is deplorable and the  

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same  is  contemptuous  amounting  to  deliberate  obstruction  of  the  

judicial  proceedings  and  an  abuse  of  the  process  of  the  Court.  

Learned  counsel  lastly  contended  that  the  Division  Bench  has  

erroneously set aside the order of the learned Single Judge on the  

ground that the issue was pending in this Court.

24. Mr.  Mukul  Rohatgi,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  in  

SLP(Crl.) Nos.1947-48 of 2013 after narrating the entire facts in the  

case and the sequence of events submitted that the continuation of  

criminal proceedings and the submission of the charge-sheet is the  

result of the wrong understanding of the order by Superintendent of  

Police, Tiruppur, who directed reinvestigation in a matter which was  

closed.  Learned  counsel,  therefore,  submitted  that  the  order  for  

reinvestigation passed by the Superintendent of Police is totally  

illegal, void and contemptuous.  It was contended that series of  

complaints filed by respondent No.1 has either been dismissed or  

quashed or stayed by the High Court and that respondent No.1 has the  

propensity to abuse the legal process and utilize it as a tool to  

wreak vengeance against others involved with the CEPL so that the  

appellants’  Company  does  not  pursue  the  Company  Law  Board  

proceedings.  Learned counsel submitted that it has been the modus  

operandi of respondent No.1 to file false and bogus complaints and  

utilize the same to harass and coerce the appellant.  Lastly, learned  

counsel  submitted  that  the  dispute  raised  by  the  respondent  is  

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purely a civil dispute but it has been given the colour of criminal  

act  with  the  sole  objective  to  implicate  and  detain  these  two  

appellants, who are foreigners, in criminal cases and not to allow  

them to travel outside India.  

25. Mr. C.A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel appearing for one of  

the appellants contended that it is a matter of record that every  

single complaint filed by respondent No. 1 has been either dismissed  

or quashed or stayed by the High Court or this Court and respondent  

No. 1 has the propensity to abuse the legal process and utilize it  

as a tool to wreak vengeance against others involved with CEPL so  

that the appellant’s company does not pursue the Company Law Board  

proceedings.   Learned counsel contended that it has been the modus  

operandi  of  respondent  No.  1  to  file  false  and  bogus  criminal  

complaints  and  to  utilize  the  same  to  harass  and  coerce  the  

appellant.  Respondent No. 1 had malafidely filed a complaint CC  

157/07  before  the  Judicial  Magistrate,  Perundurai.   This  was  an  

ingenious case where respondent No. 1 deliberately and fraudulently  

signed and issued a cheque from the CEPL account to his own company,  

namely, Cherraan Constructions Limited (CCL) for Rs. 5 crore (when  

there was no transaction, liability to the payee or authority to  

issue the cheque) and then caused the cheque to be dishonoured.  

Promptly, CCL  filed  a  Section  138  NI  Act  complaint  against  the  

appellant  and  the  other  Director  of  CEPL  etc.  but  did  not  make  

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respondent No. 1 an accused.  The Madras High Court quashed this  

complaint in Criminal O.P. No. 29737 of 2007.  

26. Mr.  Karthik  Sheshadri,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

respondent, on the other hand in support of continuance of criminal  

proceedings, submitted that the respondent - complainant made out a  

case in the complaint for prosecuting the appellant for cheating and  

misappropriation of money.  With regard to the filing of FIR being  

No.7 of 2007, learned counsel submitted that immediately after the  

FIR was lodged, the appellants approached the High Court of Madras  

and got an order of stay for further investigation in Criminal O.P.  

No. 12695/2007 and Criminal O.P. No.19384 of 2007 and consequently  

all further investigation of the crime alleged came to be stayed.  

Appellants also filed a case for quashing of the FIR before the  

Madras  High  Court.  Learned  counsel  vehemently  argued  that  FIR  

No.7/2007 was never closed at any point of time and, therefore, the  

direction for the reinvestigation was perfectly justified.  Based on  

the investigation, charge-sheet was filed.  According to the learned  

counsel,  the  Superintendent  of  Police  passed  order  for  the  

reinvestigation  only  because  no  investigation  was  ever  conducted  

because of the stay granted by the High Court.  While justifying the  

legality and validity of reinvestigation, learned counsel submitted  

that even without permission of the Magistrate, Police Officer can  

direct further investigation.  In support of that, learned counsel  

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relied upon the decision of this Court in State of Bihar & Another  

vs. J.A.C. Saldanna and Others,  AIR 1980 SC 326.  Lastly, learned  

counsel submitted that when the charge-sheet makes out a case then  

civil  liberty  is  not  the  appropriate  remedy  for  the  aggrieved  

person.  

27. In the light of factual situation and having gone through the  

entire facts and the sequence of events in the criminal proceedings  

before the criminal courts and the orders passed time to time by  

such courts, the question that falls for consideration is as to  

whether continuance of such criminal proceedings is an abuse of the  

process of the Court.

28. Before we embark upon dealing with the issue posed before us,  

we would like to discuss the principles laid down by various courts  

as to when continuance of criminal proceeding will amount to abuse  

of process of the Court.

29. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of  

refusal  to  allow  the  trial  to  proceed  is  well-established  and  

recognized doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India.  

There are some established principles of law which bar the trial  

when there appears to be abuse of process of court.  Lord Morris in  

the case of  Connelly vs. Director of Public Prosecutions,  (1964) 2  

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All ER 401 (HL) observed: “There can be no doubt that a court which  

is  endowed  with  a  particular  jurisdiction  has  powers  which  are  

necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction.  

A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rule of  

practice and to suppress any abuse of its process and to defeat any  

attempted  thwarting  of  its  process”.      “The  power  (which  is  

inherent in a court’s jurisdiction) to prevent abuse of its process  

and to control its own procedure must in a criminal court include a  

power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice.”  

In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed  

that where particular criminal proceedings  constitute an abuse of  

process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to  

proceed to trial.

30. In Hui Chi-Ming vs. The Queen [(1992) 1 AC 34 (PC)], the Privy  

Council defined the word “abuse of process” as something so unfair  

and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a  

prosecutor  to  proceed  with  what  is,  in  all  other  respects,  a  

perfectly supportable case.

31. In the leading case of Bennett vs. Horseferry Road Magistrates’  

Court, (1993) 3 All ER 138, on the application of abuse of process,  

the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of  

prosecution could arise in the following circumstances:

(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair  

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trial; or

(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of process  

because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to  

be  asked  to  try  the  accused  in  the  circumstances  of  the  

particular case.

32. In R. vs. Derby Crown Court ex p Brooks,  (1985) 80 Cr.App.R.  

164,  Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated: “It may be an abuse of  

process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the  

process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection  

provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b)  

on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be,  

prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on  

the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.”

33. Lord Justice Neill in  R. vs. Beckford,  [1996] 1 Cr.App.R. 94:  

[1995] R.T.R. 251 observed that: “The jurisdiction to stay can be  

exercised in many different circumstances.  Nevertheless two main  

strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the  

court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b)  

cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the  

defendant to be tried.”  What is unfair and wrong will be for the  

court to determine on the individual facts of each case.  

34. This Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and Others,  

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(1977) 2 SCC 699 observed that the wholesome power under Section 482  

Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes  

to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be  

an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice  

require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts  

have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal  

matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose.  A court proceeding  

ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment  

or persecution. The Court observed in this case that ends of justice  

are  higher  than  the  ends  of  mere  law  though  justice  must  be  

administered according to laws made by the legislature.   It was  

held in this case (at p.703 of SCC):

“7. …..

In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is  entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclu- sion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an  abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of jus- tice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The  saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil  and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary  public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not  to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment  or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object be- hind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material  on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the  like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceed- ing in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are  higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to  be administered according to laws made by the legislature.  The compelling necessity for making these observations is  that without a proper realisation of the object and pur- pose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent  powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State  

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and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the  width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”

This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of  

this Court and other courts.

35. In State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992  

Supp.(1) SCC 335,  this Court in the backdrop of interpretation of  

various relevant provisions of Cr.P.C. under Chapter XIV and of the  

principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions  

relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article  

226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Sec-

tion 482 Cr.P.C. gave the following categories of cases by way of il-

lustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent  

abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of  

justice. Thus, this Court made it clear that it may not be possible  

to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised  

and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaus-

tive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be ex-

ercised: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)

“102. (1) ………

(2) …..

(3) ……

(4) …..

(5) …..

(6)…..

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended  with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously  instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance  

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on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private  and personal grudge.”

36.  This Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and Others vs.  

Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Another, (2005) 1 SCC 122  observed thus:  

(SCC p. 128, para 8)

“8. … It would be an abuse of process of the court to al- low any action which would result in injustice and prevent  promotion  of  justice.  In  exercise  of  the powers,  court  would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds  that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the  process of court or quashing of these proceedings would  otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is  disclosed  by  the  complaint,  the  court  may  examine  the  question  of  fact.  When  a  complaint  is  sought  to  be  quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to  assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any  offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted  in toto.”

37. In  Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others, (2006) 6  

SCC 736 this Court again cautioned about a growing tendency in busi-

ness circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases.  

The Court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies  

are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of  

lenders/creditors.  The Court further observed that: (SCC p. 749,  

para 13)

“13. … Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims,  which  do  not  involve  any  criminal  offence,  by  applying  pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated  and discouraged.”

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38. In the case of Inder Mohan Goswami and Another vs. State of Ut-

taranchal and Others,  (2007) 12 SCC 1, this Court after considering  

series of decisions observed:

“46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution  is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking  private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise  the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we  are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desir- able to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the  exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction  of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has  to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and  only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid  down  in  the  statute  itself  and  in  the  aforementioned  cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned  judgment cannot be sustained.

xxx xxx xxx

50. Civilised countries have recognised that liberty is  the most precious of all the human rights. The American  Declaration of Independence, 1776, French Declaration of  the Rights of Men and the Citizen, 1789, Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights and the International Covenant of  Civil and Political Rights, 1966 all speak with one voice— liberty is the natural and inalienable right of every hu- man being. Similarly, Article 21 of our Constitution pro- claims that no one shall be deprived of his liberty except  in accordance with procedure prescribed by law.

51. The issuance of non-bailable warrants involves inter- ference  with  personal  liberty.  Arrest  and  imprisonment  means deprivation of the most precious right of an indi- vidual. Therefore, the courts have to be extremely careful  before issuing non-bailable warrants.

52. Just as liberty is precious for an individual so is  the interest of the society in maintaining law and order.  Both  are  extremely  important  for  the  survival  of  a  civilised society. Sometimes in the larger interest of the  public and the State it becomes absolutely imperative to  

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curtail freedom  of  an  individual  for a certain  period,  only then the non-bailable warrants should be issued.”

39. In  G. Sagar Suri and Another vs.  State of U.P. and Others,  

(2000) 2 SCC 636, this Court observed that it is the duty and obli-

gation of the criminal court to exercise a great deal of caution in  

issuing the process, particularly when matters are essentially of  

civil nature.

40. In the case of S.N. Sharma vs. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Others,  

AIR 1970 SC 786 (at p.789), this Court has stated thus:  

“7. …..   It  appears  to  us  that,  though  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to  investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable  offence  has  been  committed,  in  appropriate  cases  an  aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the  power  of  the  High  Court  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  under  which,  if  the  High  Court  could  be  convinced  that  the  power  of  investigation  has  been  exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court  can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police  officer from misusing his legal powers. The fact that the  Code does not contain any other provision giving power to  a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police cannot be  a ground for holding that such a power must be read in  Section 159 of the Code.”

41. In the case of State of West Bengal and Others vs. Swapan Kumar  

Guha and Others,  AIR 1982 SC 949 while examining the power of a  

police officer in the field of investigation of a cognizable offence,  

Chandrachud, C.J. has affirmed the view expressed by Mathew, J. and  

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observed as follows: (at p.958 of AIR)

“22. ….  There is no such thing like unfettered discretion  in the realm of powers defined by statutes and indeed,  unlimited discretion in that sphere can become a ruthless  destroyer of personal freedom. The power to investigate  into  cognizable  offences  must,  therefore,  be  exercised  strictly on the condition on which it is granted by the  Code. ….”

42. In the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar and  

Another, (2005) 10 SCC 336, this Court has held as under:

“6. Now  the  question  to  be  examined  by  us  is  as  to  whether  on  the  facts  disclosed  in  the  petition  of  complaint any criminal offence whatsoever is made out much  less  offences  under  Sections  420/120-B  IPC.  The  only  allegation in the complaint petition against the accused  persons is that they assured the complainant that when  they receive the insurance claim amounting to Rs 4,20,000,  they would pay a sum of Rs 2,60,000 to the complainant out  of that but the same has never been paid. Apart from that  there is no other allegation in the petition of complaint.  It was pointed out on behalf of the complainant that the  accused fraudulently persuaded the complainant to agree so  that the accused persons may take steps for moving the  Consumer Forum in relation to the claim of Rs 4,20,000. It  is well settled that every breach of contract would not  give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases  breach of contract would amount to cheating where there  was any deception played at the very inception. If the  intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot  amount to cheating. In the present case it has nowhere  been  stated  that  at  the  very  inception  there  was  any  intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which  is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420  IPC.

7. In our view petition of complaint does not disclose any  criminal offence at all much less any offence either under  Section 420 or Section 120-B IPC and the present case is a  case of purely civil dispute between the parties for which  remedy  lies  before  a  civil  court  by  filing  a  properly  

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constituted suit. In our opinion, in view of these facts  allowing the police investigation to continue would amount  to an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the  same it was just and expedient for the High Court to quash  the same by exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC  which it has erroneously refused.”

43. Coming back to the instant case from the affidavits filed by the  

parties, the facts which come into light are that the appellant-

Chandran Ratnaswami settled in Canada since 1974.  He is holding  

executive posts in various companies based in Canada and has made  

investment in India worth more than 1 billion USD.  He is also a  

Director on the Board of various renowned companies including ORE  

Holdings Limited based in Mauritius.  The said company ORE entered  

into  a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with C.G. Holdings Private  

Limited (respondent No.1 – K.C. Palanisamy’s Company) and N. Athappan  

for constructing and developing a hotel property, shopping complex  

etc. owned by Cherraan Properties Limited (CPL) and Vasantha Mills  

Limited (VML).  ORE invested Rs.75 crores and got 45% in Cheran  

Enterprises Private Limited (CEPL).   Athappan invested Rs. 4 crores  

and got 10%.   

44. Disputes arose between the parties when respondent No.1 alleged  

to have transferred shares of CPL and VML to CEPL instead of bringing  

money and got 45% shareholdings in CEPL.  Respondent No.1 allegedly  

swindled the said 75 crores deposited by the appellant Company ORE  

and transferred the immovable assets of CPL and VML, subsidiaries of  

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CEPL.   

Consequently, ORE filed Company Petition before the Company Law  

Board on account of alleged acts of oppression and mismanagement  

indulged by respondent No.1.  The matter before the Company Law Board  

was hotly contested and finally the Company Law Board by order dated  

13th August, 2008 directed respondent No.1, CG Holdings and CEPL to  

return the investment of appellant Company ORE and Athappan with 8%  

interest.  On payment of money it was directed that respondent K.C.  

Palanisamy  will  take  control  of  CEPL  and  its  subsidiaries.  

Clarification Petition was also disposed of by Company Law Board on  

13th August, 2008.

45. Both the parties moved the Madras High Court by filing appeals  

and those Company Appeals were finally disposed of on 5th August,  

2011 and the order passed by the Company Law Board was confirmed.    

The Division Bench of the Madras High Court while confirming  

the  view  taken  by the  Company Law  Board  held  that  both  parties  

cannot jointly run the business and, therefore, to ensure smooth  

exit of ORE and Athappan, the Company Law Board passed the order.  

The said order of the Division Bench passed in appeals, however, was  

not challenged by respondent No.1 K.C. Palanisamy.

46. The  appellant  filed  execution  case,  which  is  pending.   It  

further appears that a suit was also filed being O.S.No.90 of 2007  

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before the District Munsiff Court.  

47. Instead of complying with the order of the Company Law Board  

and the directions and observations made by the Madras High Court in  

the aforementioned Company Appeals, respondent No.1 started filing  

several  criminal  complaints  against  the  appellant.   The  first  

complaint was filed by the respondent before the Economic Offences  

Wing, Chennai, alleging that ORE invested only Rs. 75 crores and for  

not bringing Rs. 300 crores in Joint Venture Company.  The petition  

filed in the High Court seeking direction to EOW to take action on  

the complaint was, however, withdrawn.  Respondent No.1 then filed a  

second complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, Perundurai which  

was dismissed after examining respondent No.1 and his two witnesses.  

The  respondent  then  filed  another  complaint  before  the  Judicial  

Magistrate, Kangeyam without disclosing the dismissal of the earlier  

complaint  filed  before the  Judicial  Magistrate,  Perundurai.   The  

said complaint finally came to be registered as FIR No.7 of 2007.  

The appellant moved the High Court for quashing the said FIR.  In  

the  said  petition,  the  High  Court,  after  noticing  the  similar  

complaint filed earlier by respondent No.1 in the court of  Judicial  

Magistrate, Perundurai, finally observed that the second criminal  

proceeding initiated by respondent No.1 has no merit.  The court  

further passed a stringent remark against the conduct of respondent  

No.1 for filing cases on the same issue.

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48. Respondent  No.1  then  moved  this  Court  by  filing  SLP(Crl.)  

No.9853 of 2010 alleging the pendency of the protest petition and  

non-closure of the criminal case.  This Court refused to interfere  

with the order but observed that if any protest petition is pending  

the same shall be disposed of in accordance with law.

49. Curiously enough, on the report of Superintendent of Police,  

Tiruppur, the criminal case in FIR No.7 of 2007 was directed to be  

reopened for re-investigation.  On this FIR, the Magistrate before  

whom the criminal case was pending passed various orders which were  

time to time challenged by the aggrieved party before the High Court  

and before this Court.  Simultaneously, the appellant also filed  

counter  criminal  cases  against  the  respondent  which  were  also  

proceeded and are pending in those criminal courts.   

50. In  a  nutshell,  the  dispute  arising  out  of  Joint  Venture  

Agreement has been fully and finally settled by the Company Law Board  

and  also  the  High  Court  and  several  directions  were  issued  for  

compliance including the return of the amount by respondent No.1 to  

the appellant and to become the sole owner of those companies.  

51. It is pertinent to mention here that in course of arguments the  

action of Superintendent of Police was challenged by the learned  

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counsel appearing for the appellant.  In order to justify the action  

of the Superintendent of Police in directing the investigation, Mr.  

P.S.  Narsimhan,  learned  senior  counsel  submitted  that  on  the  

instruction of Inspector General of Police such reinvestigation was  

directed by the Superintendent of Police.  However, no such letter of  

instruction has been produced before us by the learned counsel.  At  

this juncture, we reiterate that the power of Police Officers in the  

field of investigation of a cognizable offence is not unlimited.  

Hence, the power during the investigation must be exercised strictly  

within the limitation prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure  

and such power may not result in destroying the personal freedom of  

a citizen.

52. As noticed above, after the dispute was finally settled by the  

Company  Law  Board  and  the  Madras  High  Court  in  appeal,  the  

respondent  approached  the  Economic  Offences  Wing,  who  refused  to  

entertain the complaint.  The respondent then moved the complaint  

before the Judicial Magistrate,  Perundurai for initiating criminal  

action  against  the  appellant  for  breach  of  contract,  which  was  

dismissed by the Magistrate holding the same as nothing but to take  

vengeance. The Magistrate further held that if the conditions of the  

agreement are violated the respondent has to seek remedy under the  

Contract Act or the Company Law instead of filing criminal case.  

Suppressing  the  said  complaint  and  the  order  passed  by  the  

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Magistrate, the respondent tried again by filing a complaint before  

the  Judicial  Magistrate,  Kangayam  for  initiating  criminal  action  

against the appellants for the breach of contract and conspiracy.  

Although the FIR was registered, but a closure report as a mistake  

of  fact  was  prepared.   The  High  Court  while  passing  the  order  

observed  that  the  Court  would  frown  upon  the  conduct  of  the  

complainant in indulging in repeated harassment of the petitioners-

appellants.  Irrespective of the dispute with regard to the closure  

of the case, a fresh life was given to the criminal case at the  

instance of Superintendent of Police, who directed re-investigation  

and in course of the said criminal proceeding irrespective of FIR  

No.7/2007 the appellants were harassed and on technicalities various  

orders for surrender, arrest and their detention had been passed.  

As noticed above, in the three writ petitions filed by respondent  

No.1, though not against the appellant but against the C.B.I. in  

respect of  different transactions,  the  High Court  dismissing  all  

those writ petitions observed that the  modus operandi of the writ  

petitioner (respondent No.1) was to defraud the person or entity and  

thereafter approach the Courts with multiple proceedings in order to  

distract attention from his own misdeeds.

53. Neither  the  High  Court  nor  the  Magisterial  Court  have  ever  

applied their mind and considered the conduct of the respondent and  

continuance  of  criminal  proceedings  in  respect  of  the  disputes,  

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which are civil in nature and finally adjudicated by the competent  

authority i.e. the Company Law Board and the High Court in appeal.

54. We  are  of  the  definite  opinion  that  the  complainant  has  

manipulated and misused the process of Court so as to deprive the  

appellants from their basic right to move free anywhere inside or  

outside the country.  Moreover, it would be unfair if the appellants  

are to be tried in such criminal proceedings arising out of alleged  

breach of a Joint Venture Agreement specially when such disputes  

have been finally resolved by the Court of competent jurisdiction.  

Hence, allowing the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No.7 of  

2007 to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court and,  

therefore, for the ends of justice such  proceedings ought to be  

quashed.  Since the High Court failed to look into this aspect of  

the matter while passing the impugned order, in our opinion, the  

same could not be sustained in law.

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55. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeals arising out of SLP (C)  

No.13120 of 2013, SLP (Crl.) Nos.3273-3274 of 2013 and SLP (Crl.)  

Nos.1947-1948 of 2013 are allowed, whereas the appeals arising out of  

SLP (Crl.) Nos.1924-1926 of 2013 and SLP (C) Nos.11342-11343 of 2013  

are dismissed.  There shall be no order as to costs.

56. Although  we  do  not  appreciate  the  action  of  a  senior  

Superintendent of Police, but in view of the order passed in these  

appeals, we do not want to proceed any further in Contempt Petition  

(C) No.166 of 2013, which stands disposed of.

……………………………..J. (P. Sathasivam)

……………………………..J. (M.Y. Eqbal)

New Delhi, May 09, 2013.

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ITEM NO. IE COURT NO.2 SECTION XII (FOR JUDGMENT)

              S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A                            RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4540 OF 2013 @ PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CIVIL) NO.13120/2013

CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI .. Appellant(s)

   Versus

K.C. PALANISAMY & ORS .. Respondent(s)

                        WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.736-737 OF 2013 @ SLP(CRL.)NOs. 3273-3274/2013

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.731-733  OF 2013 @ SLP(CRL.)NOs.1924-1926/2013

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4537-4538 OF 2013 @ SLP(C)NOs.11342-11343/2013

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.734-735 OF 2013 @ SLP(CRL.)NOs.1947-1948/2013

CONTEMPT PETITION(CIVIL) NO.. 166/2013 IN SLP(CRL.)NO.9853 OF 2010

DATE : 09/05/2013        These matters were called on for                           pronouncement of judgment today.  

                                                                   For Appellant(s) Mr. E.C. Agrawala,Adv.

For Respondent(s) M/s. Mahalakshmi Balaji & Co.

Mr. Subramonium Prasad,AAG Mr. M.Yogesh Kanna,Adv. Mr. A.Santha Kumaran,Adv. Ms. Sasi Kala,Adv.

Mr. Senthil Jagadessan,Adv.

              --- ...2/-

-2-

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Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  M.Y.  Eqbal  pronounced  the  judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.  Sathasivam and His Lordship.

Leave granted.

The  appeals  arising  out  of  SLP  (C)  No.13120 of  2013, SLP (Crl.) Nos.3273-3274 of 2013 and SLP (Crl.)  Nos.1947-1948 of 2013 are allowed, whereas the appeals  arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.1924-1926 of 2013 and SLP  (C) Nos.11342-11343 of 2013 are dismissed.  There shall  be no order as to costs.

Although  we  do  not  appreciate  the  action  of  a  senior Superintendent of Police, but in view of the  order  passed  in  these  appeals,  we  do  not  want  to  proceed any further in Contempt Petition (C) No.166 of  2013, which stands disposed of.

   [ Madhu Bala ]        Sr.PA  

    [ Savita Sainani ]    Court Master  

[ Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file ]  

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