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NON-REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 365 OF 2013

CHAMAN AND ANOTHER …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTRAKHAND                 …RESPONDENT                      WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 597 OF 2013

J U D G M E N T

AMITAVA ROY, J.

         The appeals assail the judgment and order dated  

11.6.2012, rendered by the High Court of Uttrakhand, Nainital  

in Criminal Appeal No. 111 of 2004, affirming the conviction of  

the appellants under Sections 302,364 r/w 34 IPC.  For the  

offence under Section 302 r/w  34 IPC, the appellants have  

been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of  

Rs. 5000/- each and for the offence under Section 364 r/w 34  

IPC, they have been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment  

for  seven years and  fine of  Rs.  5000/- each.   Sentence of

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imprisonment in default of fine has also been awarded.  The  

trial  court  had  convicted  and  sentenced  the  appellants  in  

identical terms.

2. We have heard Mr. V. Shekhar, learned senior counsel  

for the appellants – Chaman and Sukhbeer in Criminal Appeal  

No.  365  of  2013,  Mr.  P.K.  Dey,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant – Rakesh Kumar @ Mota in Criminal Appeal No. 597  

of 2013 and Mr. Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, learned counsel for  

the State.

3.   The genesis  of  the  prosecution case  is  traceable  to  the  

F.I.R.   lodged  on  12.6.1996  by  Rajo  Devi,  widow  of  the  

deceased Jagram, addressed to the Station In-charge, Police  

Station Cleamantown, Dehradun.  She alleged in the FIR that  

prior  to  the  date  of  incident  i.e.  12.6.1996,  the  appellants  

Chaman,  Rakesh  @  Mota  and  Sukhbeer  along  with  two  

associates had come to their residence in search of her son  

Vinod, who they alleged was involved in the murder of the son  

of Chaman.  As Vinod was not available there, they went back.  

They returned on the date of the incident at about 11 A.M.,

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when she along with her husband and daughters Bina and  

Manju  were  present  in  the  house.   The  appellants  again  

enquired about Vinod and as he was not present in the house,  

they  took  away  her  husband  Jagram  with  them.   The  

informant  stated  that  the  appellants  had  come  in  a  jeep  

bearing No. UP 015 5330 and had forced her husband in the  

said  jeep  and  had  taken  him  away.   She  expressed  

apprehension that due to the impression of the appellants that  

her  son  Vinod  was  involved  in  the  murder  of  the  son  of  

Chaman,  they  would  eliminate  her  husband,  Jagram.   She  

mentioned as well in the FIR that at the time of the incident,  

her daughters Bina and Manju raised alarm, but the people of  

the locality did not intervene.   

4. This information was registered as FIR No. 250 of 1996  

and in course of the investigation, on 15.6.1996 at about 1400  

hours, one Amar Singh informed the Police Station Chandpur,  

District Bijnour that a decomposed dead body, 3/4 days old,  

had been detected in a jungle between Cehla and Ismailpur.  

This information was recorded and inquest of the dead body

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was conducted in presence of panch witnesses, whereafter the  

body was dispatched for post-mortem examination.   At that  

stage,  the dead body was unidentified.   It  was found to be  

decomposed with maggots.  No visible injury was noticed on  

the  dead  body.   The  appellant  Chaman  was  arrested  on  

3.7.1996, who thereafter led the police to the jungle at Village  

Cehla,  within  the  jurisdiction  of  P.S.  Chandpur,  District  

Bijnour from where a rope, as shown by him, was recovered  

from  bamboo  bushes.   According  to  the  prosecution,  the  

appellant Chaman also showed to the police, the place in the  

jungle where Jagram had been killed by hanging him by that  

rope from a tree.  The rope was seized vide recovery memo and  

the site plan of the place of  occurrence as indicated by the  

appellant Chaman, was prepared.

5.  The dead body, on the completion of inquest, was sealed  

and was brought to the District Hospital, Bijnour for autopsy.  

On  the  basis  of  the  evidence  collected  in  the  course  of  

investigation,  charge-sheet  was  submitted  against  the  

appellants  –  Chaman,  Rakesh  Kumar  @  Mota,  Sukhbeer,

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Ghanshyam  @  Bundu,  Tofique  and  Ashok  under  Sections  

302/364/201 IPC.  The case being exclusively triable by the  

Court  of  Sessions was committed to  the Court of  Additional  

Sessions  Judge,  Fast  Track  (IV),  Dehradun.   Charge  was  

framed  under  Sections  147,  201/302/364  r/w  149  IPC,  to  

which the accused persons pleaded “not guilty” and claimed to  

be tried.

6.      The prosecution examined ten witnesses, whereafter the  

statements  of  the  accused  persons  were  recorded  under  

Section 313 Cr.P.C..  All of them stood by their denial in their  

statements.   On  the  conclusion  of  the  trial,  the  trial  court  

acquitted accused Ghanshyam, Tofique and Ashok of all  the  

charges.  It acquitted appellants as well, of the charges under  

Sections  147,  201  r/w  149  IPC  but  convicted  them,  under  

Sections 302/364 r/w 34 IPC and sentenced them as above.

7.   The High Court,  by the verdict  impugned, affirmed the  

sentence and conviction recorded by the trial court.

8.     Mr. Shekhar, learned senior counsel for the appellants-  

Chaman and Sukhbeer has at the threshold dismissed the case

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of the prosecution as motivated and concocted and to buttress  

this plea, has drawn the attention of the Court to a letter dated  

15.4.1996, addressed by one Surender @ Baniya, a detenue in  

District Jail, Bijnour to the Superintendent of Police, Bijnour,  

U.P. hinting at a plot to kill, the appellant Chaman who is a  

witness  in  the  case of  the murder  of  his  son.   The learned  

senior counsel sought to impress upon the court on the basis  

of this document, that the appellant Chaman in particular, was  

thus falsely  implicated in the case of  alleged abduction and  

murder of Jagram.  Apart from emphatically contending that  

there was an apparent confusion in the information as to the  

type  of  the  vehicle  in  which  the  appellants  had  visited  her  

house,  Mr.  Shekhar  has  endeavoured  to  discredit  the  

prosecution case, for the omission to examine the scribe of the  

FIR, who admittedly had penned the same on the disclosures of  

the  informant  Rajo  Devi.   According  to  the  learned  senior  

counsel, the discrepancy in the description of the rope allegedly  

recovered, being led thereto by the appellant Chaman and the  

one  produced  in  the  court,  did  conclusively  belie  the  

prosecution case.

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9.     Mr. Shekhar laboured to emphasise that this anomaly is  

writ large from the testimony of PW4, Constable Nardev Singh  

who identified the rope produced in the court to be made of  

plastic  whereas  PW10  S.I.  Ramesh  Chander  Sharma,  the  

Investigation Officer in categorical terms, had deposed that the  

seized rope was made of jute and that it was not a nylon rope.  

Mr. Shekhar further urged, that admittedly though the dead  

body was decomposed and some portions of the abdomen and  

lower half were missing, no visible injury was noticed thereon  

and particularly on the neck and thus the prosecution version  

of death by asphyxia, as opined by the doctor, effected by the  

rope recovered, was wholly untrustworthy.  The learned senior  

counsel, while questioning the identification of the appellants,  

has  also  cast  aside  the  prosecution  case  to  be  wholly  

improbable as well.

10.   While generally endorsing the above contentions, Mr. P.K.  

Dey, learned counsel for the appellant Rakesh Kumar @ Mota,  

has  urged  that  the  FIR,  lodged  within  45  minutes  of  the  

incident, is too prompt in point of time, having regard to the

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nature  of  the  incident  complained  of  and  in  reality  is  ante  

timed to falsely implicate the appellant –Rakesh Kumar in the  

case.  According  to  the  learned  counsel,  not  only  the  

prosecution case is inherently unbelievable, in absence of any  

endeavour  whatsoever  by  the  family  members  to  resist  the  

alleged  abduction  of  Jagram  and  the  non-intervention  of  

residents of  the otherwise densely populated neighbourhood,  

the  acquittal  of  the  three  co-accused,  who  allegedly  had  

accompanied the appellant, is destructive of the sub stratum of  

the  prosecution  case.   This  is  more  so,  as  the  accused-

appellant and their companions were unarmed. Mr. Dey has  

argued, that not only the discrepancy in the description of the  

rope  recovered  and  produced  in  the  court,  renders  the  

prosecution case highly doubtful, in absence of identification of  

the dead body and any perceptible nexus between the offence  

of  murder  of  Jagram and the appellants,  their  conviction,  if  

sustained, would be a travesty of justice. The learned counsel  

underlined the contradictions in the statements of  PW6, the  

Doctor and PW5-Rakesh  about the state of the body before the  

autopsy and also maintained that in absence of any evidence of

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coordination  between  the  police  stations  at  Dehradun  and  

Bijnour  over  the  detection  of  the  dead  body,  the  despath  

thereof  and  its  identification,  the  prosecution  could  not  

establish that the dead body was that of Jagram.  Inviting the  

attention of this Court to the evidence of PW5- Rakesh, the son  

of the deceased who stated  to have come to learn about the  

abduction of his father 4/5 days prior to the recovery of the  

dead  body,  the  learned  counsel  has  insisted  that  such  a  

statement being a part of the same transaction enfolding the  

alleged abduction of  the  deceased  and recovery  of  the  dead  

body, it is  res gestae and thus demolished the version in the  

FIR as well as the testimony of the informant to that effect.  Mr.  

Dey has urged as well that as the factum of the identification of  

the dead body to be of Jagram, as made by his son PW5 Vinod,  

had  not  been  put  to  the  appellants,  in  the  course  of  their  

statements  under  Section  313  Cr.P.C.,  this  incriminating  

circumstance  could  not  have  been  taken  note  of  and  acted  

upon in support of the charge.

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11.   Per contra,  learned counsel for the State  has maintained  

that   the  testimony  of  PW1–Rajo  Devi,  the  informant,  PW2-  

Manju, the daughter of  the deceased, PW4 Constable Nardev  

Singh, the seizure witness of the rope, PW5 Rakesh, son of the  

deceased who identified the dead body, PW6 Dr. A.K. Kaul who  

had  performed the  post-mortem examination  and  PW10 S.I.  

Ramesh Chander Sharma in particular has proved the charge  

against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt and thus  

the conviction and sentence  as recorded by the trial court and  

affirmed by the High Court does not merit any interference.

12.      The learned counsel for the State has asserted that as  

the abduction of the deceased has been convincibly proved by  

PWs  1  and  2  and  that  Jagram had  met  a  homicidal  death  

immediately thereafter, there was a rebuttable presumption of  

guilt against the appellants and as they had failed to offer any  

explanation whatsoever, as to how they had dealt with Jagram  

while he was in their custody, their conviction is sustainable in  

law and on facts.  He referred, in particular to Section 106 of  

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to reinforce this plea and also

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relied upon  the decision of this Court in State of  State of  

W.B. vs.  Mir Mohammad Omar and others,  (2000) 8 SCC  

382.

13.    The arguments advanced and the materials on record  

have received our due attention.  Concurrent findings of facts,  

notwithstanding, having regard to the conviction and sentence  

as recorded, we have traversed the evidence available to the  

extent essential for the present adjudication.   

14. The facts  narrated in  the FIR dated 12.6.1996,  in our  

estimate, are of sufficient clarity regarding the dual visits of  

the appellants to the house of the deceased in search of his  

son Vinod.  The contents thereof do not admit any doubt that  

the appellants along with two others had come in a jeep, the  

number whereof had been provided in the FIR, on the date of  

the incident at about 11 A.M. and had taken away with them  

the deceased,  father of  Vinod in presence of  the informant-  

Rajo Devi, his daughters Bina and Manju.  There is a clear  

averment that though the daughters raised alarm and that the  

people of the locality were present, no body did come forward

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to prevent the abduction.   The omission on the part of  the  

people  in  the  neighbourhood  to  intervene  per  se,  in  our  

opinion, does not detract from the truthfulness of the report  

made  which  admittedly  had  been  done  within  the  shortest  

possible  time.   Though  the  FIR  was   written  by  one  H.S.  

Verma,   his non-examination as well is of no adverse bearing  

on the prosecution case.  The letter by Surender, a detenu in  

the District  Jail,  Bijnour hinting at the plot  to kill  Chaman  

also,  in  our  comprehension,  is  not  of  any  definitive  

significance.  

15.    PW1-Rajo Devi, in unequivocable terms, stated on oath  

that on the date of the incident at 11 A.M., the appellants and  

two other persons, whose names were not known to her, had  

come in a car with curtains.  They searched for her son Vinod  

and  when  he  was  not  found,  they  picked  up  her  husband  

Jagram,  pushed  him  in  the  car  and  took  him  away.   She  

identified  the  appellants  and  other  accused  persons  in  the  

court to be the kidnappers of her husband.  She stated as well,  

in terms of the FIR filed, that the appellants had visited her

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house 15 days prior  to the date of the incident looking for her  

son Vinod, disclosing it to her that they suspected that he was  

involved in the murder of the son of Chaman.  The witness also  

deposed that thereafter she along with her two daughters Bina  

and Manju and son-in-law, had visited the Bijnour mortuary  

and had identified the dead body of her husband.

16.   PW2- Manju, daughter of  the deceased testified in the  

same lines as of her mother.  She identified the appellants who  

along with two others had come in a car to their house on the  

date of the incident.  She reiterated the purpose of the visit of  

the appellants and their companions as disclosed by them and  

confirmed  that  they  had  similarly  come  to  their  house  in  

search of  Vinod 15 days prior  to the date  of  incident.   She  

mentioned about the presence of her sister Veena in the house  

at the time of the incident.  She was categorical in the matter of  

identification of the accused persons.

17.    PW4 Constable Nardev Singh  deposed that the appellant  

Chaman led the police to recover the rope whereby Jagram was  

hung from the tree.  He stated that the appellant Chaman not

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only identified the tree but also led the police to the rope which  

was recovered from the bush  in the jungle.  He identified the  

rope in the court to be one of plastic.  In cross-examination,  

this witness clarified that the jungle  was not on a thorough  

fare.   He  stated  that  he  was  unaware  as  to  why  in  his  

statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the recovered rope was  

described to be a “jute rope” (suthli).

18.      PW5 Rakesh, son of the deceased on oath deposed that  

he recognized the dead body of his father at District Hospital  

Mortuary, Bijnour,  after it was taken out from the sealed cloth  

before the post-mortem examination.  He stated that he came  

to know about 4/5 days before,  that appellant Chaman had  

called his father and had taken him away.   

19.     PW6 Dr.  A.K.  Kaul  who had performed the  autopsy,  

testified that the dead body was then in an advanced stage of  

decomposition and maggots were present on it.  He stated that  

some  body  parts  like  middle  stomach  and  left  thigh  were  

missing  and  that  it  appeared  that  it  had  been  nibbled  by  

animals.  He mentioned that  there was no apparent injuries on

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the dead body of the deceased but opined that the cause of  

death might be asphyxia.  He stated as well that there was no  

mark of rope on the body but added that bronchial tube was  

broken.   According  to  him,  death  had  occurred  between  

12.6.1996 to 15.6.1996.

20.    PW7 Shakoor Khan was a witness to the recovery and  

inquest  of  the  dead  body.   PW8  S.I.   Charan  Singh  had  

prepared the  inquest  report  of  the  dead body.   PW9  Amar  

Singh had detected the dead body of an unknown person lying  

in the jungle between Cehla and Ismailpur.  The dead body was  

3/4 days old and he had informed of this fact in writing to the  

Police Station Chandpur.

21.    PW10 S.I. Ramesh Chander Sharma, the Investigating  

Officer  narrated  the  steps  taken  by  him  in  the  course  of  

investigation.  He stated about the recovery of the rope from  

the  bamboo  bushes   of  the  place  of  occurrence,  being  led  

thereto by appellant Chaman and the preparation of the memo  

of seizure thereof.  He admitted in his cross-examination that  

the place from where the rope was recovered was accessible to

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all.  He mentioned that the rope recovered was a jute rope and  

not a nylon rope.

22.    A  perusal  of  the  statements  of  the  accused  persons  

recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. reveal that comprehensive  

questions pertaining to abduction and murder of  Jagram by  

them,  detection  of  his  decomposed  dead  body,  post-mortem  

thereof with the cause of death and the recorded statement of  

appellant Chaman leading to the discovery of the rope involved,  

were put to them so as to fully enable them to explain all the  

incriminating  circumstances  appearing  against  them  in  the  

evidence adduced by the prosecution.

23.      An analytical evaluation of the materials on record does  

not admit of any doubt of the successive visits of the appellants  

on the turn of 15 days to the house of the deceased in search  

of Vinod whom they suspected was involved in the murder of  

the  son  of  the  appellant  Chaman.   There  is  nothing  to  

disbelieve PWs 1 and 2 that the appellants, on the date of the  

incident, had come in a jeep and as they did not find Vinod in  

the house, they abducted Jagram, who was later on found dead

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within 3/4  days therefrom in a nearby jungle.  Though the  

incident took place in the broad day light and the daughters  

did raise alarm, the mere non-intervention by the persons in  

the  locality,  in  our  opinion,  in  the  face  of  the  otherwise  

overwhelming and consistent testimony of the mother and the  

daughter does not discredit the prosecution case.  Noticeably,  

the PWs 1 and 2 were steadfast in the matter of identification  

of the three appellants, not only at the time of the incident but  

also  thereafter  in  court.   According  to  them,  the  appellants  

were of the village Ismailpur and thus their identification was  

not difficult for them.  Admittedly the FIR was lodged with due  

promptness,  thus  obviating  the  possibility  of  any  

embellishment.  To reiterate, non-examination of the scribe of  

FIR does not render the prosecution case untrustworthy in the  

attendant facts and circumstances.  

24.  The irrefutably proved circumstance against the appellants  

is that they had visited the house of the deceased twice within  

a span of fifteen days, on each occasion in search of his son  

Vinod and ultimately on the date of the incident    had forcibly

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taken him away,  only thereafter  to be found to have died a  

homicidal death in an unnatural setting.  The fact of recovery  

of  the  rope,  being  led  thereto  by  the  appellant  Chaman  is  

admissible in evidence against the appellants.  The discrepancy  

about  the  texture  of  the  rope,  the  seizure  thereof  having  

otherwise  been  proved,  is  not  of  much  significance.   PW4  

Constable  Nardev  Singh,  who  was  associated  with  the  

procedure of seizure of the rope had identified the same in the  

court.  In our opinion, nothing much turns on the mismatch in  

the description thereof as has been sought to be emphasised  

on the basis of his statement to this effect under Section 161  

Cr.P.C.  The dead body has been identified by the informant  

wife in presence of her daughters and sons-in-law as well as  

the son PW5 as is evident from the evidence on record.

25.     The motive for the offence is also discernible in the facts  

of this case and for that matter, from the disclosures made by  

the  appellants  for  their  visits  in  search  of  Vinod,  who  they  

believed, was involved in the murder of the son of the appellant  

Chaman.   The pleas based on res gestae and the perceived

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omission to bring to the notice of the appellants, the factum of  

identification of the dead body, in the face of the consistent,  

cogent and coherent evidence on record, do not commend for  

acceptance. The statement of PW2 that he came to know about  

the abduction after  4/5 days  can by no means be  one in  

course of the transaction encompassing the incident to attract  

the doctrine of res gestae.

26.    Significantly, the proved  abduction of the deceased from  

his house by the appellants is per se a criminal offence and  

carries  with it   a  much higher  degree  of  sinister  culpability  

compared  to  any  phenomenon  of   “last  seen  together”,  

simpliciter.  Further the deceased being in the custody of the  

appellants after his abduction on 12.6.1996, it was within their  

special knowledge as to how he had been dealt with by them  

thereafter  before his  dead body was found in a decomposed  

state in a nearby jungle.  No explanation is forthcoming in any  

form in this regard from the appellants.

27.    This  Court  in  State  of  West  Bengal (supra)  in  a  

somewhat  similar  fact  situation,  where  the  deceased  was

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abducted by the accused persons and thereafter his mangled  

body was found, held that the pristine rule that the burden of  

proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused  

should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as if it  admits of  

no process of intelligent reasoning.  It was enunciated that the  

doctrine  of  presumption  is  not  alien  to  the  above  rule,  nor  

would  it  impair  the  temper  of  the  rule  qua  the  purport  of  

presumption of fact as a rule in the law of evidence.  It was  

observed thus:        

“Presumption  of  fact  is  an  inference  as  to  the  existence  of  one  fact  from the  existence  of  some  other facts,  unless the truth of  such inference is  disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of  evidence  that  a  fact  otherwise  doubtful  may  be  inferred  from  certain  other  proved  facts.  When  inferring the existence of a fact from other set of  proved  facts,  the  court  exercises  a  process  of  reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the  most  probable  position.  The  above  principle  has  gained legislative recognition in India when Section  114  is  incorporated  in  the  Evidence  Act.  It  empowers  the  court  to  presume the  existence  of  any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In  that  process  the  court  shall  have  regard  to  the  common course of natural events, human conduct  etc. in relation to the facts of the case.”

28.     Adverting  to  the  facts,  this  Court  ruled  that  as  the  

prosecution had succeeded in establishing that the deceased

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had  been  abducted  by  the  accused,  they  alone  knew  what  

happened to him until he was with them and if he was found  

murdered in a short time, after the abduction, the permitted  

reasoning  process  would  enable  the  court  to  draw  the  

presumption that the accused had murdered him.  It was held  

that such inference can be disrupted, if the  accused would tell  

the  Court  what  else  had happened to  the  deceased at  least  

until he was in their custody.   

29.   Referring  to  Section  106  of  the  Evidence  Act,  it  was  

propounded that the said section was not intended to relieve  

the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused  

beyond reasonable  doubt,  but would  apply to cases where  

prosecution  had  succeeded  in  proving  facts  from  which  a  

reasonable inference could be drawn regarding  the existence  

of  certain  other  facts,  unless  the  accused,  by  virtue  of  his  

special knowledge regarding such facts, succeed to offer any  

explanation, to  drive the court to draw a different inference.

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30.       The following observations by this Court in the context  

of above legal provision in Shambhu Nath Mehra vs. State of   

Ajmer AIR 1956 SC 404  was adverted to with approval.

“This lays down the general rule that in a criminal  case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and  Section 106 is certainly not intended to relive it of  that duty.  On the contrary, it is designed  to meet  certain  exceptional  cases in which it  would  be  impossible,  or  at  any  rate  disproportionately  difficult  for  the  prosecution  to  establish  facts  which are ‘especially’ within the knowledge of the  accused  and  which  he  could  prove  without  difficulty  or  inconvenience.  The word ‘especially’  stresses that it means facts that are pre-eminently  or exceptionally within his knowledge.”

31.   Proof beyond reasonable doubt, as has been held in a  

plethora of decisions of this Court, is only a guideline and not a  

fetish and that someone, who is guilty, cannot get away with  

impunity only because truth may suffer some infirmity when  

projected through human processes as has been observed in  

Inder  Singh  and  another  vs.  The  State  (Delhi   

Administration)  (1978)4SCC161.  A  caveat  against  

exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt to nurture  

fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion  so as to destroy social

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defence has been sounded by this Court in Gurbachan Singh  

vs. Satpal Singh and others (1990)1SCC 445.  It has been  

propounded  that  reasonable  doubt  is  simply  that  degree  of  

doubt  which would  permit  a  reasonable  and  a  just  man to  

come to  a  conclusion.   It  has  been underlined  therein  that  

reasonableness of doubt must be commensurate to the nature  

of the offence to be investigated.

32.    Judged by the above touchstone of reasonableness of  

doubt in evaluating the facts and circumstances of the present  

case,  we  are  clear  in  our  mind  that  the  complicity  of  the  

appellants in the offences with which they have been charged,  

has been convincingly  proved as required in law.        

33.      It is patent from the evidence of the doctor conducting  

the  post-mortem  examination  that  the  cause  of  death  is  

asphyxia.  PW6 – Dr. A.K. Kaul has indicated as well in his  

statement on oath that the bronchial tube of the deceased was  

broken.   Having regard to the decomposed state of the dead  

body, at the time when the post-mortem was conducted, the  

absence of visible injury on the body per se does not militate

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against the otherwise unambiguous medical opinion that the  

death  was  due  to  asphyxia.   Breaking  of  bronchial  tube  is  

understandably  a finding in endorsement of the above cause of  

death.   Absence of visible injuries on the dead body, therefore  

as such, does not  cast any doubt about the homicidal death of  

Jagram.  This is also authenticated by the medical opinion that  

death  had  occurred  between  12.6.1996  and  15.6.1996,  i.e.  

during the interval between the abduction of the deceased and  

the detection of his dead body.

34.    On a anxious consideration of the entire gamut of the  

facts of the case  and the principles of law evolved, we are, thus  

of the unhesitant  opinion that  the concurrent convictions and  

the sentences based thereon, as recorded by the trial court and  

the High Court, do not warrant any interference in the present  

appeals.  The appeals are, thus dismissed.    

……..……………………..….J.  (S.A. BOBDE)

……..……………………..….J.  NEW DELHI (AMITAVA ROY) APRIL 19, 2016.