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REPORTABLE   

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.866 OF 2015 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5702 of 2012]

CHANDRA BABU @ MOSES ... Appellant

Versus

STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE & ORS.                ... Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

2. In  this  appeal,  by  special  leave,  the

informant-appellant calls in question the defensibility of the

order dated 13.12.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge

of the High Court of  Judicature of  Madras at Madurai in

Criminal Revision No. 790/2011 whereby he has annulled

the  order  dated  2.9.2010  passed  by  the  learned  Chief

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Judicial Magistrate, Nagercoil directing further investigation

in exercise  of  power under  Section 173(8)  of  the  Code of

Criminal  Procedure  (CrPC)  and  also  directing  the

investigation  to  be  carried  out  by  C.B.C.I.D.;  on  the

foundation that in the obtaining fact situation there are no

exceptional circumstances for ordering re-investigation.

3. As the facts would unfurl, the appellant filed an FIR

with  the  Sub-Inspector  of  Police,  Kulasekaram  Police

Station,  upon which  Crime  No.  119/2007 was  registered

u/s 147, 148, 341, 324, 323 and 307 of Indian Penal Code

(IPC). The informant had alleged that on 05.06.2007 about 2

p.m.,  Manikandan,   Jegan,  Murugan,  Vijayan,  Sunil  and

some others attacked him with ‘Vettu Kathi’, knife and iron

rod and in the said attack he sustained multiple injuries.

The motive behind the assault, as per the FIR, was due to

business  rivalry  that  existed  between  the  appellant  and

Manikandan,  as  both  are  contractors.  The  Inspector  of

Police,  Kulasekaram  Police  Station  conducted  the  initial

investigation and subsequently the case was transferred to

the  District  Crime  Branch  Police,  Kanyakumari  and

thereafter,  the  Inspector  of  Police,  District  Crime  Branch

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filed a final  report before the learned Judicial  Magistrate,

Padmanabhapuram stating that the case was a mistake of

fact.  The learned Judicial Magistrate on intimation to the

informant accepted the final report.  

4. In the meantime, the appellant had filed a protest

petition dated 5.1.2009 forming the subject matter of Crl.

M.P.  no.  1974/2009  on  the  file  of  the  learned  Judicial

Magistrate praying therein to direct CBCID to re-open the

case and file a fresh report. However, as the final report had

already been accepted before disposing the protest petition,

the appellant preferred Crl. O.P. no. 1727/2009 before the

Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court. The High Court

called  for  the  report  from  the  Magistrate’s  Court  and,

thereafter, set aside the order accepting the final report and

directed the  Magistrate  to  consider  the  final  report  along

with the protest petition.

5. The learned Magistrate vide order dated 29.07.2009

dismissed the protest petition. It took note of the decisions

in  Hasanbhai  Valibhai  Quareshi  vs  State  of  Gujarat

and Ors.1 and Hemant Dhasmana vs CBI and Anr.2, and

1  (2004) 5 SCC 347 2  (2001) 7 SCC536

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held that as the investigation officer had examined all the

witnesses  as  averred  by  the  informant  and  received  the

evidence  and  as  no  new  witnesses  were  cited  to  be

examined,  there  was  no  justification  for  directing

reinvestigation  of  the  case.   It  further  directed  that  the

protest  petition  to  be  treated  as  a  separate  private

complaint.

6. Being  aggrieved  by  the  said  order,  the  appellant

preferred Criminal Revision Petition, i.e., Crl. R.C. No. 458

of  2009  in  the  High  Court.   Before  the  High  Court,  the

appellant  contended that  the order of  the Magistrate was

based on the acceptance of the final report submitted by the

police and the order did not reflect any application of mind

on his part. It was further urged that the order was bereft of

discussion  of  the  evidence  gathered  by  the  Investigating

Officer,  and that  apart  there was total  non-application of

mind either for acceptance or rejection of the statements of

the  witnesses  filed  along  with  the  final  report.  The  High

Court  while  setting  aside  the  order  of  learned Magistrate

observed  that  the  lower  court  fell  into  error  by  neither

discussing the  material  available,  nor  clearly  spelling  out

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the reasons  and shirked its duty by merely permitting the

petitioner,  therein,  to pursue his cause by way of private

complaint.  The learned Single Judge, accordingly,  allowed

the revision and concluded thus:-  

“This  Court  has  resisted  from entering  upon a discussion on the merits of  the case or on the materials  before  it  so  as  to  avoid  prejudice  to either side.  With the aim is to avoid prejudice and  alleged  bias,  as  rightly  submitted  by  the learned  senior  counsel,  it  would  be  better  that the reconsideration of  the final  report  and also the  materials  towards  arriving  at  a  finding  of whether  the  case  is  one  calling  for  further proceedings against the accused or otherwise, be left  to  the  judicial  discretion  of  another  Court. Accordingly,  the  Judicial  Magistrate, Padmanabhapuram,  is  directed  to  forward  all records pertaining to Crime no. 119 of 2007 on the file of the respondent police to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagercoil within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagercoil is in turn directed to consider the 173 report as also the materials, hear both the public prosecutor and the de-facto complainant who has filed  the  protest  petition  and  pass  orders  in accordance of law.”   

7. After  the  remit,  the  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,

Nagercoil, took up the case for further enquiry. The Court

after hearing both the appellant and the Assistant  Public

Prosecutor came to the conclusion that the investigation by

the  Inspector  of  Police,  District  Crime  Branch  had  been

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conducted in a biased manner and the said authority had

laboured hard to save the accused persons and hence, the

final report submitted by the investigating officer was not

acceptable.  Thereafter,  it  took  note  of  the  judgments  in

Hemant  Dhasmana  (supra),  Sonalai  Soni  vs  State  of

Chattisgarh  and  Ors.3,  and  Hasanbhai  Valibhai

Quareshi  (supra), and came to hold that in terms of the

said judgments there is power under S. 173 (8) of CrPC to

forward  the  complaint  for  further  investigation  and

resultantly  by  order  dated  02.09.2010  directed  the

Additional Director General of Police, CBCID to confer the

power on the Inspector, CBCID, Nagercoil to investigate the

case in Crime no. 119/2007 and file a report.

8. Being  aggrieved  by  the  said  order,  one  of  the

accused,  Jegan,  filed  Criminal  Revision No.  790 of  2011.

The High Court, vide the impugned order, after discussing

the  evidence  on  record,  came  to  hold  that  there  were

material  discrepancies  in  the  evidence  brought  on record

and, therefore, in the present fact situation there were no

exceptional circumstances for ordering re-investigation, and

3  2005 Crl.L.J. 4461 (Chattishgarh)

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that apart, the scheme of Section 173(8) CrPC only enables

the investigating officer to request for further investigation.

The High Court, accordingly, set aside the order of the Chief

Judicial Magistrate and further observed that as the learned

Judicial  Magistrate  in  his  order  dated  13.07.2009  had

directed  that  the  protest  petition  was  to  be  treated  as  a

private  complaint,  the  de-facto  complainant  still  had  an

opportunity for presenting the case before the Court and no

prejudice was caused to him.

9. We  have  heard  Mr.  K.V.  Vishwanathan,  learned

senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. M. Yogesh Kanna,

learned  counsel  for  the  State  and  Mr.  S.  Thananjayan,

learned counsel for the respondent no.3.

10. It is submitted by Mr. Vishwanathan, learned senior

counsel  that  the  High  Court  has  absolutely  flawed  by

entering into the merits of the case when the learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate had only directed for reinvestigation by

different investigating agency.  It is urged by him that if the

order  passed  by  the  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  is  read  in

entirety, it would convey that he in actuality has directed for

further  investigation,  but  has  used  the  expression

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“reinvestigation”  as  it  was  directing  investigation  to  be

carried out by another agency.  It is his further submission

that in view of the earlier order passed by the High Court,

the order impugned in this appeal is wholly unsustainable.   

11. Learned counsel for the private respondent no.3 in

support  of  the  decision of  the  High Court  has  submitted

that  the  learned  Magistrate  has  no  power  for  directing

reinvestigation,  and hence,  the  order  passed by the  High

Court is absolutely impregnable.  It is also his submission

that when a protest petition is filed and it has been directed

to be treated as a private complaint,  the appellant,  in no

manner, is prejudiced and, therefore, there is no warrant for

interference in this appeal.  

12. First,  we  shall  dwell  upon the  issue  whether  the

High Court, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, should

have adverted to the merits of the case in extenso.  As the

factual matrix would reveal, the learned Single Judge has

dwelled  upon  in  great  detail  on  the  statements  of  the

witnesses  to  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  there  are

remarkable discrepancies with regard to the facts and there

is  nothing  wrong with  the  investigation.   In  fact,  he  has

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noted certain facts and deduced certain conclusions, which,

as we find, are beyond the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

It is well settled in law that inherent as well as revisional

jurisdiction  should  be  exercised  cautiously.   Normally,  a

revisional jurisdiction should be exercised on a question of

law.  However, when factual appreciation is involved, then it

must find place in the class of cases resulting in a perverse

finding.  Basically, the power is required to be exercised so

that justice is done and there is no abuse of power by the

Court.  (see Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander4).   

13. Judging  on  the  aforesaid  premises,  we  have  no

shadow of doubt that the High Court has adverted to the

facts not to see the perversity of approach, or to see that

justice  is  done,  but  analysed it  from an angle  as  if  it  is

exercising  the  appellate  jurisdiction.   Therefore,  the  High

Court’s  conclusion  with  regard  to  the  factual  score  is

unsustainable.   

14. Presently  to  the  thrust  of  the  matter,  the

controversy before the learned Single Judge was basically

two-fold,  namely,  whether  the  learned  Chief  Judicial

4  (2012) 9 SCC 460

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Magistrate  could  have  directed  for  reinvestigation  and

secondly, whether it could have directed for reinvestigation

by  another  investigating  agency.   To  appreciate  the  said

issues, it is necessary to analyse the scheme of Section 190

of the CrPC.  The said provision reads as follows:-

“190. Cognizance  of  offences  by Magistrates.  –  (1)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of this  Chapter,  any Magistrate  of  the  first  class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence_  

(a)  upon  receiving  a  complaint  of  facts  which constitute such offence. (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon  information  received  from  any  person other  than  a  police  officer,  or  upon  his  own knowledge,  that  such  offence  has  been committed.

(2)   The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any  Magistrate  of  the  second  class  to  take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try.”

In  Uma  Shankar  Singh  v.  State  of  Bihar5, a

two-Judge Bench was considering the issue pertaining to

the power of the Magistrate under Section 190(1)(b) of CrPC.

The Court, scanning the anatomy of the provision, opined

that the Magistrate is not bound to accept the final report 5  (2010) 9 SCC 479

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filed by the investigating agency under Section 173(2) of the

Code and is entitled to issue process against an accused

even  though  exonerated  by  the  said  authorities.   The

principle stated by the two-Judge Bench reads as follows:-

“19. … even if the investigating authority is of the view that no case has been made out against an accused,  the  Magistrate  can  apply  his  mind independently to the materials contained in the police  report  and take cognizance thereupon in exercise  of  his  powers  under  Section  190(1)(b) CrPC.”

The said principle was followed by another two-Judge

Bench in Moti Lal Songara v. Prem Prakash6.

15. In  Dharam  Pal  v.  State  of  Haryana7,  the

Constitution  Bench,  while  accepting  the  view  in  Kishun

Singh v. State of Bihar8, has held thus:-

“35. In  our  view,  the  Magistrate  has  a  role  to play while  committing the case to the Court of Session  upon  taking  cognizance  on  the  police report submitted before him under Section 173(2) CrPC. In the event the Magistrate disagrees with the police report, he has two choices. He may act on  the  basis  of  a  protest  petition  that  may be filed, or he may, while disagreeing with the police report, issue process and summon the accused. Thereafter, if on being satisfied that a case had been made out  to  proceed  against  the  persons named in column 2 of the report, proceed to try

6  (2013) 9 SCC 199 7  (2014) 3 SCC 306 8  (1993) 2 SCC 16

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the said persons or if he was satisfied that a case had  been  made  out  which  was  triable  by  the Court of Session, he may commit the case to the Court of Session to proceed further in the matter.

36. This brings us to the third question as to the procedure to be followed by the Magistrate if he was satisfied that a prima facie case had been made out to go to trial  despite the final  report submitted by the police. In such an event, if the Magistrate  decided  to  proceed  against  the persons accused,  he would have  to  proceed on the  basis  of  the  police  report  itself  and  either inquire into the matter or commit it to the Court of Session if the same was found to be triable by the Sessions Court.”

16. We  have  referred  to  the  aforesaid  authorities  to

reiterate the legal  position that a Magistrate can disagree

with  the  police  report  and  take  cognizance  and  issue

process and summons to the accused.  Thus, the Magistrate

has the jurisdiction to ignore the opinion expressed by the

investigating  officer  and independently  apply  his  mind to

the facts that have emerged from the investigation.  

17. Having stated thus, we may presently proceed to deal

with the facet of law where the Magistrate disagrees with the

report and on applying his independent mind feels there has

to be a further investigation and under that circumstance

what he is precisely required to do. In this regard, we may

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usefully  refer  to  a  notable  passage  from  a  three-Judge

Bench decision in Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police9,

which is to the following effect:-

“4. Now, when the report forwarded by the officer in  charge  of  a  police  station  to  the  Magistrate under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 comes up for  consideration by the Magistrate,  one of  two different  situations  may  arise.  The  report  may conclude that  an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in  such  a  case,  the  Magistrate  may  do  one  of three things:  (1)  he may accept  the report  and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (2) he may disagree with the report and drop the  proceeding,  or  (3)  he  may  direct  further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report. The report may on the other hand state that, in the opinion of the police, no offence appears to have  been committed and where such a report has  been  made,  the  Magistrate  again  has  an option to adopt one of three courses: (1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding, or (2) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of Section  156.  Where,  in  either  of  these  two situations,  the  Magistrate  decides  to  take cognizance of  the offence and to issue process, the informant is not prejudicially affected nor is the injured or in case of death, any relative of the deceased  aggrieved,  because  cognizance  of  the offence  is  taken  by  the  Magistrate  and  it  is decided  by  the  Magistrate  that  the  case  shall proceed. But if the Magistrate decides that there

9  (1985) 2 SCC 537

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is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drops  the  proceeding  or  takes  the  view  that though there is sufficient ground for proceeding against  some,  there  is  no  sufficient  ground for proceeding against others mentioned in the first information report, the informant would certainly be prejudiced because the first information report lodged by him would have failed of its purpose, wholly or in part. Moreover, when the interest of the  informant  in  prompt  and  effective  action being taken on the first information report lodged by  him  is  clearly  recognised  by  the  provisions contained  in  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  154, sub-section (2) of Section 157 and sub-section (2) (ii) of Section 173, it must be presumed that the informant would equally be interested in seeing that  the  Magistrate  takes  cognizance  of  the offence and issues process, because that would be  culmination  of  the  first  information  report lodged by him. There can, therefore, be no doubt that when, on a consideration of the report made by the officer in charge of a police station under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173, the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence and issue process,  the  informant  must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his  submissions  to  persuade  the  Magistrate  to take cognizance of the offence and issue process. We  are  accordingly  of  the  view  that  in  a  case where  the  Magistrate  to  whom  a  report  is forwarded under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to  drop  the  proceeding  or  takes  the  view  that there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding against  some  of  the  persons  mentioned  in  the first information report, the Magistrate must give notice  to  the  informant  and  provide  him  an opportunity  to  be  heard  at  the  time  of consideration of the report.  It was urged before us on behalf of the respondents that if in such a case  notice  is  required  to  be  given  to  the

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informant,  it  might  result  in unnecessary delay on account of the difficulty of effecting service of the notice on the informant. But we do not think this can be regarded as a valid objection against the view we are taking, because in any case the action taken by the police on the first information report has to be communicated to the informant and a copy of  the report has to be supplied to him under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 and if that  be  so,  we  do  not  see  any  reason  why  it should  be  difficult  to  serve  notice  of  the consideration  of  the  report  on  the  informant. Moreover, in any event, the difficulty of service of notice on the informant cannot possibly provide any  justification  for  depriving  the  informant  of the opportunity of being heard at the time when the report is considered by the Magistrate.”

18. Relying on the said paragraph, a two-Judge Bench in

Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali10, has opined thus:-

“37. In some judgments of this Court, a view has been advanced, [amongst others in  Reeta Nag v. State  of  W.B11,  Ram Naresh  Prasad v.  State  of Jharkhand12 and  Randhir  Singh  Rana v.  State (Delhi  Admn.)13]  that  a  Magistrate  cannot  suo motu direct  further  investigation under  Section 173(8) of the Code or direct reinvestigation into a case on account of the bar contained in Section 167(2) of the Code, and that a Magistrate could direct  filing  of  a  charge-sheet  where  the  police submits a report that no case had been made out for sending up an accused for trial.  The gist of the view taken in these cases is that a Magistrate cannot  direct  reinvestigation  and  cannot  suo motu direct further investigation.

10  (2013) 5 SCC 762 11  (2009) 9 SCC 129 12  (2009) 11 SCC 299 13  (1997) 1 SCC 361

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38. However,  having  given  our  considered thought  to  the  principles  stated  in  these judgments, we are of the view that the Magistrate before whom a report under Section 173(2) of the Code  is  filed,  is  empowered  in  law  to  direct “further investigation”  and require the police to submit  a  further  or  a  supplementary  report.  A three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Bhagwant Singh has,  in  no  uncertain  terms,  stated  that principle, as aforenoticed.

39. The  contrary  view  taken  by  the  Court  in Reeta Nag and Randhir Singh do not consider the view of this Court expressed in Bhagwant Singh. The decision of the Court in  Bhagwant Singh in regard to the issue in hand cannot be termed as an obiter. The ambit and scope of the power of a Magistrate in terms of  Section 173 of  the Code was squarely debated before that Court and the three-Judge  Bench  concluded  as  aforenoticed. Similar  views  having  been  taken  by  different Benches of this Court while following  Bhagwant Singh, are thus squarely in line with the doctrine of precedent. To some extent, the view expressed in  Reeta  Nag,  Ram Naresh and  Randhir  Singh, besides being different on facts, would have to be examined  in  light  of  the  principle  of  stare decisis.”

And eventually the Division Bench ruled:-

“40. Having analysed the provisions of the Code and the various judgments as aforeindicated, we would state the following conclusions in regard to the  powers  of  a  Magistrate  in  terms of  Section 173(2)  read  with  Section  173(8)  and  Section 156(3) of the Code:

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40.1. The  Magistrate  has  no  power  to  direct “reinvestigation” or “fresh investigation” (de novo) in  the  case  initiated  on  the  basis  of  a  police report.

40.2. A  Magistrate  has  the  power  to  direct “further  investigation”  after  filing  of  a  police report in terms of Section 173(6) of the Code.

40.3. The view expressed in Sub-para 40.2 above is in conformity with the principle of law stated in Bhagwant  Singh  case by  a  three-Judge  Bench and  thus  in  conformity  with  the  doctrine  of precedent.

40.4. Neither  the  scheme of  the  Code  nor  any specific  provision therein  bars  exercise  of  such jurisdiction  by  the  Magistrate.  The  language  of Section  173(2)  cannot  be  construed  so restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such powers  particularly  in  face  of  the  provisions  of Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power would have to be read into the language of Section 173(8).

40.5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it must receive a construction which would advance the cause of justice and legislative object sought to be achieved. It does not stand to reason that the  legislature  provided  power  of  further investigation  to  the  police  even  after  filing  a report, but intended to curtail the power of the court to the extent that even where the facts of the  case  and  the  ends  of  justice  demand,  the court can still not direct the investigating agency to conduct further investigation which it could do on its own.”

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19. We have reproduced the conclusion in extenso as we

are disposed to think that the High Court has fallen into

error in its appreciation of the order passed by the learned

Chief Judicial Magistrate.  It has to be construed in the light

of the eventual direction.  The order, in fact, as we perceive,

presents  that  the  learned  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  was

really inclined to direct further investigation but because he

had  chosen  another  agency,  he  has  used  the  word

“reinvestigation”.   Needless  to  say,  the  power  of  the

Magistrate  to  direct  for  further  investigation  has  to  be

cautiously used.  In Vinay Tyagi (supra) it has been held:

“The  power  of  the  Magistrate  to  direct  “further investigation” is a significant power which has to be exercised sparingly, in exceptional cases and to  achieve  the  ends  of  justice.  To  provide  fair, proper  and  unquestionable  investigation  is  the obligation  of  the  investigating  agency  and  the court  in  its  supervisory  capacity  is  required to ensure  the  same.  Further  investigation conducted  under  the  orders  of  the  court, including that of the Magistrate or by the police of its own accord and, for valid reasons, would lead to the filing of a supplementary report. Such supplementary report shall be dealt with as part of the primary report. This is clear from the fact that the provisions of  Sections 173(3) to 173(6) would be applicable to such reports in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code.”

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20. In  the  said  case,  the  question  arose,  whether  the

Magistrate can direct for reinvestigation.  The Court, while

dealing with the said issue, has ruled that:-

“At  this  stage,  we  may  also  state  another well-settled canon of the criminal jurisprudence that  the  superior  courts  have  the  jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or even Article 226 of  the  Constitution  of  India  to  direct  “further investigation”,  “fresh”  or  “de  novo”  and  even “reinvestigation”.  “Fresh”,  “de  novo”  and “reinvestigation”  are  synonymous  expressions and their result in law would be the same. The superior courts are even vested with the power of transferring  investigation  from  one  agency  to another, provided the ends of justice so demand such  action.  Of  course,  it  is  also  a  settled principle that this power has to be exercised by the superior courts very sparingly and with great circumspection.”

And again:-

“Whether  the  Magistrate  should  direct  “further investigation” or not is again a matter which will depend  upon  the  facts  of  a  given  case.  The learned  Magistrate  or  the  higher  court  of competent  jurisdiction  would  direct  “further investigation” or “reinvestigation” as the case may be,  on  the  facts  of  a  given  case.  Where  the Magistrate can only direct further investigation, the  courts  of  higher  jurisdiction  can  direct further,  reinvestigation or  even investigation de novo depending on the facts of  a given case. It will be the specific order of the court that would determine the nature of investigation.”

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21. We respectfully concur with the said view.  As we have

already indicated, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has

basically directed for further investigation.  The said part of

the order cannot be found fault with, but an eloquent one,

he could not have directed another investigating agency to

investigate as that would not be within the sphere of further

investigation  and,  in  any  case,  he  does  not  have  the

jurisdiction  to  direct  reinvestigation  by  another  agency.

Therefore, that part of the order deserves to be lancinated

and accordingly it is directed that the investigating agency

that had investigated shall carry on the further investigation

and such investigation shall be supervised by the concerned

Superintendent of Police.  After the further investigation, the

report shall be submitted before the learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate who shall deal with the same in accordance with

law.  We may hasten to add that we have not expressed any

opinion relating to any of the factual aspects of the case.

22. In view of the aforesaid analysis and conclusion, the

order passed by the High Court is set aside except where it

has held that the learned Magistrate could not have allowed

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another agency to investigate.  We have clarified the position

in the preceding paragraph.   

23. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.  

............................J.   [Dipak Misra]

............................J.   [V. Gopala Gowda]

New Delhi July 7, 2015   

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