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                              REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.3265 of 2012

Chairman, Rajasthan State Road Transport                   …Petitioners  Corporation & Ors.        

Versus

Smt. Santosh & Ors.                    …Respondents

O R D E R  

1. Originally this petition had been filed challenging the judgment  

and order of the Rajasthan High Court dated 21.9.2011 passed in S.B.  

Civil Misc. Appeal No. 480 of 2001, wherein the complete liability of  

providing compensation in a vehicular accident had been fixed upon  

the appellant-Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter  

referred  to  as  the ‘RSRTC’),  while  unfastening the  liability  of  the  

driver  and the owner of  the vehicle,  known as ‘Jugaad’,  under the  

provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as  

the ‘Act’).

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2. At the time of hearing the petition, this court vide order dated  

6.2.2012 did not consider it proper to examine the issue in respect of  

compensation.  However,  the  question  was  raised  by  Shri  Imtiaz  

Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the RSRTC that this court must  

examine whether ‘Jugaad’ is a vehicle under the Act, and in case, it is  

a motor vehicle under Section 2(28) of the Act, whether such ‘Jugaad’  

is required to be insured and registered before it is permitted to ply on  

the road and whether the driver of ‘Jugaad’ must compulsorily have a  

driving licence.  As such important issues have been raised by Shri  

Imtiaz Ahmed, we had requested Shri H.P.  Raval,  learned ASG to  

assist  the  court,  after  taking  instructions  from the  Road  Transport  

Ministry of the Central Government about the status of ‘Jugaad’ under  

the Act. Shri Raval responded to the aforesaid queries on 13.4.2012  

and submitted that it is a motor vehicle as defined under Section 2(28)  

of  the  Act,  and  the  Ministry  of  Shipping,  Road  Transport  and  

Highways had issued a circular dated 26.7.2007 issuing instructions to  

all  State  transport  authorities  clarifying  that  ‘Jugaad’  is  a  vehicle  

under Section 2(28) of the Act and all  the States are under a legal  

obligation  to  enforce  the  same.  Therefore,  no  person  should  be  

permitted to ply a ‘Jugaad’ as it violates all the provisions of the Act.  

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It must have a registration and  insurance and the driver must have a  

valid driving license and in case of an accident etc, the liability under  

the provisions of the Act, may be properly determined.  However, Shri  

Raval  has  raised  a  grievance  that  in  spite  of  issuance  of  such  a  

circular, most of the States have not enforced the terms of the said  

circular issued by the Central Government.  

3. Considering the aforesaid grievance raised by Shri Raval, this  

court  impleaded  the  Transport  Secretary/Commissioner  of  all  the  

States as party respondents and asked them to submit their response.  

While some of the States have submitted that it is not a vehicle within  

the meaning of the provisions of Section 2(28) of the Act. The State of  

Karnataka has submitted the vehicle like ‘Jugaad’ was not in existence  

in the State.   

4. It has further been pointed out by learned counsel for the parties  

that enforcement of the provisions of the Act and the rules framed  

under  it,  come  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State  Governments.  

Therefore, they must be directed to ensure strict compliance of the  

said  provisions  of  the  Act.   It  has  also  been  pointed  out  by  Shri  

Siddharth Luthra, learned ASG that a letter dated 19.7.2012 was sent  

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by the Director (RT) of the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways,  

Government of India, to all the State Authorities to ensure compliance  

of the statutory provisions of the Act and the rules.  

5. Shri Manish Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the  

State of Rajasthan has submitted that the government of Rajasthan has  

examined the matter and decided to prohibit the plying of “Jugaad” on  

the  roads  completely.  Such  a  vehicle  cannot  be  used  for  any  

commercial purpose, without being registered and duly insured and in  

compliance with the other statutory requirements. However, the State  

Government carved out an exception that farmers/poor villagers may  

be  permitted  to  use  the  same for  their  agricultural  purposes  as  an  

interim measure till the rules are framed in this regard.  It has further  

been submitted that in case ‘Jugaads’ are found plying on the roads,  

they shall be impounded and will be dealt with strictly in accordance  

with law.  A similar stand has been taken by the majority of the States.  

6. An application has been filed by Rashtriya Kisan Morcha, for  

impleadment/intervention  which  is  allowed.  The  Morcha  raised  a  

grievance that in case plying of the ‘Jugaad’ is prohibited completely,  

it will create a serious problem for the farmers, as seizure/impounding  

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of “Jugaad” would have penal consequences. The ‘Jugaad’ is nothing,  

but an improved version of a bullock cart which has been used for  

centuries  in  the  villages.  The  farmer  communities  should  not  be  

restrained from using the improved carts/jugaad in the villages to and  

from houses to the farms and for bringing the agricultural produces  

from their agricultural lands.  

7. Some of the lawyers have raised the issue that issuing any kind  

of direction by this Court in these regards would amount to legislation  

which is  not  permissible  in  law.   Thus,  they have suggested   that  

instead of issuing the directions, the Central Government and the State  

authorities be directed to frame a policy, amend the rules specifically  

and enforce the same. However, other lawyers have opposed this view  

and submitted that the issue involved herein is restricted only with  

enforcement of law and not with legislation.  As the “Jugaad” is a  

vehicle within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the Act.   

8. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

So far as the legislation by the court is concerned, as a corollary  

to the doctrine of separation of powers, a judge merely applies the law  

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that it gets from the legislature. Consequently, the Anglo-Saxon legal  

tradition has insisted that the judge only reflects the law regardless of  

the  anticipated  consequences,  considerations  of  fairness  or  public  

policy.  He is simply not authorised to legislate.  

9. In kindred spirit, in M. Nagaraj & Ors. v. Union of India &  

Ors., AIR 2007 SC 71, Justice Kapadia, writing for the Constitutional  

Bench, observed:

“The Constitution is not an ephemeral legal document   embodying a set of legal rules for the passing hour. It   sets  out  principles  for  an  expanding  future  and  is   intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to   be adopted to the various crisis of human affairs. . . . A   constitutional  provision  must  be  construed  not  in  a   narrow and constricted sense but in a wide and liberal   manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing   conditions  and  purposes  so  that  a  constitutional   provision  does  not  get  fossilized  but  remains  flexible   enough  to  meet  the  newly  emerging  problems  and   challenges.”  

10. Accordingly, in State of U.P. & Ors. v. Jeet S. Bisht & Anr.,  

(2007) 6 SCC 586, even  though the matter was referred to another  

Bench, owing to a split decision—Justice S.B. Sinha aptly described  

the modern understanding of the separation of powers thus:

“Separation of power in one sense is a limit on active   jurisdiction of each organ. But it has another deeper and   more relevant purpose: to act as check and balance over   

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the  activities  of  other  organs.  Thereby  the  active   jurisdiction of the organ is not challenged; nevertheless   there  are  methods  of  prodding  to  communicate  the   institution  of  its  excesses  and  shortfall  in  duty.  .  .   .Separation  of  power  doctrine  has  been  reinvented  in   modern  times.  .  .  .  The  modern  view,  which  is  today   gathering  momentum  in  Constitutional  Courts  world   over, is not only to demarcate the realm of functioning in   a negative sense, but also to define the minimum content   of the demarcated realm of functioning.”

11. In  Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 333,  

this  Court  doubted  the  competence  of  this  Court  to  issue  such  

directions, which were allegedly to be legislative in nature. Therefore,  

the matter was referred to a larger bench, and such larger bench held,  

that  in exercise  of  the powers conferred upon it  by Article  32 r/w  

Article 142 of  the Constitution,  the directions issued by this  Court  

were valid and laudable, as the same had been made to fill the vacuum  

that  existed  in  the  absence  of  any  legislation,  to  ensure  that  only  

genuine  SC/ST  and  OBC  candidates  would  be  able  to  secure  the  

benefits  of  certificates  issued,  and that  bogus candidates  would  be  

kept  out.  Simply  filling  up  an  existing  vacuum till  the  legislature  

chooses to make  appropriate laws, does not amount to taking over the  

functions of the legislature.  

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12. In its activist streak, this Court has also imparted new vigour to  

the process  of  constitutional  interpretation.  For instance,  this  Court  

has insightfully identified Article 32 as the constitutional  provision  

that provides for the enforcement of fundamental rights in areas of  

legislative vacuum. Not only has it held that fundamental rights are  

limitations  upon  the  State  power,  but  the  right  to  constitutional  

remedies is itself a fundamental right enshrined in Article 32 of the  

Constitution, and in the case of an infringement of a fundamental right  

by the State, an aggrieved party can approach this Court for a remedy.  

13. In Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 1997  

SC 3011, this Court held:

“In view of the above, and the absence of enacted law to   provide for the effective enforcement of the basic human   right  of  gender  equality  and guarantee  against  sexual   harassment and abuse, more particularly against sexual   harassment at work places, we lay down the guidelines   and norms specified hereinafter for due observance at all   workplaces  or  other  institutions,  until  a  legislation  is   enacted for the purpose. This is done in exercise of the   power available under Article 32 of the Constitution for   enforcement of the fundamental rights and it is further   emphasised  that  this  would  be  treated  as  the  law   declared  by  this  Court  under  Article  141  of  the   Constitution.”

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14. Providing further reinforcement to the Article 32 jurisprudence,  

in  Vineet Narain v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 889, this Court  

noted that the issuance of guidelines and directions, in the exercise of  

the powers under Articles 32 and 142, has become an integral part of  

our  constitutional  jurisprudence.  It  also  pointed  out  that  such  an  

exercise of powers was absolutely necessary to fill the void in areas  

with legislative vacuum. In addition, the Court noted:

“As pointed out in Vishaka (supra), it is the duty of the   executive to fill the vacuum by executive orders because   its  field  is  co-terminus  with  that  the  legislature,  and   where  there  is  inaction  even  by  the  executive  for   whatever reason, the judiciary must step in, in exercise   of  its  constitutional  obligations  under  the  aforesaid   provisions  to  provide  absolution  till  such  time  as  the   legislature acts  to perform its role  by enacting proper   legislation to cover the field.

On  this  basis,  we  now proceed  to  give  the  directions   enumerated hereafter for rigid compliance till such time   as the legislature steps in to substitute them by proper   legislation. These directions made under Article 32 read   with Article 142 to implement the rule of law wherein the   concept of equality enshrined in Article 14 is embedded,   have the force of law under Article 141 and by virtue of   Article  144  it  is  the  duty  of  all  authorities,  civil  and   judicial,  in  the  territory  of  India  to  act  in  aid  of  this   Court.”

(See also: L.K. Pandey v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1986 SC 272;  

D.K.  Basu  v.  State  of  West  Bengal,  AIR  1997  SC  610;  

Ramamurthy v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1997 SC 1739; Supreme  

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Court Bar Association v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 1895; and  

Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, AIR 2005 SC 972).  

15. Thus, the aforesaid cases clearly reveal that the courts in India  

have  not  violated  the  mandatory  constitutional  requirement,  rather  

they have only issued certain directions to meet the exigencies. Some  

of them are admittedly legislative in nature, but the same have been  

issued only to fill up the existing vacuum, till the legislature enacts a  

particular law to deal with the situation.  In view of the same, it is  

permissible to issue directions if the law does not provide a solution of  

a problem, as an interim measure, till the proper law is enacted by the  

legislature.  

We may also issue necessary directions as an interim measure,  

if the need so arisen.  

16. The Act replaced the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in view of the  

changes  in  transport  technology,  pattern  of  passenger  and  freight  

movements,  taking  into  consideration  the  road  safety  standards,  

pollution control measures, standards in transportation of hazardous  

and explosive materials.   

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17. In M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty & Ors., AIR  

1987 SC 2158, this Court has made certain suggestions to raise the  

limit of compensation payable as a result  of vehicular  accidents in  

respect of death and permanent disablement in the event of their being  

no proof of fault on the part of the person involved in the accident and  

also  in  hit  and  run  motor  accidents.   In  this  case,  the  court  also  

suggested  the  removal  of  certain  disparities  in  the  liability  of  the  

insurer to pay compensation. The said recommendations/suggestions  

were also taken into consideration and incorporated in the Act.   

18. The object of bringing and  repealing the Act 1939 had been to  

rationalise certain definitions with additions of certain new definitions  

of new types of vehicles, strict procedures relating to grant of driving  

licenses  and  period  of  validity  thereof;  standards  of  anti-pollution  

control  devices;  provisions  for  issuance  of  fitness  certificates  of  

vehicles and provision for enhancing compensation in case of no fault  

liability and in hit and run vehicular accidents and also maintenance  

of State register for driving licenses and vehicles registration.   

19. Section 2(2) of the Act defines articulated vehicle which means  

a  motor  vehicle  to  which  a  semi-trailer  is  attached;  Section  2(34)  

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defines public place; Section 2(44) defines `tractor’ as a motor vehicle  

which is not itself constructed to carry any load; Section 2(46) defines  

`trailer’ which means any vehicle, other than a semi-trailer and a side-

car, drawn or intended to be drawn by a motor vehicle.

Section 3 of the Act provides for necessity for driving license;  

Section  5  provides  for  responsibility  of  owners  of  the  vehicle  for  

contravention of Sections 3 and 4; Section 6 provides for restrictions  

on the holding of driving license; Section 56 provides for compulsion  

for  having  certificate  of  fitness  for  transport  vehicles;  Section  59  

empowers the State to fix the age limit of the vehicles; Section 66  

provides  for  necessity  for  permits  to  ply  any  vehicle  for  any  

commercial purpose; Section 67 empowers the State to control road  

transport; Section 112 provides for limits of speed; Sections 133 and  

134 imposes a duty on the owners and the drivers of the vehicles in  

case of accident and injury to a person; Section 146 provides that no  

person shall  use any vehicle at a public place unless the vehicle is  

insured.  In addition thereto, the Motor Vehicle Taxation Act provides  

for imposition of passenger tax and road tax etc.   

20. Section 2(28) of the Act defines “Motor Vehicle” as under:

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“Motor Vehicle” or “vehicle” means any mechanically   propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether  the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an   external  or  internal  source  and  includes  a  chassis  to   which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but   does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a   vehicle  of  a  special  type  adapted  for  use  only  in  a   factory or in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle   having less than four wheels fitted with engine capacity   of not exceeding twenty five cubic centimeters.”   

                                                                          (Emphasis added)

Thus, any vehicle which is mechanically propelled and adapted  

for use upon roads and does not fall within the exceptions provided  

therein, is a Motor Vehicle within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the  

Act.

21. In Natwar Parikh & Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka &  Ors.,  

AIR 2005 SC 3428, this Court dealt with the issue while dealing with  

“Tractor” and held as under:   

“Under Section 61 of the 1988 Act, which comes within   Chapter IV dealing with registration of motor vehicles,   registration  of  trailers  is  made  compulsory.  Under   Section 61(2), the registration mark assigned to a trailer   is  required to be displaced on the side of the drawing   vehicle. In the present case, we are not concerned with   tractors in the conventional sense. Even the legislature   has used the word "drawing vehicle" in place of tractors.   Under Section 61(3), it is provided that no person shall   drive  a  motor  vehicle  to  which  a  trailer  is  attached   unless  the  registration  mark  of  the  motor  vehicle  is   displayed on the trailer. Similarly, under Section 66 in   

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Chapter V which refers to control of transport vehicles,   no owner of  a motor vehicle  can use the vehicle as a   transport vehicle carrying passengers or goods without a   permit.  Under  Section  66(2),  the  holder  of  a  goods   carriage  permit  may  use  the  vehicle  for  drawing  any   trailer.  Therefore,  under  the  M.V.  Act,  1988,  the   Parliament has kept in mind the existence of a vehicle   classifiable as "tractor-trailer"…

Section 2(28) is a comprehensive definition of the   words  "motor  vehicle".  Although,  a  "trailer"  is   separately  defined  under  Section  2(46)  to  mean  any   vehicle drawn or intended to be drawn by motor vehicle,   it is still included into the definition of the words "motor   vehicle"  under  Section  2(28).  Similarly,  the  word   "tractor"  is  defined in  Section 2(44)  to  mean a motor   vehicle which is not itself constructed to carry any load.   Therefore, the words "motor vehicle" have been defined   in the comprehensive sense by the legislature. Therefore,   we  have  to  read  the  words  "motor  vehicle"  in  the   broadest possible sense keeping in mind that the Act has   been  enacted  in  order  to  keep  control  over  motor   vehicles, transport vehicles etc. A combined reading of   the  definitions  under  Section  2,  ……..  shows  that  the   definition of "motor vehicle" includes any mechanically   propelled vehicle apt for use upon roads irrespective of   the source of power and it includes a trailer. Therefore,   even though a trailer is drawn by a motor vehicle, it by   itself  being a motor vehicle,  the tractor-  trailer  would   constitute a "goods carriage" under Section 2(14) and   consequently, a "transport vehicle" under Section 2(47).   The  test  to  be  applied  in  such  a  case  is  whether  the   vehicle  is  proposed  to  be  used  for  transporting  goods   from one place to another. When a vehicle is so altered   or prepared that it becomes apt for use for transporting   goods, it can be stated that it is adapted for the carriage   of  goods.  Applying  the  above  test,  …….  the  tractor- trailer  ……  falls  under  Section  2(14)  as  a  "goods   carriage" and consequently, it falls under the definition   of  "transport  vehicle"  under Section 2(47) of  the M.V.   Act, 1988.”

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22.     The Tractor is a machine run by diesel or petrol. It is a self-

propelled vehicle for hauling other vehicles.  It is used for different  

purposes. It is also used for agricultural purposes, along with other  

implements;  such as harrows, ploughs, tillers,  blade-terracers,  seed-

drills  etc.  It  is  a  self-propelled vehicle  capable  of  pulling alone as  

defined under the definition of Motor Vehicles. It does not fall within  

any of the exclusions as defined under the Act. Thus, it is a Motor  

Vehicle  in  terms of  the  definition under  Section 2(28)  of  the  Act,  

which  definition  has  been  adopted  by  the  Act.  So,  even  without  

referring to the definition of the Tractor, if the definition of the Motor  

Vehicle as given under the Act is  strictly construed,  even then the  

Tractor is a Motor Vehicle as defined under the Act. The Tractor is  

not  only  used  for  agricultural  purposes  but  is  also  used  for  other  

purposes as stated above. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tractor  

in its popular meaning is only used for agricultural purposes and, thus,  

is  not  a Motor Vehicle as defined under the Act.  The Tractor is  a  

Motor Vehicle is also proved by this definition under Section 2(44) of  

the Act. Different types of Motor Vehicles have been defined under  

the  provisions  of  the  Act,  and  the  Tractor  is  one  of  them.  Thus,  

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considering  the  question  from  any  angle,  the  Tractor  is  a  Motor  

Vehicle as defined under the Act.  

23. Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on a driver to hold an  

effective driving license for the type of vehicle which he intends to  

drive.  Section  10  of  the  Act  enables  the  Central  Government  to  

prescribe forms of driving licenses for various categories of vehicles  

mentioned in sub-section (2) of the said Section. The definition clause  

in Section 2 of the Act defines various categories of vehicles which  

are covered in broad types mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 10.  

They  are  'goods  carriage',  'heavy  goods  vehicle',  'heavy  passenger  

motor  vehicle',  'invalid  carriage',  'light  motor  vehicle',  'maxi-cab',  

'medium goods vehicle',  'medium passenger  motor  vehicle',  'motor-

cab',  'motorcycle',  'omnibus',  'private  service  vehicle',  'semi-trailer',  

'tourist vehicle', 'tractor', 'trailer' and 'transport vehicle'.

24. The  Allahabad  High  Court  in  Writ  Tax  No.  573  of  2011-  

Kishun  Ram  v.  State  of  U.P.  &  Ors., held  that  ‘Jugaad’  was  

squarely covered under the definition of motor vehicles as specified  

under Section 2(28) of the Act, since it was mechanically propelled  

adapted for use on road and hence other relevant provisions of the  

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Act/rules were applicable. The Court further directed that as the said  

vehicle  did  not  comply  with  the  provisions  of  the  Act/Rules,  the  

seizure effected by the U.P. authorities could not be interfered with by  

the court.  

25. Further,  in  Writ  Petition  No.  6611(M/B)  of  2005  -  Avnish  

Kumar v. State of U.P. & Ors.  decided on 23.2.2011, the Allahabad  

High Court has issued directions to the statutory authorities to ensure  

compliance of the provisions of the Act and the rules, and to prevent  

the illegal plying of such vehicles, the statutory Authorities must take  

effective measures in conformity with the statutory rules.  

26. Learned standing counsel  appearing for  the State of Haryana  

has submitted that  even the Punjab and Haryana High Court while  

delivering the judgment as early as 29.3.1995 had directed the State  

authorities to ensure that no ‘Jugaad’ shall be permitted to ply in the  

State of Haryana  under any circumstance. The relevant part of the  

said judgment reads as under:

“An interim direction is issued that no such Jugars shall   be permitted to ply in the State of Haryana under any   circumstance. All such Jugars being plied shall be seized   by  the  concerned law enforcing agencies  of  the  State.   Since the aforesaid vehicles are being plied  against the  provisions of law and these vehicles are not recognised   

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under  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act, the  same  cannot  be   released in favour of a person, who is not even admitted   to  be  the  registered  owner  of  such  vehicle.  Despite   directions, we have not been intimated as to how such   unauthorised vehicles were ordered to be released and  by whom. Prima facie, it appears to us that the aforesaid   Jugars could not be released either by the law enforcing   agencies or by the Magistrates.”  

(Emphasis added)

27. As such ‘Jugaads’ were being plied against the provisions of  

the Act and the rules framed under it,  and in case any ‘Jugaad’ is  

found on the road and is seized by the police authorities, it could not  

be released in favour of its owner either by the law enforcing agency  

or  even  by  the  Magistrate.   Plying  of  such  vehicles  was  in  utter  

disregard/violation of the provisions of the Act and the rules framed  

thereunder.  

28. As  to  whether  a  particular  vehicle  can  be  defined  as  motor  

vehicle in terms of Section 2(28) of the Act, is to be determined on the  

facts of each case taking into consideration the use of the vehicle and  

its suitability for being used upon the road.  Once it  is found to be  

suitable for being used on the road, it is immaterial whether it runs on  

the public road or private road, for the reason, that actual user for a  

particular purpose, is no criteria to decide the name.  Definition of  

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motor vehicle takes within its ambit, a dumper and tractor.  Tractor  

which is used basically for agricultural purpose and a dumper is used  

in the factory premises, can suitable be adapted for being used on the  

road, therefore, they will meet the requirement of definition of motor  

vehicle  under  Section  2(28)  of  the Act.   The  word `only’  used in  

Section 2(28) of the Act clearly shows that the exemption is confined  

only to those kinds of vehicles which are exclusively being used in a  

factory  or  in  any  closed  premises.   Thus,  a  vehicle  which  is  not  

adapted for use upon the road, is only to be excluded.   

29. However,  Shri  S.C.  Maheshwari,  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing for the applicant could not satisfactorily reply as under what  

circumstances, if the tractor which is exclusively used for agricultural  

purpose,  does  require  registration  and  insurance  and   driver  also  

require a driving license, why the same provisions would not apply in  

case of `Jugaad’.  

30. ‘Jugaad’  does  not  require  the  permit,  insurance  or  a  driving  

licence for its driver. There is no specification for its body. It does not  

require  fitness  certificate.  However,  passenger  vehicle  has  a  upper  

limit  of  number  of  passengers  it  can  carry.  The same remains  the  

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position  for  the  goods  vehicle  as  there  is  a  specification  for  the  

maximum load it  can carry.  The ‘Jugaad’  is  not  liable  to  pay any  

passenger or road tax like other vehicles.  

31. In view of the above, as the `Jugaad’ is covered in the definition  

of  the  motor  vehicle  under  Section  2(28)  of  the  Act,  the  

statutory authorities cannot escape from their duty to enforce  

the  law  and  restrain  the  plying  of  `Jugaad’.   The  statutory  

authorities  must  ensure that  `Jugaad’  can be  plied  only after  

meeting the requirements of the Act.  The same has become a  

menace to public safety as they are causing a very large number  

of accidents.  ‘Jugaads’ are not insured and the owners of the  

`Jugaad’  generally  do not  have  the  financial  capacity  to  pay  

compensation  to  persons  who  suffer  disablement  and  to  

dependents  of  those,  who  lose  life.  Thus,  considering  the  

gravity of the circumstances, the statutory authorities must give  

strict adherence to the circular referred to hereinabove by the  

Central Government.   

32. However, we clarify that it is open to the statutory authorities to  

make exemptions by issuing a notification/circular specifically if such  

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a  vehicle  is  exclusively  used for  agricultural  purposes  but  for  that  

sufficient specifications have to be provided so that it cannot be used  

for commercial purposes.  

The matter is closed now.  

………………………………..................................J.                          (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

………………………………...................................J. (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)

NEW DELHI, May 10, 2013.

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